Ad vs Organic: Revisiting Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design in E-commerce Platforms

Ningyuan Li, Yunxuan Ma, Yang Zhao, Qian Wang, Zhilin Zhang, Chuan Yu, Jian Xu, Bo Zheng, Xiaotie Deng

Abstract: On typical e-commerce platforms, a product can be displayed to users in two possible forms, as an ad item or an organic item. Usually, ad and organic items are separately selected by the advertising system and recommendation system, and then combined by a content merging mechanism. Although the design of the content merging mechanism has been extensively studied, little attention has been given to a crucial situation where there is an overlap between candidate ad and organic items. Despite its common occurrence, this situation is not correctly handled by almost all existing works, potentially leading to incentive problems for advertisers and the violation of economic constraints. To address these issues, we revisit the design of the content merging mechanism. We introduce a necessary property called form stability, and provide simplification results of the mechanism design problem. Furthermore, we design two simple mechanisms strictly ensuring desired economic properties including incentive compatibility, and demonstrate their guaranteed performance through competitive ratio analysis under certain conditions.