Accelerating Nash Equilibrium Convergence in Monte Carlo Settings Through Counterfactual Value Based Fictitious Play

Qi Ju, Falin Hei, Ting Feng, Dengbing Yi, Zhemei Fang, YunFeng Luo

Keywords: incomplete information game, Counterfactual Regret Minimization, blueprint strategy, fictitious play

Abstract: Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and its variants are widely recognized as effective algorithms for solving extensive-form imperfect information games. Recently, many improvements have been focused on enhancing the convergence speed of the CFR algorithm. However, most of these variants are not applicable under Monte Carlo (MC) conditions, making them unsuitable for training in large-scale games. We introduce a new MC-based algorithm for solving extensive-form imperfect information games, called MCCFVFP (Monte Carlo Counterfactual Value-Based Fictitious Play). MCCFVFP combines CFR’s counterfactual value calculations with fictitious play’s best response strategy, leveraging the strengths of fictitious play to gain significant advantages in games with a high proportion of dominated strategies. Experimental results show that MCCFVFP achieved convergence speeds approximately 20\%$\sim$50\% faster than the most advanced MCCFR variants in games like poker and other test games.

Primary Area: Algorithmic game theory

Submission Number: 10449