Posterior Probability-Based Label Recovery Attack in Federated Learning

22 Sept 2023 (modified: 11 Feb 2024)Submitted to ICLR 2024EveryoneRevisionsBibTeX
Primary Area: societal considerations including fairness, safety, privacy
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Keywords: Federated Learning, Label Leakage, Probability Estimation
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Abstract: Recent works have proposed analytical attacks that can recover batch labels from gradients of a classification model in Federated Learning. However, these studies do not explain the essence of label leakage or show the scalability of other classification variants. In this paper, we demonstrate the root cause of label leakage from gradients and propose a generalized label recovery attack by estimating the posterior probabilities. Beginning with the focal loss function, we derive the relationship among the gradients, labels and posterior probabilities in a concise form. Then, we explain the essential reasons for such findings from the perspective of the exponential family. Furthermore, we empirically observe that positive (negative) samples of a class have approximate probability distributions. This key insight enables us to estimate the posterior probabilities of the target batch from an auxiliary dataset. Integrating the above elements, we finally present our label attack that can directly recover the batch labels of each class in realistic FL settings. Evaluation results show that on an untrained model, our attack can achieve over 96\% Class-level label Accuracy (ClsAcc) and 95\% Instance-level label Accuracy (InsAcc) on different groups of datasets, models and activations. For a training model, our approach reaches more than 90\% InsAcc on different batch sizes, class imbalance ratios, temperature parameters or label smoothing factors.
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Submission Number: 4626
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