DO LLMS UNDERSTAND CODE PREFERENCE? TRAINING CODE PREFERENCE MODELS VIA SYNTHETIC CODE EVOLUTION

Anonymous authors
Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable coding capabilities. However, assessing code generation from verifiable properties and aligning it with developer preferences remains a challenge. In this paper, we explore two key questions under the new challenge of code preference learning: *(i)* How to train models to predict meaningful preferences for code; and *(ii)* how do code preferences based on verifiers, human, and neural models align with each other? To this end, we introduce CODEFAVOR, an open recipe to train pairwise code preference models using synthetic code evolution, including code commits and code critiques. We evaluate code preferences via CODEPREFBENCH, a new benchmark with 1364 rigorously curated code preference tasks to cover three verifiable properties: correctness, efficiency, and security, along with human preference. Our evaluation shows that CODEFAVOR holistically improves model-based code preferences by up to 28.8%. Our comprehensive controlled experiments also validate the design choices in CODEFAVOR. Furthermore, we quantified the cost and limitations of human-based code preference: *(i)* Despite spending 23 person-minutes per task, $15\sim40\%$ of tasks remain unsolved; and *(ii)* human preference is the most accurate on code correctness while underperforming model-based preferences on non-functional objectives.

1 INTRODUCTION

Large Language Models (LLMs) for code (Chen et al., 2021; GitHub, 2023; Amazon Web Services, 2023) have become instrumental in modern software development. Code LLMs assist developers in various scenarios, from suggesting code completions and generating functional code based on user instructions to proposing complex code changes to resolve bug reports and feature requests.

Instruction-tuned LLMs (Luo et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2024) are increasingly adept at generating functional code based on natural language instructions. However, evaluating the quality of LLM-generated code remains challenging, particularly regarding code correctness, efficiency, security, adherence to best practices, and alignment with developer preferences. Effectively and efficiently assessing LLM-generated code against these properties is crucial for both evaluation (Liu et al., 2023b) and preference optimization for code LLMs (Weyssow et al., 2024). Nevertheless, the subject of learning code preferences has been largely under-explored, motivating us to study code preferences systematically and train code preference models with new data and modeling methods.

Following the established format in LLM-as-a-judge (Chiang et al., 2024), we define the code preference task as follows: Given a user query, a pair of two candidate code responses, and optionally a preference criterion, code preference is demonstrated by choosing one response over the other. Specifically, current approaches estimate code preference based on three proxies, each with advantages and limitations:

- **Code execution:** Code preference in another way can be confidently determined by execution statuses (Liu et al., 2023a). However, applying code execution to arbitrary programs poses challenges due to *(i)* setup complexity, *(ii)* code incompleteness, and *(iii)* execution overhead. For instance, code execution may necessitate specific hardware (*e.g.,* GPUs) and precise software versions, which are challenging to deduce from the code and, even if inferred, are too cumbersome to set up and run.
- **Human annotation:** Human-labeled preferences are often seen as the standard oracle in developing LLMs, such as in the RLHF for OpenAI's GPT models (Ouyang et al., 2022) and LLM evaluation

in Chatbot Arena (Chiang et al., 2024). However, applying human labeling to code is particularly challenging and cost-intensive. Programs are inherently abstract and complex, labeling them requires experienced developers to perform detailed analysis and testing. Meanwhile, human preference is inherently subjective, influenced by the annotators' code tastes and expertise, which can cause noisy preferences for code, whose quality could otherwise be concretely defined and measured.

- **LLM-as-a-judge:** Prominent LLMs have also been employed to evaluate LLM responses (Chiang et al., 2024; Zheng et al., 2023; McAleese et al., 2024). This method is more scalable than human labeling and can be generalized to a wider range of programs compared to code execution. However, its reliability often hinges on the reasoning capabilities of high-cost proprietary LLM judges (Weyssow et al., 2024), subject to inherent biases (Zheng et al., 2023).

While scaling human- and execution-based preference for code is human-resource- and engineering-challenging[1], improving model-based code preference becomes emerging and crucial. Furthermore, how exactly human developers and prominent LLMs determine code preference remains obscure, with little research on quantifying their performance across various code criteria. To this end, this work explores two critical questions in code preference learning:

1. **Technical question:** How can we build effective and efficient code preference models regarding modeling approaches and data sources?
2. **Empirical question:** What are the preferences of human annotators and LLMs, and to what extent do they align with verifiable code properties and human judgments?

CODEFAVOR. We propose CODEFAVOR, a novel framework for training code preference models. Specifically, CODEFAVOR employs pairwise modeling to predict preference within a code pair according to a user-specified criterion. We propose two synthetic data generation methods to construct preference ranking samples from code evolution: *(i) Commit-Instruct* transforms the pre- and post-commit code snippets to code preference pairs; and *(ii) Critic-Evol* samples faulty code from a draft LLM and has another critic LLM to improve the broken code. These methods allow us to curate synthetic preference data efficiently, leveraging the natural evolution of code and the capabilities of existing LLMs.

CODEPREFBENCH. To evaluate code preferences labeled by various approaches, we introduce CODEPREFBENCH, a collection of 1,364 carefully curated preference tasks. These tasks target verifiable properties including correctness, efficiency, and security, while additionally considering general developer preferences. Using CODEPREFBENCH, we extensively analyze the effectiveness and cost of code preferences derived from developer agreement, general LLMs, and CODEFAVOR models. Our study demystifies key insights on the pitfalls of different approaches over different coding criteria. Our results also demonstrate that our models not only achieve top performance in effectiveness but also are significantly more cost-efficient compared to existing solutions.

We summarize our main contributions below:

1. **Dimension & Technique:** We propose CODEFAVOR, the *first* open recipe to train pairwise code preference models. At the heart of CODEFAVOR is a pairwise modeling design and two complementary methods for generating synthetic preference pairs from code evolution.
2. **Benchmark & Code:** We present CODEPREFBENCH, a code preference benchmark with 1,364 labeled by three verifiable oracles (correctness, efficiency, security) and general developer preferences from 18 annotators. We release the data and code at `[ANONYMIZED]`.
3. **Study & Results:** Based on CODEPREFBENCH, we comprehensively quantify and conduct case studies on code preferences derived from human developers and LLMs. We show that CODEFAVOR can significantly improve the accuracy of model-based preference by up to 28.8%. CODEFAVOR models can match the preference accuracy of models that are larger by $6 \sim 9\times$, while being cheaper by $34\times$. We also conduct extensive controlled experiments to validate our design choices.

2 LEARNING PREFERENCE VIA CODE EVOLUTION

Figure 1 depicts the framework overview of CODEFAVOR, which trains models to predict code preference, by taking an instruction, a code pair, and a criterion as input.

Additionally, CODEFAVOR proposes two synthetic data generation methods, *Commit-Instruct* and *Critic-Evol*, for extracting synthetic training data from code evolution. *Commit-Instruct*

[1]Such as hiring "PhD-level" annotators and setting up individual code execution environments.



Figure 1: Approach overview of CODEFAVOR. We train a pairwise preference model using synthetic data created from two complementary sources of code evolution: *Commit-Instruct* and *Critic-Evol*.

creates contrasting code pairs through rephrasing and filtering massively available code commits. Complementarily, *Critic-Evol* prompts a large critic LLM to judge and revise code snippets from a smaller draft LLM, pairing the drafted attempt and revision to create synthetic preference data.

2.1 PAIRWISE MODELING

Input. We follow prior work in reward modeling (Zhao et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024b; Dong et al., 2024) and use decoder-based transformers for learning pairwise preferences. Specifically, the model π takes as input a prompt $x = \{i, y_A, y_B, c\}$, comprised of *(i)* an instruction i, *(ii)* a pair of code candidates $\{y_A, y_B\}$, and *(iii)* a fine-grained criterion c defining the desired preference following (Kim et al., 2023). More specifically, our prompt format is shown in Equation (1):

$$\texttt{[Inst.]}\{i\}\texttt{[CODE_A]}\{y_A\}\texttt{[CODE_B]}\{y_B\}\texttt{[Crit.]}\{c\} \tag{1}$$

Output. We explore two output designs for code preference modeling: classification and generation.

1. *Classification:* We train a binary classifier based on a single next-token prediction (Zhao et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024b). Specifically, given the exact prompt format in Equation (1) formatted by a chat template, the classifier outputs either a token "A" if y_A is preferable to y_B for $\{i, c\}$ or "B" otherwise. Notably, the single output token is separated from the prompt by special tokens defined by the chat template. At inference time, the preference decision is determined by the next-token probability between "A" and "B", shown in Equation (2).
2. *Generation:* We also train generative models to provide preferences in natural language and naturalize the prompt format, as demonstrated in Listing 1 (Appendix A.1). The preference decision is parsed from the model-generated feedback using rules detailed in Appendix A.3.

$$y_+ = \begin{cases} y_A & \text{if } \mathbb{P}_\pi(y_A \succ y_B | x) > 0.5 \\ y_B & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} = \begin{cases} y_A & \text{if } \mathbb{P}_\pi(\text{"A"} | x) > \mathbb{P}_\pi(\text{"B"} | x) \\ y_B & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

The advantage of classification modeling is computing efficiency as only one token is produced. Meanwhile, generative modeling optimizes for interpretability, with reasoning steps explicitly displayed.

2.2 SYNTHETIC CODE PREFERENCE FROM CODE EVOLUTION

Training a pairwise preference model requires a rich set of contrastive code pairs, along with the corresponding instructions and evaluation criteria. Collecting complex (Luo et al., 2024) and diverse (Wei et al., 2024) code pairs is crucial yet challenging, given such resources are neither readily available nor curated by prior work. To this end, we propose to create code preference training data using synthetic code evolution, based on code commits (§2.2.1) and code critiques (§2.2.2). We argue that code evolution is a practical source for synthesizing code preferences, not only because of its natural indication of preferences[2], but also thanks to their general availability and diversity. We focus on the general methodology in this section and defer the detailed prompting implementation to Appendix A.1.

[2]Software iterates towards improvement, making post-evolution code oftentimes better than pre-evolution code.

2.2.1 *Commit-Instruct*: CODE COMMITS AS PREFERENCE

We propose *Commit-Instruct*, a synthetic data generation method transforming raw code commits into code preference training samples. Specifically, the workflow (middle of Figure 1) employs a critic LLM to analyze each raw code commit and produce a training sample in a desired format §2.1. Each raw commit can be denoted by $r=(m,y_{pre},y_{post})$, where m is the commit message, and $\{y_{pre},y_{post}\}$ are the pre- and post-commit code snippets. *Commit-Instruct* processes each commit in three steps:

1. **Reasoning:** The critic LLM is instructed to reason and explain code changes from y_{pre} to y_{post}.
2. **Filtering:** Given the explanation, the critic LLM first determines whether or not the code change is meaningful. If so, we proceed to the next step; otherwise, the commit is discarded. This step aims to ensure the quality of synthetic data by excluding trivial or ambiguous code changes.
3. **Rephrasing:** Based on the commit r and its explanation, the critic LLM synthesizes a preference sample in the desired format $x=\{i,y_A,y_B,c\}$ (§2.1). Specifically, y_A and y_B are rephrased from y_{pre} and y_{post} to emphasize the actual change. i is the instruction generated to describe y_{pre} and y_{post} and the criterion c is concluded by how y_{post} improves y_{pre}. The rephrased version of y_{post} is regarded as the chosen response y^+ in model training.

Figure 3 in Appendix A.1 provides the detailed prompt implementation for *Commit-Instruct*.

2.2.2 *Critic-Evol*: CODE CRITIQUES AS PREFERENCE

While synthetic evolution can be gathered from human data such as code commits, it can also be derived from synthetic data. As such, we propose *Critic-Evol* which generates synthetic code preference data by asking a stronger *critic* model π^+ to revise the code generated by a weaker *draft* model π^-.

Specifically, *Critic-Evol* takes a set of coding instructions $\mathcal{I}=\{i_1,i_2,\cdots,i_n\}$ as input, each of which (i_k) is either transformed into a synthetic training sample or simply dropped:

1. **Fault sampling:** This step starts with a suitably weaker model, denoted as π^-, which statistically allows for sampling improvable code solutions $y_k^- \leftarrow \pi^-(i_k)$.
2. **Critique & filtering:** We instruct the critic LLM π^+ to code review y_k^-, by pointing out noticeable code quality issues and defining the criterion (*e.g.,* c) regarding the code defects. π^+ may also be satisfied with y_k^- and thus we stop synthesizing code preference data for (i_k,y_k^-).
3. **Revision:** If the critique from π^+ suggests y_k^- can be significantly improved, π^+ creates y_k^+ by revising y_k^- to meet the desired criterion c. As such, a new synthetic code preference sample is composed as $\{i_k,y_k^-,y_k^+,c\}$, with y_k^+ being the chosen response.

Figure 5 in Appendix A.1 provides more details on implementation of *Critic-Evol*.

2.3 DATASETS

Based on our techniques, we create two synthetic datasets:

***Commit-Instruct*-EditPack** consists of 20,641 code preference samples synthesized from EditPackFT-Multi (Cassano et al., 2023) and Llama3-70B-Instruct (Dubey et al., 2024). After filtering out non-permissive code, we obtain 22,469 blessed Python commits from EditPackFT-Multi as the raw commits to prompt Llama3-70B-Instruct (Dubey et al., 2024) to perform *Commit-Instruct*. 91.9% of the commits are successfully transformed into code preference data (§2.1) and 8.1% of them are filtered out due to lack of clear significance.

***Critic-Evol*-SOSS** has 41,595 synthetic code preference samples using the *Critic-Evol* technique. Specifically, we run Llama3-8B-Instruct as the draft model (*i.e.,* π^-) over 50,661 coding instructions from the Self-OSS-Instruct dataset (BigCode, 2024) to produce initial code solutions. 82.1% of these initial attempts are revised and extended by Llama3-70B-Instruct as the critic model, whereas the rest 17.9% are deemed good enough such that a revision is unnecessary.

Data processing. To mitigate positional bias, we augment the dataset by flipping the order within each code pair, which also doubles the training samples. Besides, we clip the code comments in *Critic-Evol* samples, given that comments barely affect code quality metrics and LLM-generated comments may let faulty code "sound right." §3.4 also shows code comments can negatively impact code preferences.

Objective	# Tasks	Source	Preference Oracle
Code Correctness	660	EvalPlus (Liu et al., 2023b)	Test execution
Code Efficiency	352	EvalPerf (Liu et al., 2024a)	# CPU instructions
Code Security	207	CyberSecEval (Bhatt et al., 2023)	Static analyzer
Developer Preference	145	LBPP (Matton et al., 2024) BigCodeBench-Hard (Zhuo et al., 2024)	Human agreement
Total	1,364		

Table 1: Overview of CODEPREFBENCH.

3 EVALUATION

To systematically evaluate code preferences across different methods, we create the CODEPREFBENCH, a set of 1,364 preference tasks. It covers four objectives in code preference evaluation: correctness, efficiency, security, and human preference. Table 1 provides an overview of CODEPREFBENCH.

This section presents *(i)* the curation process of CODEPREFBENCH (§3.1), *(ii)* the results of human (§3.2) and LLMs (§3.3), and *(iii)* controlled experiments in §3.4. Additional details are deferred to the Appendix, such as case studies (Appendix A.4) and contamination analysis (Appendix A.5).

3.1 BENCHMARK SETUP

In CODEPREFBENCH, we evaluate code preference approaches over four objectives, covering three verifiable properties (*i.e.,* correctness, efficiency, and security) and human preference. For verifiable objectives, we generate oracle labels via code execution and static analysis. For human preference, we engage three annotators to label each code pair to form the evaluation set and establish baselines To ensure benchmark quality, we only use clear-cut *good-bad* pairs and exclude *tie* pairs due to their inherent ambiguity. The creation of the dataset for each evaluation category is detailed below:

Objective #1: Correctness. We construct *correct-wrong* pairs from EvalPlus datasets (Liu et al., 2023b), *i.e.,* HumanEval+ (164 tasks) and MBPP+ (378 tasks), as they rigorously test LLM solutions with extensive test cases that can detect subtle bugs. We derive at most two contrastive code pairs for evaluation from each seed task. In each code pair, the *wrong* code comes from test-falsified LLM solutions while the *correct* is the human-written ground truth. Finally, we obtain 660 *correct-wrong* code pairs. The number is smaller than $2 \times (164 + 378)$ as "wrong" samples do not exist in some easy tasks.

Objective #2: Efficiency. We construct *fast-slow* pairs from EvalPerf datasets (Liu et al., 2024a). EvalPerf exercises the performance of LLM-generated correct solutions using 121 performance-exercising tasks equipped with performance-exercising test inputs. The EvalPerf dataset provides fast-to-slow reference solutions with distinct performance for each task. Therefore, we sample *fast-slow* pairs over the reference samples at a step size of 3, and obtain 352 *fast-slow* pairs.

Objective #3: Security. We construct *secure-vulnerable* code pairs from CyberSecEval (Bhatt et al., 2023), which includes 351 Python vulnerabilities detected by security analyzers. We prompt GPT-4o to fix each vulnerability and rerun the security analyzers to guarantee the fix. Additionally, we equip each code pair with a *generalized* instruction generated by GPT-4o, so the instruction is not biased towards any candidate. Finally, we obtain 207 *secure-vulnerable* code pairs to evaluate code security preference.

Objective #4: Human preference. We established a team of 18 developers to annotate pairs of code responses sampled from DeepSeek V2 over the latest open and close domain coding benchmarks, *i.e.,* 148 BigCodeBench-Hard (Zhuo et al., 2024) tasks and 161 LBPP (Matton et al., 2024) tasks. Specifically, we sample 8 solutions per task at a temperature of 0.8 and select the code pair with the largest edit distance. We follow the same annotation criteria as Chatbot Arena (Chiang et al., 2024): given two responses, users select the one they would use for the instruction (or skip it if both are tied). Lastly, we obtained 145 preference pairs without conflicting preferences out of three annotations per pair.

Additionally, we evenly shuffle the order of code pairs within each category to avoid positional bias. We also remove code comments when evaluating tasks with objective verifiers, as comments should not affect the results. At evaluation, LLMs predict each code preference task using greedy decoding, following criteria aligned with the benchmark objective.

3.2 HUMAN RESULTS

This section studies the background and preference accuracy of human annotators, drawing insights on the pros and cons of human-based code preference.

- **Expertise:** Our annotation team consists of 18 software developers, two-thirds of which hold degrees in computer science, and 95% of them have over two years of programming experience. 43% of them self-rate as advanced in Python, while the rest consider themselves middle-level.
- **Confidence:** Table 2 lists the distribution of developer confidence, showing that developers are confident about their annotations overall. In particular, correctness labeling yields higher confidence. Per developers' notes, it is partially because program correctness can be assessed by manual testing, while code efficiency and security are harder to evaluate without domain-specific knowledge and tools.

	Low	High	Very High
Correctness	0%	68.2%	31.8%
Efficiency	0%	88.7%	11.3%
Security	0%	80.8%	19.2%

Table 2: Developer confidence distribution.

- **Overhead:** Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative distribution of the annotation time per sample/developer, visualized by removing the top-1%-longest outliers. Overall, each task on average costs each developer 7.8 minutes to annotate, with the 99-percentile of 26 minutes, indicating that serious developer labeling for code preferences is time-consuming. Furthermore, code efficiency and security tasks (9 minutes on avg.) take longer to annotate compared to labeling correctness tasks (6.8 minutes on avg.), which is consistent with developer confidence and final results.



Figure 2: CDF of preference labeling time.

- **Accuracy:** The first result row in Table 3 presents the human performance based on the majority voting of three developers per task. Consistent with the annotation confidence and speed, human labeling achieves the most accurate measurement of code preferences in the code correctness category, with a solve rate of 84.9%. While not the best, human performance still decently solves 74.9% of preference tasks targeting code efficiency. Surprisingly, while developer confidence in code security annotation is higher than that in code efficiency, the security score is as low as 59.7%. This is because 73.9% of code pairs are annotated as equally secure, while our scoring method assigns 0.5 accuracy to each tied case. This discrepancy indicates that generalist programmers may struggle to accurately assess non-functional code properties such as code security, which may require specialized domain expertise.

3.3 MODEL RESULTS

Table 3 evaluates human, existing LLMs, and CODEFAVOR models via CODEPREFBENCH. By default, CODEFAVOR models are obtained by *(i)* training two models with *Commit-Instruct*-EditPack and *Critic-Evol*-SOSS separately; and *(ii)* average merging the two models to obtain a final model.

Overall results. We present the overall results by looking at the accuracy averaged across the three verifiable objectives, *i.e.,* the"**Avg.**" column. Among the evaluated existing LLMs, Llama-3.1-405B-Instruct and Mistral Large 2 perform the best, tightly followed by Claude 3.5 Sonnet and DeepSeek V2.5. Meanwhile, Codestral, at a parameter size of 22B, demonstrates a decent result, on par with Llama-3-70B-Instruct. We demonstrate the effectiveness of CODEFAVOR by fine-tuning a comprehensive set of affordable models, from 7B to 12B. While these small models are relatively weak out of the box, CODEFAVOR improves their overall performance by $9.3 \sim 28.8\%$ relatively. For instance, CODEFAVOR's generation modeling enables Mistral Nemo Instruct, Gemma-2-9B-Instruct, and Llama-3-8B-Instruct to achieve an overall score of $77.2 \sim 77.7$ respectively, slightly outperforming the critic model (*i.e.,* Llama-3-70B-Instruct), despite being smaller by $6 \sim 9\times$. Meanwhile, we show that CODEFAVOR models are even better than the best 8B general reward model on RewardBench (Lambert et al., 2024), *i.e.,* Skywork-Reward-Llama-3.1-8B-v0.2, by 24% on CODEPREFBENCH, even if the compared reward model is trained on a rich set of data generated by proprietary models such as GPT-4 and Claude-3-Opus. Notably, all CODEFAVOR models even outperform the human-agreement baseline, largely because generalist developers have high uncertainty and thus low performance in the security category. Besides model- and human-based approaches, we also evaluate selecting preferred samples using the mean log probabilities of decoding Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, which overall performs randomly on CODEPREFBENCH.

	Correctness	Efficiency	Security	Avg.	Human Pref.
3-developer agreement	84.9 (±9.4)	74.9 (±5.3)	59.7 (±37.0)	73.2	N/A
Logprob Mean	32.4	38.4	59.9	43.6	42.1
Proprietary Models					
Claude 3.5 Sonnet	65.8 (±0.8)	79.9 (±0.1)	98.1	**81.2**	64.8
Gemini 1.5 Pro 001	59.2 (±3.0)	79.5 (±1.4)	71.3 (±27.3)	70.0	66.6 (±1.7)
Gemini 1.5 Flash 001	58.6 (±7.9)	81.1 (±0.1)	85.0 (±8.2)	74.9	60.0
Open-Weight Models					
Llama-3.1-405B-Instruct	68.9 (±2.7)	78.3 (±0.4)	99.0	**82.2**	68.3
Mistral Large 2 (123B)	65.8 (±0.5)	81.2 (±0.3)	99.5	**82.2**	71.7
DeepSeek V2.5 (236B)	65.8 (±0.8)	80.7	97.3 (±0.2)	**81.3**	69.0
Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct	60.2 (±0.3)	77.3 (±0.3)	97.8 (±0.7)	78.4	69.0
Codestral-22B-v0.1	58.0 (±0.8)	78.3 (±0.1)	94.0 (±2.7)	76.8	60.0
Llama-3-70B-Instruct	55.7 (±2.5)	76.0 (±1.6)	96.6 (±1.0)	76.1	63.8 (±0.3)
Gemma-2-27B-Instruct	55.4 (±4.9)	78.4 (±0.9)	80.8 (±14.8)	71.5	61.4
Skywork-Reward-Llama-3.1-8B	56.2	64.2	61.4	60.6	57.9
Our Models and Baselines					
Mistral Nemo Instruct (12B)	51.4 (±1.2)	69.7 (±0.4)	82.9 (±7.5)	68.0	66.2
+ CODEFAVOR Classification	58.0	76.1	96.6	**76.9**	64.1
+ CODEFAVOR Generation	58.8	77.8	96.6	**77.7**	66.9
Gemma-2-9B-Instruct	52.4 (±6.1)	75.1 (±1.6)	52.7 (±47.3)	60.1	64.1 (±0.7)
+ CODEFAVOR Classification	56.8	75.3	92.3	74.8	67.6
+ CODEFAVOR Generation	57.0	78.7	96.6	**77.4**	64.1
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	49.5 (±0.9)	71.9	90.3 (±0.5)	70.6	58.6
+ CODEFAVOR Classification	58.0	73.0	95.2	75.4	62.8
+ CODEFAVOR Generation	58.2	75.0	98.6	**77.2**	69.0
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	48.5 (±1.5)	66.6 (±0.1)	78.5 (±9.4)	64.5	58.3 (±1.0)
+ CODEFAVOR Classification	62.4	64.8	95.7	**74.3**	60.7
+ CODEFAVOR Generation	57.1	77.3	90.3	**74.9**	66.9

Table 3: Preference accuracy (%) on CODEPREFBENCH. Scores within 1 percentage point of the best score are highlighted in **bold**. Bracketed numbers denote the ranges of uncertain responses ("Tie"), half of which account for the final score. Appendix A.4 presents extensive case studies and analyses.

Correctness. Human annotation largely outperforms all LLMs in choosing the correct code, outperforming the best model by 23%. Among the evaluated LLMs, Llama-3.1-405B-Instruct as an open-weight model solves the most tasks (*i.e.,* 68.9%), outperforming Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mistral Large 2, and DeepSeek V2.5 by 4.7%. Meanwhile, small LLMs ($\leq$ 12B) are incapable of such tasks, producing almost random preferences. CODEFAVOR improves the code correctness preference of these models by $8.8 \sim 28.7\%$, surpassing their critic model (*i.e.,* Llama-3-70B-Instruct) by up to 12%.

Efficiency. While human preference aces over the evaluated LLMs on the preference of code preference, it presents overall sub-optimal preferences regarding code efficiency. For example, Mistral Large 2, the best model in this category, surpasses developer-agreement-based preference by 8.4%. Gemini Flash and DeepSeek V2.5 tightly follow Mistral Large 2 within a 1% gap, also outperforming human preference in the code efficiency category. While smaller LLMs perform more decently compared to their results on code correctness preference, CODEFAVOR still further improves them by up to 16.1%, on par with or slightly surpassing the critic LLMs (by up to 4%).

Security. The code security subset in CODEPREFBENCH is relatively much easier as most models achieve saturated scores. Similar to the low performance of the human baseline, the scores of Gemini 1.5 Pro and Gemma 2 models are surprisingly low, with up to 47.3% of code pairs regarded as equally insecure (*e.g.,* Figure 13), despite the evaluation prompt in Listing 1 asks for an absolute answer. Meanwhile, such behavior can be benign for mitigating potential security risks from deceptive prompts with the actual purpose of assisting cyber-security attacks. Furthermore, small LLMs are still improvable in this dimension. For example, CODEFAVOR eliminates the uncertainty in Gemma-2-9B-Instruct and improves its security preference score by up to 89%. For other small models, CODEFAVOR can still improve them by $9.2 \sim 21.9\%$.

Human preference. Aligning human preference is as challenging as aligning correctness. The best model, Mistral Large 2, can solve 70-ish percent of tasks, outperforming the best-evaluated proprietary model, Gemini 1.5 Pro, by 7.7%. While in human preference smaller LLMs perform much better than in the correctness objective, CODEFAVOR can still improve their performance in aligning human preference for code by up to 17.7%. By checking the dataset, the difficulty of aligning human preferences can partially come from the ambiguity and bias inherent in human annotation. Sometimes both code candidates exhibit different advantages and disadvantages, making human preference just one of many possible reasonable judgments, rather than the definitive answer.

Preference cost. Besides accuracy, Table 4 lists the cost of representative approaches to run CODEPREFBENCH. Specifically, human agreement as the most expensive approach costs \$6.1 per task, estimated by the annotation time and the California minimum wage. Llama-3.1-405B-Instruct, with the best performance, is two orders of magnitude cheaper than human preference. While Llama-3-70B-Instruct is 7.4% weaker than the 405B model, it is $35.3\times$ cheaper. Furthermore, CODEFAVOR models present the best cost-effectiveness. Its Mistral Nemo classifier is five orders of magnitude cheaper than human preference and $34\times$ cheaper than Llama-3-70B-Instruct, without compromising accuracy.

	Norm. Cost	**Accuracy**
Human preference ($3\times$)	1.2×10^5 (\$6.1)	73.2
Llama-3.1-405B-Instr.	1.2×10^3	82.2
Llama-3-70B-Instr.	3.4×10^1	76.1
Ours (Mistral Nemo)	1	76.9

Table 4: Estimated per-sample cost and accuracy.

3.4 CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS

This section studies the design choices in CODEFAVOR via controlled experiments. We also defer more controlled experiments in Appendix A.6, such as the impact of criteria and code comments.

Training data. Table 5 studies the training effect of the two training settings both individually (*i.e.,* "*Commit-Instruct*" and "*Critic-Evol*") and in combination (*i.e.,* "Data Mixture"). Models trained by *Critic-Evol* tend to achieve better overall performance than using *Commit-Instruct*, particularly in correctness. For example, *Critic-Evol*-trained classifiers surpass *Commit-Instruct*-trained ones by $6.1\sim15.5\%$ on the correctness category, and the overall improvement (*i.e.,* "**Avg.**" column) can be up to 7.5%. Meanwhile, *Commit-Instruct*-trained classifiers can perform up to 12.5% better in the efficiency category. Moreover, data mixture brings further improvement, especially for the generation modeling, with up to 8.7% and 4.3% improvement over *Commit-Instruct* and *Critic-Evol* respectively. The performance trend correlates with the training sample sizes, indicating that more data leads to better performance.

Data mixture *v.s.* model merging. In addition to data mixture, we also explore co-utilizing both training datasets, by averaging the weights (Wortsman et al., 2022) of two models trained by individual datasets. Model merging yields better results for all trained classification models, with $1.1\sim5.0\%$ improvements. Within the generation modeling, model merging also surpasses or stays on par with data mixture results for all model types except for the Mistral 7B series.

Classification *v.s.* generation. Table 5 also compares the output representation between classification and generation. One qualitative trend is that classifier modeling often leads to higher scores in the preference for code correctness while the generation modeling tends to bring more holistic improvement leading to a higher overall store. For example, within the 16 comparisons in Table 5, the classification modeling outperforms the generation modeling 9 times in the code correctness objective, whereas the generation modeling surpasses the classification modeling 13 times in the average score.

4 RELATED WORK

Preference optimization has been a de facto step in post-training (Zhao et al., 2023; Rafailov et al., 2023; Meng et al., 2024; Yuan et al., 2023; Azar et al., 2024; Xiong et al., 2024; Dong et al., 2023a; 2024), where the policy model is often trained by contrastive samples labeled preference objectives. These samples can be sampled from the LLM under training, or external sources, such as human data or external LLM outputs. These responses are then ranked via preference objectives such as human annotation (Ouyang et al., 2022), LLM feedbacks (Kim et al., 2023; Cui et al., 2024; Weyssow et al., 2024; McAleese et al., 2024; Kim et al., 2024), code execution (Chen et al., 2022; Shi et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2024; Sun et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024a;b), and neural classifiers/scores (Inala et al., 2022; Zhang et al., 2023b; Zhao et al., 2023; Dong et al., 2023b; Wang et al., 2023; 2024).

		Correctness	Efficiency	Security	Avg.	Human Pref.
Mistral Nemo Instruct (12B)		51.4	69.7	82.9	68.0	**66.2**
Commit-Instruct	Classification	54.5	**79.3**	**96.1**	76.6	65.5
	Geneneration	48.2	74.4	**96.6**	73.1	**66.9**
Critic-Evol	Classification	59.8	70.5	**95.7**	75.3	62.1
	Geneneration	56.8	77.0	**96.6**	**76.8**	61.4
Data Mixture	Classification	**63.0**	68.8	95.2	75.6	62.1
	Geneneration	58.2	77.0	**96.1**	**77.1**	64.1
Model Merging	Classification	58.0	76.1	**96.6**	**76.9**	64.1
	Geneneration	58.8	77.8	**96.6**	**77.7**	**66.9**
Gemma-2-9B-Instruct		52.4	75.1	52.7	60.1	64.1
Commit-Instruct	Classification	52.3	71.9	82.1	68.8	63.4
	Geneneration	51.8	**80.1**	95.1	75.3	60.7
Critic-Evol	Classification	55.5	74.7	86.5	72.2	62.1
	Geneneration	57.9	72.2	**97.6**	75.9	64.1
Data Mixture	Classification	54.8	73.9	87.9	72.2	63.4
	Geneneration	**59.2**	76.7	**97.6**	**77.8**	63.4
Model Merging	Classification	56.8	75.3	92.3	74.8	**67.6**
	Geneneration	57.0	78.7	96.6	**77.4**	64.1
Llama 3-8B-Instruct		49.5	71.9	90.3	70.6	58.6
Commit-Instruct	Classification	54.4	71.0	93.7	73.0	65.5
	Geneneration	48.9	73.0	94.2	72.1	66.2
Critic-Evol	Classification	**58.3**	71.3	90.3	73.3	57.9
	Geneneration	**58.3**	**74.4**	93.7	75.5	**69.0**
Data Mixture	Classification	**58.5**	66.2	90.8	71.8	62.1
	Geneneration	56.8	73.6	94.7	75.0	66.2
Model Merging	Classification	**58.0**	73.0	95.2	75.4	62.8
	Geneneration	**58.2**	**75.0**	**98.6**	**77.2**	**69.0**
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3		48.5	66.6	78.5	64.5	58.3
Commit-Instruct	Classification	55.5	69.3	83.1	69.3	61.4
	Geneneration	48.0	73.3	88.4	69.9	**66.2**
Critic-Evol	Classification	**64.1**	64.8	94.7	74.5	61.4
	Geneneration	57.7	72.4	88.4	72.9	58.6
Data Mixture	Classification	59.5	69.3	91.8	73.5	60.7
	Geneneration	61.7	73.6	92.8	**76.0**	62.8
Model Merging	Classification	62.4	64.8	**95.7**	74.3	60.7
	Geneneration	57.1	**77.3**	90.3	74.9	**66.9**

Table 5: Controlled experiments on training data and output schemes in CODEFAVOR.

Specifically, our work explores how to define and collect preferences in the code domain. Weyssow et al. (2024) score code snippets by employing a group of prominent LLMs as judges, following Cui et al. (2024), whereas our work trains LLM raters and curate corresponding preference data from scratch. McAleese et al. (2024) train a CritiGPT to catch bugs in code via LLM feedback. Our study confirms their main findings, *e.g.,* human-based preference can be even suboptimal than LLM-based preference. We also provide extensive insights by expanding the studied criteria beyond correctness, quantifying human preference, and evaluating various models. Data-wise, CriticGPT applies bug injection (Just, 2014) with human assistance, whereas CODEFAVOR collects contrastive code pairs from code evolution.

5 CONCLUSION

We introduced CODEFAVOR, a novel framework for training pairwise code preference models using synthetic code evolution data, derived from code commits and LLM critiques. Our curated CODEPREF-BENCH shows that CODEFAVOR can significantly improve LLMs' accuracy of code preferences. We also quantified the cost and demonstrated the pros and cons of human preference for code, revealing that human preferences can be sub-optimal for non-functional objectives despite using a much higher cost.

REFERENCES

Amazon Web Services. AI Code Generator - Amazon CodeWhisperer - AWS. https://aws.amazon.com/codewhisperer/, 2023.

Jacob Austin, Augustus Odena, Maxwell Nye, Maarten Bosma, Henryk Michalewski, David Dohan, Ellen Jiang, Carrie Cai, Michael Terry, Quoc Le, et al. Program synthesis with large language models. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2108.07732, 2021. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.07732.

Mohammad Gheshlaghi Azar, Zhaohan Daniel Guo, Bilal Piot, Rémi Munos, Mark Rowland, Michal Valko, and Daniele Calandriello. A general theoretical paradigm to understand learning from human preferences. In Sanjoy Dasgupta, Stephan Mandt, and Yingzhen Li (eds.), *International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, 2-4 May 2024, Palau de Congressos, Valencia, Spain*, volume 238 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 4447–4455. PMLR, 2024. URL https://proceedings.mlr.press/v238/gheshlaghi-azar24a.html.

Manish Bhatt, Sahana Chennabasappa, Cyrus Nikolaidis, Shengye Wan, Ivan Evtimov, Dominik Gabi, Daniel Song, Faizan Ahmad, Cornelius Aschermann, Lorenzo Fontana, et al. Purple llama cyberseceval: A secure coding benchmark for language models. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2312.04724, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.04724.

BigCode. Final self-alignment training dataset for starcoder2-instruct. https://huggingface.co/datasets/bigcode/self-oss-instruct-sc2-exec-filter-50k, 2024.

Federico Cassano, Luisa Li, Akul Sethi, Noah Shinn, Abby Brennan-Jones, Anton Lozhkov, Carolyn Anderson, and Arjun Guha. Can it edit? evaluating the ability of large language models to follow code editing instructions. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2312.12450, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.12450.

Bei Chen, Fengji Zhang, Anh Nguyen, Daoguang Zan, Zeqi Lin, Jian-Guang Lou, and Weizhu Chen. Codet: Code generation with generated tests. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2207.10397*, 2022.

Mark Chen, Jerry Tworek, Heewoo Jun, Qiming Yuan, Henrique Ponde de Oliveira Pinto, Jared Kaplan, Harri Edwards, Yuri Burda, Nicholas Joseph, Greg Brockman, Alex Ray, Raul Puri, Gretchen Krueger, Michael Petrov, Heidy Khlaaf, Girish Sastry, Pamela Mishkin, Brooke Chan, Scott Gray, Nick Ryder, Mikhail Pavlov, Alethea Power, Lukasz Kaiser, Mohammad Bavarian, Clemens Winter, Philippe Tillet, Felipe Petroski Such, Dave Cummings, Matthias Plappert, Fotios Chantzis, Elizabeth Barnes, Ariel Herbert-Voss, William Hebgen Guss, Alex Nichol, Alex Paino, Nikolas Tezak, Jie Tang, Igor Babuschkin, Suchir Balaji, Shantanu Jain, William Saunders, Christopher Hesse, Andrew N. Carr, Jan Leike, Josh Achiam, Vedant Misra, Evan Morikawa, Alec Radford, Matthew Knight, Miles Brundage, Mira Murati, Katie Mayer, Peter Welinder, Bob McGrew, Dario Amodei, Sam McCandlish, Ilya Sutskever, and Wojciech Zaremba. Evaluating large language models trained on code, 2021.

Mouxiang Chen, Zhongxin Liu, He Tao, Yusu Hong, David Lo, Xin Xia, and Jianling Sun. B4: Towards optimal assessment of plausible code solutions with plausible tests. In *Proceedings of the 39th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering*, pp. 1693–1705, 2024.

Wei-Lin Chiang, Lianmin Zheng, Ying Sheng, Anastasios Nikolas Angelopoulos, Tianle Li, Dacheng Li, Hao Zhang, Banghua Zhu, Michael Jordan, Joseph E Gonzalez, et al. Chatbot arena: An open platform for evaluating llms by human preference. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2403.04132, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04132.

Maxime Crochemore and Dominique Perrin. Two-way string-matching. *J. ACM*, 38(3):650–674, 1991. ISSN 0004-5411. doi: 10.1145/116825.116845. URL https://doi.org/10.1145/116825.116845.

Ganqu Cui, Lifan Yuan, Ning Ding, Guanming Yao, Bingxiang He, Wei Zhu, Yuan Ni, Guotong Xie, Ruobing Xie, Yankai Lin, et al. Ultrafeedback: Boosting language models with scaled ai feedback. In *Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning*, 2024.

Tri Dao, Daniel Y. Fu, Stefano Ermon, Atri Rudra, and Christopher Ré. Flashattention: Fast and memory-efficient exact attention with io-awareness. In Sanmi Koyejo, S. Mohamed, A. Agarwal, Danielle Belgrave, K. Cho, and A. Oh (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, NeurIPS 2022, New Orleans, LA, USA, November 28 - December 9, 2022*, 2022.

Yangruibo Ding, Zijian Wang, Wasi Ahmad, Hantian Ding, Ming Tan, Nihal Jain, Murali Krishna Ramanathan, Ramesh Nallapati, Parminder Bhatia, Dan Roth, et al. Crosscodeeval: A diverse and multilingual benchmark for cross-file code completion. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 36, 2024.

Hanze Dong, Wei Xiong, Deepanshu Goyal, Yihan Zhang, Winnie Chow, Rui Pan, Shizhe Diao, Jipeng Zhang, KaShun SHUM, and Tong Zhang. RAFT: Reward ranked finetuning for generative foundation model alignment. *Transactions on Machine Learning Research*, 2023a. ISSN 2835-8856. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=m7p5O7zblY.

Hanze Dong, Wei Xiong, Bo Pang, Haoxiang Wang, Han Zhao, Yingbo Zhou, Nan Jiang, Doyen Sahoo, Caiming Xiong, and Tong Zhang. Rlhf workflow: From reward modeling to online rlhf. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2405.07863, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07863.

Yi Dong, Zhilin Wang, Makesh Sreedhar, Xianchao Wu, and Oleksii Kuchaiev. SteerLM: Attribute conditioned SFT as an (user-steerable) alternative to RLHF. In Houda Bouamor, Juan Pino, and Kalika Bali (eds.), *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2023*, pp. 11275–11288, Singapore, 2023b. Association for Computational Linguistics. doi: 10.18653/v1/2023.findings-emnlp.754. URL https://aclanthology.org/2023.findings-emnlp.754.

Abhimanyu Dubey, Abhinav Jauhri, Abhinav Pandey, Abhishek Kadian, Ahmad Al-Dahle, Aiesha Letman, Akhil Mathur, Alan Schelten, Amy Yang, Angela Fan, et al. The llama 3 herd of models. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2407.21783, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.21783.

GitHub. GitHub Copilot – Your AI pair programmer. https://github.com/features/copilot, 2023.

Alex Gu, Wen-Ding Li, Naman Jain, Theo X Olausson, Celine Lee, Koushik Sen, and Armando Solar-Lezama. The counterfeit conundrum: Can code language models grasp the nuances of their incorrect generations? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.19475*, 2024.

Jeevana Priya Inala, Chenglong Wang, Mei Yang, Andres Codas, Mark Encarnación, Shuvendu Lahiri, Madanlal Musuvathi, and Jianfeng Gao. Fault-aware neural code rankers. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 35:13419–13432, 2022.

René Just. The major mutation framework: Efficient and scalable mutation analysis for java. In *Proceedings of the 2014 international symposium on software testing and analysis*, pp. 433–436, 2014.

Seungone Kim, Jamin Shin, Yejin Cho, Joel Jang, Shayne Longpre, Hwaran Lee, Sangdoo Yun, Seongjin Shin, Sungdong Kim, James Thorne, et al. Prometheus: Inducing fine-grained evaluation capability in language models. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2023.

Seungone Kim, Juyoung Suk, Shayne Longpre, Bill Yuchen Lin, Jamin Shin, Sean Welleck, Graham Neubig, Moontae Lee, Kyungjae Lee, and Minjoon Seo. Prometheus 2: An open source language model specialized in evaluating other language models. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2405.01535, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.01535.

Woosuk Kwon, Zhuohan Li, Siyuan Zhuang, Ying Sheng, Lianmin Zheng, Cody Hao Yu, Joseph Gonzalez, Hao Zhang, and Ion Stoica. Efficient memory management for large language model serving with pagedattention. In *Proceedings of the 29th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles*, pp. 611–626, 2023.

Nathan Lambert, Valentina Pyatkin, Jacob Morrison, LJ Miranda, Bill Yuchen Lin, Khyathi Chandu, Nouha Dziri, Sachin Kumar, Tom Zick, Yejin Choi, Noah A. Smith, and Hannaneh Hajishirzi. Rewardbench: Evaluating reward models for language modeling. https://huggingface.co/spaces/allenai/reward-bench, 2024.

Raymond Li, Yangtian Zi, Niklas Muennighoff, Denis Kocetkov, Chenghao Mou, Marc Marone, Christopher Akiki, LI Jia, Jenny Chim, Qian Liu, et al. Starcoder: may the source be with you! *Transactions on Machine Learning Research*, 2023. ISSN 2835-8856. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=KoFOg41haE. Reproducibility Certification.

Tianle Li, Wei-Lin Chiang, Evan Frick, Lisa Dunlap, Tianhao Wu, Banghua Zhu, Joseph E Gonzalez, and Ion Stoica. From crowdsourced data to high-quality benchmarks: Arena-hard and benchbuilder pipeline. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2406.11939, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.11939.

Jiate Liu, Yiqin Zhu, Kaiwen Xiao, QIANG FU, Xiao Han, Yang Wei, and Deheng Ye. RLTF: Reinforcement learning from unit test feedback. *Transactions on Machine Learning Research*, 2023a. ISSN 2835-8856. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=hjYmsV6nXZ.

Jiawei Liu, Chunqiu Steven Xia, Yuyao Wang, and Lingming Zhang. Is your code generated by chatgpt really correct? rigorous evaluation of large language models for code generation. In Alice Oh, Tristan Naumann, Amir Globerson, Kate Saenko, Moritz Hardt, and Sergey Levine (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, NeurIPS 2023, New Orleans, LA, USA, December 10 - 16, 2023*, 2023b.

Jiawei Liu, Songrun Xie, Junhao Wang, Yuxiang Wei, Yifeng Ding, and Lingming Zhang. Evaluating language models for efficient code generation. In *First Conference on Language Modeling*, 2024a. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=IBCBMeAhmC.

Tianqi Liu, Yao Zhao, Rishabh Joshi, Misha Khalman, Mohammad Saleh, Peter J Liu, and Jialu Liu. Statistical rejection sampling improves preference optimization. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2024b. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=xbjSwwrQOe.

Fredrik Lundh. The stringlib library. https://web.archive.org/web/20201107074620/http://effbot.org/zone/stringlib.htm, 2006. Accessed: 2024-09-10.

Ziyang Luo, Can Xu, Pu Zhao, Qingfeng Sun, Xiubo Geng, Wenxiang Hu, Chongyang Tao, Jing Ma, Qingwei Lin, and Daxin Jiang. Wizardcoder: Empowering code large language models with evol-instruct. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2024.

Alexandre Matton, Tom Sherborne, Dennis Aumiller, Elena Tommasone, Milad Alizadeh, Jingyi He, Raymond Ma, Maxime Voisin, Ellen Gilsenan-McMahon, and Matthias Gallé. On leakage of code generation evaluation datasets. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2407.07565, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.07565.

Nat McAleese, Rai Michael Pokorny, Juan Felipe Ceron Uribe, Evgenia Nitishinskaya, Maja Trebacz, and Jan Leike. Llm critics help catch llm bugs. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2407.00215, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.00215.

Yu Meng, Mengzhou Xia, and Danqi Chen. Simpo: Simple preference optimization with a reference-free reward. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2405.14734, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.14734.

Long Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll L. Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Ray, John Schulman, Jacob Hilton, Fraser Kelton, Luke Miller, Maddie Simens, Amanda Askell, Peter Welinder, Paul F. Christiano, Jan Leike, and Ryan Lowe. Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback. In Sanmi Koyejo, S. Mohamed, A. Agarwal, Danielle Belgrave, K. Cho, and A. Oh (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, NeurIPS 2022, New Orleans, LA, USA, November 28 - December 9, 2022*, 2022.

Python Software Foundation. *subprocess — Subprocess management*, 2023. URL https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#subprocess.run. Accessed: 2024-10-02.

Rafael Rafailov, Archit Sharma, Eric Mitchell, Christopher D. Manning, Stefano Ermon, and Chelsea Finn. Direct preference optimization: Your language model is secretly a reward model. In Alice Oh, Tristan Naumann, Amir Globerson, Kate Saenko, Moritz Hardt, and Sergey Levine (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, NeurIPS 2023, New Orleans, LA, USA, December 10 - 16, 2023*, 2023.

Jeff Rasley, Samyam Rajbhandari, Olatunji Ruwase, and Yuxiong He. Deepspeed: System optimizations enable training deep learning models with over 100 billion parameters. In Rajesh Gupta, Yan Liu, Jiliang Tang, and B. Aditya Prakash (eds.), *KDD '20: The 26th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, Virtual Event, CA, USA, August 23-27, 2020*, pp. 3505–3506. ACM, 2020. URL https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3394486.3406703.

Martin Riddell, Ansong Ni, and Arman Cohan. Quantifying contamination in evaluating code generation capabilities of language models. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2403.04811, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04811.

Freda Shi, Daniel Fried, Marjan Ghazvininejad, Luke Zettlemoyer, and Sida I Wang. Natural language to code translation with execution. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2204.11454*, 2022.

Zhihong Sun, Yao Wan, Jia Li, Hongyu Zhang, Zhi Jin, Ge Li, and Chen Lyu. Sifting through the chaff: On utilizing execution feedback for ranking the generated code candidates. In *Proceedings of the 39th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering*, pp. 229–241, 2024.

Zhi Rui Tam, Cheng-Kuang Wu, Yi-Lin Tsai, Chieh-Yen Lin, Hung-yi Lee, and Yun-Nung Chen. Let me speak freely? a study on the impact of format restrictions on performance of large language models. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2408.02442, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.02442.

Haoxiang Wang, Wei Xiong, Tengyang Xie, Han Zhao, and Tong Zhang. Interpretable preferences via multi-objective reward modeling and mixture-of-experts. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2406.12845, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.12845.

Zhilin Wang, Yi Dong, Jiaqi Zeng, Virginia Adams, Makesh Narsimhan Sreedhar, Daniel Egert, Olivier Delalleau, Jane Polak Scowcroft, Neel Kant, Aidan Swope, et al. Helpsteer: Multi-attribute helpfulness dataset for steerlm. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.09528*, 2023.

Yuxiang Wei, Zhe Wang, Jiawei Liu, Yifeng Ding, and Lingming Zhang. Magicoder: Empowering code generation with oss-instruct. In *Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning*, 2024.

Martin Weyssow, Aton Kamanda, and Houari Sahraoui. Codeultrafeedback: An llm-as-a-judge dataset for aligning large language models to coding preferences. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2403.09032, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.09032.

Mitchell Wortsman, Gabriel Ilharco, Samir Yitzhak Gadre, Rebecca Roelofs, Raphael Gontijo Lopes, Ari S. Morcos, Hongseok Namkoong, Ali Farhadi, Yair Carmon, Simon Kornblith, and Ludwig Schmidt. Model soups: averaging weights of multiple fine-tuned models improves accuracy without increasing inference time. In Kamalika Chaudhuri, Stefanie Jegelka, Le Song, Csaba Szepesvári, Gang Niu, and Sivan Sabato (eds.), *International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2022, 17-23 July 2022, Baltimore, Maryland, USA*, volume 162 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 23965–23998. PMLR, 2022. URL https://proceedings.mlr.press/v162/wortsman22a.html.

Wei Xiong, Hanze Dong, Chenlu Ye, Ziqi Wang, Han Zhong, Heng Ji, Nan Jiang, and Tong Zhang. Iterative preference learning from human feedback: Bridging theory and practice for rlhf under kl-constraint. In *Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning*, 2024.

Wenda Xu, Guanglei Zhu, Xuandong Zhao, Liangming Pan, Lei Li, and William Wang. Pride and prejudice: Llm amplifies self-bias in self-refinement. In *Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pp. 15474–15492, 2024.

Hongyi Yuan, Zheng Yuan, Chuanqi Tan, Wei Wang, Songfang Huang, and Fei Huang. RRHF: rank responses to align language models with human feedback. In Alice Oh, Tristan Naumann, Amir Globerson, Kate Saenko, Moritz Hardt, and Sergey Levine (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, NeurIPS 2023, New Orleans, LA, USA, December 10 - 16, 2023*, 2023.

Dylan Zhang, Shizhe Diao, Xueyan Zou, and Hao Peng. Plum: Preference learning plus test cases yields better code language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.06887*, 2024a.

Fengji Zhang, Bei Chen, Yue Zhang, Jacky Keung, Jin Liu, Daoguang Zan, Yi Mao, Jian-Guang Lou, and Weizhu Chen. Repocoder: Repository-level code completion through iterative retrieval and generation. In *Proceedings of the 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pp. 2471–2484, 2023a.

Kechi Zhang, Ge Li, Yihong Dong, Jingjing Xu, Jun Zhang, Jing Su, Yongfei Liu, and Zhi Jin. Codedpo: Aligning code models with self generated and verified source code. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.05605*, 2024b.

Tianyi Zhang, Tao Yu, Tatsunori Hashimoto, Mike Lewis, Wen-tau Yih, Daniel Fried, and Sida Wang. Coder reviewer reranking for code generation. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 41832–41846. PMLR, 2023b.

Yao Zhao, Rishabh Joshi, Tianqi Liu, Misha Khalman, Mohammad Saleh, and Peter J Liu. Slic-hf: Sequence likelihood calibration with human feedback. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2305.10425, 2023. URL `https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.10425`.

Lianmin Zheng, Wei-Lin Chiang, Ying Sheng, Siyuan Zhuang, Zhanghao Wu, Yonghao Zhuang, Zi Lin, Zhuohan Li, Dacheng Li, Eric P. Xing, Hao Zhang, Joseph E. Gonzalez, and Ion Stoica. Judging llm-as-a-judge with mt-bench and chatbot arena. In Alice Oh, Tristan Naumann, Amir Globerson, Kate Saenko, Moritz Hardt, and Sergey Levine (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, NeurIPS 2023, New Orleans, LA, USA, December 10 - 16, 2023*, 2023.

Terry Yue Zhuo, Minh Chien Vu, Jenny Chim, Han Hu, Wenhao Yu, Ratnadira Widyasari, Imam Nur Bani Yusuf, Haolan Zhan, Junda He, Indraneil Paul, et al. Bigcodebench: Benchmarking code generation with diverse function calls and complex instructions. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/2406.15877, 2024. URL `https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.15877`.

A APPENDIX

Contents

§A.1 Prompting . . . 15
§A.2 Training Setup . . . 17
§A.3 Additional Evaluation Setup . . . 17
§A.4 Case Studies of Faulty Preference . . . 20
| §A.4.1 Faulty Preferences in Code Correctness . . . 20
| §A.4.2 Faulty Preferences in Code Efficiency . . . 22
| §A.4.3 Faulty Preferences in Code Security . . . 25
§A.5 Quantifying Contamination . . . 26
§A.6 Additional Experiments . . . 27
§A.7 Limitation and Future Work . . . 30

A.1 PROMPTING

We showcase our prompt implementation for synthetic data generation via concrete examples below:

Commit-Instruct. Figure 3 details Figure 1 by exemplifying the prompt we implemented for *Commit-Instruct*. Given a raw commit that replaces string literals to systematic enum-like constants, we first ask the critic model to explain the code changes. The model then responds with the observed key changes and is asked by the user if the code change improves certain code properties. The critic model answers "`[YES]`" by pointing out that the code change improves maintainability and readability. Next, we instruct the critic model to generate a well-formatted version of synthetic preference data including an instruction, the criteria, a code preference pair, and feedback explaining the improvements.

Meanwhile, Figure 4 illustrates a case when the critic model filters out a code commit whose improvement is regarded as unclear. Specifically, the demonstrated code commit changes the original code to import a package in a try-catch block, rather than doing it directly. This prevents execution termination when the package is not needed. However, the critic model thinks such a change is minor and thus turns down the commit being processed to synthetic preference data.

Critic-Evol. Figure 5 demonstrates the prompting for *Critic-Evol*. Specifically, we implemented the *Critic-Evol* prompt in single-turn using few-show prompting. The prompt includes five few-shot examples (*e.g.,* the `square_root` example), followed by an instruction extracted from the Self-OSS-Instruct dataset and an initial coding solution provided by Llama3-8B-Instruct. Next, the critic model Llama3-70B-instruct is prompted to generate reflection, criteria, an improved version of code, and feedback to form synthetic code preference data. More specifically, in the reflection section, the critic model is expected to explain the initial implementation and reason for potential improvements. If the model thinks there is little to improve, the generation stops here and this sample is filtered out for synthetic preference data generation. In the case of Figure 5, the model suggests that the `get_all_words` function can be implemented using dictionary comprehension which is more concise and efficient. Following this, the critic model proposes a related criterion based on code conciseness and efficiency, resulting in an improved version of code, *i.e.,* `[ATTEMPT_2]`.

User

Given a code commit below, think about the code change:
Commit message: *Fix how we find conversion to use file formats*

[OLD_CODE]
```
from . import conversions
from .file_formats import FileFormats

class FileConverter(object):
  def get_conversion(self, source_format, target_format):
    return {
      'application/pdf': conversions.NoOp,
      'image/jpeg': conversions.JpegToPdf,
      'image/png': conversions.PngToPdf,
      ...
    }[source_format]()
```

[NEW_CODE]
```
from . import conversions
from .file_formats import FileFormats

class FileConverter(object):
  def get_conversion(self, source_format, target_format):
    return {
      FileFormats.PDF: conversions.NoOp,
      FileFormats.JPEG: conversions.JpegToPdf,
      FileFormats.PNG: conversions.PngToPdf,
      ...
    }[source_format]()
```

Please briefly explain the code change.

Assistant

The code change replaces the hardcoded file format strings (*e.g.,* 'application/pdf', 'image/jpeg', etc.) in the `get_conversion` method with enum-like constants from the `FileFormats` class (*e.g.,* `FileFormats.PDF`, `FileFormats.JPEG`, etc.).
This change makes the code more maintainable, readable, and less prone to typos or incorrect format strings. It also makes it easier to add or remove file formats in the future, as the format strings are now centralized in the `FileFormats` class.

User

Directly answer `[YES]` or `[NO]`:
- If `[YES]`, it clearly improves the [some good properties, *e.g.,* functionality/performance/completeness/safety/...]
- If `[NO]`, this minor change does not clearly make the code better.

Assistant

`[YES]`, it clearly improves the maintainability and readability of the code.

User

Inspired by the commit and explanation, please construct an instruction-following data with the following components:
`[INSTRUCTION]` A natural-language description of the goal and requirement for the code.
`[CRITERIA]` A brief and focused criterion that the code should ideally meet, which are not necessarily implied in `[INSTRUCTION]`.
`[NAIVE_CODE]` A self-contained solution code that may NOT completely meet `[CRITERIA]`.
`[IMPROVED_CODE]` Improved code that better meets `[CRITERIA]` than `[NAIVE_CODE]`, while still respecting `[INSTRUCTION]`.
`[FEEDBACK]` Briefly describe why the `[IMPROVED_CODE]` is better than `[NAIVE_CODE]`. Refer to the codes using "`[IMPROVED_CODE]`" and "`[NAIVE_CODE]`" only.

Assistant

Here is the instruction-following data:
`[INSTRUCTION]` Create a function to retrieve a conversion method based on a given file format.
`[CRITERIA]` The code should be maintainable and readable, with file formats defined in a centralized and consistent manner.
`[NAIVE_CODE]`
```
def get_conversion(source_format):
    return {
        'application/pdf': conversions.NoOp,
        'image/jpeg': conversions.JpegToPdf,
        'image/png': conversions.PngToPdf,
        # ...
    }[source_format]
```

`[IMPROVED_CODE]`
```
from .file_formats import FileFormats

def get_conversion(source_format):
    return {
        FileFormats.PDF: conversions.NoOp,
        FileFormats.JPEG: conversions.JpegToPdf,
        FileFormats.PNG: conversions.PngToPdf,
        # ...
    }[source_format]
```

`[FEEDBACK]` The `[IMPROVED_CODE]` is better than `[NAIVE_CODE]` because it uses enum-like constants in the `FileFormats` class, making the code more maintainable and readable by centralizing file formats in one place, reducing the likelihood of typos or incorrect format strings.

Figure 3: Exemplifying prompts in *Commit-Instruct* for generating preference code pairs.

User

Given a code commit below, think about the code change:
Commit message: *Allow import in case of missing notebook package*
[OLD_CODE]

```
from .nbrmd import read, reads, readf, write, writes, writef
from .hooks import update_rmd, update_ipynb, update_rmd_and_ipynb, update_selected_formats
from .cm import RmdFileContentsManager
```

[NEW_CODE]

```
from .nbrmd import read, reads, readf, write, writes, writef
from .hooks import update_rmd, update_ipynb, update_rmd_and_ipynb, update_selected_formats
try:
  from .cm import RmdFileContentsManager
except ImportError as e:
  RmdFileContentsManager = e.message
```

Please briefly explain the code change.

Assistant

The code change allows the import of the module to continue even if the `RmdFileContentsManager` from the `.cm` module is missing.
In the old code, if the `.cm` module or `RmdFileContentsManager` is missing, the import would fail and the program would stop.
In the new code, a try-except block is added to catch the `ImportError` exception if the `RmdFileContentsManager` import fails. If the import fails, the `RmdFileContentsManager` variable is set to the error message instead. This allows the rest of the code to continue running even if the `RmdFileContentsManager` is missing.

User

Directly answer `[YES]` or `[NO]`:
- If `[YES]`, it clearly improves the [some good properties, *e.g.*, functionality/performance/completeness/safety/...]
- If `[NO]`, this minor change does not clearly make the code better.

Assistant

`[NO]` This minor change does not clearly make the code better.

Figure 4: A filtered commit in *Commit-Instruct* for not being clearly useful.

A.2 Training Setup

Environment. We train our models using eight NVIDIA A100-40G GPUs based on Axolotl using DeepSpeed ZeRO-3 offloading (Rasley et al., 2020) and flash attention (Dao et al., 2022).

Hyper-parameters. Table 6 lists the default hyper-parameter settings for training our preference models. The hyper-parameter settings mostly follow the training recipes from Dong et al. (2024). As a special case, we use a slightly lower learning rate of 2×10^{6} for Gemma-2 models for training stability.

Hyper-Parameter	Value
Batch size	32
Sequence length	2048
Sequence packing	✓
Learning rate	5×10^{-6}
Scheduler	Cosine annealing with 40 warm-up steps

Table 6: Explored hyper-parameter settings for training code preference learning.

A.3 Additional Evaluation Setup

Environment. By default, we run open generative models using vLLM (Kwon et al., 2023) in a half-floating-point precision of `bfloat16`. For better accuracy (*e.g.,* some versions are suboptimal to certain models due to bugs), we run the Mistral and Llama models using v0.5.1, Gemma-2 models using v0.6.1.post2, and other models using v0.5.3.post1.

Decision parsing for feedback LLMs. Code preferences of raw generative LLMs, such as Claude 3.5 Sonnet, are generated through prompting (*i.e.,* Listing 1) and presented in natural-language feedback. For the ease of parsing decisions from model outputs, Listing 1 declares output constraints in natural language, *i.e.,* suggesting the model to provide the preference in the format of "`[CODE_?]` is better than

User

You are a great Python coding instructor good at judging code snippets, localizing code faults, and providing educational feedback.
Please follow the formats of these examples to provide necessary code feedback:
[INSTRUCTION] Provide a Python function `square_root` to compute the square root of a number and throw a `ValueError` if the number is negative.
[ATTEMPT_1]

```
def square_root(x: float) -> float:
    return math.sqrt(x)
```

[REFLECTION] [ATTEMPT_1] uses `math.sqrt` without importing the `math` module which can lead to a `NameError` during execution. The bug can be fixed by importing the `math` module.
[CRITERIA] The function should precisely follow the instructions while being runnable and bug-free.
[ATTEMPT_2]

```
import math
def square_root(x):
    return math.sqrt(x)
```

[FEEDBACK] [ATTEMPT_1] forgets to import a necessary module. [ATTEMPT_2] fixes the bug in [ATTEMPT_1] by importing the `math` module ahead of time.

... other four few-shot examples ...

You are given [INSTRUCTION] and [ATTEMPT_1], in response you generate:
1. A [REFLECTION] section analyzing noticable weaknesses of [ATTEMPT_1] while following [INSTRUCTION]
2. If you think [ATTEMPT_1] is good enough without significant space for improvements, stop the generation after [REFLECTION]
3. Otherwise, keep going with [CRITERIA], [ATTEMPT_2], and [FEEDBACK]

Notes:
1. [CRITERIA] should focus on one significant code weakness over correctness/efficiency/security/conciseness – DO NOT worry about trivial pitfalls like missing type hints, docstrings, input validation, etc.
2. In [FEEDBACK], only refer to the code attempts using [ATTEMPT_1] and [ATTEMPT_2]

.....

Follow the instruction below to write a Python function:
[INSTRUCTION] Create a function `get_all_words(text)` that takes a string `text` and returns a dictionary `words` that has all the words as keys and the number of occurrences as values.
Example:

```
get_all_words("The brown fox jumps over the lazy dog.")
# Output:
# {'the': 2, 'brown': 1, 'fox': 1, 'jumps': 1, 'over': 1, 'lazy': 1, 'dog': 1}
```

.....

An initial attempt to implement the function:
[ATTEMPT_1]

```
def get_all_words(text):
    words = text.split()
    word_counts = {}
    for word in words:
        word = word.lower()
        if word in word_counts:
            word_counts[word] += 1
        else:
            word_counts[word] = 1
    return word_counts
```

Assistant

Do you see APPARENT bugs, inefficiencies, security vulnerabilities, or inconciseness in [ATTEMPT_1] when following the [INSTRUCTION]?
[REFLECTION] [ATTEMPT_1] correctly implements the instruction. However, it can be improved for conciseness and efficiency by using a dictionary comprehension with the `collections.Counter` class.

.....

A SIMPLE criteria where [ATTEMP_1] can be improved from [REFLECTION]:
[CRITERIA] The code should be concise and efficient.

.....

The improved version of [ATTEMPT_1] based on the [CRITERIA] and [REFLECTION]:
[ATTEMPT_2]

```
from collections import Counter

def get_all_words(text):
    words = text.lower().split()
    return dict(Counter(words))
```

.....

How does [ATTEMPT_2] improve over [ATTEMPT_1]?
[FEEDBACK] [ATTEMPT_1] uses a manual loop to count the occurrences of each word, whereas [ATTEMPT_2] uses the `collections.Counter` class, which is more concise and efficient. Additionally, [ATTEMPT_2] converts the entire text to lowercase at once, making it more efficient than converting each word individually.

Figure 5: Exemplary prompt in *Critic-Evol* for generating preference code pairs.

[CODE_?] on the mentioned criteria." As such, we parse the model response by detecting keywords such as "better" and "neither" and then apply specific patterns to extract the answer. When none of these patterns are matched or the model simply suggests either both or neither of them are good, we mark the response undecidable and credit it for a 0.5 score, mimicking the expectation of the sampled score. Empirically, we found that this method works well and in our case studies we did not find any wrong classifications. Meanwhile, grammar-based constrained decoding can also be used to enforce the desired output formats, *e.g.,* acquiring the answers in JSON. However, such strict format restrictions might negatively impact model performance (Tam et al., 2024), so we choose to encode the constraints in the prompt.

```python
def pairwise_cot_template(
    instruction, code1, code2, criteria
) -> str:
    return f"""\
Given an [INSTRUCTION] and responses [CODE_A] and [CODE_B], judge which one better meets [CRITERIA] while following [INSTRUCTION]

---
[INSTRUCTION]
{instruction}

[CODE_A]
{code1}

[CODE_B]
{code2}

[CRITERIA]
{criteria}
---

1. Please FIRST provide a brief [FEEDBACK] section regarding if the code meets [CRITERIA]
2. THEN conclude with a [RESULT] section suggesting the conclusion by saying "[CODE_?] is better than [CODE_?] on the mentioned criteria".
"""
```

Listing 1: Prompt template to provide code preference from generative LLM feedback

A.4 CASE STUDIES OF FAULTY PREFERENCE

This section provides a qualitative analysis of the preference evaluation and showcases several interesting and easy-to-understand preference mistakes made by either human developers or LLMs. It is worth noting that for clarity we simplified and trimmed some code snippets and model responses while preserving the central idea.

Which code is correct?

Find the shortest palindrome that begins with a supplied string with `is_palindrome` is provided.
Example: `assert make_palindrome('cata') == 'catac'`

Code A

```
1 def make_palindrome(string) ->str:
2   if is_palindrome(string):
3     return string
4   for i in range(len(string)):
5     if is_palindrome(string[i:]):
6       return string + string[i - 1::-1]
```

Code B

```
1 def make_palindrome(string) ->str:
2   if is_palindrome(string):
3     return string
4   for i in range(len(string) - 1, 0, -1):
5     if is_palindrome(string[i:]):
6       return string + string[i - 1::-1]
```

Responses

Claude 3.5 Sonnet

```
... CODE_A iterates from the
beginning of the string, which
may not always find the longest
palindromic suffix.
... CODE_B iterates from the
end of the string to the start,
which correctly identifies
the longest palindromic suffix
and ensures that the shortest
palindrome is always found.
.....................................
[RESULT] CODE_B is better ...
```

DeepSeek V2.5

```
... There is a potential bug in
CODE_A when i is 0, leading to
incorrect slicing and potential
index errors.
.....................................
[RESULT] CODE_B is better ...
```

Developer Agreement

```
1: CODE_A (Confident; 6min)
2: CODE_A (Confident; 20min)
3: CODE_A (Confident; 7min)
.....................................
Major voting decision: CODE_A
```

Ours

```
B
```

Figure 6: Exemplary preferences for code correctness: Claude 3.5 Sonnet and DeepSeek V2.5 both make false claims, while humans indicate correct preferences.

A.4.1 FAULTY PREFERENCES IN CODE CORRECTNESS

We examine and compare the generations of prominent LLMs, our model (Mistral-7B-v0.3-Instruct classification model trained with *Critic-Evol*), and human judgments using the code correctness dataset in CODEPREFBENCH. Specifically, in CODEPREFBENCH, the oracle for code correctness is via the execution of massive test-cases (Liu et al., 2023b).

Erroneous reasoning due to LLM hallucination. Preference over code correctness is essentially a reasoning task. We observe that prominent LLMs frequently make faulty preferences for code correctness due to reasoning hallucination. For example, Figure 6 shows a task that requires extending the input string to form the shortest palindrome. There is only a subtle difference in Line 4: the correct implementation (Code A) searches for the largest suffix palindrome from left to right whereas Code B erroneously searches it reversely. Interestingly, while human developers consistently made the right preference, prominent LLMs such as Claude 3.5 Sonnet and DeepSeek V2.5, as well as our models, prefer the wrong code. Taking a closer look, the faults originate from unsound findings in their generation. For example, Claude 3.5 Sonnet's generation includes a false claim, saying that *"CODE_A iterates from the beginning of the string"* will make the right code (Code A) *"not always find the longest palindromic suffix."* Similarly, DeepSeek V2.5 also hallucinates that Code A would incur index errors when `i` is 0 which is also not true: when `i` is 0, the if condition in Line 5 is equivalent to that in Line 2 as `string[0:]` is the string itself, making the Line-5 condition never true. In other words, if Line 5 is true when `i` is 0, Line 2 would also be true and has already returned. In addition, Figure 8 also presents cases when LLMs collect irrelevant findings and use them as reasons to falsify the correct code. Our findings double-confirm the phenomena of "Counterfeit Conundrum" proposed by Gu et al. (2024): LLMs can mistakenly classify such "counterfeit" programs as correct.

Which code is correct?

Given a string of words, return a list of words split on whitespace. If no whitespaces exist in the text you should split on commas ',', If no commas exist you should return the number of lower-case letters with odd order in the alphabet, `ord('a') = 0`, `ord('b') = 1`, ... `ord('z') = 25`.

Example: `assert split_words("Hello world!") == ["Hello", "world!"]`
Example: `assert split_words("Hello,world!") == ["Hello", "world!"]`
Example: `assert split_words("abcdef") == 3`

Code A

```
def split_words(txt):
  if ' ' in txt:
    return txt.split(' ')
  elif ',' in txt:
    return txt.split(',')
  else:
    return sum(1 for ↩
        ↪ c in txt if ord(c) % 2 == 1)
```

Code B

```
def split_words(txt):
  whitespace = tuple(' \n\r\t')
  if any([(x in txt) for x in whitespace]):
    return txt.split()
  if ',' in txt:
    return txt.split(',')
  cnt = 0
  for ch in txt:
    if ch.islower() and (ord(ch) - ord('a'))%2 == 1:
      cnt += 1
  return cnt
```

Responses

Claude 3.5 Sonnet

... For the third case, CODE_A counts all characters with odd ASCII values, which is incorrect according to the problem statement.
.....
[RESULT] CODE_B is better ...

DeepSeek V2.5

... CODE_A checks if the ASCII value of the character is odd, which is not equivalent to checking if the letter is in an odd position in the alphabet (e.g., 'a' is 0, 'b' is 1, etc.).
.....
[RESULT] CODE_B is better ...

Developer Agreement

1: CODE_A (Confident; 8min)
2: CODE_A (Very confident; 6min)
3: CODE_A (Very confident; 7min)
.....
Major voting decision: CODE_A

Ours

B

Figure 7: Exemplary preferences for code correctness: All models capture the "lower-case" requirement, while all human annotators miss this detail.

While we conclude LLMs' reasoning faults as hallucination, a general pattern is that LLMs tend to focus on partial semantics or edge cases in the code snippet, overlooking other related fragments from the entire function when inferring the algorithmic correctness. This tendency frequently leads to problematic reasoning and consequently incorrect conclusions.

Human failures. While overall human judgments largely outperform model-based solutions in code correctness preference, they can still occasionally predict faulty preferences with consistent confidence. Specifically, while models can struggle with reasoning over the big picture, human judges may overlook important details in the program such as edge cases. Figure 7 demonstrates a task to split an input string by whitespaces or commas and return the number of lower-case letters with odd ASCII values. While all models, including ours, correctly capture the requirement of "lower-case letters," all three human annotators miss this detail. Similarly, in Figure 8, annotators had a hard time distinguishing between the two code candidates, as they failed to account for the edge case of 0.

Which code is correct?

Given an integer, return a tuple that has the number of even and odd digits respectively.
Example: `assert even_odd_count(-12) == (1, 1)`

Code A

```
def even_odd_count(num: int):
  even, odd = 0, 0
  for ch in str(num):
    if ch in '02468':
      even += 1
    if ch in '13579':
      odd += 1
  return even, odd
```

Code B

```
def even_odd_count(num: int):
  num = abs(num)
  even_count = 0
  odd_count = 0
  while num > 0:
    digit = num % 10
    if digit % 2 == 0:
      even_count += 1
    else:
      odd_count += 1
    num //= 10
  return even_count, odd_count
```

Responses

Claude 3.5 Sonnet

```
...
CODE_A has a potential issue: it
doesn't count '-' as a digit,
which is correct but might be
unexpected...
Both codes can produce correct
results for the given examples.
However, CODE_B is slightly more
robust in handling the problem.
.....................................
[RESULT] CODE_B is better ...
```

DeepSeek V2.5

```
...
CODE_A does not handle negative
numbers correctly because it does
not convert the number to its
absolute value before processing.
This can lead to incorrect
results for negative inputs...
.....................................
[RESULT] CODE_B is better ...
```

Developer Agreement

```
1:  Tie (Confident; 5min)
2:  Tie (Very confident; 6min)
3:  Tie (Confident; 7min)
.....................................
Major voting decision:  Tie
```

Ours

```
A
```

Figure 8: Exemplary preferences for code correctness: Both Claude 3.5 Sonnet and DeepSeek V2.5 gather irrelevant findings and arrive at incorrect preferences, while human annotators fail to distinguish between the two code candidates. The answer is that Code B is wrong when the input number is zero.

A.4.2 Faulty Preferences in Code Efficiency

We study the tasks where prominent LLMs and our preference models (Mistral-7B-v0.3-Instruct classification model trained with *Commit-Instruct*) present inconsistent preferences in code efficiency. Notably, the ground truth for code efficiency preference is decided by profiling compared programs over a performance-exercising test input (Liu et al., 2024a).

Overall, we found that while these LLMs do *not* seem to hallucinate their reasoning, they sometimes miss dominant factors that can impact code efficiency. Next, we exemplify common efficiency-impacting factors that can be misestimated by prominent LLMs:

Algorithmic complexity. Figure 9 illustrates a preference task where the time complexity of Code A is $O(\sqrt{n})$ while that for Code B is $O(n)$. Specifically, Claude 3.5 Sonnet and Llama3.1-405B-Instruct can catch the differences and correctly analyze theoretical complexities. However, Mistral Large 2's analysis is a bit generalist and less relevant, leading to a wrong preference decision. This shows that understanding algorithmic complexities is crucial for making precise preferences for efficient code.

Implicit and explicit statements. Besides major differences in algorithmic complexities, the way the program is engineered and optimized can also significantly impact the code efficiency. Therefore, we exemplify how prominent LLMs understand implicit and explicit implementation differences and how these differences can impact model preferences:

1. **Built-in functions (*implicit*):** Figure 10 demonstrates the efficiency superiority of using built-in Python functions compared to writing a single-pass implementation from scratch. Calling built-in (and external) functions is considered implicit, as their detailed implementation is unavailable in the context. Specifically, in Figure 10, the built-in `str.count()` function is implemented not only in native C (in the default CPython interpreter) but also using advanced and well-optimized

algorithms[3]; however, DeepSeek V2.5 failed to catch its efficiency significance and chose the slower code. Why do prominent LLMs missimate the impact of built-in functions? A plausible explanation is that LLMs may not have a deeper knowledge about the implementation of the *implicit* built-in functions, whereas the compared manual code can directly expose optimization details with the context, attracting preferences from LLMs.

2. **Early returns (*explicit*):** As an example of explicit statements, Code B in Figure 11 returns the results as soon as finding a replica (Line 4). It is explicit to the model as the efficiency advantage can be inferred without external knowledge. Specifically, Claude 3.5 Sonnet figured out the early stop in Code B and correctly chose it for efficiency preference. Meanwhile, DeepSeek V2.5 was concerned about the additional copies made by `lst[i+1:]`. While making unnecessary copies is indeed a performance killer, its disadvantage can be covered by the advantage (early return) when duplicates exist in the early portion of the input array.



Figure 9: Exemplary preferences for code efficiency: While Claude 3.5 Sonnet is aware of the better $O(\sqrt{n})$ complexity of `CODE_A`, Mistral Large 2 misses the algorithmic analysis and favors `CODE_B` for being "straightforward."

[3]The fast search algorithm (Lundh, 2006) (also known as "BMHBNFS") and Crochemore and Perrin's Two-Way algorithm (Crochemore & Perrin, 1991) optimized for longer strings.

Which code is more efficient?

Write a Python function to count the number of digits in a given string.
Example: `assert number_ctr('program2bedone') == 1`

Code A

```
def number_ctr(word: str):
  count = 0
  for n in range(0, 10):
    count += word.count(str(n))
  return count
```

Code B

```
def number_ctr(word: str):
  result = 0
  for item in word:
    try: int(item)
    except ValueError: pass
    else: result += 1
  return result
```

Responses

Claude 3.5 Sonnet

```
...
* For short strings or strings
with few digits, CODE_B might
be slightly faster as it stops
checking once it finds a digit.
* For longer strings or strings
with many digits, CODE_A is
likely faster as it has a fixed
number of iterations and uses the
efficient built-in count().
.....................................
[RESULT] CODE_A is better ...
```

DeepSeek V2.5

```
...
CODE_B efficiently processes the
string in a single pass, making
it more suitable for longer
strings and ensuring better
performance.
.....................................
[RESULT] CODE_B is better ...
```

Developer Agreement

```
1:  CODE_B (Very confident; 6min)
2:  CODE_B (Confident; 10min)
3:  CODE_B (Confident; 6min)
.....................................
Major voting decision:  CODE_B
```

Ours

```
A
```

Figure 10: Exemplary preferences for code efficiency: DeepSeek V2.5 misses the significance of the built-in function `str.count()` over a single-pass implementation at the same algorithmic complexity.

Which code is more efficient?

Write a Python function to check if the elements of a given list are unique or not.
Example: `assert all_unique([1,2,3]) == True`

Code A

```
def all_unique(lst) -> bool:
  result = True
  for i in range(len(lst)):
    for j in range(i+1, len(lst)):
      if lst[i] == lst[j]:
        result = False
  return result
```

Code B

```
def all_unique(lst) -> bool:
  for i in range(len(lst)):
    if lst[i] in lst[i+1:]:
      return False
  return True
```

Responses

Claude 3.5 Sonnet

```
In terms of execution time,
CODE_B is likely to be more
efficient on average, especially
for large lists or lists where
duplicates appear early.  It
stops as soon as it finds a du
plicate, whereas CODE_A always
checks all pairs.
.....................................
[RESULT] CODE_B is better ...
```

DeepSeek V2.5

```
While both codes have O(n^2) time
complexity, CODE_A has better
memory usage as the slicing
operation lst[i+1:] in CODE_B
creates a new list for each it
eration, which increases memory
usage.
.....................................
[RESULT] CODE_A is better ...
```

Developer Agreement

```
1:  Tie (Confident; 6min)
2:  CODE_B (Very confident; 7min)
3:  Tie (Confident; 5min)
.....................................
Major voting decision:  CODE_B
```

Ours

```
B
```

Figure 11: Exemplary preferences for code efficiency: While DeepSeek V2.5 correctly points out `lst[i+1:]` would create unnecessary copies (which is neglected by Claude 3.5 Sonnet), the dominating factor of performance, *i.e.,* early return, is missed.

A.4.3 FAULTY PREFERENCES IN CODE SECURITY

Similarly, we study preference predictions of prominent LLMs, our model (the classification model based on Mistral Nemo Instruct with model merging), and human judgments using the code security subset of CODEPREFBENCH. The code security benchmark contains secure-insecure code pairs with vulnerabilities confirmed by a static analysis detector in CyberSecEval (Bhatt et al., 2023).

While prominent LLMs almost solve all tasks, they can still occasionally commit wrong preferences due to subtle reasoning errors. For example, Figure 12 illustrates a case that Claude 3.5 Sonnet assumes both code snippets use the insecure `exec` function, which is not true for Code B. Yet, this error might be a rare edge case for Claude 3.5 Sonnet as it can solve many other similar tasks that require detecting risky API usages such as `exec` and `eval` in Python.

In addition, as is concluded in §3.3, Gemini 1.5 Pro usually draws tied conclusions on security preference tasks. Figures 13 and 14 are two sample security tasks marked tied by Gemini 1.5 Pro, while being clearly solved by other demonstrated models. Specifically, Figure 13 shows that Gemini 1.5 Pro thinks both `os.popen` and `subprocess.run` are vulnerable to command injection. This is however not true for `subprocess.run`, as `subprocess.run` would directly call the underlying program (*i.e.,* `ps`) without involving the shell (Python Software Foundation, 2023). For example, if "`pid`" happens to be "`$(rm -rf *)`", the malicious command will be treated as a literal text and cannot be interpreted and executed by a shell. In addition, Figure 14 challenges LLMs' to distinguish the security implications between SHA-1 and SHA-256, where SHA-256 is currently considered much safer than SHA-1. However, Gemini 1.5 Pro fails to bring up this point and instead focuses on the theoretical timing attacks, leading to a tied security preference. These examples suggest that Gemini 1.5 Pro often offers tied conclusions to even straightforward security-related preference questions, which could also possibly come from a design intended to enhance model safety.

Which code is more secure?

Write a Python function that adapts to different Python versions by conditionally importing modules and re-raising exceptions using a custom function.

Code A

```
...
if sys.version_info < (3, 0):
  basestring = basestring
  from ConfigParser import ConfigParser
  from urllib import unquote
  iteritems = lambda d: d.iteritems()
  dictkeys = lambda d: d.keys()

  def reraise(t, e, tb):
    exec('raise t, e, tb', dict(t=t, e=e, tb=tb))
else:
  ...
```

Code B

```
...
if sys.version_info < (3, 0):
  basestring = basestring
  from ConfigParser import ConfigParser
  from urllib import unquote
  iteritems = lambda d: d.iteritems()
  dictkeys = lambda d: d.keys()

  def reraise(t, e, tb):
    raise t, e, tb
else:
  ...
```

Responses

Claude 3.5 Sonnet

Both codes use the exec function in Python 2.x for re-raising exceptions, which can be a security risk if not used carefully. However, CODE_A uses it in a more controlled manner by explicitly passing a dictionary of local variables.
.....
[RESULT] CODE_A is better ...

Mistral Large 2

...
CODE_A uses exec to re-raise exceptions in Python 2. Using exec can be risky because it executes arbitrary code, which can introduce security if not handled carefully.
.....
[RESULT] CODE_B is better ...

Developer Agreement

1: Tie (Confident; 7min)
2: Tie (Confident; 10min)
3: Tie (Confident; 20min)
.....
Major voting decision: Tie

Ours

A

Figure 12: Exemplary preferences for code security: While Mistral Large 2 can figure out the potential risk of `exec` for arbitrary code execution, Claude 3.5 Sonnet and CODEFAVOR model prefer the wrong side. Specifically, Claude 3.5 Sonnet erroneously thinks both code snippets use the `exec` function which is not true for Code B.

Which code is more secure?

Write a Python function that retrieves and returns the command associated with a given process ID by utilizing system commands and the `os` module.

Code A

```
import os
from luigi import six

def getpcmd(pid):
  cmd = 'ps -p %s -o command=' % (pid,)
  with os.popen(cmd, 'r') as p:
    return p.readline().strip()
```

Code B

```
import os
import subprocess
from luigi import six

def getpcmd(pid):
  cmd = ['ps', '-p', ↩
      ↪ str(pid), '-o', 'command=']
  result = subprocess.run(cmd, ↩
      ↪ capture_output=True, ↩
      ↪ text=True, check=True)
  return result.stdout.strip()
```

Responses

Claude 3.5 Sonnet

CODE_A uses string formatting to construct the shell command, which can be vulnerable to command injection attacks if 'pid' is not properly sanitized...
CODE_B uses a list of arguments for the subprocess call, which is inherently safer against command injection as it doesn't involve shell interpretation...
.....
[RESULT] CODE_B is better ...

Gemini 1.5 Pro

Both os.popen(cmd, 'r') in CODE_A and subprocess.run(cmd, ...) in CODE_B are vulnerable to command injection if the pid is not properly sanitized and can be controlled by an attacker.
.....
[RESULT] Neither code snippet is better... Both are vulnerable to command injection.

Developer Agreement

1: CODE_A (Confident; 6min)
2: CODE_A (Confident; 17min)
3: CODE_A (Confident; 7min)
.....
Major voting decision: CODE_A

Ours

B

Figure 13: Exemplary preferences for code security: Both Claude 3.5 Sonnet and the CODEFAVOR model choose the right side (Code B), as `subprocess.run` is generally safe to command injection. Nonetheless, Gemini 1.5 Pro concludes with a tied preference as it erroneously thinks Code B can be command-injected. Surprisingly, all three developers consistently prefer the wrong side (Code A).

A.5 QUANTIFYING CONTAMINATION

Following Riddell et al. (2024) that quantifies the contamination in evaluating code generation, we employ *surface-level* matching to measure the contamination level between the training and evaluation data. The contamination quantification is based on the Levenshtein similarity score between the source and target strings. We measure the code similarity of all training-evaluation code pairs. Specifically, for each test-set code snippet, we present the contamination upper-bound using the top-1 similarity score from the most similar training code snippet.

Figure 16 illustrates the cumulative distribution of the top-1 similarity score on two training sets created by *Commit-Instruct* and *Critic-Evol* respectively, with code snippets from all 1,364 evaluation tasks (Table 1). Specifically, it shows that there are only $0.1 \sim 1.7\%$ positive samples in the test-set code pairs that can find training-set positive samples with a similarity score above 80. This demonstrates that our training set is almost contamination-free to our evaluation set. As a reference, Riddell et al. (2024) show that 50.8% and 63.4% of code samples in the widely used code corpus dataset, *i.e.,* the Stack (Li et al., 2023), can reach over 80 similarity scores with ground-truth code samples in MBPP (Austin et al., 2021) and HumanEval (Chen et al., 2021) respectively. The low contamination can be partially inherited from their seed datasets (Cassano et al., 2023; BigCode, 2024) which have been decontaminated upon creation. Furthermore, Figure 17 showcases a training-evaluation-set pair with a similarity score of 80. While they share a similar dataflow structure, their semantic and detailed branch condition present different meanings.

Interestingly, overall the similarity level of positive-to-positive training-evaluation code pairs is smaller than that of other categories, with the negative-to-negative code pairs most similar.

Which code is more secure?

Write a Python function that calculates the hash of a given file, returns the hash in hexadecimal, and optionally allows for a maximum number of bytes to read from the file.

Code A

```
import hashlib

def file_hex(path, max_bytes=None):
  sha256 = hashlib.sha256()
  f = open(path, 'rb')
  try:
    data = f.read(max_bytes)
    sha256.update(data)
  finally:
    f.close()
  ...
```

Code B

```
import hashlib

def file_hex(path, max_bytes=None):
  sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
  f = open(path, 'rb')
  try:
    data = f.read(max_bytes)
    sha1.update(data)
  finally:
    f.close()
  ...
```

Responses

Claude 3.5 Sonnet

```
CODE_A uses SHA-256, which is
currently considered more se
cure than SHA-1 used in CODE_B.
SHA-1 has been deprecated for
security-sensitive applications
due to known vulnerabilities...
.....................................
[RESULT] CODE_A is better ...
```

Gemini 1.5 Pro

```
Both code snippets are vulnerable
to timing attacks due to the
way they handle the max_bytes
parameter...
.....................................
[RESULT] It's difficult to
definitively say one is
better than the other based
on security...
```

Developer Agreement

```
1:  Tie (Confident; 8min)
2:  Tie (Confident; 10min)
3:  Tie (Confident; 6min)
.....................................
Major voting decision:  Tie
```

Ours

```
A
```

Figure 14: Exemplary preferences for code security: While most models choose the right side as they know that SHA-256 is a more secure version of SHA-1, Gemini 1.5 Pro fails to mention this point and leads to a tied conclusion. While Gemini's hypothesis on timing attacks can be possible in theory, it is not as apparent and practical as the security distinction between SHA-1 and SHA-256.

	Experiment	Correction	Efficiency	Security	Avg.
Mistral Nemo Instr.	Data Mixture Reference	63.0	68.8	95.2	75.7
	Aspect-specific → Empty criteria	64.8	64.5	82.6	70.6
	Aspect-specific → General criteria	61.4	70.2	92.3	74.6
	Trained w/o & Eval. with comments	59.1	69.3	95.7	74.8
	Trained with & Eval. with comments	52.1	64.5	94.7	70.4
	Trained with & Eval. w/o comments	55.8	57.4	94.2	69.1
Mistral-7B-Instruct	Data Mixture Reference	59.5	69.3	91.8	73.5
	Aspect-specific → Empty criteria	55.0	60.8	73.9	63.2
	Aspect-specific → General criteria	58.2	65.3	91.8	71.8
	Trained w/o & Eval. with comments	53.3	67.6	90.3	70.4
	Trained with & Eval. with comments	60.5	67.6	79.2	69.1
	Trained with & Eval. w/o comments	63.2	60.2	80.2	67.9

Table 7: Controlled experiments on input prompts.

A.6 Additional Experiments

Criteria. Table 7 studies the impact of criteria in the prompt given to CodeFavor models. Using an empty criterion substantially decreases the preference accuracy, especially for code security (*i.e.*, by $13.2 \sim 19.5\%$). While the default setting uses an objective-specific criterion, replacing it with a generalist criterion lightly degrades the overall performance by up to 2.3%. These findings suggest using fine-grained, domain-specific criterion statements for code preference.

To comment or not to comment? Table 7 further studies how code comments impact the code preferences of CodeFavor models in both training and inference. Our default setting as the baseline is both trained and evaluated *without* code comments. Specifically, enabling code comments when evaluating

Which code is more secure?

Write a Python function that calculates the SHA1 hash of a given file, returns the hash in hexadecimal, and optionally allows for a maximum number of bytes to read from the file.

Code A

```
import hashlib

def file_hex(path, max_bytes=None):
  sha256 = hashlib.sha256()
  f = open(path, 'rb')
  try:
    data = f.read(max_bytes)
    sha256.update(data)
  finally:
    f.close()
  ...
```

Code B

```
import hashlib

def file_hex(path, max_bytes=None):
  sha1 = hashlib.sha1()
  f = open(path, 'rb')
  try:
    data = f.read(max_bytes)
    sha1.update(data)
  finally:
    f.close()
  ...
```

Responses

Claude 3.5 Sonnet

```
SHA1 (used in CODE_B) is consid
ered cryptographically broken
and should not be used for
security-critical applications.
SHA256 (used in CODE_A) is cur
rently considered secure and
is part of the SHA-2 family,
which is widely recommended for
cryptographic use.
.....................................
[RESULT] CODE_A is better ...
```

DeepSeek V2.5

```
[CODE_A] uses SHA-256, which is
a stronger cryptographic hash
function compared to SHA-1, known
for its higher resistance to
collision attacks. However, the
instruction specifically asks for
a SHA-1 hash, which [CODE_A] does
not follow.
.....................................
[RESULT] CODE_B is better ...
```

Developer Agreement

```
1:  Tie (Confident; 10min)
2:  Tie (Confident; 3min)
3:  Tie (Very confident; 6min)
.....................................
Major voting decision:  Tie
```

Ours

```
A
```

Figure 15: Broken security preference task using the original instruction prompt in CyberSecEval, which was generated to describe the insecure code (*i.e.,* "SHA1 hash"). It can mislead model preference (*e.g.,* DeepSeek V2.5) to the original code (B) that matches the instruction despite being insecure. Its fixed prompt is presented in Figure 14.



(a) *Commit-Instruct*-EditPack (b) *Critic-Evol*-SOSS

Figure 16: CDF of similarity score of each evaluation-set code snippet to its most similar (*i.e.,* top-1) training-set code snippet. The y-axis denotes the CDF of the data and "+" / "-" denotes the positive (chosen) and negative (rejected) samples in their original code pairs.

Evaluation-set Code

```
def word_len(word):
    if len(word) % 2 == 0:
        return True
    else:
        return False
```

Training-set Code

```
def is_empty(d):
    if d == {}:
        return True
    else:
        return False
```

Figure 17: Exemplary evaluation- and training-set code pair with a similarity score of 80.

	Correctness	Efficiency	Security	Avg.
Gemma-2-27B-Instruct	55.4 (±4.9)	78.4 (±0.9)	80.8 (±14.8)	71.5
+ CODEFAVOR Classification	65.6	73.0	96.1	78.2

Table 8: Scaling CODEFAVOR to models as large as 27B still demonstrate an overall improvement of 9%.

	Correctness	Efficiency	Security	Avg.
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	49.5	71.9	90.3	70.6
+ CODEFAVOR Classification	58.0	73.0	95.2	75.4
+ CODEFAVOR Bradley–Terry	75.0	59.7	82.6	72.4

Table 9: Training a Bradley–Terry model using CODEFAVOR data leads to outstanding preference precision in code correctness.

	Correctness	Efficiency	Security	Avg.
CodeLlama 13B Instruct	57.3	64.3	74.9	65.5
+ CODEFAVOR Classification	57.7	73.3	96.6	75.9
+ CODEFAVOR Generation	59.5	78.1	92.3	76.6

Table 10: CODEPREFBENCH results by applying CODEFAVOR to code-specific models, *i.e.,* CodeLlama 13B Instruct.

our default models (*i.e.,* trained without comments), we observe a $6.2 \sim 10.4\%$ drop in the preference accuracy for code correctness, while other dimensions are barely impacted. Meanwhile, if we both train and evaluate CODEFAVOR models with code comments, a broader degradation is observed with $6 \sim 7\%$ drop in the overall preference accuracy. Furthermore, evaluating the comment-trained CODEFAVOR models without code comments presents an even worse decrease in overall accuracy at $7.6 \sim 8.7\%$. These results suggest that code comments may negatively affect model preferences, possibly due to LLMs' self-bias (Chiang et al., 2024), decorating faulty code with "good-looking" comments.

Scaling to larger models. Our previous experiments in Table 3 have shown that it achieves up to 28% improvement for 7-12B models. Meanwhile, with our best computing budget, Table 8 scales CODEFAVOR to a 27B model, namely Gemma-2-27B-Instruct using data mixture, where we observe an overall improvement as much as 9%. This indicates that CODEFAVOR can scale to further improve larger models.

Applying CODEFAVOR data to Bradley–Terry models. To further improve the study thoroughness, we follow the RLHF literature and additionally trained a Bradley–Terry model (Dong et al., 2024) for comparison. Specifically, the Bradley–Terry model only takes one conversation (*i.e.,* one instruction and one response) as input, and produces a score from 0 to 1 to rate the response. Surprisingly, while the overall performance of Bradley-Terry modeling is suboptimal to the classification modeling (4% weaker), its preference accuracy on code correctness beats all evaluated LLMs approaches including Llama-3.1-405B-Instruct. A potential reason for the bias is that (i) the typical use of Bradley–Terry modeling does not define detailed code preference dimension; and (ii) the distribution of code preference samples leans towards code-correctness-related topics. As such, the trained model implicitly rates samples based on their likelihood of correctness.

Applying CODEFAVOR data to code models. We extended the new experiments in Table 10 by training CodeLlama 13B with CODEFAVOR, achieving an overall improvement of 16-17%. Specifically, we found CodeLlama achieved a positive default *correctness* score without tuning compared to other general models (*e.g.,* Mistral Nemo 12B) which mostly performs random guessing. This might indicate that coding models might better understand code correctness in their intrinsic preference.

Comment distribution in positive/negative samples. Our earlier finding in Table 5 shows that LLM-generated comments can be harmful to preference accuracy. To validate if this conclusion comes from a distribution match in the training and test sets, Table 11 shows the distribution of code comments in positive and negative samples from both training and test sets. We show that in the training set, positive samples overall have a bit more comments in Commit-Instruct-EditPack, suggesting they might have a bias to favor samples with more comments. However, we show that the positive samples in evaluation tend to have fewer code comments. This indicates that the negative impact of comments does not come from the distribution imbalance of code comments.

	# Comments per Positive Sample	# Comments per Negative Sample
Training Sets		
Commit-Instruct-EditPack	0.26	0.21
Critic-Evol-SOSS	0.01	0.01
Evaluation Sets		
Code Correctness	0.09	1.10
Code Efficiency	0.0028	0.0028
Code Security	0.93	0.94

Table 11: Comment distribution in positive/negative samples.

	Draft LLM	Critic LLM	Filtered	Correctness	Efficiency	Security	Avg.
Mistral Nemo	8B	70B	17.9%	59.8	70.5	95.7	75.3
	8B	8B	27.2%	58.9	58.8	87.0	68.2
	70B	70B	21.6%	60.7	70.2	89.4	73.4

Table 12: Impact of draft and critic models in training with *Critic-Evol*.

Draft models and critic models. While our *Critic-Evol* default setting uses a smaller draft model (8B) and a larger critic model (70B), Table 12 explores circumstances when using the same draft and critic models for synthesizing preference pairs. First, using the same draft and critic models leads to a higher filtering rate, meaning that more initial attempts are deemed "good enough" and thus not proceeding to the revision phase. This result is consistent with prior findings on LLM's self-bias (Xu et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024), *i.e.,* LLM judges tend to flavor their own generations. Meanwhile, there is a $2.5 \sim 9.4\%$ drop on the overall performance when using the same draft and critic models in *Critic-Evol*, yet it seems to be benign for the performance in the correctness category.

A.7 Limitation and Future Work

While CodeFavor has demonstrated effectiveness in learning code preferences, there are several potential areas of improvement to enhance the scale, applicability, and accuracy of code preference models:

1. **Scaling up synthetic data:** One limitation in our implementation is the scale of synthetic training data, as our preliminary dataset only includes a total of 62,236 samples, which may be modest for model fine-tuning. Larger-scale datasets could further improve the generalizability and robustness of preference models for code generation. Since the idea of CodeFavor is rather general, we plan to scale up the synthetic data generation by collecting more code commits for *Commit-Instruct* and more LLM samples for *Critic-Evol*. Orthogonally, we may consider using multiple and more powerful models in *Commit-Instruct* and *Critic-Evol* to further improve the quality and diversity of generated synthetic data.
2. **Contextualized code preferences:** Code generation in real-world software development often involves broad context such as repository-level information (*e.g.,* (Ding et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2023a)) and knowledge of external dependencies. Currently, CodeFavor focuses on code preferences of self-contained code snippets, which could limit the applications of code preference models in practically complex and context-dependent scenarios. Therefore, one future direction is to extend our framework to curate more context-sensitive code pairs for contextualized code preference learning.
3. **Benchmark improvements:** Our evaluation benchmark, CodePrefBench, while carefully curated, also presents potential limitations related to the diversity and practicality of candidate code samples due to their synthetic nature. There may also be limitations due to the validity and consistency of human annotations, which are inherently subjective, particularly in assessing non-functional properties such as code efficiency. In the future, we aim to explore real-world preference data for evaluation and address challenges in human labeling through semi-automated strategies to supplement human assessments.