SALIENT CONDITIONAL DIFFUSION FOR BACKDOORS

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ABSTRACT

We propose a novel algorithm, **Salient Conditional Diffusion** (**Sancdifi**), a state-of-the-art defense against backdoor attacks. **Sancdifi** uses a diffusion model (DDPM) to degrade an image with noise and then recover it. Critically, we compute saliency map-based masks to condition our diffusion, allowing for stronger diffusion on the most salient pixels by the DDPM. As a result, **Sancdifi** is highly effective at diffusing out triggers in data poisoned by backdoor attacks. At the same time, it reliably recovers salient features when applied to clean data. **Sancdifi** is a black-box defense, requiring no access to the Trojan network parameters.



Figure 1: **Sancdifi**: Given a possibly backdoor attacked image, we compute saliency maps via RISE, and use the top-5 class maps to construct a mask, $\boldsymbol{A}$. Notice the trigger is left unmasked. We then apply diffusion purification (DP) conditioned with the saliency mask. Following this, we reapply DP using the reverse mask, $\boldsymbol{I} - \boldsymbol{A}$. **Sancdifi** diffuses out the trigger without large degradation.

1 INTRODUCTION

As machine learning develops, attention is being given to sophisticated attacks aligning closely to practical use cases. We consider backdoor attacks, like *BadNet* (Gu et al., 2017), that are challenging to defend against (Li et al., 2020). The attack poisons data with a visual trigger so that a malicious classifier will purposefully misclassify it, allowing an adversary to hack with precision. In this work, we:

1. Propose a novel defense against backdoor attacks, **Sancdifi**, that *purifies* input by diffusing and denoising it with a diffusion model (DDPM) conditioned on a mask derived from saliency maps.
2. Establish state-of-the-art performance among backdoor defense algorithms. While **Sancdifi** is a black-box defense algorithm, it achieves performance competitive with state-of-the-art white-box defenses such as adversarial retraining (Madry et al., 2017) and fine-pruning (Liu et al., 2018a).

1.1 RELATED WORK

Backdoor Attacks Surveyed in TrojanZOO (Pang et al., 2022), there are several types of defenses against backdoor attacks. There are black-box input reformation defenses like our algorithm, down-



Figure 2: **Upper Left: Sancdifi** defense against BadNet attacks on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 for ResNet-50. Top/bottom rows display our method operating on clean/BadNet attacked images. **Right:** Computed saliency masks. Each column displays; the top class saliency map, the computed saliency mask, and the post-**Sancdifi** saliency map. We have removed the trigger and its saliency.

Algorithm 1 Salient Conditional Diffusion algorithm with image $\boldsymbol{x}$, Trojan network f, N RISE masks, timesteps $\{T_1, T_2\}$, saliency percentile cutoff d, and r of top-r performance.

$\mathbb{C} \leftarrow$ top-k$(f(\boldsymbol{x}), r)$ indices
$\mathbb{S} \leftarrow \{$RISE$(\boldsymbol{x}, f, N, c), \quad c \in \mathbb{C}\}$ ▷ see (Petsiuk et al., 2018) for RISE algorithm
$\boldsymbol{M} \leftarrow \{\boldsymbol{S}_i \leq percentile(\boldsymbol{S}_i, d), \quad \boldsymbol{S}_i \in \mathbb{S}\}$
$\boldsymbol{A} \leftarrow \prod_i \boldsymbol{M}_i, \quad \boldsymbol{M}_i \in \boldsymbol{M}$
for i in $\{1, 2\}$ **do**
  $\boldsymbol{z} \leftarrow$ sample $q(\boldsymbol{x}_{T_i}|\boldsymbol{x}_0)$
  $\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{T_i} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{A}\boldsymbol{x}_0 + (\boldsymbol{I} - \boldsymbol{A})\boldsymbol{z}$
  for t in $\{T_i, T_i - 1, ..., 0\}$ **do**
    $\boldsymbol{z} \leftarrow$ sample $p(\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{T_i-1}|\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{T_i})$ ▷ trained DDPM parameterizing $p(\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{T-1}|\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_T)$
    $\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{T_i-1} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{A}\hat{\boldsymbol{x}}_{T_i} + (\boldsymbol{I} - \boldsymbol{A})\boldsymbol{z}$
  $\boldsymbol{A} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{I} - \boldsymbol{A}$

sampling (DS) (Xu et al., 2018), and manifold projection (MP) (Meng & Chen, 2017). State-of-the-art defenses include two model sanitization defenses, adversarial retraining (AR) (Madry et al., 2017) and fine-pruning (FP) (Liu et al., 2018a). These alter the Trojan model and are white-box.

Diffusion Models DDPMs (Ho et al., 2020) are a recent popular generative model. Of interest, Nie et al. (2022) and Wu et al. (2022) both proposed *diffusion purification*, using DDPMs to defend against PGD attacks. Consider that a defense for PGD attacks is not necessarily valid for backdoor attacks (Weng et al., 2020). Others have guided DDPMs with deep features (Dhariwal & Nichol, 2021; Voynov et al., 2022) Unlike these methods, our work does not require user input, such as class.

2 Salient Conditional Diffusion for Backdoor Defense

To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to propose the use of diffusion models (DDPMs) as a defense against backdoor attacks. The main novel contribution of **Sancdifi** is the use of saliency masks for conditioning diffusion purification. We begin by stating our attack model.

Backdoor Attack Model Figure 1, illustrating the salient conditional diffusion process, displays a typical BadNet trigger, a small 3x3 patch. Concretely, a backdoor trigger is a pattern, $p(\boldsymbol{x})$, that

Table 1: **Sancdifi** (SD) results on BadNet for ResNet-50. Our metrics include clean accuracy reduction (CAR) and attack success rate (ASR) for top-1 and top-5 class performance. The other algorithms are defined in Section 1.1. **Sancdifi** outperforms the other black-box algorithms, manifold projection (MP) and down-sampling (DU). Our algorithm CAR outperforms adversarial retraining (AR), while our top-1 ASR is competitive with both adversarial retraining and fine-pruning (FP).

		Backdoor Defenses								
		top-1					top-5			
Dataset	**Metric**	**SD**	AR	FP	MP	DU	**SD**	AR	FP	MP
CIFAR-10	CAR	2.0	6.0	-1.0	-1.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	ASR	12.0	9.0	36.0	100.0	100.0	55.0	41.0	95.0	100.0
CIFAR-100	CAR	18.0	20.0	15.0	6.0	21.0	11.0	11.0	5.0	3.0
	ASR	0.0	1.0	1.0	33.0	98.0	7.0	4.0	3.0	91.0
Tiny ImageNet	CAR	7.0	27.0	0.0	2.0	16.0	5.0	28.0	0.0	1.0
	ASR	3.0	0.0	1.0	99.0	99.0	7.0	2.0	6.0	99.0

may depend on the data, $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{R}^d$, as well as hyperparameters such as transparency. Trojan networks are trained to handle both poisoned data and clean data. The clean data is associated with a label, y, while the target label for poisoned data is t. In this work, we use BadNet (Gu et al., 2017) and TrojanNN (Liu et al., 2018b) as our attack models. In BadNet, the trigger $\boldsymbol{r}$ is fixed, while TrojanNN optimizes the pixel colors of the trigger to maximize certain neuron activations.

Methodology Now we describe the **Sancdifi** algorithm, summarized in Algorithm 1 and Figure 1. A core component of our algorithm is the use of saliency to condition diffusion. To be clear, a saliency map $\boldsymbol{S}_k$ for a given image $\boldsymbol{x}$, class k, and classifier network f measures the importance of each pixel of $\boldsymbol{x}$. This importance is relative to $f's$ determination of the k-class probability of $\boldsymbol{x}$. We compute saliency maps using the black-box RISE algorithm (Petsiuk et al., 2018).

Given input image $\boldsymbol{x}$, **Sancdifi** starts by computing the RISE saliency maps of $\boldsymbol{x}$ for the top r classes determined by the Trojan network f_θ. Examples of RISE saliency maps can be seen in the right of Figure 2. The most probable saliency map for clean images highlights meaningful areas. In contrast, the top saliency map for BadNet-poisoned images has the strongest response on the trigger. From the saliency map $\boldsymbol{S}_k$, we threshold the top d percentile of values to create a k-class saliency mask, $\boldsymbol{M}_k$. We desire robust performance over different metrics such as top-5 accuracy. With that in mind, given the set of masks for the top-r most probable classes $\mathbb{S}_{\boldsymbol{M}}$, we can define a composite saliency mask $\boldsymbol{A}$ as their elementwise product. Formal definitions are visible in Algorithm 1.

We use $\boldsymbol{A}$ to condition our diffusion processes. Intuitively, the composite mask ignores all but the most salient pixels of the most likely classes. Our method of diffusion is taken from OpenAI's improved-diffusion DDPM (Nichol & Dhariwal, 2021). Given a trained DDPM, there is an associated conditional distribution for forward diffusion, $q(\boldsymbol{x}_t|\boldsymbol{x}_0)$, and the learned prior distribution for backward diffusion, $p(\boldsymbol{x}_{t-1}|\boldsymbol{x}_t)$. For brevity, we omit their definitions referring the reader to Nichol & Dhariwal (2021). The diffusion conditioned with mask is formalized in Algorithm 1. Following the first diffusion purification step, we reapply diffusion purification using the complement of our salient mask, $\boldsymbol{I} - \boldsymbol{A}$, with time $\hat{t}$ where $\hat{t} < t$. Our reason for doing this is to safeguard against other attacks with support across the entire image.

3 Numerical Experiments

With our algorithm defined, we outline the setting of our experiments. We concern ourselves with image classification in the presence of backdoor attacks. We use three **datasets**: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, (Krizhevsky et al., 2009), and Tiny-ImageNet (Le & Yang, 2015). Any metrics reported are for the dataset validation subsets. Additionally, we use three **architectures**; ResNet-50 (He et al., 2016), EfficientNet-B7 (Tan & Le, 2019), and a transformer ViT-Base-16 (Dosovitskiy et al., 2020).

Figure 3: We display a clean image, it purified with **Sancdifi**, and the attacked image purified with **Sancdifi** and DiffPure respectively. Without salient conditioning, the face in the image is destroyed.

Concerning our algorithm, we use pretrained DDPMs from OpenAI's improved-diffusion repository (Nichol & Dhariwal, 2021). For the CIFAR datasets, we diffuse out to 300 time steps for the first diffusion purification. For Tiny-ImageNet, we use 450 time steps as we find that it is needed to sufficiently defend against BadNet attacks. For the second diffusion purification step using the complement mask, $\boldsymbol{I} - \boldsymbol{A}$, we diffuse out to 100 time steps. Our backdoor attacks are generated using the TrojanZoo suite (Pang et al., 2022) with their default parameters. Regarding saliency, the number of binary masks used to compute RISE maps was set at 2000. For the saliency thresholding cutoff, we set a value of 95%. The composite saliency map is aggregated across the top-5 classes to align us with top-5 validation metrics. We compare with the other defenses stated in Section 1.1.

Performance on BadNet Attack Table 1 contains the results of defending against BadNet attacks on ResNet-50 using **Sancdifi**. Performance is given in terms of clean accuracy reduction (CAR) and attack success rate (ASR). While we focus mainly on top-1 classification accuracy, we include top-5 classification results. To be clear, CAR denotes the reduction in accuracy on clean images after applying the defense. Intuitively, we desire CAR and ASR to be low. Clearly **Sancdifi** outperforms the other black-box defenses. Additionally, its competitive with adversarial retraining and fine-pruning. The winner among our method and the last two is largely a question of the tradeoffs between CAR and ASR as well as top-1 and top-5 performance. Importantly, its black-box style gives our defense wider applicability. The **Sancdifi** defense is visible in Figure 2. The BadNet trigger has clearly been diffused after purification. In contrast, the other salient regions of the images not covered by salient mask $\boldsymbol{A}$ have been reliably recovered by the DDPM.

To further validate our performance, we repeat the previous experiment for our other architectures on the CIFAR-100 dataset. The results can be found in Table 2 in the Appendix. The behavior is similar to Table 1, showing that our performance generalizes to various classes of neural networks. We also show that our performance generalizes to other backdoor and adversarial attacks in Table 3.

Impact of Saliency Masks Naively, one might assume that vanilla diffusion purification a la DiffPure (Nie et al., 2022) is sufficient against backdoor attacks. Table 4 in the Appendix provides results on ResNet-50 where we have performed no salient thresholding and omit the second diffusion purification step. Strikingly, CAR is much higher without salient masking. Notably, DiffPure at 30% has the highest CAR across all defenses for the CIFAR-100 dataset. A comparison of the output with and without salient conditioning is visible in Figure 3. We can see that while it is not the most salient, the masked part of the image offers a strong prior for the DDPM. This prior allows us to reliably recover the unmasked part of the image excluding the backdoor trigger. The mask prevents image-wide degradation that we can see in DiffPure. The second diffusion purification step with the mask complement is necessary to safeguard against backdoor attacks with larger triggers such as Invisible BadNet. This attack has image-wide support and is L_∞-bounded to prevent perceptability.

4 Conclusion and Future Work

Salient conditional diffusion, **Sancdifi**, is a state-of-the-art defense against backdoor attacks with wide generalization. It is a black-box defense with the performance of white-box defenses like adversarial retraining. Salient conditioning plays a major role in diffusing out backdoor triggers while preventing massive degradation to other parts of an image. We believe conditional diffusion will play a strong role in the future in defending against backdoor attacks.

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A APPENDIX

Table 2: **Sancdifi** (SD) defense results on BadNet for CIFAR100 for other networks. Other methods and metrics defined are in Table 1. Our performance extends to architectures beyond ResNet-50, with top-1 ASR comparable to white-box defenses, adversarial retraining and fine-pruning.

		Backdoor Defenses								
		top-1					top-5			
Network	**Metric**	**SD**	AR	FP	MP	DU	**SD**	AR	FP	MP
Efficient-Net	CAR	16.0	26.0	18.0	-2.0	10.0	5.0	11.0	6.0	1.0
	ASR	1.0	0.0	1.0	6.0	95.0	13.0	8.0	2.0	17.0
ViT	CAR	26.0	15.0	1.0	2.0	4.0	10.0	5.0	0.0	0.0
	ASR	1.0	1.0	1.0	76.0	100.0	18.0	3.0	10.0	99.0

Table 3: **Sancdifi** (SD) defense results on other backdoor attacks for CIFAR-100 and ResNet-50. We also include PGD attacks. Clearly, our algorithm can handle other backdoor attacks such as TrojanNN as well as the traditional PGD attack. So **Sancdifi** can be used for both backdoor and adversarial robustness. Our worst scenario is the image-wide Invisible BadNet attack, though we can resolve this by running the second diffusion for longer than 100 steps.

		Backdoor Defenses								
		top-1					top-5			
Attack	**Metric**	**SD**	AR	FP	MP	DU	**SD**	AR	FP	MP
Invisible BadNet	CAR	5.0	14.0	-3.0	4.0	14.0	10.0	7.0	-1.0	1.0
	ASR	20.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	72.0	3.0	4.0	13.0
TrojanNN	CAR	9.0	22.0	4.0	2.0	12.0	10.0	18.0	5.0	3.0
	ASR	1.0	0.0	2.0	93.0	99.0	4.0	8.0	11.0	98.0
PGD	CAR	18.0	16.0	—	1.0	15.0	10.0	11.0	—	1.0
	ASR	0.0	8.0	—	18.0	8.0	3.0	24.0	—	53.0

Table 4: Diffusion results **without** salient conditioning for ResNet-50. This reduces to the DiffPure algorithm (Nie et al., 2022). Diffusion times are denoted relative to the maximum 1000 time steps. As diffusion time increases, ASR decreases at the cost of increased CAR. At less than 30% diffusion, ASR can become too high as in the case of Tiny-ImageNet. Yet the high diffusion leads to worse CAR. Notice that in the case of CIFAR-100, CAR is much higher at 30% than our algorithm (SD) in Table 1. Thus, saliency masking is needed.

		Diffusion Times					
		top-1			top-5		
Dataset	**Metric**	10%	20%	30%	10%	20%	30%
CIFAR-10	CAR	5.0	5.0	9.0	1.0	1.0	2.0
	ASR	90.0	14.0	11.0	100.0	63.0	61.0
CIFAR-100	CAR	13.0	31.0	47.0	2.0	15.0	31.0
	ASR	42.0	1.0	0.0	82.0	3.0	3.0
Tiny ImageNet	CAR	2.0	2.0	13.0	0.0	3.0	6.0
	ASR	99.0	47.0	9.0	99.0	53.0	15.0