Interbank Lending Games

Jinyun Tong, Bart De Keijzer, Haoxiang Wang, Carmine Ventre

Keywords: Potential Game, Infinite Strategy Space, Pure Nash Equilibrium, Best-response Dynamics

Abstract: We define and study a lending game to model the interbank money market, in which lending banks strategically allocate their cash to borrowing banks. The interest rate offered by each borrowing bank is within the interest rate corridor set by the central bank and ultimately depends on the demand and the supply of cash in the interbank market. Lending banks naturally aim to maximise the income coming from the interest repayments. In its purest form, this is an infinite-strategy game that we show to be an exact potential game which has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We then define and solve a constrained optimisation problem and propose a strongly polynomial-time algorithm to compute this Nash equilibrium. We also study some variants of best-response dynamics of this lending game, showing that they converge to the Nash equilibrium in both discrete and continuous-time scenarios.

Area: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms (GTEP)

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Submission Number: 1138