AoI-aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing using Stackelberg Game

Mingjun Xiao, Yin Xu, Jinrui Zhou, Jie Wu, Sheng Zhang, Jun Zheng

Abstract: Mobile CrowdSensing (MCS) is a mobile computing paradigm, through which a platform can coordinate a crowd of workers to accomplish large-scale data collection tasks using their mobile devices. Information freshness has attracted much focus on MCS research worldwide. In this paper, we investigate the incentive mechanism design in MCS systems that take the freshness of collected data and social benefits into concerns. First, we introduce the Age of Information (AoI) metric to measure the freshness of data. Then, we model the incentive mechanism design with AoI guarantees as a novel incomplete information two-stage Stackelberg game with multiple constraints. Next, we derive the optimal strategies of this game so as to determine the optimal reward paid by the platform and the optimal data update frequency for each worker. Moreover, we prove that these optimal strategies form a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Based on the optimal strategies, we propose an AoI-Aware Incentive (AIAI) mechanism for the MCS system, whereby the platform and all workers can maximize their utilities simultaneously. Meanwhile, the system can ensure that the AoI values of all data uploaded to the platform are not larger than a given threshold to achieve high data freshness. Extensive simulations on real-world traces are conducted to demonstrate the significant performance of AIAI.