An Online Continuous Progressive Second Price Auction for Electric Vehicle Charging

Yang Zhang, Qingyu Yang, Wei Yu, Dou An, Donghe Li, Wei Zhao

Abstract:

In this paper, we address the issue of the energy
trading in the scenario of electric vehicles (EVs) charging in the
smart grid. The EVs energy trading problems have attracted
growing attention with the popularity of EVs. As the traditional
first-reserve-first-serve scheme in the energy trading market
impairs the benefits of both buyers and seller, we consider an
auction scheme, called progressive second price (PSP), which has
been proved to be an efficient way to conduct resource allocation
in the trading market. Compared with other auction schemes,
the PSP scheme can achieve both incentive compatibility and
Nash equilibrium, which are important properties for the market. Nonetheless, the PSP auction scheme is not designed for
online auction and it cannot guarantee that the seller can provide an enough number of charging piles to satisfy the demand of
winners. To tackle these issues, in this paper we propose a novel
online continuous PSP-based auction scheme, which is capable of
not only achieving the property of online energy trading but also
guaranteeing that the number of winners is limited to be no more
than the number of charging piles. Further, we prove that our
auction scheme achieves incentive compatibility and Nash equilibrium. The extensive experimental results demonstrate that our
auction scheme achieves good performance with respect to social
welfare, the seller satisfaction ratio, the buyer satisfaction ratio,
as well as computation overhead.