Project Submission Games in Participatory Budgeting

Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Grzegorz Pierczyński

Keywords: Participatory Budgeting, Strategic Nomination, Equilibria

Abstract: We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer submits a subset of project proposals, aiming at maximizing the total cost of those that get funded. We focus on finding conditions under which pure Nash equilibria exist in our games, and on the complexity of checking whether they exist. We also seek algorithms for computing best responses for the proposers. Finally, we check the existence of equilibria, as well as their properties, in real-life data.

Area: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms (GTEP)

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Submission Number: 649