Learning not to Regret

David Sychrovsky, Michal Sustr, Elnaz Davoodi, Marc Lanctot, Martin Schmid

Abstract: Regret minimization is a key component of many algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in imperfect-information games. To scale to games that cannot fit in memory, we can use search with value functions. However, calling the value functions repeatedly in search can be expensive. Therefore, it is desirable to minimize regret in the search tree as fast as possible. We propose to accelerate the regret minimization by introducing a general ``learning not to regret'' framework, where we meta-learn the regret minimizer. The resulting algorithm is guaranteed to minimize regret in arbitrary settings and is (meta)-learned to converge fast on a selected distribution of games. Our experiments show that meta-learned algorithms converge substantially faster than prior regret minimization algorithms.