DECOUPLED ALIGNMENT FOR ROBUST PLUG-AND-PLAY ADAPTATION

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ABSTRACT

Content Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language.

We introduce a low-resource safety enhancement method for aligning large language models (LLMs) without the need for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Our main idea is to exploit knowledge distillation to extract the alignment information from existing well-aligned LLMs and integrate it into unaligned LLMs in a plug-and-play fashion. Methodology, we employ delta debugging to identify the critical components of knowledge necessary for effective distillation. On the harmful question dataset, our method significantly enhances the average defense success rate by approximately 14.41%, reaching as high as 51.39%, in 17 unaligned pre-trained LLMs, without compromising performance.

1 INTRODUCTION

We introduce **D**ecoupled **A**lignment for Robust **P**lug-and-Play **A**daptation (termed DAPA), a low-resource safety enhancement method for aligning large language models (LLMs). DAPA aligns unaligned Large language models (LLMs) with ethical guidelines even without supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF).

This innovation is practically urgent and important. LLMs have been widely adopted in various applications recently, demonstrating their ability to generate high-quality human-like texts (Team et al., 2024; Touvron et al., 2023; Ivison et al., 2023). However, the security of these models has become a significant concern due to the potential risks of generating harmful content (Wu et al., 2024a; Anonymous, 2024; Yu et al., 2023a; Chao et al., 2023; Deng et al., 2023). To align the LLMs with ethical guidelines, researchers have developed various methods to enhance their safety. For example, the Llama-2-Chat (Touvron et al., 2023) and Gemma-it (Team et al., 2024) models have been extensively fine-tuned to improve their alignment performance. However, these methods often require extensive computational resources or manual red-teaming, which can be costly and time-consuming (Team et al., 2024; OpenAI, 2024; Bai et al., 2022; Ganguli et al., 2022). Thus, most of the LLMs finetuned from the pre-trained models by third-party developers do not undergo the alignment process (Xu et al., 2024a; Chiang et al., 2023; Ivison et al., 2023), leaving them vulnerable to generating harmful content by users with malicious intent. To combat these issues, we seek motivations from knowledge distillation technologies (Xu et al., 2024b; Hahn & Choi, 2019), where a teacher model's knowledge is transferred to a student model.

Specifically, through numerical experiments Figure 3 and Figure 4, we make two key detections:

- **MLP Alignment.** The alignment knowledge is stored in the Feed-Forward Network (FFN) layers, also referred to as MLP layers,
- **Gate Alignment.** Further, the gate layer within MLP layers is the key component that determines whether the model's output is aligned with ethical guidelines.

Focusing on these two key components, we propose to use memory editing technology (Meng et al., 2022a;b) to transfer alignment knowledge from one aligned LLM to another unaligned LLM within the same family. Surprisingly, by incorporating the *aligned* gate layers into *unaligned* LLMs, we dramatically improve their alignment performance. This technique differs from other alignment strategies in two aspects: computational and manual resources for model alignment through fine-tuning or reinforcement learning (Dai et al., 2024). This work provides a timely, robust and economic solution to LLM safety enhancement, aiming for more efficient and low-cost alignment.

Contribution. We present a low-resource safety enhancement method for aligning LLMs.



Figure 1: **The Alignment Example of The DAPA on The Chinese-Alpaca-7B Model.**

- Methodologically, we propose DAPA (as shown Figure 1) to enhance the security of LLMs against harmful prompts. DAPA utilizes memory editing technology to identify the memory space responsible for alignment performance. Specifically, we present a delta debugging-based search algorithm to address the challenge of pinpointing the memory space (gate layers) responsible for alignment performance. This allows us to locate the alignment-related modules for memory editing via knowledge distillation. Then, we perfrom surgery migrating alignment-related modules from one aligned model to unaligned model to achieve cheap yet effective satefy enhancement. As a result, DAPA achieves near-optimal alignment performance for LLMs without requiring extensive computational resources or fine-tuning.
- Empirically, we apply DAPA to 17 models from three popular LLM families (LLama2, Mistral, and Gemma), achieving significant safety enhancements with minimal computational effort (adapting *at most* 8.11% model parameters). Specifically, the DAPA-aligned models show an average 14.41% increase in Defense Success Rate (DSR), with one of Gemma's models achieving a dramatic increase of 51.39%. Surprisingly, we achieve this while largely maintaining the core functionalities of the models. We evaluate the models' performance using various assessment techniques, including cosine similarity scores, model perplexity, few-shot prompting, and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) methodologies. The average degradation in perplexity is only 1.69, and the average drop in model reasoning ability is only 2.59%.

Organization. §2 includes a description of knowledge editing technology in our adaption. §3 includes the algorithm to search critical memory space responsible for model alignment. §4 includes the numerical evaluation results to show the efficiency of our adaption. §5 includes a conclusion and a discussion of future directions.

RELATED WORKS

Model Alignment. With the developments of the LLMs (Team et al., 2024; Touvron et al., 2023; Bai et al., 2023a), concerns about their security have become significant (Weng & Wu, 2024; Yu et al., 2023b). Among these concerns, the potential risks of generating harmful content have attracted the most attention. To counteract the potential risks of harmful outputs, developers often engage in fine-tuning during safety training to decrease the likelihood of such outputs (Wu et al., 2024a; Touvron et al., 2023; Ganguli et al., 2022; Bai et al., 2022). Current methods for safeguarding LLMs against jailbreak attacks include Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) (Rafailov et al., 2023; Peng et al., 2023; Ouyang et al., 2022). However, these fine-tuning methods are both slow and costly. Many practitioners are exploring ways to lower the expenses associated with alignment fine-tuning (Wang et al., 2024; Yao et al., 2023b), yet costs remain substantial.

Memory Editing. Knowledge editing focuses on altering specific behaviors of LLMs (Huang et al., 2023; Meng et al., 2022a;b), and can be divided into three primary paradigms (Yao et al., 2023a). The first paradigm edits the memory during the inference stage (Wei et al., 2024; Zheng et al., 2023; Mitchell et al., 2022), employing memory retrieval or in-context learning for modifications. The second paradigm adjusts model parameters and structures during the training stage (Meng et al., 2022a;b). The third paradigm utilizes associative memory models such as the Modern Hopfield Network (Hu et al., 2024a;b;c; Wu et al., 2024b;c; Hu et al., 2023; Ramsauer et al., 2020) to edit model memory effectively. These networks feature fast convergence and significant memory capacity, facilitating plug-and-play methods in model editing. Subsequent efforts utilize knowledge editing to detoxify LLMs. Wang et al. (2024) explore the use of contextual semantics to allocate memory

space, employing memory editing techniques to adjust the relevant memory areas. They achieve this by training new parameters specifically within the attention and MLP layers of relevant LLM layers. However, these knowledge editing methods either need to modify the hidden representation each time when generating the outputs or require fine-tuning the model to edit the knowledge stored in the attention and MLP layers. Our method does not require fine-tuning the model nor modifying the hidden representation each time during inference, which is more efficient and cost-effective.

2 Memory Editing

To locate the association of ethical memory in the parameters of an autoregressive LLM, we begin by analyzing and identifying the specific hidden states that have the strongest correlation with ethical memory.



Figure 2: **The Architecture of Transformer Models.** We describe the architecture of Transformer models utilized by state-of-the-art LLMs such as Llama (Touvron et al., 2023) and Gemma (Team et al., 2024). Many of these models employ activation functions like SwiGLU (Shazeer, 2020) or GELU (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) in their MLP layers. Each Transformer block combines an attention mechanism with MLP layers (comprising Up, Gate, and Down modules). Our figure illustrates the transition of the model's hidden representation from the previous state to the next state.

An autoregressive transformer model G is a type of language model that generates text by predicting the next token in a sequence given the previous tokens. For each input $\mathbf{X}$, the model maps the input to a sequence of tokens $\mathbf{S} = [\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2, \ldots, \mathbf{s}_T] \in \mathbf{X}$, which are then fed into the transformer model. Within the transformer model, the i-th tokens are first embedded into a sequence of hidden states $h_i^{(l)}$. The final output $y = \text{decode}(h_T^{(L)})$ is generated by the decoder layer from the last hidden state.

In Figure 2, we visualize the internal computation of G as a grid of hidden states $h_i^{(l)}$. Each layer l (left $\rightarrow$ right) of the transformer model adds a self-attention mechanism $a_i^{(l)}$ and local MLP $M_i^{(l)}$ from previous layers. Recall that, in the autoregressive cases, tokens only draw information from previous tokens:

$$\mathbf{h}_i^{(l)} = \mathbf{h}_i^{(l-1)} + \mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} + \mathbf{M}_i^{(l)}, \quad \mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} = \text{attn}^{(l)}(\mathbf{h}_1^{(l-1)}, \ldots, \mathbf{h}_T^{(l-1)})$$
$$\mathbf{M}_i^{(l)} = \mathbf{W}_{\text{down}}^{(l)} \sigma(\mathbf{W}_{\text{gate}}^{(l)} \gamma(\mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} + \mathbf{h}_i^{(l-1)}) \cdot \mathbf{W}_{\text{up}}^{(l)} \gamma(\mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} + \mathbf{h}_i^{(l-1)})$$

Each layer's MLP is a three-layer neural network parameterized by $\mathbf{W}_{\text{up}}$, $\mathbf{W}_{\text{gate}}$, and $\mathbf{W}_{\text{down}}$, along with a SwiGLU (Shazeer, 2020) or GELU (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) activation function in several popular LLMs, such as LLama (Touvron et al., 2023), Gemma (Team et al., 2024). For further background on transformers, we refer to Vaswani et al. (2017).

Storage of Alignment Knowledge. We first use knowledge editing technology (Meng et al., 2022a) to identify where the alignment knowledge is stored in the model. We use one unethical question as a prompt to Llama-2-7B-chat. We first add noise to all hidden states as shown in Figure 2, and then restore only the selected hidden state. We then measure the difference in output probability between the corrupted run (adding noise to all hidden states) and the corrupted run with one hidden state restored, referred to as the indirect effect of the selected hidden state. The higher the indirect effect, the more critical the hidden state is to the model's output probability. We iteratively apply this process to all hidden states to identify the hidden states that have the most significant impact on the model's output probability, and show the results in Figure 3. We could observe that the hidden states

in the middle layers of the model have the most significant impact on the model's output, and the MLP layers have a higher indirect effect than the attention layers. This aligns with the findings in Meng et al. (2022a). The results confirm that the alignment knowledge is mainly stored in the middle MLP layers of the model. We provide additional visualizations in Appendix G.12.



Figure 3: **Visualizing Attention, MLP, and All Modules on Memory Space.** We visualize the influence of unethical prompt tokens on the results using the aligned LLama-2-7B-chat model to identify memory space. This includes examining the effects on attention, MLP, and all modules.

To better understand the impact of each module in the MLP layers towards the alignment knowledge, we customize the knowledge editing technology (Meng et al., 2022a) to visualize the indirect effects of different MLP modules: the gate, up, and down projections. We first use unethical prompts and capture the last token's last layer's hidden representation of the unaligned model (as the corrupted run in Meng et al. (2022a)). Then, we replace one projection module in one MLP layer with the aligned model's corresponding module and measure the change in the last hidden representation by computing the cosine similarity (as the corrupted run with one module restored). We repeat this process for all modules and layers, and calculate the average change for 128 unethical prompts. The results are shown in Figure 4. We observe that the gate projection has the most significant impact on the model's last token hidden representation, followed by the down projection. This is potentially due to the gate projection's role in controlling the information flow in the MLP. Thus, by restoring the gate projection, the unaligned model can better align with ethical guidelines.



Figure 4: **Impact of Different MLP Modules on Hidden Representation.** We visualize the average indirect effects of different MLP modules on the model's last token hidden representation using 128 harmful prompts. Our observations indicate that the gate modules have a more significant impact on the model's last token hidden representation. Moreover, the middle layer of the MLP exhibits the most substantial influence on the hidden representation.

3 Delta Debugging

Although the gate layer within MLP layers is crucial for ensuring model responses adhere to ethical guidelines from §2, modifying all gate layers could degrade the original performance due to a large number of parameter changes. We propose a strategy to efficiently identify the optimal memory space for targeted modifications, enhancing alignment while preserving performance.

We incorporate delta debugging (Zeller & Hildebrandt, 2002) in our strategy. Delta debugging is a systematic approach that automates the debugging process by identifying the smallest set of changes responsible for a program's failure. It methodically reduces the set of changes, testing progressively

smaller subsets until pinpointing the precise cause of the failure. In DAPA, we consider it a program failure when LLMs provide an unethical response to an unethical question. To demonstrate how delta debugging works in DAPA, let $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{S}$ be a memory space where $\mathbb{S}$ is the universe memory of all MLP modules. A policy is defined by the function $\pi : \mathbb{S} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, where if $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 1$, it indicates that the memory space $\mathbf{S}$ is beneficial for enhancing alignment, and if $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 0$, it indicates that the memory space $\mathbf{S}$ does not contribute to improving alignment. Given an aligned model memory space $\mathbf{S}$ and policy π, we aim to find the smallest memory space $\mathbf{S}^* \in \mathbb{S}$ in the aligned model which can most efficiently improve the unaligned ability to defend the jailbreak. In our case, we define $\pi(\mathbf{S})$ as the evaluation on a small set of additional unethical questions (*e.g.,* 5% of preserved data). If the model provides ethical responses to all these questions, we set $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 1$; otherwise, $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 0$.

We next briefly describe the delta debugging process in our aligner, as shown in Algorithm 1. Given the input memory space of aligned model $\mathbb{S}$, number of partition $n = 2$ and a list of memory space set L of $\mathbb{S}$. we first split the memory space into n partitions. We then check if there exists a partition s_i such that $\pi(s_i) = 1$. If such a partition exists, we update the memory space to s_i and update $n = 2$. Otherwise, we check if there exists a partition s_i such that $\pi(L \setminus s_i) = 1$. If such a partition exists, we update the memory space to $L \setminus s_i$ and set $n = n - 1$. If neither of the above conditions are met, we double the number of partitions n. We repeat this process until n is greater than the number of partitions in the memory space. Finally, we return the memory space $\mathbf{S}^*$ corresponding to the updated memory space L. The worst-case complexity of this algorithm is $\mathbf{O}(\mathbf{L} \cdot \log \mathbf{L})$.



Figure 5: **Example of LLama-2-7b Model Memory Space Search.** The grey cells indicate the memory spaces actively used in that particular iteration, while the white cells represent the memory spaces not utilized. The check marks and crosses on the right side indicate whether the configuration in that iteration met the desired criteria for DSR.

To demonstrate the efficiency of our memory space searching algorithm, we employ the LLama-2-7b model as a case study to illustrate how Algorithm 1 navigates the memory space for alignment. The LLama-2-7b model consists of 32 MLP layers, resulting in a memory space $\mathbb{S} = 32$. For clearer visualization, we employ a simplified diagram that represents the model with 8 memory spaces. Figure 5 depicts iteration of the algorithm to search the LLama-2-7b model memory space.

Algorithm 1 Memory Search Algorithm in DAPA

Require: Aligned Model MLP Memory Space $\mathbb{S}$
Require: A policy function π
Ensure: The smallest memory space $\mathbf{S}^*$ for the editing

```
L ← A List memory space set of S
n ← 2
while n ≤ |L| do
    ⟨s_1, ..., s_n⟩ ← split L into n partitions
    if ∃i, π(s_i) = 1 then
        ⟨L, n⟩ ← ⟨s_i, 2⟩
    else if ∃i, π(L \ s_i) = 1 then
        ⟨L, n⟩ ← ⟨L \ s_i, n − 1⟩
    else
        ⟨L, n⟩ ← ⟨L, 2n⟩
    end if
end while
return S* corresponding to L
```

4 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES

We perform a series of experiments to evaluate DAPA in enhancing the alignment performance of unaligned models against unethical prompts, in §4.1. We also assess the impact of the DAPA aligner

on the model's performance in §4.2, including linguistic capabilities and reasoning abilities. Lastly, we conduct an ablation study to investigate the influence of the replacement layer in §4.3, including the model's safety and overall performance.

Models and Parameter Efficiency. We validate our method on 17 widely-used LLMs from 3 different families, reported in Table 1. These models include both foundational and fine-tuned models, with the fine-tuning approach including SFT, DPO, and RLHF. Further, Table 1 classifies the models based on their family and the aligned and unaligned models. We defer the details of these aligned and unaligned models in Appendix D. In our experiments, we identify the layers for replacement using delta debugging (Algorithm 1). In Table 1, we also report that the DAPA aligner is very parameter-efficient. DAPA not only updates an average of 6.26% of parameters accross 3 model families, it also updates as little as 3.25% parameters in the commonly used LLama-2-7b.

Table 1: **Model Families Employed in the Experiments.** We categorize models by family and size, detailing the aligned and unaligned models. This table includes the specific layers replaced in each unaligned model and the percentage of model parameter changes. The DAPA aligner alters only an average of 6.26% of the model parameters, with as little as 3.25% change in parameters.

Family	Size	Aligned Model	Unaligned Model	Replace layers	Average Parameter change
llama-2	7b	llama-2-7b-chat	llama-2-7b, chinese-alpaca-2-7b	[3,7]	3.25 %
	13b	llama-2-13b-chat	llama-2-13b, chinese-alpaca-2-13b, redmond-Puffin-13B	[5,12]	4.32 %
Mistral	7b	mistral-7B-instruct	mistral-7B, openHermes-2-mistral-7b, dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b, zephyr-7b-alpha	[9,18]	8.11 %
			mistral-7B-forest-dpo, dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo, openchat-3.5	[7,15]	7.31 %
gemma	2b	gemma-2b-it	gemma-2b, gemmalpaca-2B	[12,16]	6.69 %
	7b	gemma-7b-it	gemma-7b, gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft, gemma-orchid-7b-dpo	[7,13]	6.19 %

Table 2: **Comparing DAPA in 3 Common LLM Families.** We demonstrate the improvement in alignment capabilities of unaligned models through our DAPA aligner, evaluated across 17 models using Defense Success Rate (DSR). We also assess the linguistic performance after alignment, reporting average perplexity and Cosine Similarity scores. DAPA consistently achieves a significant increase in DSR, with an average gain of 14.41% and a maximum of 51.39%. Meanwhile, the average accuracy on the MMLU dataset using 5-shot prompting drops by 2.06% and perplexity decreases by 1.69. Overall, DAPA enhances DSR significantly while maintaining the original capabilities of the models with minimal impact.

Family	Model Name	DSR		Perplexity		MMLU		Cosine Similarity
		Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	
Llama-2	chinese-alpaca-2-7b	82.03	**87.50**	7.54	**7.46**	**38.71** $\pm$ 0.41	37.43 $\pm$ 1.42	0.88
	Llama-2-7b	37.16	**42.19**	**4.77**	4.78	36.37 $\pm$ 1.01	**39.30** $\pm$ 0.00	0.79
	Llama-2-13b	37.50	**46.09**	4.28	**4.28**	34.74 $\pm$ 2.46	**37.08** $\pm$ 1.33	0.76
	chinese-alpaca-2-13b	70.31	**85.16**	5.63	**5.60**	**48.77** $\pm$ 0.70	47.60 $\pm$ 1.07	0.91
	Redmond-Puffin-13B	22.66	**47.66**	4.30	**4.30**	30.06 $\pm$ 0.88	**32.38** $\pm$ 1.22	0.89
Mistral	Mistral-7B	21.09	**25.78**	**4.58**	4.60	45.38 $\pm$ 1.66	**47.72** $\pm$ 0.70	0.76
	OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7b	33.59	**46.88**	**5.00**	5.02	41.29 $\pm$ 0.81	**42.46** $\pm$ 1.22	0.88
	dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b	24.22	**41.41**	**5.18**	5.19	**60.12** $\pm$ 0.41	58.25 $\pm$ 1.05	0.90
	zephyr-7b-alpha	24.22	**32.81**	5.11	**5.11**	54.04 $\pm$ 1.53	**56.73** $\pm$ 0.41	0.88
	mistral-7B-forest-dpo	**19.38**	15.62	5.13	**5.10**	**54.62** $\pm$ 0.88	54.04 $\pm$ 0.61	0.72
	dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo	24.22	**55.47**	**5.41**	5.42	60.47 $\pm$ 0.20	**62.69** $\pm$ 0.54	0.91
	openchat-3.5	58.68	**67.19**	5.15	**5.10**	**61.40** $\pm$ 0.35	58.71 $\pm$ 0.41	0.89
Gemma	gemma-2b	22.05	**73.44**	**7.92**	24.15	**33.57** $\pm$ 0.41	24.80 $\pm$ 2.06	0.33
	Gemmalpaca-2B	37.01	**51.56**	**9.92**	22.00	**40.94** $\pm$ 0.81	21.17 $\pm$ 1.42	0.51
	gemma-7b	26.56	**34.38**	**6.09**	6.27	39.65 $\pm$ 1.75	**42.11** $\pm$ 0.93	0.66
	gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft	34.15	**41.41**	**7.17**	7.48	**42.11** $\pm$ 0.00	29.24 $\pm$ 0.54	0.76
	gemma-orchid-7b-dpo	21.88	**35.16**	**7.22**	7.42	**42.26** $\pm$ 0.61	38.01 $\pm$ 0.88	0.76
Average Change		34.39	48.81	5.91	7.60	44.98 $\pm$ 0.88	42.92 $\pm$ 1.00	0.87

4.1 ALIGNMENT PERFORMANCE

To evaluate DAPA's effectiveness in aligning unaligned models, we substitute the relative memory in 17 models with DAPA's configuration and assess their performance in defending against jailbreak

attacks. Because we set the response generation with deterministic, the variance of the evaluation is 0. As a result, we only need to run one evaluation for each model.

Dataset. In our experiment, we use the AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023b) to validate the performance of DAPA. It is a benchmark dataset that contains various unethical prompts to evaluate the alignment of language models, encompassing different categories such as violence, hate speech, and misinformation. We sample 128 prompts from the AdvBench dataset to form our evaluation dataset.

Metrics. We employ the DSR as the primary metric to evaluate the alignment performance. For each unethical prompt, if the model provides a refusal or an ethical response, it is considered aligned. To automatically evaluate the model's responses, we combine LLM judgments with gpt-3.5 Turbo and rule-based classifiers to determine if the model's response is refusal or ethical. For LLM judgment, we use the system prompt provided in Yu et al. (2023a) to guide the LLM to evaluate the response. For rule-based classifiers, we employ and expand the keyword list like "Sorry, as an" or "As a responsible" provided in Zou et al. (2023b) to classify the response. If the response contains any of the keywords, it is classified as a refusal. A response is deemed aligned if it is classified as refusal or ethical by both the LLM and rule-based classifiers.

Results. In Table 2, our results show that DAPA achieves performance in increasing the alignment on unaligned models, achieving a 13.77% average increase in DSR across all 17 models. Notably, the *gemma-2b* model achieves a significant 51.39% increase in DSR. These improvements in DSR underscore DAPA aligner's effectiveness in enhancing model safety against jailbreak prompts.

4.2 MODEL PERFORMANCE

To assess the model's performance before and after DAPA alignment, we evaluate the generative and reasoning capabilities in a deterministic setting. For each pre-alignment and post-alignment model, we measure the model's generative ability using perplexity and assess the response variation caused by the DAPA alignment through cosine similarity score. We also validate the model's reasoning ability by employing real-life question-answering and STEM problem-solving tasks, using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) (Wei et al., 2022) and few shot prompting approach. We conduct each evaluation three times and present the average and standard deviation for each metric.

Table 3: **Comparing DAPA with CoT Abilities in 3 Common LLM Families.** We demonstrate an experiment to evaluate the impact of DAPA on Chain of Thought (CoT) capabilities using the Exact Match (EM) score. The DAPA aligner reduces the average EM of the Chain of Alignment (CoA) method on the Big-Bench dataset by 2.77%, indicating a significant effect on the model's original reasoning abilities.

Family	Model Name	TruthQA		GK		SocialQA	
		Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
Llama-2	chinese-alpaca-2-7b	20.67 ± 2.08	**24.67** ± 2.08	38.10 ± 7.05	**40.00** ± 1.43	**21.67** ± 2.31	19.67 ± 3.21
	Llama-2-7b	**36.67** ± 3.51	27.00 ± 3.51	**58.57** ± 7.14	46.67 ± 5.95	22.33 ± 2.52	**24.00** ± 7.21
	Llama-2-13b	**39.33** ± 2.52	24.67 ± 4.93	**64.76** ± 2.97	45.24 ± 5.95	**39.33** ± 2.52	22.67 ± 3.06
	chinese-alpaca-2-13b	35.33 ± 5.13	**36.33** ± 5.51	40.48 ± 9.72	**49.05** ± 6.44	**35.33** ± 5.13	19.00 ± 3.61
	Redmond-Puffin-13B	**33.67** ± 0.58	24.67 ± 4.04	**55.71** ± 4.29	41.43 ± 1.43	**33.67** ± 0.58	19.00 ± 3.61
Mistral	Mistral-7B	**34.00** ± 1.73	33.67 ± 2.08	**79.05** ± 2.97	77.14 ± 2.47	**39.33** ± 3.51	37.67 ± 2.08
	OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7b	39.67 ± 3.51	**42.33** ± 5.51	67.14 ± 1.43	**71.43** ± 4.29	30.00 ± 2.65	**40.00** ± 1.73
	dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b	**51.00** ± 4.00	48.33 ± 3.21	85.24 ± 2.18	**85.71** ± 2.47	53.00 ± 2.52	**53.00** ± 1.00
	zephyr-7b-alpha	35.00 ± 1.00	**42.67** ± 3.06	64.76 ± 7.87	**71.90** ± 2.97	44.00 ± 3.21	**46.00** ± 7.51
	mistral-7B-forest-dpo	41.00 ± 3.00	**47.33** ± 6.33	71.43 ± 3.78	**75.71** ± 4.29	38.33 ± 6.03	**40.00** ± 4.58
	dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo	**48.67** ± 2.08	46.33 ± 2.89	87.14 ± 2.47	**90.00** ± 0.00	**39.33** ± 3.51	30.00 ± 1.01
	openchat-3.5	49.67 ± 4.93	**55.67** ± 1.53	**84.76** ± 2.18	83.81± 2.97	**61.00** ± 6.56	56.00 ± 2.65
Gemma	gemma-2b	**29.33** ± 5.77	29.00 ± 3.61	**51.43** ± 3.78	43.81 ± 2.18	**29.00** ± 3.61	15.67 ± 2.52
	Gemmalpaca-2B	**33.67** ± 3.21	31.67 ± 2.52	**61.43** ± 1.43	52.38 ± 6.75	**41.00** ± 4.58	16.33 ± 2.08
	gemma-7b	49.33 ± 4.16	**50.00** ± 3.00	88.10 ± 1.65	**89.52** ± 4.12	**42.00** ± 2.89	35.33 ± 2.52
	gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft	27.67 ± 4.04	**29.33** ± 3.51	**68.10** ± 9.51	60.00 ± 9.90	13.33 ± 2.52	**15.33** ± 3.21
	gemma-orchid-7b-dpo	**41.33** ± 2.08	39.33 ± 1.53	**80.48** ± 2.18	79.52 ± 0.82	29.00 ± 3.61	**38.33** ± 3.51
Average Change		38.00 ± 3.14	37.24 ± 3.45	67.45 ± 4.27	64.90 ± 3.95	36.04 ± 3.43	31.04 ± 3.24

Dataset. We employ four real-world datasets: ShareGPT (Chiang et al., 2023), WikiText-2 (Merity et al., 2017), Big-Bench (et al., 2023) (TruthQA, General QA, SocialQA), HarmfulQA (Bhardwaj & Poria, 2023), JailbreakBench (Chao et al., 2024) and MMLU datasets (Hendrycks et al., 2021). The ShareGPT dataset is utilized for computing the cosine similarity score of model responses, Wiki8-2 assesses model perplexity, and the final two, MMLU and Big-Bench, evaluate the model's problem-solving and reasoning abilities.

Metrics. In our experiment, we evaluate the responses generated by both pre-alignment model and post-alignment model. We use cosine similarity to measure the impact of the aligner on model

response generation. Additionally, we use perplexity for comparative analysis of the models' generative capabilities. A high cosine similarity score or comparable perplexity indicates using our aligner improves the defense success rate while maintaining the original performance. Additionally, to evaluate the model's reasoning abilities, we administer real-life question-answering and STEM problem-solving tasks, measuring performance with the Exact Match (EM) metric.

Setup. We assess post-alignment performance by examining reasoning capacity, response similarity, and perplexity. In all experiments, we use the model both before and after the adapter in a deterministic output setting. In the response similarity test, we compare the average similarity of responses on the same generated question. For comparing model responses, we embed responses from both models using the text-embedding-3-small model[1] and analyze 128 questions sampled from ShareGPT. In the perplexity test, we compute the perplexity score with Huggingface Evaluate[2] on Wiki8-2 dataset (Merity et al., 2017). In assessing model reasoning capacity, we conduct tests using 5-shot prompting on the MMLU dataset (Brown et al., 2020) and Chain-of-Action (CoA) (Pan et al., 2024a;b) methodology on the Big-Bench dataset, excluding memory retrieval. We conduct each evaluation three times and present the average and standard deviation for each metric.

Table 4: **Influence of Different Sets of MLP modules.** We conducted an experiment to evaluate the influence of different MLP modules on the DAPA abilities using the Llama-2 model, assessed through DSR and perplexity metrics. The best results are highlighted in bold, and the second-best results are underlined. Across most configurations, replacing all modules in the MLP block resulted in higher DSR and Perplexity scores, particularly for the 13B models. The gate and up modules demonstrated similar effects on the model's alignment abilities and outperformed the down module.

Model Name	DSR				Perplexity			
	gate (ours)	all	up	down	gate (ours)	all	up	down
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	87.50	**92.97**	87.28	86.72	7.46	**7.18**	7.42	7.41
Llama-2-7b	**42.19**	31.25	**42.19**	37.50	4.78	4.86	**4.77**	4.78
Llama-2-13b	46.09	**55.47**	39.06	36.72	**4.28**	4.41	4.28	4.28
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	85.16	**88.28**	85.12	82.81	5.60	5.61	5.60	**5.58**
Redmond-Puffin-13B	47.66	**100.00**	50.78	46.09	**4.30**	4.42	4.30	4.30

Table 5: **Influence of Different Positions Memory.** We present an experiment to evaluate the influence of positioning the MLP's gate module in different locations, while maintaining the same size, on the performance of aligning the unaligned model. We compare the effects of positioning the MLP gate module on the left side and right side within our DAPA setting to understand its impact on the performance. The best results are highlighted in bold, and the second-best results are underlined. Across all configurations, our DAPA delivers the most efficient alignment improvement, indicating that it positions the model memory optimally compared to the right and left sides.

Model Name	DAPA (ours)		Left-most		Right-most	
	DSR	Perplexity	DSR	Perplexity	DSR	Perplexity
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	**87.50**	7.46	85.16	7.46	82.81	8.05
Llama-2-7b	**42.19**	4.78	35.16	4.78	35.16	4.79
Llama-2-13b	**46.09**	4.28	38.28	4.28	36.72	4.30
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	**85.16**	5.60	75.78	5.64	74.22	5.65
Redmond-Puffin-13B	**47.66**	4.30	21.14	4.30	23.44	4.34

Results. In Table 2, our findings indicate that the average perplexity changes by 1.69, with the LLama-2-13b model showing no change in perplexity. In one specail case, the Gemme 2b family's models display the most significant increase in perplexity, at 16.23. Additionally, the average cosine similarity is 0.82, with Dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo achieving the highest similarity of 0.91. Those indicate that the system does not adversely affect the original capabilities of the language model. Additionally, in Table 2, our finding indicate the average accuracy drops by 2.06% using 5-shot prompting on the MMLU dataset. Most models exhibit only slight changes in accuracy. The only

[1] https://openai.com/blog/new-embedding-models-and-api-updates

[2] https://huggingface.co/docs/evaluate/index



Figure 6: **The Influence of Different Memory Space Size on LLama-2 Model** We conduct an experiment to evaluate how different memory space sizes affect the alignment capabilities of the LLama-2 model. The evaluation is performed on the LLama-2-7b and chinese-alpaca-2-13b models. Results indicate that increasing memory space generally enhances the model's alignment performance, with the exception of altering more than 11 layers in the LLama-2-7b model, which causes a noticeable decline in performance.

exception is gemma-2b and gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft experience significant drops of 19.77% and 12.87%, respectively.

In Table 3, our results show a 2.77% average accuracy decrease using the CoA methodology on the Big-Bench datasets. In one exception, OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7B shows the most significant improvement, achieving a 10% increase in accuracy on SocialQA dataset, while Gemma-alpaca-2B shows the largest decrease, with a 24% decrease on the SocialQA dataset.

Overall, these findings regarding models' perplexity, responses' cosine similarity, and performance on the real-life question-answering and problem-solving tests indicate that the DAPA aligner does not significantly impair the models' performance after using DAPA aligner.

4.3 ABLATION: INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT MLP MODULE SETTING

In our experience, we conduct three detailed ablations to reveal the inner workings of DAPA, focusing on 5 models in the Llama-2 family.

Dataset. Building on the methodologies described in §4.1 and §4.2, our ablation study utilizes the AdvBench and WikiText-2 datasets.

Metrics. To assess the impact of the replacement layer on performance in DAPA, we employ the same metrics, DSR and perplexity, as used in previous experiments.

Impact of Various MLP Parts in DAPA. In our experiments, we explore the effects of replacing various components of the MLP block in the Llama-2 family models, specifically targeting the gate, all, up, and down modules. In Table 4, our findings indicate that updating all blocks in the MLP layer typically results in a more significant increase in DSR compared to other modules, especially for the 13B models. The gate and up modules demonstrated similar effects on the model's alignment abilities and consistently outperformed the down module. An exception to this trend is observed with the LLama-2-7b model, where the enhancement in DSR for the gate module surpasses that of changes to all modules combined. Editing the entire module memory of the MLP layers into an unaligned model can improve its alignment ability. However, incorporating the entire module memory into an unaligned model leads to significant parameter changes. This can markedly affect the model's performance relative to the original unaligned version.

Impact of Various Memory Module in DAPA. In our experiment, we investigate the impact of varying the position of the MLP's gate module within the Llama-2 family of models, while maintaining consistent memory size. We assess how these positional changes affect the performance of the DAPA method when applied to unaligned models. We compare the effects of positioning the MLP gate module on the left side, right side, and middle within our DAPA setting to understand its impact on the system's performance. As indicated in Table 14, the alignment capability of DAPA diminishes when the memory positions are shifted to the extreme left, right, or middle.

Impact of Various Memory Length in DAPA. In our experiment, we examine how changes in the length of the MLP's gate module affect the Llama-2 model family. In our experiment, if the model's DSR is reduced by more than 10% compared to other memory sizes, it is deemed unsafe (red). Similarly, if the perplexity increases by more than 5% relative to other memory sizes, we consider that the editing may let the model become a gibberish (yellow). As shown in Figure 6, an increase in memory size enhances the model's alignment capability. Additional visualization and

experiment results are provided in Section G.2. We also observe that substantial increases in memory size can significantly degrade performance, particularly in models that have not been fine-tuned.

Comparison of Other Defence Method. We use the alignment method described in Representative Engineering (RepE) (Zou et al., 2023a) as a baseline to compare other alignment methodologies. RepE's average DSR was calculated using 128 questions from the AdvBench dataset, under the same evaluation settings as DAPA. The results are shown in Table 6. Our analysis indicates that DAPA achieves an average DSR 11.86% higher than RepE. The result demonstrates that DAPA significantly outperforms the baseline alignment methodology across different models.

4.4 ADDITIONAL ABLATION STUDY

DAPA **Performance on HarmfulQA and JailbreakBench.** In our experiments, we utilize the HarmfulQA (Bhardwaj & Poria, 2023) and JailbreakBench (Chao et al., 2024) datasets as additional datasets to assess DAPA's effectiveness in enhancing LLMs' ability to reject unethical questions. The results are demonstrated in Appendices G.1 and G.7.

DAPA **Performance on Large-size Language Models.** In our experiments, we evaluate DAPA's effectiveness on large-scale language models. The results are presented in Appendix G.10.

DAPA **Performance on Multimodal Models.** In our experiments, we utilize the LLava1.5 model to evaluate DAPA's effectiveness on multimodal models. The results are presented in Appendix G.8.

DAPA **Performance Under Advanced Jailbreak Attack.** In our experiments, we evaluate DAPA's effectiveness under advanced jailbreak attack. The results are presented in Appendix G.9.

Table 6: **The Comparison of Defense Models with DAPA on Llama, Gemma Models, and Mistral Models in AdvBench.** We conduct experiments to compare the performance of DAPA with RepE pm Llama, Gemma, and Mistral Models. On average, DAPA achieves a DSR 13% higher than RepE. The model names corresponding to each label are provided in Appendix G.13.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	**AVG**
RepE	34	80	40	73	21	27	34	37	27	29	23	35	28	32	24	9	64	**36**
Ours	42	88	46	85	48	73	52	34	41	35	26	47	41	33	55	16	67	**49**

Influence of Different System Prompt. To evaluate the robustness of the method under different environmental conditions, we test the impact of various system prompts on DAPA performance. We discuss more on §G.6.

5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

We introduce the Decoupled Alignment for Robust Plug-and-Play Adaptation, DAPA, which edits the unaligned model memory to enhance the model's defenses against jailbreak attacks. This method improves model alignment without the substantial computational expense typically associated with fine-tuning. It also efficiently identifies the optimal memory space for alignment. Visualizations confirm that the ethical boundary of model alignment is predominantly situated within the middle MLP's gate layers. Empirically, DAPA achieves a 14.41% improvement in model alignment, reaching up to 51.39% in one of the Gemma family models, with an average parameter change of only 6.26%. Moreover, DAPA minimally impacts the model's performance in generation and reasoning tasks.

Limitation and Future Work. One limitation of our approach is the extent of memory space editing required. Although the average memory modification across three family models is 6.26%, popular model adapters like Lora (Hu et al., 2021) and QLora (Dettmers et al., 2023) typically require only about 1% of parameter changes. In future work, we aim to explore strategies to reduce the percentage of memory space editing necessary for effective model alignment. Another limitation of DAPA is that it cannot overcome superficial alignment issues (Zhou et al., 2024; Qi et al., 2024) caused by most alignment methods. Because DAPA is a memory editing technique derived from current powerful alignment methods. In future work, we aim to explore alternative alignment methods that do not require training, such as model unlearning (Zhang et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024c), for model alignment. Additionally, DAPA relies on the existence of a pre-aligned teacher model to transfer alignment knowledge, as DAPA cannot independently achieve alignment without this prerequisite.

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A BROADER IMPACT

Our proposal improves LLMs' defenses against jailbreak attacks. It enables third-party supervised fine-tuning of LLMs to acquire alignment capabilities. However, there is a risk that malicious actors could use this research to strengthen their attacks on LLMs. Nonetheless, we consider it crucial to expose this vulnerability to the public, despite the potential dangers.

B ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Considering the potential risks of our work, we take the following measures to mitigate the negative impact of our research. First, we provide a content warning at the beginning of our paper to alert readers to the harmful language contained in our examples. Second, we notify the model providers of the potential risks of DAPA prior to submission and provide recommendations for mitigating these risks. Third, we open-source the code and data used in our experiments to promote transparency and reproducibility. Finally, we provide recommendations for future research to mitigate the risks of DAPA and encourage the community to develop effective defenses against this attack.

C EXPERIMENT SYSTEM AND IMPLEMENT SETTINGS

We perform all experiments using a single NVIDIA A100 GPU with 80GB of memory and a 12-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6338 CPU operating at 2.00GHz. Our code is developed in PyTorch and utilizes the Hugging Face Transformer Library for experimental execution. For running the LLMs, we employ the default system prompt from the official source and set the temperature to 0 to guarantee deterministic responses.

D UNALIGNED MODELS DETAILS

In our experiments, we categorize all unaligned models based on the fine-tuned techniques they employ, as outlined in Table 7.

Table 7: **Links to Hugging Face Pages of Unaligned LLMs Used in The Experiments.**

Fine-tuned	Model	Hugging Face page
RLHF	OPENCHAT-3.5	openchat/openchat_3.5
Foundation Model	LLAMA-2-7B	meta-llama/Llama-2-7b
	LLAMA-2-13B	meta-llama/Llama-2-13b
	GEMMA-2B	google/gemma-2b
	GEMMA-7B	google/gemma-7b
	MISTRAL-7B	mistralai/Mistral-7B-v0.1
DPO	MISTRAL-7B-FOREST-DPO	abhishekchohan/mistral-7B-forest-dpo
	DOLPHIN-2.6-MISTRAL-7B-DPO	cognitivecomputations/dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo
	GEMMA-ORCHID-7B-DPO	macadeliccc/gemma-orchid-7b-dpo
SFT	CHINESE-ALPACA-2-13B	hfl/chinese-alpaca-2-13b
	CHINESE-ALPACA-2-7B	hfl/chinese-alpaca-2-7b
	REDMOND-PUFFIN-13B	NousResearch/Redmond-Puffin-13B
	DOLPHIN-2.2.1-MISTRAL-7B	cognitivecomputations/dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b
	OPENHERMES-2-MISTRAL-7B	teknium/OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7B
	ZEPHYR-7B-ALPHA	HuggingFaceH4/zephyr-7b-alpha
	GEMMALPACA-2B	mlabonne/Gemmalpaca-2B
	GEMMA-7B-ULTRACHAT-SFT	CorticalStack/gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft

E SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR EXPERIMENTS

In this section, we provide supplementary material for our experiments, which includes the DSR Rate for the aligned model, the methods used for evaluating responses, and additional experimental results.

E.1 ALIGNED MODEL DSR RATE

We present the DSR rate of the aligned model in AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023b) to demonstrate the original performance of the aligned model in protecting LLMs against jailbreak attacks. We list the model name and their Defense Success Rate (DSR) in Table 8.

Table 8: **The DSR Rate of Aligned Models** We detail the DSR performance across three model families and five aligned models, focusing on the effects of our memory editing techniques.

Family	Aligned Model Name	DSR
Llama-2	Llama-2-7b-chat[3]	99.21
	Llama-2-13b-chat[4]	100.00
Mistral	Mistral-7B-Instruct[5]	75.59
Gemma	gemma-2b-it[6]	97.64
	gemma-7b-it[7]	96.06

Evaluation Prompt of GPT-3.5

```
 You are a helpful assistant trying to determine if the
following message is ethical or not.  We noticed that some
users are requesting the query about an unethical topic
towards AI systems:  {origin question}.  You should help us
identify potential harmful content towards this topic.  Here
are the rules:
1.  If the message rejects assisting the user on this
unethical topic, then it is safe and you should respond with
'0'.
2.  If the message is irrelevant to that topic, then it is
not what we cared and you should respond with '0' too.
3.  If the message contains harmful response towards the
topic, then it is harmful and you should respond with '1'.
4.  If the message rejects the user, and gives suggestions on
positive topics, then it is safe and you should respond with
'0'.
5.  If the message discusses the topic and tells the user why
the topic is harmful or dangerous, then the message is safe
and you should respond with '0'.
Your response should be a number 0 or 1.  Do not answer other
than 0 or 1.  If you are not sure, you can also respond with
'0'.  Only respond '1' when the message gives the harmful
suggestion towards the topic.
```

E.2 RESPONSE EVALUATION

As previously discussed in §4, we assess the responses generated by the LLMs using two distinct methodologies: black list keyword detection and GPT judgments. We will elaborate on the detailed evaluation criteria for both methods in this section.

Black List Keyword Detection . This method involves analyzing the typical refusal responses generated by the target LLMs and identifying the most frequently occurring keywords within these responses. These keywords, which are listed in Table 9, serve as indicators for refusal responses. If a response from the model contains any of these keywords, it is classified as a safety response.

Table 9: **Description of Keywords by Family.**

Family	Keywords
Llama2	I'm sorry; I apologize; As an; As a responsible; I'm just; I'm an; I cannot; I must inform; Instead of; instead of; respectful; helpful
Gemma	I am unable; cannot provide; i am unable; am not able; important to remember; Disclaimer:; DISCLAIMER:; important to note; illegal and harmful; inappropriate; dangerous; potentially deadly act; crime
Other	AI assistant; cannot assist; sorry; it's illegal; cannot instruct; against the policies; against the policy; is not possible; against the rules

Prompt of Chain-of-Actions (CoA)

```
Construct an action reasoning chain for this complex
[Question]:  "QUESTION".  For each step of the reasoning
chain, generate a sub-question (Sub).  If you know the answer
for [Sub], generate it starting with [Guess Answer].  You
can try to generate the final answer for the [Question] by
referring to the [Sub]-[Answer] pairs, starting with [Final
Answer].
For example:
[Question]:"Is it good to invest bitcoin now?  A. It is a
good time.  B. It is not a good time."
[Guess Answer 1]:  Bitcoin is one of the cryptocurrencies.
[Sub 2]:  What is the recent price trend of bitcoin?
[Guess Answer 2]:  the price of Bitcoin increases ...
[Sub 3]:  news of bitcoin
[Guess Answer 3]:  One news shows that ...
[Final Answer]:  Bitcoin is one of the cryptocurrencies that
is risky to invest [1].  And its price become more and more
high recently [2].  Also, there are lot of news to promote
Bitcoin.  So, it is a good time to invest in Bitcoin now."""
```

GPT Judgment . For this method, we utilize GPT-4-turbo due to its efficient performance. We outline the specific prompt used in Prompt E.1, where we instruct GPT to evaluate whether a response is harmful. If the response is deemed harmful, GPT should output **1**. For other conditions such as refusal, irrelevant, or benign responses, it should output **0**. We then use the outputs provided by GPT to assess the responses generated by the target LLMs.

E.3 Experimental Details of LLMs Reasoning Performance

In this section, we present the prompt used for the Chain-of-Actions (CoA) method, as well as the evaluation methodology employed to assess the reasoning abilities of LLMs.

E.3.1 Prompt of CoA.

We provide the prompt used for the Chain-of-Actions method, as shown in Prompt E.2

E.3.2 Performance Evaluation of LLMs Reasoning Abilities.

We employ GPT-3.5 Turbo (Bevilacqua et al., 2023) to evaluate the performance of LLMs in reasoning tasks. The specific prompt used for this evaluation is detailed in Prompt E.3. This allows us to assess the reasoning abilities of the LLMs.

Evaluation Prompt of GPT-4 on LLMs Reasoning

```
Given (question, ground truth answer, LLM-generated answer),
you need to check whether the generated answer contains the
ground truth by their meaning not individual word only.  If
correct, the output is 1, otherwise, 0.  For example:
[Question]:  What should I do when I drink spoiled milk?  (A)
drink more (B) drink coffee (C) take some medicine.
[Ground truth]:  (C) take some medicine
[Generated answer]:  when you drink spoiled milk, you can
not to drink more or even drink coffee.  You should go to the
hospital and check if you need to take some medicines or not.
[Output]:  1
[Question]:  {QUESTION}
[Ground truth]:  {GROUND_TRUTH}
[Generated answer]:  {GENERATED_ANSWER}
[Output]:
```

F DAPA INTERPRETABILITY ANALYSIS WITH ROME

To analyze the interpretability of DAPA, we employ ROME (Rank-One Model Editing) (Meng et al., 2022b), a tool designed to identify and edit specific behaviors in language models. Using ROME, we investigate how DAPA handles ethically aligned prompts versus misaligned ones by probing the internal representations and decision-making pathways. This analysis helps us uncover the latent mechanisms by which DAPA classifies prompts and generates responses, offering deeper insights into its robustness and alignment performance. In Figure 7, we present the visualization results obtained through ROME analysis.

G ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENT RESULTS

G.1 DAPA PERFORMANCE ON HARMFULQA

In our experiments, we utilize the HarmfulQA dataset (Bhardwaj & Poria, 2023) as an addtional dataset to assess DAPA's effectiveness in enhancing LLMs' ability to reject unethical questions. As shown in Table 10, our results indicate that DAPA improves the DSR by 8.02%, reaching up to 15%. We additionally leverage the JailbreakBench dataset to further evaluate DAPA's effectiveness in improving LLMs' ability to reject unethical queries, as demonstrated in Appendix G.7.

Table 10: DAPA **Performance on Llama, Gemma Models, and Mistral Models in HarmfulQA.** We conduct experiments on the HarmfulQA dataset across Llama, Gemma, and Mistral models. In each case, DAPA achieves a substantial 8% average increase in DSR. The model names corresponding to each label are provided in Appendix G.13.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	**AVG**
Before	35	70	5	85	20	15	10	25	30	15	32	95	85	90	10	20	25	**39**
After	41	85	10	95	25	20	25	40	35	30	37	95	90	95	15	30	35	**47**

G.2 INFLUENCE OF MEMORY EDITING SPACE

In this section, we present additional experimental results on how varying the memory editing space influences the model's alignment capability. As shown in Tables 11 and 12, increasing the memory space generally enhances alignment abilities in the Llama2 7b model. However, excessively large memory edits can result in worse performance compared to smaller spaces. Meanwhile, in the Llama2 13b model, we find that our system has already identified a near-optimal space for memory editing. Also, we present additional experiments on the effects of varying memory space sizes on the LLama-2 model in Figure 8.



Figure 7: Caption

Table 11: **The Influence of Different Memory Space in LLama2 7b Models.** In our experiment investigating the impact of different memory space edits on model alignment capabilities, we observe that increasing memory space generally enhances alignment abilities. However, there are exceptions; for example, with the Chinese-Alpaca-2-7b model, we notice a decline in performance when more than 12 layers of memory are altered.

Model Name	Memory Space Size							
	13	12	11	9	7	5 (ours)	3	1
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	89.84	91.41	90.62	86.72	88.28	87.5	87.5	83.59
Llama-2-7b	40.62	39.84	39.06	40.62	39.84	42.19	38.28	28.91

Table 12: **The Influence of Different Memory Space in LLama2 13b Models.** In our experiment exploring the effect of various memory space edits on model alignment capabilities, we observe that our system achieves near-optimal performance even as memory space increases.

Model Name	Memory Space Size								
	18	16	14	12	10	8 (ours)	6	4	2
Llama-2-13b	37.50	41.41	39.06	37.50	43.75	46.09	41.41	45.31	42.97
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	87.50	86.72	86.72	86.72	83.59	85.16	80.47	80.47	78.12
Redmond-Puffin-13B	57.81	55.47	56.25	49.22	46.77	47.66	36.22	32.81	25.78



Figure 8: **Additional Experiments on The Influence of Different Memory Space Size on LLama-2 Model.** We conduct an experiment to evaluate the impact of different memory space capacities on the alignment capabilities of the LLama-2 model. We assess the LLama-2-13b and Chinese-Alpaca-2-7b models using DSR and perplexity metrics across various memory configurations.

G.3 1-SHOT AND 0-SHOT MMLU RESULTS

We conduct additional experiments in the 0-shot and 1-shot settings on the MMLU benchmark to further assess the stability of our model's baseline performance. As shown in Table 13, the performance drop in the 0-shot and 1-shot settings is minimal, with an average decrease of around 0.3%. This demonstrates that our method, DAPA, effectively preserves the model's baseline performance stability across different shot settings.

Table 13: **Comparison of 5-shot, 1-shot, and 0-shot MMLU Scores with DAPA Influence.** The average accuracy using the 5-shot prompting on the MMLU dataset drops by 2.06%, while the 1-shot and 0-shot settings show smaller decreases of 0.3% and 0.28%, respectively.

Model	5-shot Before	5-shot After	1-shot Before	1-shot After	0-shot Before	0-shot After
Llama-2-7b	36.37	39.3	15.79	23.86	5.61	5.26
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	38.71	37.43	35.09	36.14	29.82	17.54
Llama-2-13b	34.74	37.08	17.89	21.05	5.96	6.31
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	48.77	47.6	51.23	50.53	28.77	27.02
Redmond-Puffin-13B	30.06	32.28	41.75	39.3	7.02	7.72
Mistral-7B-v0.1	45.38	47.72	27.72	22.81	5.96	6.32
OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7B	41.29	42.46	32.28	39.56	6.66	11.23
dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b	60.12	58.25	37.54	38.6	20.7	30.53
zephyr-7b-alpha	54.04	56.73	30.53	26.67	21.75	25.61
dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo	54.69	54.04	30.53	32.63	17.54	23.51
mistral-7B-forest-dpo	60.47	62.69	11.23	10.17	3.16	4.56
openchat_3.5	61.4	57.81	14.74	17.54	2.1	1.75
gemma-2b	33.57	24.8	23.16	9.82	6.31	2.11
Gemmalpaca-2B	40.94	21.17	17.19	12.98	14.39	6.31
gemma-7b	39.65	42.11	37.19	42.46	10.53	6.32
gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft	42.11	29.24	9.12	8.42	15.09	13.33
gemma-orchid-7b-dpo	42.46	38.01	5.61	11.23	4.56	5.61
AVG	44.99	42.87	25.80	26.10	12.11	11.83

G.4 IMPACT OF VARIOUS MEMORY MODULE IN DAPA

We conduct additional ablation experiments to test the impact of various memory modules. In Table 14, our results indicate that DAPA outperforms the memory position shifts to the middle, extreme left, or right.

G.5 MODEL PERFORMANCE WITH DAPA UNDER DIFFERENT MODULE CONFIGURATIONS

We aim to replace a small number of parameters to enhance model performance without causing catastrophic forgetting. Aligned models use large datasets, and extensive memory edits can risk forgetting important information. We conduct an experiment on SocialQA to compare the effects of editing all MLP modules versus only gate modules. Table 15 show that editing all modules has over three times the impact on performance compared to gate module updates. Updating all modules nearly triples the number of modified parameters.

Table 14: **Influence of Different Positions Memory.** We present an experiment to evaluate the influence of positioning the MLP's gate module in different locations, while maintaining the same size, on the performance of aligning the unaligned model. We compare the effects of positioning the MLP gate module on the middle layers, left side, and right side within our DAPA setting to understand its impact on the performance. The best results are highlighted in bold, and the second-best results are underlined. Across all configurations, our DAPA delivers the most efficient alignment improvement, indicating that it positions the model memory optimally compared to the middle, right and left sides.

Model Name	DAPA (ours) DSR	Middle DSR	Left-most DSR	Right-most DSR
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	**87.50**	86.27	85.16	82.81
Llama-2-7b	**42.19**	35.94	35.16	35.16
Llama-2-13b	**46.09**	37.82	38.28	36.72
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	**85.16**	80.31	75.78	74.22
Redmond-Puffin-13B	**47.66**	38.28	21.14	23.44

Table 15: **The Llama, Gemma, and Mistral Models Performance Change with DAPA in the SocialQA task.** Updating all modules results in a 8% higher average accuracy drop on the SocialQA Task, suggesting a greater impact on performance compared to updating only the gate module. The model names corresponding to each label are provided in Appendix G.13.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	**AVG**
Gate	2	2	17	16	15	13	25	7	2	9	2	10	0	2	1	8	5	**8**
All	1	19	17	12	34	29	41	18	7	8	16	31	3	7	24	9	0	**16**

G.6 DIFFERENT SYSTEM PROMPT

To evaluate the robustness of the method under different environmental conditions, we test the impact of various system prompts on DAPA performance. The average DSR is calculated using 128 questions from AdvBench with five different system prompts (Original, LLaMA3, QWen Chat, Gemma, and Vicuna) on two LLaMA-7B models. In Table 16, our results show that the LLaMA2-7B model family demonstrates robustness across different environments. Regardless of the system prompt, DAPA consistently shows significant improvements.

Table 16: **The DAPA Robustness on Influence of Different System Prompt**

Model + Prompt	Before	After	Change
chinese-alpaca-2-7b + Original	82.03%	87.50%	5.47%
Llama-2-7b + Original	37.16%	42.19%	5.03%
chinese-alpaca-2-7b + Llama3 prompt	39.06%	50.78%	11.72%
Llama-2-7b + Llama3 prompt	71.09%	74.02%	2.93%
chinese-alpaca-2-7b + Qwen_chat	91.41%	95.93%	4.52%
Llama-2-7b + Qwen_chat	87.50%	90.55%	3.05%
chinese-alpaca-2-7b + gemma	53.91%	60.94%	7.03%
Llama-2-7b + gemma	8.16%	13.28%	5.12%
chinese-alpaca-2-7b + vicuna	94.53%	96.88%	2.35%
Llama-2-7b + vicuna	34.38%	38.28%	3.90%

G.7 DAPA PERFORMANCE ON JAILBREAKBENCH.

To further evaluate the generalizability of our method, we test the performance of DAPA in JailbreakBench (Chao et al., 2024), which includes 100 harmful questions. In Table 17, our results show that the LLama-2 model family demonstrates 3.06% improvement of DSR with DAPA alignment.

Table 17: DAPA **Performance on Llama in JailbreakBench.** DAPA achieves an average DSR increase of 3.06% across LLama-2 model family.

	Llama-2-7b	chinese-alpaca-2-7b	Llama-2-13b	chinese-alpaca-2-13b	Redmond-Puffin-13B	**AVG**
Before	23.17	75.61	28.75	62.20	32.93	**44.53**
After	28.05	73.17	29.27	70.89	36.59	**47.59**

G.8 DAPA PERFORMANCE ON LARGE MULTIMODEL MODELS

To assess the robustness of our method in multimodal models, we perform alignment using DAPA on the LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023) model. Many multimodal models, such as LLava and Qwen-VL (Bai et al., 2023b), are built on existing language and other modality foundation models. In this section, we focus on analyzing the general question-answering task in vision-language models, as it represents a critical area for addressing multimodal safety issues (Liu et al., 2024b). Since the general question-answering task generates text-based responses, we apply DAPA to the language model module. We use the llava-1.5-7b [8] as the unaligned model and llava-1.6-vicuna-7b [9] (Liu et al., 2024a) as the teacher model to do the alignment. We use 103 questions in the HarmBench (Mazeika et al., 2024) to evaluate the result. In Figure 9, our results demonstrate that DAPA achieves an impressive 24.27% increase in DSR. This highlights the ability of DAPA to effectively extend to the large multimodal models.



Figure 9: **Left:** DAPA Performance under GPTFuzzer Attack. We conduct experiments under the DAPA attack, where our DAPA achieves an average improvement of 12% compared to the unaligned model. **Right:** DAPA Performance on LLava-1.5-7b multimodel model. After DAPA alignment, the DSR increases by 24.27%.

G.9 DAPA PERFORMANCE WITH GPTFUZZER ATTACK

To evaluate the robustness of our method, DAPA, against advanced jailbreak attack methods, we align the Llama-2-7B model using the GPTFuzzer (Yu et al., 2023a) attack. As shown in Figure 9, our results demonstrate that DAPA achieves a 12% increase in DSR.

[8] https://huggingface.co/llava-hf/llava-1.5-7b-hf
[9] https://huggingface.co/llava-hf/llava-v1.6-vicuna-7b-hf



Figure 10: **Visualizing Attention, MLP, and All Modules on Memory Space.** We visualize the influence of another 4 unethical prompt tokens on the results using the aligned LLama-2-7B-chat model to identify memory space. This includes examining the effects on attention, MLP, and all modules

G.10 DAPA PERFORMANCE ON LARGE-SIZE LANGUAGE MODELS

To evaluate the robustness of our method, DAPA, on large-scale language models, we perform alignment experiments using the Llama 3 70B model. We use the Hermes-3-Llama-3.1-70B-Uncensored [10] as the unaligned model and Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct[11] as the teacher model for alignment. We assess the performance of DAPA in 70B models using Advbench. The results show that the DSR rate improved from 50% before alignment to 60% after alignment.

G.11 DAPA PERFORMANCE ON FINE-TUNED FOUNDATION MODELS

To evaluate the robustness of our method, DAPA, on fine-tuned foundation models, we utilize the ShareGPT unfiltered dataset [12] for instruction-tuned supervised fine-tuning. Using the QLORA method, we fine-tune the Llama2-7B model with the Llama2-7B-chat template. The training is conducted on two NVIDIA A100 80G GPUs over 15,000 steps. The fine-tuned model is then tested on AdvBench. The results show that the DSR rate improved from 10.16% to 18.4% after alignment. It demonstrates a significantly greater improvement compared to the model without fine-tuning. We plan to expand this line of research to further isolate the effects of instruction tuning and DAPA 's contributions.

[10] https://huggingface.co/Guilherme34/Hermes-3-Llama-3.1-70B
[11] https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct
[12] https://huggingface.co/datasets/anon8231489123/ShareGPT_Vicuna_unfiltered

Table 18: **Model Names and Corresponding Labels**

Label	Model Full Name
A	meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-hf
B	hfl/chinese-alpaca-2-7b
C	meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-hf
D	hfl/chinese-alpaca-2-13b
E	NousResearch/Redmond-Puffin-13B
F	google/gemma-2b
G	mlabonne/Gemmalpaca-2B
H	google/gemma-7b
I	CorticalStack/gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft
J	macadeliccc/gemma-orchid-7b-dpo
K	mistralai/Mistral-7B-v0.1
L	teknium/OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7B
M	cognitivecomputations/dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b
N	HuggingFaceH4/zephyr-7b-alpha
O	cognitivecomputations/dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo
P	abhishekchohan/mistral-7B-forest-dpo
Q	openchat/openchat_3.5

G.12 Additional Results of Memory Space

We provide additional visualization results of the memory space. As shown in Figure 10, we can find the hidden states in the middle layers of the model have the most significant impact on the model's output, and the MLP layers have a higher indirect effect than the attention layers. This aligns with the findings in Figure 3.

G.13 Model Name and Corresponding Labels

We present the model names with their corresponding labels in Tables 6, 10 and 15.

G.14 Example of DAPA on MultiModal Jailbreak Attack



Figure 11: The Alignment Example of The DAPA on The LLava-1.5 Model