Knowledge of Self and Other Within a Broader Commonsense Setting

Darsana P. Josyula, Matthew D. Goldberg, Anthony Herron, Christopher Maxey, Paul Zaidins, Timothy Clausner, Justin Brody, Don Perlis

Abstract: We examine some formal-reasoning aspects of Theory of Mind (ToM) from the perspective of an agent teaming with others, in a broad (active logic) setting that includes a commonsense-reasoning context. Our emphasis is on how to represent time-evolving inferences by an agent about what it and other agents do or don’t know. Specifically, what sorts of knowledge representation and reasoning are needed for an agent in a team to capture ToM in a formal time-evolving commonsense-reasoning setting, especially with regard to introspection, presence of direct contradictions, inference about another’s knowledge or lack (e.g., on their asking a question, and on being told an answer), and quotation mechanisms for representing beliefs about beliefs.