Adversarial Robustness with Semi-Infinite Constrained Learning

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Abstract

Despite strong performance in numerous applications, the fragility of deep learning to input perturbations has raised serious questions about its use in safety-critical domains. While adversarial training can mitigate this issue in practice, state-of-the-art methods are increasingly application-dependent, heuristic in nature, and suffer from fundamental trade-offs between nominal performance and robustness. Moreover, the problem of finding worst-case perturbations is non-convex and underparameterized, both of which engender a non-favorable optimization landscape. Thus, there is a gap between the theory and practice of robust learning, particularly with respect to *when* and *why* adversarial training works. In this paper, we take a constrained learning approach to address these questions and to provide a theoretical foundation for robust learning. In particular, we leverage semi-infinite optimization and non-convex duality theory to show that adversarial training is equivalent to a statistical problem over perturbation distributions. Notably, we show that a myriad of previous robust training techniques can be recovered for particular, sub-optimal choices of these distributions. Using these insights, we then propose a hybrid Langevin Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach for which several common algorithms (e.g., PGD) are special cases. Finally, we show that our approach can mitigate the trade-off between nominal and robust performance, yielding state-of-the-art results on MNIST and CIFAR-10. Our code is available at: https://github.com/arobey1/advbench.

1 Introduction

Learning is at the core of many modern information systems, with wide-ranging applications in clinical research [1–4], smart grids [5–7], and robotics [8–10]. However, it has become clear that learning-based solutions suffer from a critical lack of robustness [11–17], leading to models that are vulnerable to malicious tampering and unsafe behavior [18–22]. While robustness has been studied in statistics for decades [23–25], this issue has been exacerbated by the opacity, scale, and non-convexity of modern learning models, such as convolutional neural network (CNNs). Indeed, the pernicious nature of these vulnerabilities has led to a rapidly-growing interest in improving the so-called *adversarial robustness* of modern ML models. To this end, a great deal of empirical evidence has shown *adversarial training* to be the most effective way to obtain robust classifiers, wherein models are trained on perturbed samples rather than directly on clean data [26–31]. While this approach is now ubiquitous in practice, adversarial training faces two fundamental challenges.

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35th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2021), Sydney, Australia.

Firstly, it is well-known that obtaining *worst-case*, adversarial perturbations of data is challenging in the context of deep neural networks (DNNs) [32, 33]. While gradient-based methods have been shown to be empirically effective at finding perturbations that lead to misclassification, there are no guarantees that these perturbations are truly worst-case due to the non-convexity of most commonly-used ML function classes [34]. Moreover, whereas optimizing the parameters of a DNNs is typically an overparameterized problem, finding worst-case perturbations is severely underparametrized and therefore does not enjoy the benign optimization landscape of standard training [35–39]. For this reason, state-of-the-art adversarial attacks increasingly rely on heuristics such as random initializations, multiple restarts, pruning, and other *ad hoc* training procedures [40–49].

The second challenge faced by adversarial training is that it engenders a fundamental trade-off between robustness and nominal performance [50–52]. In practice, penalty-based methods that incorporate clean data into the training objective are often used to overcome this issue [53–56]. However, while empirically successful, these methods cannot typically guarantee nominal or adversarial performance outside of the training samples. Indeed, classical learning theory [57, 58] provides generalization bounds only for the aggregated objective and not each individual penalty term. Additionally, the choice of the penalty parameter is not straightforward and depends on the underlying learning task, making it difficult to transfer across applications and highly dependent on domain expert knowledge.

Contributions. To summarize, there is a significant gap between the theory and practice of robust learning, particularly with respect to *when* and *why* adversarial training works. In this paper, we study the algorithmic foundations of robust learning toward understanding the fundamental limits of adversarial training. To do so, we leverage semi-infinite constrained learning theory, providing a theoretical foundation for gradient-based attacks and mitigating the issue of nominal performance degradation. In particular, our contributions are as follows:

- We show that adversarial training is equivalent to a stochastic optimization problem over a specific, *non-atomic* distribution, which we characterize using recent non-convex duality results [59, 60]. Further, we show that a myriad of previous adversarial attacks reduce to particular, sub-optimal choices of this distribution.
- We propose an algorithm to solve this problem based on stochastic optimization and Markov chain Monte Carlo. Gradient-based methods can be seen as limiting cases of this procedure.
- We show that our algorithm outperforms state-of-the-art baselines on MNIST and CIFAR-10. In particular, our approach yields a ResNet-18 classifiers which simultaneously achieve greater than 50% adversarial accuracy and greater than 85% clean accuracy on CIFAR-10, which represents a significant improvement over the previous state-of-the-art.
- We provide generalization guarantees for the empirical version of this algorithm, showing how to effectively limit the nominal performance degradation of robust classifiers.

2 Problem formulation

Throughout this paper, we consider a standard classification setting in which the data is distributed according to an unknown joint distribution $\mathcal{D}$ over instance-label pairs $(\mathbf{x}, y)$. In this setting, the instances $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}$ are assumed to be supported on a compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^d$, and each label $y \in \mathcal{Y} := \{1, \ldots, K\}$ denotes the class of a given instance $\mathbf{x}$. By $(\Omega, \mathcal{B})$ we denote the underlying measurable space for this setting, where $\Omega = \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ denotes its Borel σ-algebra. Furthermore, we assume that the joint distribution $\mathcal{D}$ admits a density $\mathfrak{p}(\mathbf{x}, y)$ defined over the sets of $\mathcal{B}$.

At a high level, our goal is to learn a classifier which can correctly predict the label y of a corresponding instance $\mathbf{x}$. To this end, we let $\mathcal{H}$ be a hypothesis class containing functions $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} : \mathbb{R}^d \to \mathcal{S}^K$ parameterized by vectors $\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta \subset \mathbb{R}^p$, where we assume that the parameter space Θ is compact and by $\mathcal{S}^K$ we denote the $(K-1)$-simplex. We also assume that $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})$ is differentiable with respect to $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ and $\mathbf{x}$.[1] To make a prediction $\hat{y} \in \mathcal{Y}$, we assume that the simplex $\mathcal{S}^K$ is mapped to the set of classes $\mathcal{Y}$ via $\hat{y} \in \operatorname{argmax}_{k \in \mathcal{Y}} [f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})]_k$ with ties broken arbitrarily. In this way, we can think of the k-th output of the classifier as representing the probability that $y = k$. Given this notation, the statistical problem of learning a classifier that accurately predicts the label y of a given instance $\mathbf{x}$

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[1]Note that the classes of support vector machines, logistic classifiers, and convolutional neural networks (CNNs) with softmax outputs can all be described by this formalism.

drawn randomly from $\mathcal{D}$ can be formulated as follows:

$$\underset{\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta}{\text{minimize}}\, \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y)\sim\mathcal{D}} \left[\ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y\big) \right]. \tag{P-NOM}$$

Here ℓ is a $[0, B]$-valued loss function and $\ell(\cdot, y)$ is M-Lipschitz continuous for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. We assume that $(\mathbf{x}, y) \mapsto \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y\big)$ is integrable so that the objective in (P-NOM) is well-defined; we further assume that this map is an element of the Lebgesgue space $L^p(\Omega, \mathcal{B}, \mathfrak{p})$ for some fixed $p \in (1, \infty)$.

Formulating the robust training objective. For common choices of the hypothesis class $\mathcal{H}$, including DNNs, classifiers obtained by solving (P-NOM) are known to be sensitive to small, norm-bounded input perturbations [61]. In other words, it is often straightforward to find a relatively small perturbations $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ such that the classifier correctly predicts the label y of $\mathbf{x}$, but misclassifies the perturbed sample $\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}$. This has led to increased interest in the robust analog of (P-NOM), namely,

$$P_{\text{R}}^{\star} \triangleq \underset{\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta}{\text{minimize}}\, \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y)\sim\mathcal{D}} \left[\max_{\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \Delta}\, \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y\big) \right]. \tag{P-RO}$$

In this optimization program, the set $\Delta \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ denotes the set of valid perturbations[2]. Typically, Δ is chosen to be a ball with respect to a given metric on Euclidean space, i.e., $\Delta = \{\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \mathbb{R}^d : \|\boldsymbol{\delta}\| \leq \epsilon\}$. However, in this paper we make no particular assumption on the specific form of Δ. In particular, our results apply to arbitrary perturbation sets, such as those used in [62–66].

The most common and empirically effective strategy for evaluating the robust loss is to leverage the differentiability of typical ML models (e.g., CNNs) with respect to their inputs. More specifically, by computing gradients of such models, one can approximate the value of ℓ_{adv} using projected gradient ascent. For instance, in [27, 67] an adversarial perturbation $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ is computed for a fixed parameter $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ and data point $(\mathbf{x}, y)$ by repeatedly applying the update

$$\boldsymbol{\delta} \leftarrow \textstyle\prod_{\Delta} \left[\boldsymbol{\delta} + \eta\, \text{sign}\left[\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\delta}}\, \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y\big) \right] \right], \tag{1}$$

where $\prod_{\Delta}$ denotes the projection onto Δ and $\eta > 0$ is a fixed step size. This idea is at the heart of adversarial training, in which (1) is iteratively applied to approximately evaluate the robust risk in the objective of (P-RO); the parameters $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ can then be optimized with respect to this robust risk.

Common pitfalls for adversarial training. Their empirical success notwithstanding, gradient-based approaches to adversarial training are not without drawbacks. One pitfall is the fact that gradient-based algorithms are not guaranteed to provide optimal (or even near-optimal) perturbations, since $\mathbf{x} \mapsto \ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y)$ is typically not a concave function. To this end, notice that maximizing over $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ in (P-RO) is generally an underparametrized problem as opposed to the minimization over $\boldsymbol{\theta}$, and therefore does not enjoy the same benign optimization landscape [35–39]. Because of this, heuristics [68, 69] are often needed to improve the solutions obtained from (1). Furthermore, a second fundamental issue faced by the robust formulation (P-RO) is that it often degrades the performance of the model on clean data [52, 70, 71]. Penalty-based approaches are often used to overcome this issues [53], and indeed this technique has been used to obtain state-of-the-art performance on several benchmarks [72]. These results, however, are not guaranteed to generalize outside of the training sample. Indeed, classical learning theory guarantees generalization in terms of the aggregated objective and not in terms of the robustness requirements it may describe [57, 58, 60].

In the remainder of this paper, we address these generalization issues by leveraging semi-infinite constrained learning theory. To do so, we explicitly formulate the problem of finding the most robust classifier among those that have good nominal performance. Next, we show that (P-RO) is equivalent to a stochastic optimization problem that can be related to numerous adversarial training methods. We then leverage provide generalization guarantees for the constrained robust learning problem when solve using empirical (*unconstrained*) risk minimization (Section 4). Finally, we derive an algorithm based on a Langevin MCMC sampler of which (1) is a particular case (Section 5).

3 Dual robust learning

While empirically successful, in the previous section we argued that adversarial training is not without its shortcomings. To this end, in this section, we develop the theoretical foundations needed to tackle

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[2]Note that $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}$ must now be defined on $\mathcal{X} \oplus \Delta$, where $\oplus$ denotes the Minkowski (set) sum. In a slight abuse of notation, we will refer to this set as $\mathcal{X}$ from now on.

the two challenges of (P-RO): (1) Finding worst-case perturbations, i.e., evaluating the robust loss defined in ℓ_{adv}; and (2) Mitigating the trade-off between robustness and nominal performance. To address these challenges, we first propose a constrained optimization problem, which explicitly captures the trade-off between robustness and nominal performance. In particular, we seek solutions to the following *constrained* optimization problem:

$$P^\star \triangleq \underset{\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta}{\text{minimize}} \quad \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[\max_{\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \Delta} \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y\big) \right] \tag{P-CON}$$
$$\text{subject to} \quad \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[\ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y\big) \right] \leq \rho$$

where $\rho \geq 0$ is a desired nominal performance level. At a high level, (P-CON) seeks the most robust classifier $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\cdot)$ among those classifiers that have strong nominal performance. In this way, (P-CON) is directly designed to address the trade-off between robustness and accuracy. Thus, (P-CON) will be the central object of study in this paper. At face value, the statistical constraint in (P-CON) is challenging to enforce in practice, especially given the well-known difficult in solving the unconstrained analog, e.g., (P-RO), in practice. To this end, our approach in this work is to use duality to obtain solutions for (P-CON) that generalize with respect to both adversarial and nominal performance (see Section 4).

Computing worst-case perturbations. Before tackling the constrained problem (P-CON), we begin by consider its unconstrained version, namely, (P-RO). We start by writing (P-RO) using an epigraph formulation of the maximum function to obtain the following semi-infinite program:

$$P_{\text{R}}^\star = \underset{\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta,\, t \in L^p}{\text{minimize}} \quad \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[t(\mathbf{x}, y) \right] \tag{PI}$$
$$\text{subject to} \quad \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y\big) \leq t(\mathbf{x}, y), \quad \text{for all } (\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\delta}, y) \in \mathcal{X} \times \Delta \times \mathcal{Y}.$$

Note that (PI) is indeed equivalent to (P-RO) given that

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \Delta} \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y\big) \leq t(\mathbf{x}, y) \iff \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y\big) \leq t(\mathbf{x}, y) \text{ for all } \boldsymbol{\delta} \in \Delta. \tag{2}$$

While at first it may seem that we have made (P-CON) more challenging to solve by transforming an unconstrained problem into an infinitely-constrained problem, notice that (PI) is no longer a composite minimax problem. Furthermore, it is *linear* in t, indicating that (PI) should be amenable to approaches based on Lagrangian duality. Indeed, the following proposition shows that (PI) can be used to obtain a statistical counterpart of (P-RO).

Proposition 3.1. *If $(\mathbf{x}, y) \mapsto \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y\big) \in L^p$ for $p \in (1, \infty)$, then (P-RO) can be written as*

$$P_{\text{R}}^\star = \min_{\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta} p(\boldsymbol{\theta}), \tag{PII}$$

for the primal function

$$p(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \triangleq \max_{\lambda \in \mathcal{P}^q} \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\delta} \sim \lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}|\mathbf{x},y)} \left[\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y) \right] \right], \tag{3}$$

where $\mathcal{P}^q$, with $\frac{1}{p} + \frac{1}{q} = 1$, is the subspace of L^q containing almost everywhere non-negative functions such that $\mathfrak{p}(\mathbf{x}, y) = 0 \Rightarrow \lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta} \mid \mathbf{x}, y) = 0$ and $\int \lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta} \mid \mathbf{x}, y) d\boldsymbol{\delta} = 1$ for almost every $(\mathbf{x}, y) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$.

The proof is provided in Appendix B. Informally, Proposition 3.1 shows that the robust learning problem in (P-RO) can be recast as a problem of optimizing over a set of probability distributions $\mathcal{P}^q$ taking support over Δ. This establishes an equivalence between the traditional robust learning problem (P-RO), where the maximum is taken over perturbations $\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \Delta$ of the input, and its stochastic version (PII), where the maximum is taken over a conditional distribution over perturbations $\boldsymbol{\delta} \sim \lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}|\mathbf{x}, y)$. Notably, a variety of training formulations can be seen as special cases of PII. In particular, for particular sub-optimal choices of this distribution, paradigms such as random data augmentation and distributionally robust optimization can be recovered (see Appendix A for details).

As we remarked in Section 2, for many modern function classes, the task of evaluating the adversarial loss ℓ_{adv} is a nonconcave optimization problem, which is challenging to solve in general. Thus, Proposition (3.1) can be seen as lifting the nonconcave inner problem $\max_{\delta \in \Delta} \ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y)$ to the equivalent *linear* optimization problem in (3) over probability distributions $\lambda \in \mathcal{P}^q$. This dichotomy parallels the one that arises in PAC vs. agnostic PAC learning. Indeed, while the former seeks a

deterministic map $(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{x}, y) \mapsto \boldsymbol{\delta}$, the latter considers instead a distribution of perturbations over $\boldsymbol{\delta}|\mathbf{x}, y$ parametrized by $\boldsymbol{\theta}$. In fact, since (PII) is obtained from (P-RO) through semi-infinite duality, the density of this distribution is exactly characterized by the dual variables λ.

Note that while (PII) was obtained using Lagrangian duality, it can also be seen as a *linear lifting* of the maximization in ℓ_{adv}. From this perspective, while recovering ℓ_{adv} would require λ to be atomic, Proposition 3.1 shows that this is in fact not necessary as long as $\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y)$ is an element of L^p. That is, because $\mathcal{P}^q$ does not contain any Dirac distributions, the optimal distribution $\lambda^\star$ for the maximization problem in (3) is *non-atomic*. We remark that for conciseness, Proposition 3.1 does not account for $p \in \{1, \infty\}$. Nevertheless, neither of the dual spaces L^{1^*} or L^{∞^*} contain Dirac distributions, meaning that for $p \in \{1, \infty\}$, $\lambda^\star$ would remain non-atomic.

Exact solutions for the outer maximization in Problem (PII). While (PII) provides a new constrained formulation for (P-RO), the objectives of both (PII) and (P-RO) still involve the solution of a non-trivial inner maximization. However, whereas the maximization problem in (P-RO) is a finite-dimensional problem which is nonconcave for most modern function classes, the maximization in (PII) is a linear, variational problem regardless of the function class. We can therefore leverage variational duality theory to obtain a full characterization of the optimal distribution $\lambda^\star$ when $p = 2$.

Proposition 3.2 (Optimal distribution for (PII)). *Let $p = 2$ (and $q = 2$) in Proposition 3.1, and let $[z]_+ = \max(0, z)$. For each $(\mathbf{x}, y) \in \Omega$, there exists constants $\gamma(\mathbf{x}, y) > 0$ and $\mu(\mathbf{x}, y) \in \mathbb{R}$ s.t.*

$$\lambda^\star(\boldsymbol{\delta}|\mathbf{x}, y) = \left[\frac{\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y) - \mu(\mathbf{x}, y)}{\gamma(\mathbf{x}, y)} \right]_+, \tag{4}$$

is a solution of the maximization in (3). In particular, the value of $\mu(\mathbf{x}, y)$ is such that

$$\int_\Delta [\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y) - \mu(\mathbf{x}, y)]_+ \, d\boldsymbol{\delta} = \gamma(\mathbf{x}, y), \textit{for all } (\mathbf{x}, y) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}. \tag{5}$$

The proof is provided in Appendix C. This result says that when $(\mathbf{x}, y) \mapsto \ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y) \in L^2$, we can obtain a closed-form expression for the distribution $\lambda^\star$ that maximizes the objective of (PII). Moreover, this distribution is proportional to a truncated version of the loss of the classifier. Note that the assumption that the loss belongs to L^2 is mild given that the compactness of $\mathcal{X}$, $\mathcal{Y}$, and Δ imply that $L^{p_1} \subset L^{p_2}$ for $p_1 > p_2$. It is, however, fundamental to obtain the closed-form solution in Proposition 3.2 since it allows (3) to be formulated as a strongly convex constrained problem whose primal solution (4) can be recovered from its dual variables (namely, γ and μ). To illustrate this result, we consider two particular *suboptimal* choices for the constants μ and γ.

Special case I: Over-smoothed $\lambda^\star$. To begin, we consider the case when $\gamma(\mathbf{x}, y)$ is taken to be a normalizing constant $\int_\Delta \ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y) d\boldsymbol{\delta}$ be for each $(\mathbf{x}, y) \in \Omega$. As the loss function ℓ is non-negative, (5) implies that $\mu(\mathbf{x}, y) = 0$, and thus the distribution defined in (4) can be written as

$$\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}|\mathbf{x}, y) = \frac{\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y)}{\int_\Delta \ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y) d\boldsymbol{\delta}}, \tag{6}$$

meaning that $\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}|\mathbf{x}, y)$ is exactly proportional to the loss $\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y)$ on a perturbed copy of the data. Thus, for this choice of γ and μ, the distribution λ in (6) is an over-smoothed version of the optimal distribution $\lambda^\star$. In our experiments, we will use this over-smoothed approximation of $\lambda^\star$ to derive an MCMC-style sampler, which yields state-of-the-art performance on standard benchmarks.

Special case II: Under-smoothed $\lambda^\star$. It is also of interest to consider the case in which γ approaches zero. In the proof of Proposition 3.2, we show that the value of μ is fully determined by γ, and that γ is directly related to the smoothness of the optimal distribution; in fact, γ is equivalent to a bound on the L^2 norm of $\lambda^\star$. In this way, as we take γ to zero, we find that μ approaches $\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y)$, meaning that the distribution is truncated so that mass is only placed on those perturbations $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ which induce the high loss. Thus, in the limit, λ approaches a highly under-smoothed atomic distribution concentrated entirely at a perturbation $\delta^\star$ that maximizes the loss, i.e.,

$$\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}|\mathbf{x}, y) = \begin{cases} 1 & \boldsymbol{\delta}^\star \in \text{argmax}_{\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \Delta} \ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \tag{7}$$

Interestingly, this is the same distribution that would be needed to recover the solution to the inner maximization as in (P-RO). This highlights the fact that although recovering the optimal $\delta^\star$ in (P-CON) would require $\lambda^\star$ to be atomic, the condition that $\gamma > 0$ means that $\lambda^\star$ will be non-atomic.

These two special cases illustrate the fundamental difference between (P-RO) and (PII): Whereas in (P-RO) our goal is to search for worst-case perturbations, in (PII) we seek a method that will allow us to sample perturbations $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ from the non-atomic perturbation distribution $\lambda^\star$. Thus, given a method for sampling $\delta \sim \lambda^\star(\boldsymbol{\delta}|\mathbf{x}, y)$, the max in (P-RO) can effectively be replaced by an expectation, allowing us to consider the following optimization problem:

$$P_R^\star = \min_{\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta} \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\delta} \sim \lambda^\star(\boldsymbol{\delta}|\mathbf{x},y)} \left[\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, y)) \right] \right]. \tag{PIII}$$

Notice that crucially this problem is non-composite, in the sense that it no longer contains an inner maximization. To this end, in Section 5, we propose a scheme that can be used to sample from $\lambda^\star$ toward evaluating the inner expectation in (PIII).

4 Solving the constrained learning problem

So far, we have argued that (P-CON) captures the problem of finding the most robust model with high nominal performance, and we have shown the the minimax objective of (P-CON) can be rewritten as a stochastic optimization problem over perturbation distributions. In this section, we address the distinct yet related issue of satisfying the constraint in (P-CON), which is a challenging task in practice given the statistical and potentially non-convex nature of the constraint. Further complicating matters is the fact that by assumption we have access to the data distribution $\mathcal{D}$ only through samples $(\mathbf{x}, y) \sim \mathcal{D}$, which means that in practice we cannot evaluate either of the expectations in (P-CON). To overcome these obstacles, given a dataset $\{(\mathbf{x}_n, y_n)\}_{n=1}^N$ sampled i.i.d. from $\mathcal{D}$, our approach is to use duality to approximate (P-CON) by the following empirical, unconstrained saddle point problem

$$\hat{D}^\star = \max_{\nu \geq 0} \min_{\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^n \left[\max_{\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \Delta} \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_n + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y_n\big) + \nu \left[\ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_n), y_n\big) - \rho \right] \right]. \tag{$\widehat{\text{DI}}$}$$

Thus, our goal will be to show that solutions of ($\widehat{\text{DI}}$) are (probably approximately) near-optimal *and* near-feasible for (P-CON). As one would expect, this is only possible if the objective and constraint of (P-CON) are learnable individually. As we discussed in Section 2, this is known to hold in a variety of scenarios (e.g., when the Rademacher complexity or VC-dimension are bounded), although obtaining more general results remains an area of active research [73–77]. To this end, we next formally describe the learning theoretic assumptions we require on the objective and constraint.

Learning theoretic assumptions for (P-CON). To begin, we assume that the parameterization space Θ is sufficiently rich, in the sense that a convex combination of any two classifiers $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}_1}$ and $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}_2}$ can be well-approximated by another classifier $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}$ up to a small, fixed confidence level $\alpha > 0$. This is explicitly stated in the following assumption:

Assumption 4.1. *The parametrization $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}$ is rich enough so that for each $\boldsymbol{\theta}_1, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2 \in \Theta$ and $\beta \in [0, 1]$, there exists $\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta$ such that $\sup_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} |\beta f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}_1}(\boldsymbol{x}) + (1 - \beta) f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}_2}(\boldsymbol{x}) - f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x})| \leq \alpha$.*

Assumption 4.2. *There exists $\boldsymbol{\theta}' \in \Theta$ such that $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} \left[\ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}'}(\mathbf{x}), y\big) \right] < \rho - M\alpha$.*

Assumption 4.3. *There exists $\zeta_R(N), \zeta_N(N) \geq 0$ monotonically decreasing in N such that $\forall \boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta$:*

$$\left| \mathbb{E}_{(\boldsymbol{x},y) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[\max_{\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \Delta} \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y\big) \right] - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \max_{\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \Delta} \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}_n + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y_n\big) \right| \leq \zeta_R(N) \text{ w.p. } 1 - \delta \tag{8a}$$

$$\left| \mathbb{E}_{(\boldsymbol{x},y) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y) \right] - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_n), y_n) \right| \leq \zeta_N(N) \text{ w.p. } 1 - \delta \tag{8b}$$

One natural question to ask is whether the bounds in (8a) and (8b) will hold in practice. To this end, we note that there is overwhelming evidence that the non-adversarial uniform convergence property (8b) [78]. And although these classical results do not imply that the robust uniform convergence property of (8a) will hold, there is a growing body of evidence which suggests that this property does in fact hold in practice for the function class of deep neural networks [74, 79, 80].

Algorithm 1 Semi-Infinite Dual Adversarial Learning (DALE)

Initialize $\boldsymbol{\theta} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{\theta}_0$ and $\nu \leftarrow 0$

1: **repeat**
2:     **for** Batch $\{(\mathbf{x}_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^m$ **do**
3:         $\boldsymbol{\delta}_i \leftarrow \mathbf{0}$, for $i = 1, \ldots, m$
4:         **for** L steps **do**
5:             $U_i \leftarrow \log\left[\ell_{\text{pert}}\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_i + \boldsymbol{\delta}_i), y_i\big)\right]$, for $i = 1, \ldots, m$
6:             $\boldsymbol{\delta}_i \leftarrow \prod_{\Delta}\left[\boldsymbol{\delta}_i + \eta\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\delta}_i} U_i + \sqrt{2\eta T}\boldsymbol{\xi}_i\right]$, where $\boldsymbol{\xi}_i \sim \text{Laplace}(0, I)$ and $i = 1, \ldots, m$
7:         **end for**
8:         $\boldsymbol{\theta} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{\theta} - \dfrac{\eta_p}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}\left[\ell_{\text{ro}}\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_i + \boldsymbol{\delta}_i), y_i\big) + \nu\ell_{\text{nom}}\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_i), y_i\big)\right]$
9:     **end for**
10:    $\nu \leftarrow \left[\nu + \eta_d\left(\dfrac{1}{N}\sum_{n=1}^{N} \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_n), y_n\big) - \rho\right)\right]_+$
11: **until** convergence

Near-optimality and near-feasibility of ($\widehat{\text{DI}}$). Under these assumptions, we can explicitly bound the empirical duality gap (with high probability) and characterize the feasibility of the empircal dual optimal solution for (P-CON).

Proposition 4.4 (The empirical dual of (P-CON)). *Let $\ell(\cdot, y)$ be a convex function for all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. Under Assumptions 4.1–4.3, it holds with probability $1 - 5\delta$ that*

1. *$\left|P^\star - \hat{D}^\star\right| \leq M\alpha + (1 + \overline{\nu})\max(\zeta_R(N), \zeta_N(N))$; and*

2. *There exists $\boldsymbol{\theta}^\dagger \in \arg\min_{\boldsymbol{\theta}\in\Theta} \hat{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \hat{\nu}^\star)$ such that $\mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y)\sim\mathcal{D}}\left[\ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}^\dagger}(\mathbf{x}), y\big)\right] \leq \rho + \zeta_N(N)$.*

Here, $\hat{\nu}^\star$ denotes a solution of ($\widehat{\text{DI}}$), $\nu^\star$ denotes an optimal dual variable of (P-CON) solved over $\overline{\mathcal{H}} = \text{conv}(\mathcal{H})$ instead of $\mathcal{H}$, and $\overline{\nu} = \max(\hat{\nu}^\star, \nu^\star)$. Additionally, for any interpolating classifier $\boldsymbol{\theta}'$, i.e. such that $\mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y)\sim\mathcal{D}}\left[\ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}'}(\mathbf{x}), y\big)\right] = 0$, it holds that

$$\nu^\star \leq \rho^{-1}\,\mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x},y)\sim\mathcal{D}}\left[\max_{\boldsymbol{\delta}\in\Delta} \ell\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}'}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y\big)\right]. \tag{9}$$

The proof is provided in Appendix D. At a high level, Proposition 4.4 tells us that it is possible to learn robust models with high clean accuracy using the empirical dual problem in ($\widehat{\text{DI}}$) at essentially no cost in the sample complexity. This means that seeking a robust classifier with a given nominal performance is (probably approximately) equivalent to seeking a classifier that minimizes a combination of the nominal and adversarial empirical loss. Notably, the majority of past approaches for solving (P-CON) cannot be endowed with similar guarantees in the spirit of Proposition 4.4. Indeed, while the objective resembles a penalty-based formulation, notice that ν is an *optimization variable* rather than a fixed hyperparameter. Concretely, the magnitude of this dual variable ν quantifies the extent to which the sample complexity depends on how hard it is to learn an adversarially robust model while maintaining strong nominal performance. Though seemingly innocuous, this caveat is the difference between guaranteeing generalization only on the aggregated loss and guaranteeing generalization for the objective value and feasibility in the constraint.

5 Dual robust learning algorithm

So far, under the mild assumption that $(\mathbf{x}, y) \mapsto \ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}), y) \in L^2$, Propositions 3.1, 3.2, and 4.4 allow us to transform (P-CON) into the following **D**ual **A**dversarial **LE**arning problem

$$\hat{D}^\star \triangleq \max_{\nu\geq 0} \min_{\boldsymbol{\theta}\in\Theta} \frac{1}{N}\sum_{n=1}^{n}\left[\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\delta}_n}\left[\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_n + \boldsymbol{\delta}_n), y_n)\right] + \nu\left[\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_n), y_n) - \rho\right]\right] \tag{P-DALE}$$

where $\boldsymbol{\delta}_n \sim \gamma^{-1}\left[\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_n + \boldsymbol{\delta}_n), y_n) - \mu\right]_+$ for each $n \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$, and where $\gamma > 0$ and μ are the constants specified in Proposition 3.2. Note that this formulation is considerably more

Figure 1: **Visualizing the distribution of adversarial perturbations.** In this figure, we visualize the distribution of adversarial perturbations by projecting the perturbations generated by PGD, FGSM, and DALE onto their first two principal components. The first and second principal components are shown on the x- and y-axes respectively. Notice that DALE varies much less along the second principal component vis-a-vis PGD and FGSM; this indicates that DALE tends to focus more on directions in which the data varies most, indicating that it finds stronger adversarial perturbations.

amenable than (P-CON). Indeed, it is (i) empirical and therefore does not involve unknown statistical quantities such as $\mathcal{D}$; (ii) unconstrained and therefore more amendable to gradient-based optimization techniques; and (iii) its objective does not involve a challenging maximization problem in view of the closed-form characterization of $\lambda^\star$ in Proposition 3.2. In fact, for models that are linear in $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ but nonlinear in the input (e.g., kernel models or logistic regression), this implies that we can transform the non-convex, composite optimization problem (P-CON) into a convex problem in (P-DALE).

Nevertheless, for many modern ML models such as CNNs, (P-DALE) remains a non-convex program in $\boldsymbol{\theta}$. And while there is overwhelming theoretical and empirical evidence that stochastic gradient-based algorithms yield good local minimizers for such overparametrized problems [35–39], the fact remains that solving (P-DALE) requires us to evaluate an expectation with respect to $\lambda^\star$, which is challenging due to the fact that μ and γ are not known a priori. To this end, in the ensuing section, we propose a practical algorithm for solving (P-DALE) based on MCMC and stochastic optimization.

Sampling from the optimal distribution $\lambda^\star$. Although Proposition 3.2 provides a characterization of the optimal distribution $\lambda^\star$, obtaining samples from $\lambda^\star$ can still be challenging in practice, especially when the dimension of $\boldsymbol{\delta}_n$ is large (e.g., for image-classification tasks). Moreover, in practice the value of γ for which (4) is a solution of (3) is not known *a priori* and can be arbitrarily close to zero, in which case the support of $\lambda^\star$ vanishes, and the distribution $\lambda^\star$ can become discontinuous. Fortunately, these issues can be addressed by using Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) methods, which leverage the geometry of the distribution to overcome the curse of dimensionality.

In particular, we propose a projected Langevin Monte Carlo (LMC) sampler [81]. To derive this sampler, we first make a simplifying assumption: Rather than seeking the optimal constants γ and μ, we consider the over-smoothed approximation of $\lambda^\star$ derived in (6), wherein the mass allocated by λ to a particular perturbation $\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \Delta$ is proportional to the loss $\ell(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y)$ when the data is perturbed by $\boldsymbol{\delta}$. We note that while this choice of $\lambda^\star$ may not be optimal, the sampling scheme that we derive under this assumption yields strong numerical performance. Indeed, even if we knew the true values of γ and μ, the resulting distribution for $\mu \neq 0$ would be discontinuous, and sampling from such distributions in high-dimensional settings is a challenge in and of itself (see, e.g., [82]).

Given this approximate characterization of the optimal distribution, the following Langevin iteration can be derived directly from the commonly-used leapfrog simpletic integrator for the Hamiltonian dynamics induced by the distribution λ defined in (6) (see Appendix E for details). This, in turn, yields the following two-step update rule:

$$\boldsymbol{\delta} \leftarrow \Pi_\Delta \left[\boldsymbol{\delta} + \eta \operatorname{sign} \left[\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\delta}} \log \left[\ell_{\text{pert}}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y) \right] + \sqrt{2\eta T} \boldsymbol{\xi} \right] \right] \tag{10}$$

where $\boldsymbol{\xi} \sim \text{Laplace}(\mathbf{0}, \boldsymbol{I})$. In this notation, $T > 0$ and $\eta > 0$ are constants which can be chosen as hyperparameters, and ℓ_{pert} is a loss functions for the perturbation. The resulting algorithm is summa-

Table 1: **Adversarial robustness on MNIST and CIFAR-10.** In this table, we report the test accuracy of our method and various state-of-the-art baselines on MNIST and CIFAR-10. Our results are highlighted in gray. Observe that on both datasets, DALE surpasses the state-of-the-art against the PGD adversaries, while simultaneously maintaining high nominal performance.

Algorithm	ρ	MNIST			CIFAR-10		
		Clean	**FGSM**	**PGD**^{10}	**Clean**	**FGSM**	**PGD**^{20}
ERM	-	99.3	14.3	1.46	94.0	0.01	0.01
FGSM	-	98.3	98.1	13.0	72.6	49.7	40.7
PGD	-	98.1	95.5	93.1	83.8	53.7	48.1
CLP	-	98.0	95.4	92.2	79.8	53.9	48.4
ALP	-	98.1	95.5	92.5	75.9	55.0	48.8
TRADES	-	98.9	96.5	94.0	80.7	55.2	49.6
MART	-	98.9	96.1	93.5	78.9	55.6	49.8
DALE	0.5	99.3	96.6	94.0	86.0	54.4	48.4
DALE	0.8	99.0	96.9	94.3	85.0	55.4	50.1
DALE	1.0	99.1	97.7	94.5	82.1	55.2	51.7

rized in Algorithm 1. Notice that Algorithm 1 accounts for scenarios in which the losses associated with the adversarial performance (ℓ_{ro}), the perturbation (ℓ_{pert}), and the nominal performance (ℓ_{nom}) are different. It can therefore learn from perturbations that are adversarial for a different loss than the one used for training the model $\boldsymbol{\theta}$. This generality allows it to tackle different applications, e.g., by replacing the adversarial error objective in (P-CON) by a measure of model invariance (e.g. ACE in [53]). This feature can also be used to show that existing adversarial training procedures can be seen as approximations of Algorithm 1 (see Appendix A).

6 Experiments

In this section, we include an empirical evaluation of the DALE algorithm. In particular, we consider two standard datasets: MNIST and CIFAR-10. For MNIST, we train four-layer CNNs and set $\Delta = \{\boldsymbol{\delta} : \|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_\infty \leq 0.3\}$; for CIFAR-10, we train ResNet-18 models and set $\Delta = \{\boldsymbol{\delta} : \|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_\infty \leq 8/255\}$. All hyperparameters and performance metrics are chosen with respect to the robust accuracy of a PGD adversary evaluated on a small hold-out validation set. Further details concerning hyperparameters and architectures are provided in Appendix F. We also provide additional experiments in Appendix G.

Evaluating the adversarial robustness of DALE. We begin our empirical evaluation by comparing the adversarial robustness of DALE with numerous state-of-the-art baselines in Table 1. To evaluate the robust performance of these classifiers, we use a 1-step and an L-step PGD adversary to evaluate robust performance; we denote these adversaries by FGSM and PGD^L respectively. Notice that on CIFAR-10, DALE with $\rho = 0.8$ is the only method to achieve higher than 85% clean accuracy and 50% adversarial accuracy against PGD^{20}. Furthermore, when DALE is run with $\rho = 1.1$, we see that our method achieves nearly 52% adversarial accuracy, which is a significant improvement over all baselines. To further illustrate the trade-off induced by the parameter ρ, in Appendix G we provide a more complete over ρ for ResNet-18 and ResNet-50.

Visualizing the distribution of adversarial perturbations. To visualize the distribution over perturbations generated by DALE, we use principal component analysis (PCA) to embed perturbations into a two-dimensional space. In particular, we performed PCA on the MNIST training set to extract the first two principal components of the images; we then projected the perturbations $\boldsymbol{\delta} \in \Delta$ generated by PGD, FGSM, and DALE in the last iteration of training onto these principal components. A plot of this projection is shown in Figure 1, in which the first and second principal components are shown on the x- and y-axes respectively. Notice that the perturbations generated by FGSM are spread out somewhat unevenly in this space. In contrast, the perturbations found by PGD and DALE are spread out more evenly. Furthermore, the perturbations generated by PGD and FGSM vary more along the second principal component (y-axis) than the first (x-axis) relative to DALE. Since the first component describes the direction of largest variance of the data, this indicates that DALE tends to

Figure 2: **Tracking the dual variables.** In the leftmost panel, we show the clean and robust test accuracies of a ResNet-18 classifier trained on CIFAR-10 using DALE. In the middle panel, we show the training losses, and in the rightmost panel, we show the magnitude of the dual variable. Note that the dual variable increases until the constraint on the nominal loss is satisfied, at which point the dual variable decreases, which allows the optimization to focus on minimizing the robust loss.

find perturbations that place more mass on the direction in which the data varies most. This implies that DALE finds more challenging perturbations on MNIST.

Tracking the dual variables. In Figure 2 we study the performance of DALE over the course of training. In the leftmost panel, we plot the test accuracy on clean samples and on adversarially perturbed samples. Notably, this classifier exceeds 50% robust accuracy against PGD^{20} as well as 85% clean accuracy; these figures are higher than either of the corresponding metrics for any of the baselines in Table 1, indicating that our method is more effectively able to mitigate the trade-off between robustness and accuracy. In the middle panel of Figure 2, we track the nominal and robust training losses, and in the rightmost panel, we show the magnitude of the dual variable ν. Observe that at the onset of training, the constraint in (P-CON) is not satisfied, as the blue curve is above the red dashed-line. In response, the dual variable places more weight on the nominal loss term in (P-DALE). After several epochs, this reweighting forces constraint satisfaction, after which the dual variable begins to decrease, which in turn decreases the weight on the nominal objective and allows the optimizer to focus on minimizing the robust loss.

Regularization vs. primal-dual. Our final ablation study is to consider the impact of performing the dual-update step in line 10 of Algorithm 1. In particular, in Table 2, we record the performance of DALE when Algorithm 1 is run without the dual update step. This corresponds to running DALE with a fixed weight ν. Notice that although our method reaches the same level of robust performance as MART and TRADES, it does not match the performance of the DALE classifiers in Table 1. This indicates that the strong robust performance of our algorithm relies on adaptively updating the dual variable over the course of training.

Table 2: **Regularized DALE.** We show the test accuracies attained by running DALE without the dual-update step in line 10 of Algorithm 1.

ν	Clean	FGSM	PGD^{20}
0.1	86.4	55.3	49.5
0.2	86.8	54.2	49.3
0.3	86.3	54.8	48.2
0.4	86.2	54.6	47.3
0.5	86.5	54.3	46.8
0.6	85.7	53.3	46.4
0.7	85.8	53.3	46.0
0.8	84.9	53.1	45.9
0.9	85.0	53.4	45.7
1.0	84.5	52.7	45.8

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we studied robust learning from a constrained learning perspective. We proved an equivalence between the standard adversarial training paradigm and a stochastic optimization problem over a specific, non-atomic distribution. This insight provided a new perspective on robust learning and engendered a Langevin MCMC approach for adversarial robustness. We validate experimentally that this algorithm outperforms the state-of-the-art on standard benchmarks. Notably, our method simultaneously achieved greater than 50% adversarial accuracy and greater than 85% clean accuracy on CIFAR-10, which represents a significant improvement over the previous state-of-the-art.

8   Acknowledgements and disclosure of funding

The authors would like to thank Juan Cervino and Samuel Sokota for their helpful feedback.

The research of Alexander Robey and Hamed Hassani is supported by NSF Grants 1837253, 1943064, 1934876, AFOSR Grant FA9550-20-1-0111, and DCIST-CRA.

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