Learning with Differentially Private Sliced Wasserstein Gradients

Abstract

In this work, we introduce a novel framework for privately optimizing objectives that depend on sliced Wasserstein distances between data-dependent empirical measures. Our main theoretical contribution is a non-trivial analysis of the sensitivity of the Wasserstein gradients to individual data points, derived from an explicit formulation of the gradient in a fully discrete setting. This enables strong privacy guarantees with minimal utility loss. We demonstrate that standard privacy accounting methods naturally extend to Wasserstein-based objectives, allowing for large-scale private training. This supports a wide range of private machine learning applications involving distribution matching under privacy constraints on the source, the target, or both. These include: (i) an in-processing method for fairness mitigation using a private Wasserstein penalty, and (ii) what we believe is the first approach for training private sliced Wasserstein autoencoders. We validate our framework through experiments showing its ability to effectively balance privacy and utility, offering a theoretically grounded approach to privacy-preserving machine learning with sliced Wasserstein losses.

1 Introduction

Privacy has emerged as a critical consideration in machine learning, driven by widespread concerns about data misuse and regulatory frameworks such as GDPR and the European AI Act. Traditional machine learning approaches often require access to sensitive information, and it is well-established that releasing statistics based on such data, without appropriate safeguards, can result in serious privacy breaches (Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2006; Backstrom et al., 2007; Fredrikson et al., 2015; Dinur & Nissim, 2003; Homer et al., 2008; Loukides et al., 2010; Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2008; Sweeney, 2000; Wagner & Eckhoff, 2018; Sweeney, 2002).

Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b), has become the gold standard for addressing these concerns, providing rigorous guarantees on individual data protection during model training. Differential privacy incorporates randomness into the computation process, ensuring that the estimator relies not only on the dataset, but also on an additional source of randomness. This mechanism obscures the influence of individual data points, safeguarding user privacy. The formal definition of differential privacy, as well as the basic results, and tools surrounding it, was moved to Section 2. To the non-expert reader, it is only useful to know that privacy is tuned by two scalar numbers $\varepsilon, \delta \geq 0$, and that the smaller they are, the stronger the privacy guarantees are. Privacy is usually obtained via noise addition mechanisms, of which the amount of noise usually scales with the *sensitivity* of a given query Dwork et al. (2006b). Prominent organizations like the US Census Bureau (Abowd, 2018), Google (Erlingsson et al., 2014), Apple (Thakurta et al., 2017), and Microsoft (Ding et al., 2017) have adopted this approach. Notably, an extended body of literature studies the interplay between privacy and learning / statistics (Wasserman & Zhou, 2010; Barber & Duchi, 2014; Diakonikolas et al., 2015; Karwa & Vadhan, 2018; Bun et al., 2019; 2021; Kamath et al., 2019; Biswas et al., 2020; Kamath et al., 2020; Acharya et al., 2021; Lalanne, 2023; Aden-Ali et al., 2021; Cai et al., 2019; Brown et al., 2021; Cai et al., 2019; Kamath et al., 2022a; Lalanne et al., 2023a;b; Lalanne & Gadat, 2024; Singhal, 2023; Kamath et al., 2023; 2022b). However, achieving privacy guarantees without significant hampering the

efficiency of the models remains challenging, particularly when dealing with complex distributional objectives such as those based on Wasserstein distances.

Besides, optimal transport, and in particular the Wasserstein distance, has become increasingly important in machine learning due to its ability to capture meaningful geometric relationships between probability distributions, enabling a wide range of applications from generative modeling to domain adaptation and fairness. Given two measures of probability P and Q in $\mathbb{R}^d$ equipped with its Borel σ-algebra, the Wasserstein distance $W_p(P,Q)$ is defined as the pth root of the cost associated to the optimal transport plan, i.e., $W_p(P,Q) = \left(\inf_{\pi \in \Pi(P,Q)} \int_{\mathbb{R}^d} \|x-y\|_2^p d\pi(x,y)\right)^{1/p}$, where $\Pi(P,Q)$ represents the set of measures of probability in the product space with marginals P and Q. Except mentioned otherwise, this article will look at the specific case of W_2. Its straightforward geometric interpretation makes it an effective tool for comparing distributions even when the supports do not align, offering a significant advantage over other widely used metrics and divergences. Thus, it has been successfully applied in a number of areas, including generative models (Arjovsky et al., 2017), representation learning (Tolstikhin et al., 2018), domain adaptation (Courty et al., 2017) and fairness (Gordaliza et al., 2019; Risser et al., 2022; De Lara et al., 2024; Jiang et al., 2020; Chzhen et al., 2020; Gaucher et al., 2023).

To tackle the curse of dimensionality in its computations, two main alternatives have been explored, namely, entropic regularization, as proposed by Cuturi (2013), and leveraging the use the Wasserstein distance between one-dimensional projections.

Indeed, denoting by, for any measure of probability P on $\mathbb{R}$, F_P its cumulative distribution function (CDF) and F_P^{-1} its quantile function, which is defined as the generalized inverse of F_P, then the Wasserstein distance satisfies $W_2(P,Q) = \|F_P^{-1} - F_Q^{-1}\|_{L^2}$ for any measures of probability P,Q on $\mathbb{R}$. This perspective has inspired a variety of distance surrogates that reduce to one-dimensional projections. In this work, we center our attention on the sliced Wasserstein distance (Rabin et al., 2011; Bonneel et al., 2015), defined as $SW_2(P,Q) = \left(\int_{\mathbb{S}^{d-1}} W_2^2(\mathrm{Pr}_\vartheta \#P, \mathrm{Pr}_\vartheta \#Q) d\rho(\vartheta)\right)^{1/2}$, where $\#$ is the *push forward* operation of a measure by a measurable mapping, Pr_ϑ the projection along the direction of ϑ, and ρ denotes the uniform measure on the unit sphere $\mathbb{S}^{d-1}$. Note that the integral on the sphere may be approximated by Monte Carlo methods. A substantial body of research has demonstrated the effectiveness of the sliced Wasserstein distance as a discrepancy measure for generative modeling (Deshpande et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2019), representation learning (Kolouri et al., 2018), domain adaptation (Lee et al., 2019) and fairness (Risser et al., 2022).

1.1 Contributions

In this work, we address the challenge of optimizing objectives which depend on sliced Wasserstein distances between empirical measures. Assume that we have samples $\mathbf{X} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathcal{X}^n$, $\mathbf{Z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_m) \in \mathcal{Z}^m$, and denote by $P_\mathbf{X}$ and $P_\mathbf{Z}$ the empirical distributions associated with $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Z}$. Assuming that we have a vector of trainable weights θ that parametrizes two general functions $g_\theta : \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R}^d$ and $h_\theta : \mathcal{Z} \to \mathbb{R}^d$, we want to optimize for the function

$$\theta \mapsto W_2^2(g_\theta \# P_\mathbf{X}, h_\theta \# P_\mathbf{Z}), \text{ if } d = 1 \ , \quad \text{ or } \quad \theta \mapsto SW_2^2(g_\theta \# P_\mathbf{X}, h_\theta \# P_\mathbf{Z}), \text{ if } d > 1, \tag{1}$$

under differential privacy guarantees. Our main theoretical advance lies in carefully analyzing the *sensitivity* of Wasserstein gradients (the gradients of the previous function) to individual data points. This general contribution can be split as follows.

1) Sensitivity analysis with $1/n$ scaling. Although W_2^2 lacks the usual finite-sum structure (e.g., $\frac{1}{n}\sum_i \ell(g_\theta(x_i))$), we prove that its gradient admits a decomposition favorable for privacy analysis and compatible with standard autodiff frameworks (Abadi et al., 2015; Paszke et al., 2019; Bradbury et al., 2018). In Section 4, we show that the gradient's ℓ_2-sensitivity decays as $O(1/n)$, allowing the use of classical DP mechanisms with vanishing noise cost.

2) A practical deep-learning recipe. While DP analyses typically assume bounded data-dependent quantities, in practice clipping is required (Abadi et al., 2016), often introducing bias (Kamath et al., 2023). We show in Section 5 that clipping and privacy accounting (Abadi et al., 2016; Dong et al., 2019) extend

naturally to Wasserstein gradients. This yields a scalable, DP-compatible training framework that integrates seamlessly with standard optimizers.

3) Novel applications to distributional learning under DP. To the best of our knowledge, our framework is the first to enable end-to-end learning with sliced Wasserstein losses under differential privacy for both source and target samples. We illustrate its breadth through two applications:

- **Private sliced Wasserstein autoencoders (Section 6)**: the first DP procedure for training SWAEs, enabling privacy-preserving representation learning with generative capabilities;
- **Fairness via private in-processing (Section 7)**: a new approach to bias mitigation based on private Wasserstein penalties between conditional distributions. This provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first methods for fair and private *multivariate regression* and *representation learning.*

1.2 Related Work

Differential Privacy and Optimal Transport. Our work directly compares to the work of Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021), which extends the ideas of Harder et al. (2021), originally applied to the Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD), to the sliced Wasserstein loss. Their work establishes privacy guarantees for the value of the sliced Wasserstein distance, based on the use of the post-processing lemma. However, their privacy guarantees are insufficient for training models privately, except in simple scenarios such as the generative model proposed by Harder et al. (2021). Indeed, their technique requires private data to be static (as opposed to trainable), which prevents its use when the Wasserstein loss appears downstream in the learning process. In contrast, our work is significantly broader in scope, and adapts to a wider range of problems, as discussed in Remark 4.5. A more detailed comparison with Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021) is provided later in the article, both in terms of applicability of the methods and numerical results when both are applicable. Liu et al. (2025) follows the same line of work as Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021), extending their methodology to an alternative definition of the sliced Wasserstein distance. In a different vein, other existing works develop task-specific private methodologies leveraging optimal transport. The sliced Wasserstein distance has been applied in data generation by Sebag et al. (2023) from a different approach based on gradient flows. Tien et al. (2019) tackled differentially private domain adaptation with optimal transport by perturbing the optimal coupling between noisy data. Recently, Xian et al. (2024) proposed a post-processing method based on the Wasserstein barycenter of private histogram estimators of conditional densities to obtain a fair and private regressor. The private estimation of optimal transport maps was recently studied by Lalanne et al. (2025). Beyond these approaches, optimal transport has also been explored in novel privacy paradigms unrelated to our work (Pierquin et al., 2024; Kawamoto & Murakami, 2019; Yang et al., 2024a).

Fairness in Machine Learning. Fairness in machine learning has emerged as a critical area of research, driven by the growing recognition of its societal impact and the ethical implications of algorithmic decision-making. Additionally, regulatory frameworks such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the recent European AI Act[1] mandate stringent measures to identify and mitigate bias in AI systems, emphasizing the need for fair and private methodologies in machine learning. Unfairness arises when certain variables, often referred to as sensible variables, systematically bias the behavior of an algorithm against specific groups of individuals, leading to disparate outcomes. This field of research has received a growing attention over the last few years as pointed out in the following papers and references therein (Chouldechova & Roth, 2020; Dwork et al., 2012; Oneto & Chiappa, 2020; Wang et al., 2022; Barocas et al., 2018; Besse et al., 2022). The Wasserstein distance offers a compelling framework for addressing fairness, as it provides a principled way to quantify discrepancies between the distributions of different subgroups. Moreover, as stated first by Feldman et al. (2015), then by Gouic et al. (2020) or Chzhen et al. (2020), Wasserstein distance between the conditional distributions of the algorithm for each group, is the natural measure to quantify the cost of ensuring fairness of the algorithm, defined as algorithms exhibiting the same behavior for each group. Hence optimal transport based methods are commonly used to assess and mitigate distributional biases, paving the way for more equitable algorithmic decision-making. We refer, for instance, to the previously mentioned references (Chiappa et al., 2020; Gordaliza et al., 2019) and references therein.

---

[1] https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/

Differential Privacy and Fair Learning. The interplay between fairness and differential privacy has received significant attention in recent years. A comprehensive review of this topic in decision and learning problems is provided by Fioretto et al. (2022). Within the learning framework, research has progressed in various directions. From a theoretical standpoint, despite the early work of Cummings et al. (2019) demonstrating inherent incompatibilities between exact fairness and differential privacy, Mangold et al. (2023) recently presented promising theoretical results indicating that fairness is not severely compromised by privacy in classification tasks. Another research direction has focused on studying the disparate impacts on model accuracy introduced by private training of algorithms. This phenomenon was first observed by Bagdasaryan et al. (2019) and has been extensively studied in subsequent works (Farrand et al., 2020; Tran et al., 2021; Xu et al., 2021; Esipova et al., 2023). A third line of research aims to develop models that are both private and fair. Private and fair classification models have been proposed using in-processing and post-processing techniques across various scenarios (Xu et al., 2019; Jagielski et al., 2019; Ding et al., 2020; Lowy et al., 2022; Yaghini et al., 2023; Ghoukasian & Asoodeh, 2024). A recent comparison of these works can be found in Ghoukasian & Asoodeh (2024). In the topic of fair and private regression, the only available work is the aforementioned post-processing method of Xian et al. (2024).

2 Differential Privacy

We briefly recall the notions of differential privacy that underpin our sensitivity analysis in Section 4. Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b;a) starts with a dataset space $\mathcal{D}$ and a neighboring relation $\sim$ on $\mathcal{D}$. For $\mathbf{D}, \tilde{\mathbf{D}} \in \mathcal{D}$, we write $\mathbf{D} \sim \tilde{\mathbf{D}}$ when they differ by the data of a single individual. A randomized mechanism $\mathcal{M} : \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{O}$ is then required to make $\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{D})$ statistically hard to distinguish from $\mathcal{M}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}})$.

The neighboring relation $\sim$ is *application specific* and is usually either the *addition / deletion* relation ($\mathbf{D}$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{D}}$ are neighbors iff one can be obtained from the other by adding or removing the data of one individual from the dataset) or the *replacement* relation ($\mathbf{D}$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{D}}$ are neighbors iff one can be obtained from the other by changing the data of one individual from either dataset). In general, it is useful to the reader to understand $\mathbf{D} \sim \tilde{\mathbf{D}}$ as : "The difference between $\mathbf{D}$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{D}}$ only comes from one individual's data".

In our paper, due to the splitting of the data into separate categories in the Wasserstein distance, and because of potential asymmetry that may arise in their treatments, we will occasionally employ modified definitions of neighboring relations, which can be encompassed within the following family, indexed by the number of classes $k \geq 1$. Note that the case $k = 1$ reduces to the usual *replacement* relation.

Definition 2.1. (k-end neighboring relation) Let $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{D}_1^{n_1} \times \ldots \times \mathcal{D}_k^{n_k}$ be the set of partitioned datasets with sizes $n_1, \ldots, n_k \geq 1$. Given two datasets $\mathbf{D} = (\mathbf{D^1}, \ldots, \mathbf{D^k})$, $\tilde{\mathbf{D}} = (\tilde{\mathbf{D}^1}, \ldots, \tilde{\mathbf{D}^k}) \in \mathcal{D}$, we say that $\mathbf{D} \sim_k \tilde{\mathbf{D}}$ if there exist and index $j \in [k] := \{1, \ldots, k\}$ such that $\mathbf{D^i} = (d_1^i, \ldots, d_{n_i}^i)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{D}^i} = (\tilde{d}_1^i, \ldots, \tilde{d}_{n_i}^i)$ coincide up to a permutation of the elements if $i \neq j$, and up to a permutation and a replacement of one of the d_l^i's by any element in $\mathcal{D}_i$ if $i = j$.

The historic definition of differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b;a; Dwork, 2006) with (ε, δ) reads:

Definition 2.2 ((ε, δ)-DP (Dwork et al., 2006a))**.** A randomized mechanism $M : \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{O}$ is (ε, δ)-differentially private ((ε, δ)-DP) if $\forall \, \mathbf{D} \sim \tilde{\mathbf{D}}$, and $\forall$ measurable $S \subset \mathcal{O}$,

$$\mathbb{P}\left(M(\mathbf{D}) \in S\right) \leq e^{\varepsilon} \mathbb{P}\left(M(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}) \in S\right) + \delta \, ,$$

where the randomness is taken on M only.

A ubiquitous building block for building private mechanisms is the so-called *Gaussian mechanism* which consists in adding independent Gaussian noise to the output of a deterministic mapping. Quantifying the privacy of this (now randomized) mechanism then boils down to controlling the variations of the deterministic mapping on neighboring datasets, as formalized in the following lemma.

Lemma 2.3 (Privacy of the Gaussian mechanism (Corollary of Theorem 2.7, Corollary 3.3 and Corollary 2.13 in Dong et al. (2019)))**.** *Given a deterministic function h mapping a dataset to a quantity in $\mathbb{R}^d$, one can define the l_2-sensitivity of h as*

$$\Delta_2 h := \sup_{\mathbf{D} \sim \tilde{\mathbf{D}}} \left\| h(\mathbf{D}) - h(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}) \right\|_2 \, .$$

When this quantity is finite, for any $\sigma > 0$, the Gaussian mechanism defined as $\mathbf{D} \mapsto h(\mathbf{D}) + \sigma \mathcal{N}(0, I_d)$, is $(\varepsilon, \delta(\varepsilon))$-DP for any $\varepsilon \geq 0$ where, by noting $\mu = \frac{\Delta_2 h}{\sigma}$, $\delta(\varepsilon) = \Phi\left(-\frac{\varepsilon}{\mu} + \frac{\mu}{2}\right) - e^\varepsilon \Phi\left(-\frac{\varepsilon}{\mu} - \frac{\mu}{2}\right)$, where Φ denotes the standard normal CDF.

In particular, Section 4 proves that the Wasserstein gradients enjoy such property, motivating the methods presented in this article.

Finally, this article will at times use the notion of *Gaussian Differential Privacy* (GDP). Informally, given $\mu > 0$, a mechanism M is said to be μ-GDP if it makes $M(\mathbf{D})$ at least as hard to discriminate from $M(\tilde{\mathbf{D}})$ as $\mathcal{N}(0,1)$ is to discriminate from $\mathcal{N}(\mu, 1)$, for any $\mathbf{D} \sim \tilde{\mathbf{D}}$. We refer to Dong et al. (2019) for a formal definition and the links to (ε, δ)-DP.

3 Wasserstein Gradients

To analyze privacy we require explicit formulas for the gradients of the Wasserstein distance between empirical distributions. Consider observations $x_i \in \mathbb{R}$ for $i \in [n]$ with order statistics $x_{(1)} \leq \cdots \leq x_{(n)}$. Given $P_{\mathbf{U}} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \delta_{U_i}$ and $P_{\mathbf{V}} = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^m \delta_{V_j}$, the squared Wasserstein distance admits the following weighted quadratic form.

Proposition 3.1. *With $R_{i,j} = \lambda\left(\left(\frac{i-1}{n}, \frac{i}{n}\right] \cap \left(\frac{j-1}{m}, \frac{j}{m}\right]\right)$ where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure, and rank permutations σ, τ such that $U_i = U_{(\sigma(i))}$ for each $i \in [n]$ and $V_j = V_{(\tau(j))}$ for each $j \in [m]$, one has*

$$W_2^2(P_{\mathbf{U}}, P_{\mathbf{V}}) = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\sigma(i), \tau(j)} (U_i - V_j)^2.$$

Proof. See Appendix G.1. $\qquad\square$

Proposition 3.1 expresses the Wasserstein distance as a weighted sum of squared differences, with weights $R_{\sigma(i), \tau(j)}$, that depend only on the rank permutations. Thus, the partial derivative with respect to U_i, is well defined, as long as its rank $\sigma(i)$ remains unchanged in a neighborhood of U_i.

Proposition 3.2. *With all the previous definitions, $W_2^2(P_{\mathbf{U}}, P_{\mathbf{V}})$ is differentiable as a function of $\mathbf{U} = (U_1, \ldots, U_n)$ in the set of points verifying $U_{(1)} < \ldots < U_{(n)}$, and $\nabla_U W_2^2(P_{\mathbf{U}}, P_{\mathbf{V}}) = \left(2 \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\sigma(i), \tau(j)} (U_i - V_j)\right)_{i \in [n]}$. Similarly, it is differentiable as a function of $\mathbf{V} = (V_1, \ldots, V_m)$ in the set of points verifying $V_{(1)} < \ldots < V_{(m)}$, and $\nabla_V W_2^2(P_{\mathbf{U}}, P_{\mathbf{V}}) = \left(2 \sum_{i=1}^n R_{\sigma(i), \tau(j)} (V_j - U_i)\right)_{j \in [m]}$.*

Proof. Simple derivation in Proposition 3.1. $\qquad\square$

From a practical viewpoint, non-differentiability when points coincide is benign: the rank permutation is not unique, but any consistent choice yields valid updates, in line with prior practice (Deshpande et al., 2018; Kolouri et al., 2018). We therefore follow earlier work in referring to these updates as "gradients"; importantly, our privacy guarantees that are presented in the next section remain valid even at such points.

4 A Private Surrogate for Wasserstein Gradients

We now present our main theoretical result (see Theorem 4.1): a tight upper bound on the sensitivity of Wasserstein gradients, showing that it decays as $O(1/n)$. This scaling directly enables the use of the Gaussian mechanism (Lemma 2.3) to obtain differential privacy at vanishing cost.

For clarity we present the one-dimensional case $g_\theta(\cdot), h_\theta(\cdot) \in \mathbb{R}$, the multidimensional extension being given in Remark 4.3. Combining Proposition 3.2 with the chain rule yields

$$\nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta \# P_\mathbf{X}, h_\theta \# P_\mathbf{Z}) = 2 \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)}(g_\theta(x_i) - h_\theta(z_j))\nabla_\theta g_\theta(x_i)$$
$$+ 2 \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)}(h_\theta(z_j) - g_\theta(x_i))\nabla_\theta h_\theta(z_j) .$$

This decomposition enables the following sensitivity analysis:

Theorem 4.1. *With all the previous notation, assume that there exists constants $M, L_1, L_2 \geq 0$ such that for each $\theta \in \Theta$, $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and $z \in \mathcal{Z}$,*

$$(i)\ |g_\theta(x)| \leq M,\ |h_\theta(z)| \leq M\ , \qquad (ii)\ \|\nabla_\theta g_\theta(x)\|_2 \leq L_1,\ \|\nabla_\theta h_\theta(z)\|_2 \leq L_2\ .$$

Under the neighboring relation $\sim_1$ in $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{X}^n$, if we define $\Phi(\mathbf{X}) = \nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta \# P_\mathbf{X}, h_\theta \# P_\mathbf{Z})$, then

$$\Delta_2 \Phi \leq 4M \frac{3L_1 + L_2}{n}\ . \tag{2}$$

Consequently, under the neighboring relation $\sim_2$ in $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{X}^n \times \mathcal{Z}^m$, if we define $\Psi(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Z}) = \nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta \# P_\mathbf{X}, h_\theta \# P_\mathbf{Z})$, then

$$\Delta_2 \Psi_\theta \leq 4M \max\left\{\frac{3L_1 + L_2}{n}, \frac{L_1 + 3L_2}{m}\right\}\ . \tag{3}$$

Proof. See Appendix G.2. □

For any $\mu > 0$, define $\sigma_\mu = \Delta/\mu$, where Δ denotes the right-hand side of (2), if only $\mathbf{X}$ is private, or (3), if both $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Z}$ are private. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1, if we define, with a slight abuse,

$$\hat{\nabla}_\theta W_2^2 := \nabla_\theta W_2^2 + \sigma_\mu \mathcal{N}(0, I)\ , \tag{4}$$

then Theorem 4.1 together with Lemma 2.3 ensure that for every $\epsilon \geq 0$, the mechanism is $(\epsilon, \delta(\epsilon))$-DP, where $\delta(\epsilon)$ is given in Lemma 2.3. Furthermore, the mechanism admits the following high-probability utility bound:

Corollary 4.2. *With the above notation, if r denotes the dimension of the parameter space, for any $\delta \in (0, 1)$, with probability at least $1 - \delta$,*

$$\|\hat{\nabla}_\theta W_2^2 - \nabla_\theta W_2^2\|_2^2 \leq \sigma_\mu^2 \left(r + 2\sqrt{r \log(\tfrac{1}{\delta})} + 2\log(\tfrac{1}{\delta})\right).$$

Proof. Follows from the exponential inequality in Lemma 1 of Laurent & Massart (2000). □

Remark 4.3 (**Extension to arbitrary dimension**). Theorem A.1 in Appendix A extends Theorem 4.1 to the multidimensional setting $g_\theta(\cdot), h_\theta(\cdot) \in \mathbb{R}^d$, using the sliced Wasserstein distance SW_2^2 or its Monte Carlo approximation. The conclusions of Theorem A.1 remain identical to Theorem 4.1, but now require uniform control over $\vartheta \in \mathbb{S}^{d-1}$ of the composite functions $\mathrm{Pr}_\vartheta \circ g_\theta, \mathrm{Pr}_\vartheta \circ h_\theta$. To achieve this, Assumption (i) is replaced by $\|g_\theta(x)\|_2 \leq M, \|h_\theta(x)\|_2 \leq M$ and Assumption (ii) by $\|\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)\|_2 \leq L_1, \|\mathcal{J}_\theta h_\theta(z)\|_2 \leq L_2$, where $\|\cdot\|_2$ denotes here the spectral norm of a matrix. Note that, if $d = 1$, $\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta = \nabla_\theta g_\theta$ and the spectral norm coincides with the euclidean norm.

Remark 4.4 (**On the assumptions**). Conditions (i)–(ii) are standard boundedness and Lipschitz assumptions. Assumption (ii) is verified as soon as g_θ and h_θ are Lipschitz with respect to the parameter θ. When they do not hold exactly, clipping techniques (Abadi et al., 2016) ensure they can be enforced in practice (see Section 5 for a detailed discussion on a technique that we introduce, called *inner-clipping*, that plays the same role as regular clipping in vanilla DPSGD but that is compatible with SW losses).

Remark 4.5 (**Comparison to the baseline** (Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola, 2021)). Assuming $h_\theta = I_d$, by the chain rule, and with a slight abuse of notation,

$$\nabla_\theta SW_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}), \mathbf{Z}) = \nabla_{g_\theta(\mathbf{X})} SW_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}), \mathbf{Z}) \times \mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(\mathbf{X}) \ .$$

Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021) privatize only the first term, so their guarantees apply only when g_θ does not act on private data. Our bound covers both terms, extending their approach to genuine end-to-end private training. A detailed comparison is provided in Appendix D, both from a conceptual perspective—highlighting the broader applicability of our technique—and from a numerical perspective, comparing results in a setting where both methods are applicable.

5 A Framework for Deep Learning

This section explains how to quantify the privacy guarantees after T steps of any first-order optimization algorithm (e.g., SGD) minimizing a sliced Wasserstein loss when using (4) as a substitute for the usual gradients, particularly in a deep learning framework where it is not possible to guarantee a priori that gradients and activations are bounded, and where one typically needs to run many iterations in a batched setting.

5.1 Inner-Clipping of the Gradients

Directly applying Theorem 4.1 to general deep learning models is typically infeasible, as the required boundedness conditions are not satisfied. As a solution, we propose to introduce three hyperparameters $M \geq 0$, $L_1 \geq 0$, and $L_2 \geq 0$, and to use as a proxy for $\nabla_\theta W_2^2$ the following quantity:

$$\nabla_\theta^{M,L_1,L_2} W_2^2 = 2 \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)}(U_i - V_j) \operatorname{Proj}_{L_1}(\nabla_\theta g_\theta(x_i)) + 2 \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)}(V_j - U_i) \operatorname{Proj}_{L_2}(\nabla_\theta h_\theta(z_j))$$
$$(5)$$

where for all i and j, we have $U_i = \operatorname{Proj}_M(g_\theta(x_i))$, $V_j = \operatorname{Proj}_M(h_\theta(z_j))$, and σ, τ are defined as in Section 3. This technique is known as *clipping* and was historically introduced as a preprocessing of the gradients for problems with a finite-sum structure (Abadi et al., 2016). For Wasserstein gradients, note that we also need to clip the *activations*. Now, Theorem 4.1 applies and one may add noise to this quantity to make it private with the Gaussian mechanism.

Remark 5.1 (**Computational considerations**). This approach requires access to per-sample gradients (or per-sample Jacobians in the case of SW_2^2, see Remark A.2) at the layer where the constraint is applied, which introduces overhead, but remains compatible with modern autodiff libraries. A broader discussion on this topic is provided in Appendix E including running-times comparisons.

5.2 Amplification by Subsampling

In deep-learning, sub-sampling is often a necessity because of the size of the datasets. With differential privacy, it allows to leverage a property called *privacy amplification by subsampling*. Since such property varies depending on the neighboring relation, we formalize it in the following lemma with the conventions of this article.

Lemma 5.2 (Privacy amplification by subsampling). *Let $n_1' \leq n_1, \ldots, n_k' \leq n_k$. If a mechanism M_{batch} is (ε, δ)-DP on $\mathcal{D}_1^{n_1'} \times \ldots \times \mathcal{D}_k^{n_k'}$, the mechanism M that (i) selects n_i' among the n_i points in each category without replacement, and then (ii) applies M_{batch} to the sampled dataset, is (ε', δ')-DP on $\mathcal{D}_1^{n_1} \times \ldots \times \mathcal{D}_k^{n_k}$ where $\varepsilon' = \ln(1 + p(e^\varepsilon - 1)), \ \delta' = p\delta$ and $p = \max\left(\frac{n_1'}{n_1}, \ldots, \frac{n_k'}{n_k}\right)$.*

Proof. See Appendix G.3. $\square$

5.3 Privacy Accountanting

In the influential article of Abadi et al. (2016), the authors introduce the *moment accountant* method, a framework for quantifying the privacy of a composition of subsampled Gaussian mechanisms. We now detail why similar methods (Dong et al., 2019) are applicable to Wasserstein gradients.

Total loss: $\mathscr{L}_\alpha = (1 - \alpha) \cdot \frac{1}{n} \sum_i \ell(\hat{x}_i, x_i) + \alpha \cdot SW_2^2(\varphi_\theta \# P_\mathbf{X}, P_\mathbf{Z})$

Figure 1: Sliced Wasserstein autoencoder with privacy-aware training. The encoder maps input x_i to a latent code $\varphi_\theta(x_i)$, encouraged to match the prior $P_\mathbf{Z}$. The decoder reconstructs $\hat{x}_i$. The loss combines reconstruction and sliced Wasserstein distance in latent space.

Since our neighboring relation is based on the replacement relation and since we use subsampling with fixed batch size and without replacement, the classical moment accountant method (Abadi et al., 2016) does not apply. We thus turn to the accounting techniques of Dong et al. (2019) that build on the theory of f-differential privacy and that are more suited to this scenario. Using the notation of Dong et al. (2019), and denoting by Δ the sensitivity of $\nabla_\theta^{M,L_1,L_2} W_2^2$ (which is controlled by Theorem 4.1), $\nabla_\theta^{M,L_1,L_2} W_2^2 + \sigma N(0, I)$ is $\frac{\Delta}{\sigma}$-GDP (for *Gaussian Differential Privacy*) ignoring the subsampling step. In order to account for subsampling, one would like to apply Theorem 4.2 in Dong et al. (2019). This is not possible since this article uses a different neighboring relation and a different form of subsampling. However, we can notice that we can substitute Lemma 4.4 in the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Dong et al. (2019) by our Lemma 5.2 and the rest of the proof follows. We thus get that the overall procedure described by Algorithm 1 is $C_p(G_{(\sigma/\Delta)^{-1}})^{\otimes T}$-DP where $p = \max(n_1'/n_1, \ldots, n_k'/n_k)$ with the formalism of f-differential privacy (Dong et al., 2019).

Algorithm 1 Sequential Computation of Subsampled Wasserstein Noisy Gradients

---

for $t = 1$ to T **do**
    Select n_i' among the n_i points in each category without replacement.
    Compute $\hat{\nabla}_\theta W_2^2 := \nabla_\theta^{M,L_1,L_2} W_2^2 + \sigma \mathcal{N}(0, I)$ on the subsampled dataset.
    Publish $\hat{\nabla}_\theta W_2^2$.
    Wait for the optimizer to update θ.
end for

Finally, our approach aligns with the privacy accounting framework in the asymptotic regime described in Section 5.2 of (Dong et al., 2019). In our experiments, we implement this privacy accountant using the (Yousefpour et al., 2021) library. Note that this accountant can be replaced by any accountant, tailored for fixed size batch sampling without replacement and with the replacement neighboring relation.

6 Private Sliced Wasserstein Autoencoders

Building on our analysis, we present what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first differentially private training procedure for the sliced Wasserstein autoencoders of Kolouri et al. (2018).

6.1 General Method

Given a private dataset $\mathbf{X} \in \mathcal{X}^n$, the goal is to learn an encoder φ_{θ_a} and a decoder ψ_{θ_b} by minimizing a reconstruction loss ℓ, regularized with a sliced Wasserstein penalty in the latent space. This encourages the encoded representations to match a non-private random sample $\mathbf{Z}$ from a prescribed distribution Q on $\mathbb{R}^{d_0}$. Denoting $\theta = (\theta_a, \theta_b)$, $\varphi_\theta = \varphi_{\theta_a}$ and $\psi_\theta = \psi_{\theta_b}$, we minimize

$$\mathscr{L}_\alpha(\theta) = (1 - \alpha)\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \ell(\psi_\theta(\varphi_\theta(x_i)), x_i) + \alpha \, SW_2^2\big(\varphi_\theta \# P_\mathbf{X}, \, P_\mathbf{Z}\big) , \qquad (6)$$

where $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ is the regularization parameter (see Figure 1).

Figure 2: Benchmarking the capabilities of a (ε, δ)-DP sliced Wasserstein autoencoder on MNIST with $\delta = 10^{-5}$ and varying ε. **Top:** Reconstructed digits from the test dataset. The first row shows the earliest sample of each digit (0–9) in the test set, followed by reconstructions. **Bottom:** Generated samples from the same model by decoding noise from the latent space.

6.2 Private Training Loop

We now control the sensitivity of the gradients. For the first term in Equation (6), the finite-sum structure carries to the gradient: if $\|\nabla_\theta \ell(\psi_\theta(\varphi_\theta(x_i)), x_i)\|_2 \leq C$ for all $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$, the sensitivity is bounded by $2C/n$ under $\sim_1$. For the second term, if φ_θ satisfies Assumptions (i)–(ii) of Theorem A.1,

$$\Delta_2\big[\nabla_\theta \mathscr{L}_\alpha(\theta)\big] \leq (1-\alpha)\frac{2C}{n} + \alpha \cdot \frac{12\,M\,L}{n} .$$

This benefits from large n, enabling private gradients with minimal noise. As in Section 5, the training uses:

- **Clipping:** If assumptions fail, we clip per-example reconstruction gradients by $C > 0$, and apply inner clipping to the sliced Wasserstein part using $M > 0$ for the *encoder output* and $L > 0$ for the spectral norm of the encoder Jacobian;
- **Subsampling:** We estimate gradients over batches of size n', replacing n by n' in the above sensitivity.

6.3 Generative Modeling as a Byproduct — Comparison to the Baseline

A byproduct of SWAEs is their ability to generate data resembling the training distribution: matching $\varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}$ to a prior and decoding fresh prior samples yields synthetic data. Since training is differentially private end-to-end, this yields a privacy-preserving data generator.

6.4 Data and Results

We use $\mathbf{X} \in (\mathbb{R}^{28 \times 28})^{60000}$ from MNIST or Fashion-MNIST, and $\mathbf{Z}$ as i.i.d. samples from the uniform distribution on the unit ball in $\mathbb{R}^{d_0}$ with $d_0 = 6$. Encoder/decoder architectures are in Table 2 (Appendix B). We train with binary cross-entropy and $\alpha = 0.1$, using private gradients on random batches of size $n' = 600$, and ADAM updates (Kingma & Ba, 2015). Clipping values: $M = 1.5$ for the encoder output, $L = \sqrt{6}$ for the spectral norm of the last-layer encoder Jacobian (naive approach of Remark A.2), and $C = 1$ for per-example reconstruction gradients. We run 5000 iterations, adding noise each step to reach (ε, δ)-DP over all iterations. The SW_2 Monte Carlo approximation uses 100 random projection directions. Reconstructions and embeddings for MNIST are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The latent distributional constraints (including support shape) are enforced while preserving meaningful reconstructions. This structured latent representation also enables meaningful interpolations between samples, as illustrated in Figure 6 (Appendix B).

Figure 3: Encoded latent space MNIST samples for the autoencoder, trained under (ε, δ)-DP, with $\delta = 10^{-5}$ and varying values of ε.

For generative modeling, examples for MNIST appear in Figure 2; analogous Fashion-MNIST results are given in Appendix B. Within Wasserstein-based approaches, our results are competitive; cf. Sebag et al. (2023) comparing private sliced Wasserstein flows to Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021). Broader comparisons to task-specific methods are presented in Table 1 in the main text for $\varepsilon = 10$. Additional comparisons for $\varepsilon = 1$ are given in Table 3 in Appendix B. While our approach does not match specialized state-of-the-art methods for DP data generation (e.g., DP diffusion), this is not its primary goal: the contribution here is to provide, for the first time, a differentially private training procedure for SWAEs. Despite this shift in focus, our results remain competitive with recent alternatives and demonstrate strong downstream utility, highlighting the value of SWAE-style representation learning under privacy constraints.

Table 1: Comparison of different methods on MNIST under (ϵ, δ)-DP, with $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon = 10}$ and $\delta = 10^{-5}$, using Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) and test accuracy (Acc) computed by training an MLP classifier on synthetic images. The number in parentheses indicates the accuracy of a classifier applied to the reconstructed images from the autoencoder. Additional details on the comparison metrics can be found in Table 3 (Appendix B), which reports results for the same experimental setting under $\varepsilon = 1$.

METHOD	MNIST (FID/Acc)	F-MNIST (FID/Acc)
DP-SWAE (Ours)	123.6 / 0.755 (0.848)	145.8 / 0.692 (0.733)
DP-NTK (Yang et al., 2024b)	- / 0.880	- / 0.784
DPDM (Dockhorn et al., 2022)	5.0 / 0.948	18.6 / 0.830
PEARL (Liew et al., 2022)	116.0 / 0.783	102.0 / 0.732
DP-Sinkhorn (Cao et al., 2021)	48.4 / 0.827	128.3 / 0.746
DP-CGAN (Torkzadehmahani et al., 2020)	179.2 / 0.600	243.8 / 0.500
DP-HP (Vinaroz et al., 2022)	- / 0.804	- / 0.717
DP-MERF (Harder et al., 2021)	116.3 / 0.783	132.6 / 0.745
GS-WGAN (Chen et al., 2020)	61.3 / 0.790	131.3 / 0.650

7 Fairness via Private In-Processing

This section shows how our framework enables training models that are simultaneously fair and differentially private.

7.1 General Method

Given a dataset $\mathbf{D}$ with samples (x_i, a_i, y_i) or (x_i, a_i), where x_i are non-sensitive attributes, $a_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is a binary sensitive attribute, and y_i is a response variable (in supervised settings), standard learning algorithms minimize the empirical risk

Figure 4: Distributions of $\varphi_\theta(X)$ conditioned on $A = 0$ and $A = 1$, for models trained to minimize $\mathscr{L}_\alpha^{SP}$ under (ε, δ)-DP, with $\delta = 0.1/n$ and varying values of the regularization parameter α and the privacy budget ε. The representation φ_θ corresponds to: (i) predicted class probabilities in a classification task, (ii) predicted values in a bidimensional regression task, and (iii) bidimensional latent representations from an autoencoder.

$$\min_\theta \mathscr{L}(\theta) := \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \ell(g_\theta(x_i)),$$

with $\ell(g_\theta(x_i)) = \ell(g_\theta(x_i), y_i)$ in supervised tasks and $\ell(g_\theta(x_i), x_i)$ in unsupervised ones. In our framework, fairness notions are enforced by adding suitable Wasserstein penalties to $\mathscr{L}(\theta)$, while keeping sensitivity bounded for DP guarantees.

Among fairness notions, *statistical parity* requires decisions to be independent of A: $\mathcal{L}(g_\theta(X) \mid A = 0) = \mathcal{L}(g_\theta(X) \mid A = 1)$. Writing $\mathbf{X}_j = \{x_i : a_i = j\}$ with $n_j = |\mathbf{X}_j|$, we minimize

$$\mathscr{L}_\alpha^{SP}(\theta) = (1 - \alpha)\mathscr{L}(\theta) + \alpha\, SW_2^2(\varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_0},\ \varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_1}),$$

where $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ controls the fairness–accuracy tradeoff, and $\varphi_\theta = g_\theta$ (output-level) or an intermediate representation. Other notions are discussed in Appendix C.

7.2   Training Details

Under boundedness assumptions, the sensitivity of $\nabla_\theta \mathscr{L}_\alpha^{SP}(\theta)$ is bounded by

$$(1 - \alpha)\frac{2C}{n} + \alpha\frac{16ML}{\min\{n_0, n_1\}},$$

under the two-end neighboring relation $\sim_2$ (see Corollary C.1). Optimization then proceeds with DP-SGD, using subsampling and privacy accounting (Section 5). Full details are given in Appendix C.

7.3   Data and Results

We evaluate our approach on simulated biased datasets (Appendix C) across three scenarios:

- **Private and fair binary classification:** a well-studied benchmark, previously explored by several authors, as detailed in the related work section;

- **Private and fair multidimensional regression:** a novel extension beyond current one-dimensional approaches such as Xian et al. (2024);

- **Private and fair representation learning:** a new setting where fairness is enforced directly at the representation level.

As shown in Figure 4, two conclusions emerge: (i) increasing α effectively mitigates bias through Wasserstein penalization, and (ii) adding privacy has minimal effect on fairness outcomes. Full details and statistical metrics are reported in Appendix C.

Figure 5: Tradeoff between fairness and accuracy for different $(2, 1/n)$-DP methods on the one-dimensional private regression problem of Remark C.3, averaged over 5 random seeds. Fairness is measured in terms of both W_2^2 (squared Wasserstein distance) and KS distance, while accuracy is measured by mean squared error (MSE). Blue numbers represent the radius β of the KS ball used in the approach of Xian et al. (2024), and red numbers the value of the regularization parameter α in our approach. Our method achieves competitive performance under both fairness metrics compared to the post-processing approach of Xian et al. (2024).

7.4 Fair and private 1-D regression: comparison to the baseline

Finally, we compare with the one-dimensional regression method of Xian et al. (2024) which controls fairness via Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) distance, using a transformation of the same biased data. Their approach is specific to the 1-D case, whereas ours extends naturally. On the same task, our method achieves a better fairness–utility tradeoff under W_2^2 and remains competitive under the KS metric (Figure 5, see Remark C.3 for further datails).

8 Conclusion

We introduced a novel sensitivity analysis for sliced Wasserstein gradients, enabling differentially private learning in distributional matching problems. Building on this foundation, we proposed two new applications: (i) the first private training procedure for sliced Wasserstein autoencoders, and (ii) a general in-processing method for private and fair learning. On benchmarks where Wasserstein-based baselines exist (Section 6 and Appendix D), our approach consistently matches or surpasses these prior methods, while uniquely enabling applications that were previously out of reach. These results underline the potential of our framework to advance private (and fair) machine learning.

We note that sliced Wasserstein autoencoders, while not state-of-the-art for data generation compared to specialized models such as DP diffusion, were never primarily designed for this purpose. Their value lies in being lightweight, versatile, and now, for the first time, trainable under differential privacy. This positions our framework not as a competitor to tailored generative models, but as a complementary tool for representation learning, fairness, and private distributional matching.

A practical limitation is the computational overhead of Jacobian computations (Remark 5.1). Such costs are common in differential privacy (De et al., 2022), but improving the efficiency of Jacobian evaluation remains an important avenue for scaling our method to larger models.

Our analysis also highlights several promising research directions. First, the sensitivity bounds hinge on the quadratic structure of W_2^2: as shown in Appendix F, they do not extend to general W_p with $p \geq 1$. Extending the framework to W_p^p for $p > 1$ seems both feasible and worthwhile. Second, incorporating sliced Wasserstein barycenters under DP would broaden applicability to aggregation and clustering tasks. Finally, *entropic regularization* could reduce complexity and improve stability.

References

Martín Abadi, Ashish Agarwal, Paul Barham, Eugene Brevdo, Zhifeng Chen, Craig Citro, Greg S. Corrado, Andy Davis, Jeffrey Dean, Matthieu Devin, Sanjay Ghemawat, Ian Goodfellow, Andrew Harp, Geoffrey Irving, Michael Isard, Yangqing Jia, Rafal Jozefowicz, Lukasz Kaiser, Manjunath Kudlur, Josh Levenberg, Dandelion Mané, Rajat Monga, Sherry Moore, Derek Murray, Chris Olah, Mike Schuster, Jonathon Shlens, Benoit Steiner, Ilya Sutskever, Kunal Talwar, Paul Tucker, Vincent Vanhoucke, Vijay Vasudevan, Fernanda Viégas, Oriol Vinyals, Pete Warden, Martin Wattenberg, Martin Wicke, Yuan Yu, and Xiaoqiang Zheng. TensorFlow: Large-scale machine learning on heterogeneous systems, 2015. URL https://www.tensorflow.org/. Software available from tensorflow.org.

Martín Abadi, Andy Chu, Ian J. Goodfellow, H. Brendan McMahan, Ilya Mironov, Kunal Talwar, and Li Zhang. Deep learning with differential privacy. In Edgar R. Weippl, Stefan Katzenbeisser, Christopher Kruegel, Andrew C. Myers, and Shai Halevi (eds.), *Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Vienna, Austria, October 24-28, 2016*, pp. 308–318. ACM, 2016. doi: 10.1145/2976749.2978318. URL https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978318.

John M Abowd. The us census bureau adopts differential privacy. In *Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining*, pp. 2867–2867, 2018.

Jayadev Acharya, Ziteng Sun, and Huanyu Zhang. Differentially private Assouad, Fano, and Le Cam. In Vitaly Feldman, Katrina Ligett, and Sivan Sabato (eds.), *Algorithmic Learning Theory, 16-19 March 2021, Virtual Conference, Worldwide*, volume 132 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 48–78. PMLR, 2021. URL http://proceedings.mlr.press/v132/acharya21a.html.

Ishaq Aden-Ali, Hassan Ashtiani, and Gautam Kamath. On the sample complexity of privately learning unbounded high-dimensional gaussians. In Vitaly Feldman, Katrina Ligett, and Sivan Sabato (eds.), *Algorithmic Learning Theory, 16-19 March 2021, Virtual Conference, Worldwide*, volume 132 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 185–216. PMLR, 2021. URL http://proceedings.mlr.press/v132/aden-ali21a.html.

Martín Arjovsky, Soumith Chintala, and Léon Bottou. Wasserstein generative adversarial networks. In Doina Precup and Yee Whye Teh (eds.), *Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2017, Sydney, NSW, Australia, 6-11 August 2017*, volume 70 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 214–223. PMLR, 2017. URL http://proceedings.mlr.press/v70/arjovsky17a.html.

Lars Backstrom, Cynthia Dwork, and Jon M. Kleinberg. Wherefore art thou r3579x?: anonymized social networks, hidden patterns, and structural steganography. In Carey L. Williamson, Mary Ellen Zurko, Peter F. Patel-Schneider, and Prashant J. Shenoy (eds.), *Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW 2007, Banff, Alberta, Canada, May 8-12, 2007*, pp. 181–190. ACM, 2007. doi: 10.1145/1242572.1242598. URL https://doi.org/10.1145/1242572.1242598.

Eugene Bagdasaryan, Omid Poursaeed, and Vitaly Shmatikov. Differential privacy has disparate impact on model accuracy. In Hanna M. Wallach, Hugo Larochelle, Alina Beygelzimer, Florence d'Alché-Buc, Emily B. Fox, and Roman Garnett (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2019, NeurIPS 2019, December 8-14, 2019, Vancouver, BC, Canada*, pp. 15453–15462, 2019. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2019/hash/fc0de4e0396fff257ea362983c2dda5a-Abstract.html.

Rina Foygel Barber and John C. Duchi. Privacy and statistical risk: Formalisms and minimax bounds. *CoRR*, abs/1412.4451, 2014. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.4451.

Solon Barocas, Moritz Hardt, and Arvind Narayanan. *Fairness and Machine Learning*. fairmlbook.org, 2018. URL http://www.fairmlbook.org.

Ainhize Barrainkua, Paula Gordaliza, Jose A Lozano, and Novi Quadrianto. Uncertainty matters: stable conclusions under unstable assessment of fairness results. In *International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics*, pp. 1198–1206. PMLR, 2024.

Barry Becker and Ronny Kohavi. Adult. UCI Machine Learning Repository, 1996. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24432/C5XW20.

Philippe Besse, Eustasio del Barrio, Paula Gordaliza, Jean-Michel Loubes, and Laurent Risser. A survey of bias in machine learning through the prism of statistical parity. *The American Statistician*, 76(2):188–198, 2022.

Sourav Biswas, Yihe Dong, Gautam Kamath, and Jonathan R. Ullman. Coinpress: Practical private mean and covariance estimation. In Hugo Larochelle, Marc'Aurelio Ranzato, Raia Hadsell, Maria-Florina Balcan, and Hsuan-Tien Lin (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, NeurIPS 2020, December 6-12, 2020, virtual*, 2020. URL `https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2020/hash/a684eceee76fc522773286a895bc8436-Abstract.html`.

Nicolas Bonneel, Julien Rabin, Gabriel Peyré, and Hanspeter Pfister. Sliced and radon wasserstein barycenters of measures. *J. Math. Imaging Vis.*, 51(1):22–45, 2015. doi: 10.1007/S10851-014-0506-3. URL `https://doi.org/10.1007/s10851-014-0506-3`.

James Bradbury, Roy Frostig, Peter Hawkins, Matthew James Johnson, Chris Leary, Dougal Maclaurin, George Necula, Adam Paszke, Jake VanderPlas, Skye Wanderman-Milne, and Qiao Zhang. JAX: composable transformations of Python+NumPy programs, 2018. URL `http://github.com/jax-ml/jax`.

Gavin Brown, Marco Gaboardi, Adam D. Smith, Jonathan R. Ullman, and Lydia Zakynthinou. Covariance-aware private mean estimation without private covariance estimation. In Marc'Aurelio Ranzato, Alina Beygelzimer, Yann N. Dauphin, Percy Liang, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2021, NeurIPS 2021, December 6-14, 2021, virtual*, pp. 7950–7964, 2021. URL `https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2021/hash/42778ef0b5805a96f9511e20b5611fce-Abstract.html`.

Mark Bun, Gautam Kamath, Thomas Steinke, and Zhiwei Steven Wu. Private hypothesis selection. In Hanna M. Wallach, Hugo Larochelle, Alina Beygelzimer, Florence d'Alché-Buc, Emily B. Fox, and Roman Garnett (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2019, NeurIPS 2019, December 8-14, 2019, Vancouver, BC, Canada*, pp. 156–167, 2019. URL `https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2019/hash/9778d5d219c5080b9a6a17bef029331c-Abstract.html`.

Mark Bun, Gautam Kamath, Thomas Steinke, and Zhiwei Steven Wu. Private hypothesis selection. *IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory*, 67(3):1981–2000, 2021. doi: 10.1109/TIT.2021.3049802. URL `https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2021.3049802`.

T. Tony Cai, Yichen Wang, and Linjun Zhang. The cost of privacy: Optimal rates of convergence for parameter estimation with differential privacy. *CoRR*, abs/1902.04495, 2019. URL `http://arxiv.org/abs/1902.04495`.

Tianshi Cao, Alex Bie, Arash Vahdat, Sanja Fidler, and Karsten Kreis. Don't generate me: Training differentially private generative models with sinkhorn divergence. In Marc'Aurelio Ranzato, Alina Beygelzimer, Yann N. Dauphin, Percy Liang, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2021, NeurIPS 2021, December 6-14, 2021, virtual*, pp. 12480–12492, 2021. URL `https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2021/hash/67ed94744426295f96268f4ac1881b46-Abstract.html`.

Dingfan Chen, Tribhuvanesh Orekondy, and Mario Fritz. GS-WGAN: A gradient-sanitized approach for learning differentially private generators. In Hugo Larochelle, Marc'Aurelio Ranzato, Raia Hadsell, Maria-Florina Balcan, and Hsuan-Tien Lin (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, NeurIPS 2020, December 6-12, 2020, virtual*, 2020. URL `https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2020/hash/9547ad6b651e2087bac67651aa92cd0d-Abstract.html`.

Silvia Chiappa, Ray Jiang, Tom Stepleton, Aldo Pacchiano, Heinrich Jiang, and John Aslanides. A general approach to fairness with optimal transport. In *The Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2020, The Thirty-Second Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2020, The Tenth AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2020, New York, NY, USA, February 7-12, 2020*, pp. 3633–3640. AAAI Press, 2020. doi: 10.1609/AAAI.V34I04.5771. URL https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i04.5771.

Alexandra Chouldechova and Aaron Roth. A snapshot of the frontiers of fairness in machine learning. *Communications of the ACM*, 63(5):82–89, 2020.

Evgenii Chzhen, Christophe Denis, Mohamed Hebiri, Luca Oneto, and Massimiliano Pontil. Fair regression with wasserstein barycenters. In H. Larochelle, M. Ranzato, R. Hadsell, M.F. Balcan, and H. Lin (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 33, pp. 7321–7331. Curran Associates, Inc., 2020. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2020/file/51cdbd2611e844ece5d80878eb770436-Paper.pdf.

Nicolas Courty, Rémi Flamary, Devis Tuia, and Alain Rakotomamonjy. Optimal transport for domain adaptation. *IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell.*, 39(9):1853–1865, 2017. doi: 10.1109/TPAMI.2016.2615921. URL https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAMI.2016.2615921.

Rachel Cummings, Varun Gupta, Dhamma Kimpara, and Jamie Morgenstern. On the compatibility of privacy and fairness. In *Adjunct publication of the 27th conference on user modeling, adaptation and personalization*, pp. 309–315, 2019.

Marco Cuturi. Sinkhorn distances: Lightspeed computation of optimal transport. In Christopher J. C. Burges, Léon Bottou, Zoubin Ghahramani, and Kilian Q. Weinberger (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 26: 27th Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2013. Proceedings of a meeting held December 5-8, 2013, Lake Tahoe, Nevada, United States*, pp. 2292–2300, 2013. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2013/hash/af21d0c97db2e27e13572cbf59eb343d-Abstract.html.

Soham De, Leonard Berrada, Jamie Hayes, Samuel L. Smith, and Borja Balle. Unlocking high-accuracy differentially private image classification through scale. *CoRR*, abs/2204.13650, 2022. doi: 10.48550/arXiv.2204.13650. URL https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2204.13650.

Lucas De Lara, Alberto González-Sanz, Nicholas Asher, Laurent Risser, and Jean-Michel Loubes. Transport-based counterfactual models. *Journal of Machine Learning Research*, 25(136):1–59, 2024.

Ishan Deshpande, Ziyu Zhang, and Alexander G. Schwing. Generative modeling using the sliced wasserstein distance. In *2018 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, CVPR 2018, Salt Lake City, UT, USA, June 18-22, 2018*, pp. 3483–3491. Computer Vision Foundation / IEEE Computer Society, 2018. doi: 10.1109/CVPR.2018.00367. URL http://openaccess.thecvf.com/content_cvpr_2018/html/Deshpande_Generative_Modeling_Using_CVPR_2018_paper.html.

Ilias Diakonikolas, Moritz Hardt, and Ludwig Schmidt. Differentially private learning of structured discrete distributions. In Corinna Cortes, Neil D. Lawrence, Daniel D. Lee, Masashi Sugiyama, and Roman Garnett (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 28: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2015, December 7-12, 2015, Montreal, Quebec, Canada*, pp. 2566–2574, 2015. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2015/hash/2b3bf3eee2475e03885a110e9acaab61-Abstract.html.

Bolin Ding, Janardhan Kulkarni, and Sergey Yekhanin. Collecting telemetry data privately. In Isabelle Guyon, Ulrike von Luxburg, Samy Bengio, Hanna M. Wallach, Rob Fergus, S. V. N. Vishwanathan, and Roman Garnett (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2017, December 4-9, 2017, Long Beach, CA, USA*, pp. 3571–3580, 2017. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2017/hash/253614bbac999b38b5b60cae531c4969-Abstract.html.

Jiahao Ding, Xinyue Zhang, Xiaohuan Li, Junyi Wang, Rong Yu, and Miao Pan. Differentially private and fair classification via calibrated functional mechanism. In *The Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2020, The Thirty-Second Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2020, The Tenth AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2020, New York, NY, USA, February 7-12, 2020*, pp. 622–629. AAAI Press, 2020. doi: 10.1609/ AAAI.V34I01.5402. URL `https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i01.5402`.

Irit Dinur and Kobbi Nissim. Revealing information while preserving privacy. In Frank Neven, Catriel Beeri, and Tova Milo (eds.), *Proceedings of the Twenty-Second ACM SIGACT-SIGMOD-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, June 9-12, 2003, San Diego, CA, USA*, pp. 202–210. ACM, 2003. doi: 10.1145/773153.773173. URL `https://doi.org/10.1145/773153.773173`.

Tim Dockhorn, Tianshi Cao, Arash Vahdat, and Karsten Kreis. Differentially private diffusion models. *CoRR*, abs/2210.09929, 2022. doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.2210.09929. URL `https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2210.09929`.

Jinshuo Dong, Aaron Roth, and Weijie J. Su. Gaussian differential privacy. *CoRR*, abs/1905.02383, 2019. URL `http://arxiv.org/abs/1905.02383`.

Cynthia Dwork. Differential privacy. In Michele Bugliesi, Bart Preneel, Vladimiro Sassone, and Ingo Wegener (eds.), *Automata, Languages and Programming, 33rd International Colloquium, ICALP 2006, Venice, Italy, July 10-14, 2006, Proceedings, Part II*, volume 4052 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pp. 1–12. Springer, 2006. doi: 10.1007/11787006_1. URL `https://doi.org/10.1007/11787006_1`.

Cynthia Dwork, Krishnaram Kenthapadi, Frank McSherry, Ilya Mironov, and Moni Naor. Our data, ourselves: Privacy via distributed noise generation. In Serge Vaudenay (ed.), *Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2006, 25th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 28 - June 1, 2006, Proceedings*, volume 4004 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pp. 486–503. Springer, 2006a. doi: 10.1007/11761679_29. URL `https://doi.org/10.1007/11761679_29`.

Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim, and Adam D. Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis. In Shai Halevi and Tal Rabin (eds.), *Theory of Cryptography, Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006, New York, NY, USA, March 4-7, 2006, Proceedings*, volume 3876 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pp. 265–284. Springer, 2006b. doi: 10.1007/11681878_14. URL `https://doi.org/10.1007/11681878_14`.

Cynthia Dwork, Moritz Hardt, Toniann Pitassi, Omer Reingold, and Richard Zemel. Fairness through awareness. In *Proceedings of the 3rd innovations in theoretical computer science conference*, pp. 214–226, 2012.

Úlfar Erlingsson, Vasyl Pihur, and Aleksandra Korolova. RAPPOR: randomized aggregatable privacy-preserving ordinal response. In Gail-Joon Ahn, Moti Yung, and Ninghui Li (eds.), *Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Scottsdale, AZ, USA, November 3-7, 2014*, pp. 1054–1067. ACM, 2014. doi: 10.1145/2660267.2660348. URL `https://doi.org/10.1145/2660267.2660348`.

Maria S. Esipova, Atiyeh Ashari Ghomi, Yaqiao Luo, and Jesse C. Cresswell. Disparate impact in differential privacy from gradient misalignment. In *The Eleventh International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2023, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1-5, 2023*. OpenReview.net, 2023. URL `https://openreview.net/forum?id=qLOaeRvteqbx`.

Tom Farrand, Fatemehsadat Mireshghallah, Sahib Singh, and Andrew Trask. Neither private nor fair: Impact of data imbalance on utility and fairness in differential privacy. In Benyu Zhang, Raluca Ada Popa, Matei Zaharia, Guofei Gu, and Shouling Ji (eds.), *PPMLP'20: Proceedings of the 2020 Workshop on Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning in Practice, Virtual Event, USA, November, 2020*, pp. 15–19. ACM, 2020. doi: 10.1145/3411501.3419419. URL `https://doi.org/10.1145/3411501.3419419`.

Michael Feldman, Sorelle A Friedler, John Moeller, Carlos Scheidegger, and Suresh Venkatasubramanian. Certifying and removing disparate impact. In *proceedings of the 21th ACM SIGKDD international conference on knowledge discovery and data mining*, pp. 259–268, 2015.

Ferdinando Fioretto, Cuong Tran, Pascal Van Hentenryck, and Keyu Zhu. Differential privacy and fairness in decisions and learning tasks: A survey. In Luc De Raedt (ed.), *Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2022, Vienna, Austria, 23-29 July 2022*, pp. 5470–5477. ijcai.org, 2022. doi: 10.24963/IJCAI.2022/766. URL `https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/766`.

Matt Fredrikson, Somesh Jha, and Thomas Ristenpart. Model inversion attacks that exploit confidence information and basic countermeasures. In Indrajit Ray, Ninghui Li, and Christopher Kruegel (eds.), *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Denver, CO, USA, October 12-16, 2015*, pp. 1322–1333. ACM, 2015. doi: 10.1145/2810103.2813677. URL `https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813677`.

Solenne Gaucher, Nicolas Schreuder, and Evgenii Chzhen. Fair learning with wasserstein barycenters for non-decomposable performance measures. In *International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics*, pp. 2436–2459. PMLR, 2023.

Hrad Ghoukasian and Shahab Asoodeh. Differentially private fair binary classifications. *CoRR*, abs/2402.15603, 2024. doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.2402.15603. URL `https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2402.15603`.

Ian Goodfellow. Efficient per-example gradient computations. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1510.01799*, 2015.

Paula Gordaliza, Eustasio del Barrio, Fabrice Gamboa, and Jean-Michel Loubes. Obtaining fairness using optimal transport theory. In Kamalika Chaudhuri and Ruslan Salakhutdinov (eds.), *Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2019, 9-15 June 2019, Long Beach, California, USA*, volume 97 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 2357–2365. PMLR, 2019. URL `http://proceedings.mlr.press/v97/gordaliza19a.html`.

Thibaut Le Gouic, Jean-Michel Loubes, and Philippe Rigollet. Projection to fairness in statistical learning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.11720*, 2020.

Kristjan Greenewald, Yuancheng Yu, Hao Wang, and Kai Xu. Privacy without noisy gradients: Slicing mechanism for generative model training. In *Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems*, 2024.

Frederik Harder, Kamil Adamczewski, and Mijung Park. Dp-merf: Differentially private mean embeddings with randomfeatures for practical privacy-preserving data generation. In *International conference on artificial intelligence and statistics*, pp. 1819–1827. PMLR, 2021.

Martin Heusel, Hubert Ramsauer, Thomas Unterthiner, Bernhard Nessler, and Sepp Hochreiter. Gans trained by a two time-scale update rule converge to a local nash equilibrium. In Isabelle Guyon, Ulrike von Luxburg, Samy Bengio, Hanna M. Wallach, Rob Fergus, S. V. N. Vishwanathan, and Roman Garnett (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2017, December 4-9, 2017, Long Beach, CA, USA*, pp. 6626–6637, 2017. URL `https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2017/hash/8a1d694707eb0fefe65871369074926d-Abstract.html`.

Hans Hofmann. Statlog (German Credit Data). UCI Machine Learning Repository, 1994. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24432/C5NC77.

Nils Homer, Szabolcs Szelinger, Margot Redman, David Duggan, Waibhav Tembe, Jill Muehling, John V Pearson, Dietrich A Stephan, Stanley F Nelson, and David W Craig. Resolving individuals contributing trace amounts of dna to highly complex mixtures using high-density snp genotyping microarrays. *PLoS Genet*, 4(8):e1000167, 2008.

Matthew Jagielski, Michael Kearns, Jieming Mao, Alina Oprea, Aaron Roth, Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi, and Jonathan Ullman. Differentially private fair learning. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 3000–3008. PMLR, 2019.

Ray Jiang, Aldo Pacchiano, Tom Stepleton, Heinrich Jiang, and Silvia Chiappa. Wasserstein fair classification. In *Uncertainty in artificial intelligence*, pp. 862–872. PMLR, 2020.

Gautam Kamath, Jerry Li, Vikrant Singhal, and Jonathan R. Ullman. Privately learning high-dimensional distributions. In Alina Beygelzimer and Daniel Hsu (eds.), *Conference on Learning Theory, COLT 2019, 25-28 June 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA*, volume 99 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 1853–1902. PMLR, 2019. URL http://proceedings.mlr.press/v99/kamath19a.html.

Gautam Kamath, Vikrant Singhal, and Jonathan R. Ullman. Private mean estimation of heavy-tailed distributions. In Jacob D. Abernethy and Shivani Agarwal (eds.), *Conference on Learning Theory, COLT 2020, 9-12 July 2020, Virtual Event [Graz, Austria]*, volume 125 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 2204–2235. PMLR, 2020. URL http://proceedings.mlr.press/v125/kamath20a.html.

Gautam Kamath, Xingtu Liu, and Huanyu Zhang. Improved rates for differentially private stochastic convex optimization with heavy-tailed data. In Kamalika Chaudhuri, Stefanie Jegelka, Le Song, Csaba Szepesvári, Gang Niu, and Sivan Sabato (eds.), *International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2022, 17-23 July 2022, Baltimore, Maryland, USA*, volume 162 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 10633–10660. PMLR, 2022a. URL https://proceedings.mlr.press/v162/kamath22a.html.

Gautam Kamath, Argyris Mouzakis, and Vikrant Singhal. New lower bounds for private estimation and a generalized fingerprinting lemma. In *NeurIPS*, 2022b. URL http://papers.nips.cc/paper_files/paper/2022/hash/9a6b278218966499194491f55ccf8b75-Abstract-Conference.html.

Gautam Kamath, Argyris Mouzakis, Matthew Regehr, Vikrant Singhal, Thomas Steinke, and Jonathan R. Ullman. A bias-variance-privacy trilemma for statistical estimation. *CoRR*, abs/2301.13334, 2023. doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.2301.13334. URL https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2301.13334.

Vishesh Karwa and Salil P. Vadhan. Finite sample differentially private confidence intervals. In Anna R. Karlin (ed.), *9th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, ITCS 2018, January 11-14, 2018, Cambridge, MA, USA*, volume 94 of *LIPIcs*, pp. 44:1–44:9. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2018. doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2018.44. URL https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2018.44.

Yusuke Kawamoto and Takao Murakami. Local obfuscation mechanisms for hiding probability distributions. In Kazue Sako, Steve A. Schneider, and Peter Y. A. Ryan (eds.), *Computer Security - ESORICS 2019 - 24th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Luxembourg, September 23-27, 2019, Proceedings, Part I*, volume 11735 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pp. 128–148. Springer, 2019. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0_7. URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0_7.

Diederik P. Kingma and Jimmy Ba. Adam: A method for stochastic optimization. In Yoshua Bengio and Yann LeCun (eds.), *3rd International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2015, San Diego, CA, USA, May 7-9, 2015, Conference Track Proceedings*, 2015. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6980.

Soheil Kolouri, Charles E. Martin, and Gustavo K. Rohde. Sliced-wasserstein autoencoder: An embarrassingly simple generative model. *CoRR*, abs/1804.01947, 2018. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.01947.

Natasa Krco, Thibault Laugel, Jean-Michel Loubes, and Marcin Detyniecki. When mitigating bias is unfair: A comprehensive study on the impact of bias mitigation algorithms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.07185, IEEE SATML*, 2025.

Clément Lalanne. *On the tradeoffs of statistical learning with privacy.* Theses, Ecole normale supérieure de lyon - ENS LYON, October 2023. URL https://theses.hal.science/tel-04379624.

Clément Lalanne and Sébastien Gadat. Privately Learning Smooth Distributions on the Hypercube by Projections. In *ICML 2024 - 41st International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 39 p., Vienna, Austria, July 2024. URL `https://hal.science/hal-04549279`.

Clément Lalanne, Aurélien Garivier, and Rémi Gribonval. Private Statistical Estimation of Many Quantiles. In *ICML 2023 - 40th International Conference on Machine Learning*, Honolulu, United States, July 2023a. URL `https://hal.science/hal-03986170`.

Clément Lalanne, Clément Gastaud, Nicolas Grislain, Aurélien Garivier, and Rémi Gribonval. Private Quantiles Estimation in the Presence of Atoms. *Information and Inference*, August 2023b. doi: 10.1093/imaiai/iaad030. URL `https://hal.science/hal-03572701`.

Clément Lalanne, Franck Iutzeler, Jean-Michel Loubes, and Julien Chhor. On the Private Estimation of Smooth Transport Maps. working paper or preprint, January 2025. URL `https://hal.science/hal-04923578`.

B. Laurent and P. Massart. Adaptive estimation of a quadratic functional by model selection. *The Annals of Statistics*, 28(5):1302–1338, 2000. ISSN 00905364. URL `http://www.jstor.org/stable/2674095`.

Chen-Yu Lee, Tanmay Batra, Mohammad Haris Baig, and Daniel Ulbricht. Sliced wasserstein discrepancy for unsupervised domain adaptation. In *IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, CVPR 2019, Long Beach, CA, USA, June 16-20, 2019*, pp. 10285–10295. Computer Vision Foundation / IEEE, 2019. doi: 10.1109/CVPR.2019.01053. URL `http://openaccess.thecvf.com/content_CVPR_2019/html/Lee_Sliced_Wasserstein_Discrepancy_for_Unsupervised_Domain_Adaptation_CVPR_2019_paper.html`.

Jaewoo Lee and Daniel Kifer. Scaling up differentially private deep learning with fast per-example gradient clipping. *Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies*, 2021(1), 2021.

Seng Pei Liew, Tsubasa Takahashi, and Michihiko Ueno. PEARL: data synthesis via private embeddings and adversarial reconstruction learning. In *The Tenth International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2022, Virtual Event, April 25-29, 2022*. OpenReview.net, 2022. URL `https://openreview.net/forum?id=M6M8BEmd6dq`.

Ziniu Liu, Han Yu, Kai Chen, and Aiping Li. Privacy-preserving generative modeling with sliced wasserstein distance. *IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.*, 20:1011–1022, 2025. doi: 10.1109/TIFS.2024.3516549. URL `https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2024.3516549`.

Grigorios Loukides, Joshua C. Denny, and Bradley A. Malin. The disclosure of diagnosis codes can breach research participants' privacy. *J. Am. Medical Informatics Assoc.*, 17(3):322–327, 2010. doi: 10.1136/jamia.2009.002725. URL `https://doi.org/10.1136/jamia.2009.002725`.

Andrew Lowy, Devansh Gupta, and Meisam Razaviyayn. Stochastic differentially private and fair learning. *CoRR*, abs/2210.08781, 2022. doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.2210.08781. URL `https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2210.08781`.

Paul Mangold, Michaël Perrot, Aurélien Bellet, and Marc Tommasi. Differential privacy has bounded impact on fairness in classification. In Andreas Krause, Emma Brunskill, Kyunghyun Cho, Barbara Engelhardt, Sivan Sabato, and Jonathan Scarlett (eds.), *International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2023, 23-29 July 2023, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA*, volume 202 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 23681–23705. PMLR, 2023. URL `https://proceedings.mlr.press/v202/mangold23a.html`.

Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov. How to break anonymity of the netflix prize dataset. *CoRR*, abs/cs/0610105, 2006. URL `http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0610105`.

Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov. Robust de-anonymization of large sparse datasets. In *2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2008), 18-21 May 2008, Oakland, California, USA*, pp. 111–125. IEEE Computer Society, 2008. doi: 10.1109/SP.2008.33. URL `https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2008.33`.

Luca Oneto and Silvia Chiappa. Fairness in machine learning. In *Recent trends in learning from data: Tutorials from the inns big data and deep learning conference (innsbddl2019)*, pp. 155–196. Springer, 2020.

Adam Paszke, Sam Gross, Francisco Massa, Adam Lerer, James Bradbury, Gregory Chanan, Trevor Killeen, Zeming Lin, Natalia Gimelshein, Luca Antiga, Alban Desmaison, Andreas Kopf, Edward Yang, Zachary DeVito, Martin Raison, Alykhan Tejani, Sasank Chilamkurthy, Benoit Steiner, Lu Fang, Junjie Bai, and Soumith Chintala. Pytorch: An imperative style, high-performance deep learning library. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32*, pp. 8024–8035. Curran Associates, Inc., 2019. URL `http://papers.neurips.cc/paper/9015-pytorch-an-imperative-style-high-performance-deep-learning-library.pdf`.

Clément Pierquin, Aurélien Bellet, Marc Tommasi, and Matthieu Boussard. Rényi pufferfish privacy: General additive noise mechanisms and privacy amplification by iteration via shift reduction lemmas. In *Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2024, Vienna, Austria, July 21-27, 2024*. OpenReview.net, 2024. URL `https://openreview.net/forum?id=VZsxhPpu9T`.

Julien Rabin, Gabriel Peyré, Julie Delon, and Marc Bernot. Wasserstein barycenter and its application to texture mixing. In Alfred M. Bruckstein, Bart M. ter Haar Romeny, Alexander M. Bronstein, and Michael M. Bronstein (eds.), *Scale Space and Variational Methods in Computer Vision - Third International Conference, SSVM 2011, Ein-Gedi, Israel, May 29 - June 2, 2011, Revised Selected Papers*, volume 6667 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pp. 435–446. Springer, 2011. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-24785-9_37. URL `https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24785-9_37`.

Alain Rakotomamonjy and Liva Ralaivola. Differentially private sliced wasserstein distance. In Marina Meila and Tong Zhang (eds.), *Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2021, 18-24 July 2021, Virtual Event*, volume 139 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 8810–8820. PMLR, 2021. URL `http://proceedings.mlr.press/v139/rakotomamonjy21a.html`.

Laurent Risser, Alberto González-Sanz, Quentin Vincenot, and Jean-Michel Loubes. Tackling algorithmic bias in neural-network classifiers using wasserstein-2 regularization. *J. Math. Imaging Vis.*, 64(6):672–689, 2022. doi: 10.1007/S10851-022-01090-2. URL `https://doi.org/10.1007/s10851-022-01090-2`.

Ilana Sebag, Muni Sreenivas Pydi, Jean-Yves Franceschi, Alain Rakotomamonjy, Mike Gartrell, Jamal Atif, and Alexandre Allauzen. Differentially private gradient flow based on the sliced wasserstein distance for non-parametric generative modeling. *CoRR*, abs/2312.08227, 2023. doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.2312.08227. URL `https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2312.08227`.

Vikrant Singhal. A polynomial time, pure differentially private estimator for binary product distributions. *CoRR*, abs/2304.06787, 2023. doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.2304.06787. URL `https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2304.06787`.

Thomas Steinke. Composition of differential privacy & privacy amplification by subsampling. *CoRR*, abs/2210.00597, 2022. doi: 10.48550/ARXIV.2210.00597. URL `https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2210.00597`.

Latanya Sweeney. Simple demographics often identify people uniquely. *Health (San Francisco)*, 671(2000): 1–34, 2000.

Latanya Sweeney. k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy. *Int. J. Uncertain. Fuzziness Knowl. Based Syst.*, 10(5):557–570, 2002. doi: 10.1142/S0218488502001648. URL `https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218488502001648`.

Abhradeep Guha Thakurta, Andrew H Vyrros, Umesh S Vaishampayan, Gaurav Kapoor, Julien Freudiger, Vivek Rangarajan Sridhar, and Doug Davidson. Learning new words. *Granted US Patents*, 9594741, 2017.

Nam Lê Tien, Amaury Habrard, and Marc Sebban. Differentially private optimal transport: Application to domain adaptation. In Sarit Kraus (ed.), *Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019, Macao, China, August 10-16, 2019*, pp. 2852–2858. ijcai.org, 2019. doi: 10.24963/IJCAI.2019/395. URL `https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/395`.

Ilya O. Tolstikhin, Olivier Bousquet, Sylvain Gelly, and Bernhard Schölkopf. Wasserstein auto-encoders. In *6th International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2018, Vancouver, BC, Canada, April 30 - May 3, 2018, Conference Track Proceedings*. OpenReview.net, 2018. URL `https://openreview.net/forum?id=HkL7n1-0b`.

Reihaneh Torkzadehmahani, Peter Kairouz, and Benedict Paten. DP-CGAN: differentially private synthetic data and label generation. *CoRR*, abs/2001.09700, 2020. URL `https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.09700`.

Cuong Tran, My H. Dinh, and Ferdinando Fioretto. Differentially private empirical risk minimization under the fairness lens. In Marc'Aurelio Ranzato, Alina Beygelzimer, Yann N. Dauphin, Percy Liang, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2021, NeurIPS 2021, December 6-14, 2021, virtual*, pp. 27555–27565, 2021. URL `https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2021/hash/e7e8f8e5982b3298c8addedf6811d500-Abstract.html`.

Margarita Vinaroz, Mohammad-Amin Charusaie, Frederik Harder, Kamil Adamczewski, and Mijung Park. Hermite polynomial features for private data generation. In Kamalika Chaudhuri, Stefanie Jegelka, Le Song, Csaba Szepesvári, Gang Niu, and Sivan Sabato (eds.), *International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2022, 17-23 July 2022, Baltimore, Maryland, USA*, volume 162 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 22300–22324. PMLR, 2022. URL `https://proceedings.mlr.press/v162/vinaroz22a.html`.

Isabel Wagner and David Eckhoff. Technical privacy metrics: A systematic survey. *ACM Comput. Surv.*, 51 (3):57:1–57:38, 2018. doi: 10.1145/3168389. URL `https://doi.org/10.1145/3168389`.

Xiaomeng Wang, Yishi Zhang, and Ruilin Zhu. A brief review on algorithmic fairness. *Management System Engineering*, 1(1):7, 2022. ISSN 2731-5843. doi: 10.1007/s44176-022-00006-z. URL `https://doi.org/10.1007/s44176-022-00006-z`.

Larry A. Wasserman and Shuheng Zhou. A statistical framework for differential privacy. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 105(489):375–389, 2010. doi: 10.1198/jasa.2009.tm08651. URL `https://doi.org/10.1198/jasa.2009.tm08651`.

Jiqing Wu, Zhiwu Huang, Dinesh Acharya, Wen Li, Janine Thoma, Danda Pani Paudel, and Luc Van Gool. Sliced wasserstein generative models. In *IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, CVPR 2019, Long Beach, CA, USA, June 16-20, 2019*, pp. 3713–3722. Computer Vision Foundation / IEEE, 2019. doi: 10.1109/CVPR.2019.00383. URL `http://openaccess.thecvf.com/content_CVPR_2019/html/Wu_Sliced_Wasserstein_Generative_Models_CVPR_2019_paper.html`.

Ruicheng Xian, Qiaobo Li, Gautam Kamath, and Han Zhao. Differentially private post-processing for fair regression. In *Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2024, Vienna, Austria, July 21-27, 2024*. OpenReview.net, 2024. URL `https://openreview.net/forum?id=JNeeRjKbuH`.

Depeng Xu, Shuhan Yuan, and Xintao Wu. Achieving differential privacy and fairness in logistic regression. In Sihem Amer-Yahia, Mohammad Mahdian, Ashish Goel, Geert-Jan Houben, Kristina Lerman, Julian J. McAuley, Ricardo Baeza-Yates, and Leila Zia (eds.), *Companion of The 2019 World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2019, San Francisco, CA, USA, May 13-17, 2019*, pp. 594–599. ACM, 2019. doi: 10.1145/3308560.3317584. URL `https://doi.org/10.1145/3308560.3317584`.

Depeng Xu, Wei Du, and Xintao Wu. Removing disparate impact on model accuracy in differentially private stochastic gradient descent. In Feida Zhu, Beng Chin Ooi, and Chunyan Miao (eds.), *KDD '21: The 27th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, Virtual Event, Singapore, August 14-18, 2021*, pp. 1924–1932. ACM, 2021. doi: 10.1145/3447548.3467268. URL `https://doi.org/10.1145/3447548.3467268`.

Mohammad Yaghini, Patty Liu, Franziska Boenisch, and Nicolas Papernot. Learning with impartiality to walk on the pareto frontier of fairness, privacy, and utility. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.09183*, 2023.

Chengyi Yang, Jiayin Qi, and Aimin Zhou. Wasserstein differential privacy. In Michael J. Wooldridge, Jennifer G. Dy, and Sriraam Natarajan (eds.), *Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2024, Thirty-Sixth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, IAAI 2024, Fourteenth Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAAI 2014, February 20-27, 2024, Vancouver, Canada*, pp. 16299–16307. AAAI Press, 2024a. doi: 10.1609/AAAI.V38I15.29565. URL https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i15.29565.

Yi Yang, Kamil Adamczewski, Xiaoxiao Li, Danica J. Sutherland, and Mijung Park. Differentially private neural tangent kernels (DP-NTK) for privacy-preserving data generation. *J. Artif. Intell. Res.*, 81:683–700, 2024b. doi: 10.1613/JAIR.1.15985. URL https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.15985.

Ashkan Yousefpour, Igor Shilov, Alexandre Sablayrolles, Davide Testuggine, Karthik Prasad, Mani Malek, John Nguyen, Sayan Ghosh, Akash Bharadwaj, Jessica Zhao, Graham Cormode, and Ilya Mironov. Opacus: User-friendly differential privacy library in PyTorch. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2109.12298*, 2021.

A   Extension to the Sliced Wasserstein Distance ($d \geq 2$)

As pointed out in Remark 4.3, the results of this paper can be extended to higher dimensions by considering the sliced Wasserstein distance. Assume that $g_\theta(x), h_\theta(x) \in \mathbb{R}^d$. Following the notation of Section 4, we are interested now in bounding the sensitivity of the gradient of the (squared) sliced Wasserstein distance between the distributions $g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}$ and $h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}}$ in $\mathbb{R}^d$, defined as

$$SW_2^2(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}}) = \int_{\mathbb{S}^{d-1}} W_2^2 \Big(\mathrm{Pr}_\vartheta \# (g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}), \mathrm{Pr}_\vartheta \# (h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}}) \Big) d\rho(\vartheta) \ ,$$

where ρ represents the uniform measure on $\mathbb{S}^{d-1}$, the unit sphere of $\mathbb{R}^d$. From a practical standpoint, we are mainly interested in the study of the gradient of its Monte Carlo approximation given by k i.i.d. random directions $\vartheta_1, \ldots, \vartheta_k \in \mathbb{S}^{d-1}$,

$$SW_{2,k}^2(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}}) = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{l=1}^{k} W_2^2 \Big(\mathrm{Pr}_{\vartheta_l} \# (g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}), \mathrm{Pr}_{\vartheta_l} \# (h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}}) \Big) \ .$$

As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, it suffices to bound the sensitivity of the gradient with respect to the substitution neighboring relation $\mathbf{X} \sim_1 \tilde{\mathbf{X}}$. If we define $\Phi(\mathbf{X}) = \nabla_\theta SW_2^2(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}})$ and $\Phi_\vartheta(\mathbf{X}) = \nabla_\theta W_2^2(\mathrm{Pr}_\vartheta \# (g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}), \mathrm{Pr}_\vartheta \# (h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}}))$, by the chain rule and the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 1 in Bonneel et al. (2015), we know that under suitable smoothness assumptions, in the set of non-repeated points $\Gamma = \{\theta : g_\theta(x_i) \neq g_\theta(x_j), h_\theta(z_i) \neq h_\theta(z_j) \text{ for } i \neq j\}$,

$$\Phi(\mathbf{X}) = \int_{\mathbb{S}^{d-1}} \Phi_\vartheta(\mathbf{X}) d\rho(\vartheta) \ .$$

As in Section 3, we can define the *gradient* $\Phi(\mathbf{X})$ by this expression, even outside the set of differentiability points Γ, and provide privacy guarantees for every point. Similarly, if we consider the Monte Carlo approximation of the gradient $\Phi(\mathbf{X}) = \nabla_\theta SW_{2,k}^2(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}})$, it follows that $\Phi(\mathbf{X}) = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{l=1}^{k} \Phi_{\vartheta_l}(\mathbf{X})$. In any case, we can conclude that

$$\Delta_2 \Phi = \sup_{\mathbf{X} \sim \tilde{\mathbf{X}}} \|\Phi(\mathbf{X}) - \Phi(\tilde{\mathbf{X}})\|_2 \leq \sup_{\vartheta \in \mathbb{S}^{d-1}} \Delta_2 \Phi_\vartheta \ .$$

The sensitivity of Φ_ϑ can be controlled with the one-dimensional results in Section 4. Note that if we define $g_\theta^\vartheta(x) = (\mathrm{Pr}_\vartheta \circ g_\theta)(x) = \vartheta^T g_\theta(x)$ and $h_\theta^\vartheta(z) = (\mathrm{Pr}_\vartheta \circ h_\theta)(z) = \vartheta^T h_\theta(z)$, then $\Phi_\vartheta(\mathbf{X}) = \nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta^\vartheta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta^\vartheta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}})$, and we can conclude

$$\Delta_2 \Phi_\vartheta \leq 4M \frac{3L_1 + L_2}{n}$$

provided that:

(i) $|g_\theta^\vartheta(x)| = |\vartheta^T g_\theta(x)| \le M$, $|h_\theta^\vartheta(x)| = |\vartheta^T h_\theta(z)| \le M$.

(ii) $\|\nabla_\theta g_\theta^\vartheta(x)\|_2 = \|\vartheta^T \mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)\|_2 \le L_1$, $\|\nabla_\theta h_\theta^\vartheta(z)\|_2 = \|\vartheta^T \mathcal{J}_\theta h_\theta(z)\|_2 \le L_2$.

In particular, both inequalities hold uniformly in $\vartheta \in \mathbb{S}^{d-1}$ if we impose the following, more natural conditions:

(i) $\|g_\theta(x)\|_2 \le M$, $\|h_\theta(z)\|_2 \le M$

(ii) $\|\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)\|_2 = \sup_{\|\eta\|_2=1} \|\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)\eta\|_2 \le L_1$, $\|\mathcal{J}_\theta h_\theta(z)\|_2 = \sup_{\|\eta\|_2=1} \|J_\theta h_\theta(z)\eta\|_2 \le L_2$.

By the properties of the spectral norm, $\|\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)\|_2 = \|\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)^T\|_2$. Therefore, for every $\vartheta \in \mathbb{S}^{d-1}$ and x,

$$\|\nabla_\theta g_\theta^\vartheta(x)\|_2 = \|\vartheta^T \mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)\|_2 = \|\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)^T \vartheta\|_2 \le L_1 ,$$

and similarly for h_θ. As in the one dimensional setting, Assumption (ii) is verified if g_θ and h_θ are L_1-Lipschitz and L_2-Lipschitz with respect to θ. To see this, note that if $\|\eta\|_2 = 1$, by the Lipschitz condition,

$$\|\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)\eta\|_2 = \left\| \lim_{t \to 0} \frac{g_{\theta+t\eta}(x) - g_\theta(x)}{t} \right\| \le L_1 \|\eta\|_2 = L_1 .$$

Therefore, Theorem 4.1 can be extended to the multidimensional setting with the sliced Wasserstein distance as follows:

Theorem A.1. *With all the previous notation, assume that there exists constants $M, L_1, L_2 \ge 0$ such that for each $\theta \in \Theta$, $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and $z \in \mathcal{Z}$,*

(i) $\|g_\theta(x)\|_2 \le M$, $\|h_\theta(z)\|_2 \le M$

(ii) $\|\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)\|_2 = \sup_{\|\eta\|_2=1} \|\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)\eta\|_2 \le L_1$, $\|\mathcal{J}_\theta h_\theta(z)\|_2 = \sup_{\|\eta\|_2=1} \|J_\theta h_\theta(z)\eta\|_2 \le L_2$.

Then, under neighboring relation $\sim_1$ in $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{X}^n$, if we define $\Phi(\mathbf{X})$ as $\nabla_\theta SW_2^2(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}})$ or its Monte Carlo approximation $\nabla_\theta SW_{2,k}^2(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}})$ then

$$\Delta_2 \Phi \le 4M \frac{3L_1 + L_2}{n} .$$

Consequently, under neighboring relation $\sim_2$ in $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{X}^n \times \mathcal{Z}^m$, if we define $\Psi(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Z})$ as $\nabla_\theta SW_2^2(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}})$ or its Monte Carlo approximation $\nabla_\theta SW_{2,k}^2(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}})$, then

$$\Delta_2 \Psi \le 4M \max\left\{ \frac{3L_1 + L_2}{n}, \frac{L_1 + 3L_2}{m} \right\} .$$

Remark A.2. From a computational point of view, if we want to define a clipped approximation $\mathcal{J}_\theta^{L_1} g_\theta(x)$ of $\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)$ that verifies Assumption (ii) in Theorem A.1, this might be done by clipping the eigenvalues of the singular value decomposition of $\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(x)$. This should be done at each step, for each x_i in the batch. To simplify the computation and enable easy parallelization, we have adopted a suboptimal, naive alternative approach. Given $g_\theta = (g_\theta^1, \ldots, g_\theta^d)$, we define

$$\mathcal{J}_\theta^{L_1} g_\theta(x) = \begin{pmatrix} \text{clip}_{\frac{L_1}{\sqrt{d}}}(\nabla_\theta g_\theta^1(x)) \\ \vdots \\ \text{clip}_{\frac{L_1}{\sqrt{d}}}(\nabla_\theta g_\theta^d(x)) \end{pmatrix} .$$

Then, it follows that for every η verifying $\|\eta\|_2 = 1$,

$$\|\mathcal{J}_\theta^{L_1} g_\theta(x)\eta\|_2 = \left(\sum_{i=1}^d \langle \text{clip}_{\frac{L_1}{\sqrt{d}}}(\nabla_\theta g_\theta^i(x)), \eta \rangle^2 \right)^{1/2} \le \left(\sum_{i=1}^d \frac{L_1^2}{d} \right)^{1/2} = L_1$$

which implies the desired bound on the spectral norm, $\|\mathcal{J}_\theta^{L_1} g_\theta(x)\|_2 \le L_1$.

B Additional Details on the Private Sliced Wasserstein Autoencoder

Table 2: Architecture of the convolutional autoencoder.

ENCODER	DECODER
Input: $1 \times 28 \times 28$ image	Input: latent vector ($\mathbb{R}^{\text{latent\_dim}}$)
Conv2D (8 filters, 3×3), LeakyReLU (0.2)	FC: latent_dim $\rightarrow$ 64, ReLU
AvgPool (2×2) $\rightarrow 8 \times 14 \times 14$	FC: $64 \rightarrow 128$, ReLU
Conv2D (16 filters, 3×3), LeakyReLU (0.2)	FC: $128 \rightarrow 784$, ReLU
AvgPool (2×2) $\rightarrow 16 \times 7 \times 7$	Reshape to $16 \times 7 \times 7$
Conv2D (16 filters, 3×3), LeakyReLU (0.2)	Conv2D (16 filters, 3×3), LeakyReLU (0.2)
Flatten $\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{784}$	Upsample $\rightarrow 16 \times 14 \times 14$
FC: $784 \rightarrow 128$, ReLU	Conv2D (8 filters, 3×3), LeakyReLU (0.2)
FC: $128 \rightarrow 64$, ReLU	Upsample $\rightarrow 8 \times 28 \times 28$
FC: $64 \rightarrow$ latent_dim	Conv2D (1 filter, 3×3), Sigmoid

Table 3: Comparison of data generation methods on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST under (ϵ, δ)-DP, with $\varepsilon = 1$, $\delta = 10^{-5}$, using the same SWAE generative models as in Section 6. Results for our approach are averaged over 5 random seeds. Scores for all methods except ours are taken from Dockhorn et al. (2022) or Yang et al. (2024b). FID denotes the Fréchet Inception Distance (Heusel et al., 2017), computed using statistics from features of a pretrained network as in Dockhorn et al. (2022). Accuracy (Acc) is computed by training an MLP classifier (width = 100, as in Yang et al. (2024b)) on synthetic images, and testing it on the test set. Since our generator is unconditional, labels are assigned using a KNN classifier in the embedding space (used for noise injection). Values in parentheses correspond to the composition of our autoencoder and the trained classifier, leveraging our autoencoder structure to improve utility.

METHOD	MNIST (FID/Acc)	F-MNIST (FID/Acc)
DP-SWAE (Ours)	146.2 / 0.556 (0.772)	160.9 / 0.567 (0.709)
DP-NTK (Yang et al., 2024b)	- / 0.862	- / 0.764
DPDM (Dockhorn et al., 2022)	23.4 / 0.916	18.6 / 0.769
PEARL (Liew et al., 2022)	121.0 / 0.796	109.0 / 0.740
DP-HP (Vinaroz et al., 2022)	- / 0.801	- / 0.721
DP-MERF (Harder et al., 2021)	- / 0.807	- / 0.738

$\varepsilon = \infty$ $\varepsilon = 10$ $\varepsilon = 5$

Figure 6: MNIST interpolations between the earliest samples $\{z_i\}_{i=0}^{9}$ of each digit (0–9) in the test set, produced by the encoder φ_θ and decoder ψ_θ trained under (ε, δ)-DP, with $\delta = 10^{-5}$ and varying values of ε. For each pair $0 \le i < j \le 9$, we compute the linear interpolation in the latent space $(1 - \eta_l)\varphi_\theta(z_i) + \eta_l \varphi_\theta(z_j)$, for $\eta_l = \frac{l}{9}$, $0 \le l \le 9$, and map it back to the image space using the decoder ψ_θ.

Figure 7: Reconstructed Fashion-MNIST images from the test dataset. The first row shows the earliest sample of each label (0–9) in the test set. The subsequent rows display the corresponding reconstructions produced by the trained autoencoder under (ε, δ)-DP, with $\delta = 10^{-5}$ and varying values of ε.

Figure 8: Encoded latent space Fashion-MNIST samples for the autoencoder, trained under (ε, δ)-DP, with $\delta = 10^{-5}$ and varying values of ε.

Figure 9: Generated samples from the Fashion-MNIST autoencoder trained under (ε, δ)-DP, with $\delta = 10^{-5}$ and varying values of ε.

$\varepsilon = \infty$ $\varepsilon = 10$ $\varepsilon = 5$

Figure 10: MNIST interpolations between the earliest samples $\{z_i\}_{i=0}^9$ of each label (0–9) in the test set, produced by the encoder φ_θ and decoder ψ_θ trained under (ε, δ)-DP, with $\delta = 10^{-5}$ and varying values of ε. For each pair $0 \leq i < j \leq 9$, we compute the linear interpolation in the latent space $(1-\eta_l)\varphi_\theta(z_i) + \eta_l\varphi_\theta(z_j)$, for $\eta_l = \frac{l}{9}$, $0 \leq l \leq 9$, and map it back to the image space using the decoder ψ_θ.

C   Fairness via Private In-Processing

C.1   General method

Let us begin by recalling the general framework introduced in Section 7. Let $\mathbf{D}$ denote a dataset with n samples (x_i, a_i, y_i) or (x_i, a_i), where x_i are the non-sensitive attributes, $a_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is the sensitive attribute and y_i the response variable, only available in supervised problem. We consider the general empirical risk minimization problem:

$$\min_\theta \mathscr{L}(\theta) := \min_\theta \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \ell(g_\theta(x_i)) \ , \tag{7}$$

where $\ell(g_\theta(x_i))$ is a shorthand for $\ell(g_\theta(x_i), y_i)$ in supervised problems and $\ell(g_\theta(x_i), x_i)$ in unsupervised problems. The goal is to privately optimize a regularized version of this problem, incorporating a fairness penalty based on the sliced Wasserstein distance. As explained in Section 6, the finite-sum structure of the loss function translates to the gradient, and as long as $\|\nabla_\theta \ell(g_\theta(x))\|_2 \leq C$ for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$, the sensitivity of $\nabla_\theta \mathscr{L}(\theta)$ is bounded by $2C/n$, not only for the substitution relation $\sim_1$, but for any k-end neighboring relation $\sim_k$. To choose an adequate fairness penalty, we have considered in this work two different fairness notions: *Statistical parity* and *Equality of Odds*. The first was already discussed in Section 7, we include it again for completeness. We present this section for the general case of the sliced Wasserstein distance, note that the case $d = 1$ coincides with the one-dimensional Wasserstein distance. As in Section 7, let φ_θ denote the representation to which the fairness penalty is applied. That is, $\varphi_\theta = g_\theta$ if the penalty is applied at the output, or $g_\theta = \psi_\theta \circ \varphi_\theta$ if it is applied to an intermediate representation (e.g., an intermediate layer of a neural network). In either case, for any pair of distributions P, Q, the equality $\mathcal{L}(\varphi_\theta \# P) = \mathcal{L}(\varphi_\theta \# Q)$ implies $\mathcal{L}(g_\theta \# P) = \mathcal{L}(g_\theta \# Q)$, which justifies penalizing any intermediate representation.

Statistical Parity (SP):   Statistical parity corresponds to the situation where the algorithmic decision does not depend on the sensitive variable. Statistical parity is thus satisfied if $\mathcal{L}(g_\theta(X)|A = 0) = \mathcal{L}(g_\theta(X)|A = 1)$. Given our data, if we define $\mathbf{X}_j = (x_i : a_i = j)$, $n_j = |\mathbf{X}_j|$ for $j = 0, 1$, statistical parity can be favored by minimizing

$$\mathscr{L}_\alpha^{SP}(\theta) = (1 - \alpha)\mathscr{L}(\theta) + \alpha SW_2^2\Big(\varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_0}, \varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_1}\Big) \tag{8}$$

where $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ measures the weight of each part in the optimization. In order to establish privacy guarantees, we need to assume that n_0 and n_1 are fixed.

Equality of Odds (EO):   Beyond guaranteeing the same decision for all, which is not suitable in some cases where the sensitive variable impacts the decision, bias mitigation may require that the model performs with the same accuracy for all groups, often referred to as equality of odds. We focus only in the supervised case, where y_i is available and takes values in $\{0, \dots, R - 1\}$. In this case, equality of odds is verified if $\mathcal{L}(g_\theta(X)|A = 0, Y = k) = \mathcal{L}(g_\theta(X)|A = 1, Y = k)$ for all $k \in \{0, \dots, R - 1\}$. With the same ideas as before, if we define $\mathbf{X}_{j,k} = (x_i : a_i = j, y_i = k)$, $n_{j,k} = |\mathbf{X}_{j,k}|$ for $j \in \{0, 1\}, k \in \{0, \dots, R - 1\}$, equality of odds bias mitigation can be enforced by training with loss

$$\mathscr{L}_\alpha^{EO}(\theta) = (1 - \alpha)\mathscr{L}(\theta) + \frac{\alpha}{R} \sum_{k=1}^R SW_2^2\Big(\varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_{0,k}}, \varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_{1,k}}\Big) \tag{9}$$

To obtain privacy guarantees, now we need to impose that the values $n_{j,k}$ are fixed.

Corollary C.1. *If φ_θ verifies $\|\varphi_\theta(x)\|_2 \leq M$, $\|\mathcal{J}_\theta \varphi_\theta(x)\|_2 \leq L$ and $\|\nabla_\theta \ell(g_\theta(x))\|_2 \leq C$, then*

• For SP, under $\sim_2$, the sensitivity of $\nabla_\theta \mathscr{L}_\alpha^{SP}(\theta)$ or its MC approximation is bounded by

$$(1 - \alpha)\frac{2C}{n} + \alpha \frac{16ML}{\min\{n_0, n_1\}} \ . \tag{10}$$

- *For EO, under $\sim_{2R}$, the sensitivity of $\nabla_\theta \mathscr{L}_\alpha^{EO}(\theta)$ or its MC approximation is bounded by*

$$(1-\alpha)\frac{2C}{n} + \frac{\alpha}{R}\frac{16ML}{\min_{j,k}\{n_{j,k}\}} \ . \tag{11}$$

Proof. See Appendix G.3. □

Remark C.2. Our privacy guarantees in the fairness framework are built upon the knowledge of class sizes. The importance of controlling these sizes has been previously recognized. For example, Lowy et al. (2022) imposes a restriction on the minimum proportion of elements in each class, while Ghoukasian & Asoodeh (2024) and Xian et al. (2024) derive privacy guarantees that degrade with smaller class sizes. Conceptually, our framework for establishing privacy guarantees is very sound. Even though an attacker might learn some information about the number of individuals in each class used during training, they cannot distinguish between the outputs of two datasets $\mathbf{D}$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{D}}$ differing only in one individual from the same class.

C.2 Applications: Private bias mitigation in diverse learning tasks

In order to demonstrate the versatility of our methodology for imposing fairness in different scenarios, we use an illustrative synthetic model to simulate bias in algorithmic decision-making. Note that we do not include extensive comparisons with other application-specific methodologies, as our approach is highly general and does not include any of the statistical, convergence, or fairness guarantees described by other methods (see Xu et al. (2019); Jagielski et al. (2019); Ding et al. (2020); Lowy et al. (2022); Yaghini et al. (2023); Ghoukasian & Asoodeh (2024) for the fair and private classification problem, or Xian et al. (2024) for fair and private one-dimensional regression). Yet we provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first method to handle novel problems such as multidimensional fair and private regression, or fair and private representation learning.

We consider $\mathbf{D} = \{(x_i, a_i, y_i^C, y_i)\}_{i=1}^n$ i.i.d. samples with the same distribution as (X, A, Y^C, Y), where X denotes the features, A is the sensitive variable, $Y^C = (Y_1^C, Y_2^C)$ is a continuous response variable and Y is a discrete version of Y^C, related by

(i) $Y^C \sim U([0,1] \times [0,1])$

(ii) $Y = I\left(Y_2^C > 1 - Y_1^C\right)$

(iii) $A = BY + (1-B)(1-Y)$, where $B \sim \text{Bernoulli}(p)$ independent of Y.

(iv) $X_{core} = \underbrace{[Y^C, \ldots, Y^C]}_{d_{core}/2 \ times} + N\left(0, \sigma_{core}^2 I_{d_{core}}\right), \quad X_{sp} = \underbrace{[A, \ldots, A]}_{d_{sp} \ times} + N\left(0, \sigma_{sp}^2 \ I_{d_{sp}}\right).$

(v) $X = [X_{core}, X_{sp}]$

Therefore, this generated data consists in a response variable Y_C, which is correlated with the sensitive attribute A. The features X are divided into two parts: a first part X_{core} which is a noisy transformation of Y_C, and a second spurious part X_{sp} which is a noisy version of A. If p is close to 1, most of the cases verify $A = Y$ and therefore, the decision of the algorithm relies highly on the sensitive variable A. Bias in the algorithmic decision is created when the sensitive variable A is not aligned with the decision. When $Y \neq A$, the learning task is more complicated since while X_{core} is correlated with Y, the spurious part pushes towards the bad decision. This setting reproduces the characteristics of some of the main biases present in many data sets, for instance, (Becker & Kohavi, 1996) or (Hofmann, 1994) in supervised learning. We explore this problem across different scenarios, demonstrating how penalized models using our Wasserstein–based losses can help mitigate unfairness, according to various fairness notions, while maintaining differential privacy guarantees. All experiments are conducted on the same synthetic dataset, generated with the previous mechanism for a fixed seed and values $n = 30000$, $p = 0.7$, $d_{core} = d_{sp} = 8$, $\sigma_{core}^2 = 1/5$, $\sigma_{sp}^2 = 2/5$.

All models are trained with DP-SGD as explained in Section 5, with clipping constant $C > 0$ for the individual gradients in (7), as usual in DP-SGD, and inner clipping constants $M, L > 0$ for the Wasserstein

gradient approximation (5) or its sliced version. In the latter case, all the experiments use the naive clipping procedure explained in Remark A.2. Corollary C.1 and the procedure described in Section 5, enable us to compute the privacy budget obtained after T iterations of DP-SGD. In particular, in all the experiments, we fix the number of iterations T and the value of δ, and compute the required noise to obtain (ε, δ)-DP after T iterations, for different values of the privacy budget ε and the weight $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ in the penalized loss functions (8) and (9).

Following the above notation, $\mathbf{X}_j = (x_i : a_i = j)$, $n_j = |\mathbf{X}_j|$ for $j = 0, 1$, and $\mathbf{X}_{j,k} = (x_i : a_i = j, y_i = k)$, $n_{j,k} = |\mathbf{X}_{j,k}|$ for $j, k \in \{0, 1\}$. Given our data generation procedure, we know that $\mathbb{E}(n_j) = n/2$, $\mathbb{E}(n_{j,j}) = pn/2$ and $\mathbb{E}(n_{j,1-j}) = (1-p)n/2$ for $j \in \{0, 1\}$. In all the subsequent experiments, the batch sizes considered are $n'_j \approx n_j/10$ when minimizing (8), and $n'_{j,k} \approx n_{j,k}/10$ when minimizing (9), where the approximation is related to internal parallelization of the gradient computations in the code detailed in Section E. A summary of the sample sizes in the data and the batch sizes considered is presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Sample sizes / batch sizes for different groups and subgroups. The center part displays the pairs $n_{j,k}/n'_{j,k}$, while the right side displays the pairs n_j/n'_j.

	Y = 0	**Y = 1**	**TOTAL**
A = 0	10608 / 1050	4564 / 450	15172 / 1500
A = 1	4446 / 400	10382 / 1000	14828 / 1450

C.3 Classification

First, we consider the problem of predicting the label Y as a function of X. Our decision rule is based on logistic regression, where the function g_θ maps each x_i to the predicted probability $g_\theta(x_i) \in (0, 1)$. The classification rule is given by $G_\theta(x) = I(g_\theta(x) > 1/2)$. g_θ is defined as a neural network with one layer and a sigmoid activation function, and the classification loss is defined as the binary cross-entropy. We impose fairness using the two notions presented above. Considering $\varphi_\theta = g_\theta$, we have trained our model with simple iterations of DP-SGD to minimize (8) to enforce SP, and (9) to enforce EOO. In both cases, we have trained the model for different values of the weight α and the privacy budget ε, when we fix $\delta = 0.1/n$, number of iterations $T = 500$, clipping constants $C = 5$, $M = L = 1$ and learning rate $= 0.05$. For each fairness notion, we present a brief overview of the methodology, followed by a detailed exposition of the results. We include statistical measures to assess the trade-off between fairness, privacy, and utility for each model.

Statistical Parity: Statistical parity in classification, it is usually measured by the Disparate Impact, defined as

$$DI(G_\theta) = \frac{\mathbb{P}(G_\theta(X) = 1 | A = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(G_\theta(X) = 1 | A = 1)} \ . \tag{12}$$

However, enforcing statistical parity by enforcing independence between $G_\theta(X)$ and A often produces unstable solutions as discussed by Krco et al. (2025) or Barrainkua et al. (2024), hence many authors propose to mitigate not only the mean but the whole distribution of the predicted probabilities $g_\theta(X) \in (0, 1)$ as in Risser et al. (2022), Gouic et al. (2020) or Chzhen et al. (2020), the same approach we have adopted in this work.

Figure 11 shows the results of training the model minimizing (8) for different values of the weight α and the privacy budget ε. Two main conclusions can be drawn. First, it confirms that the Wasserstein penalization approach mitigates the unfair biases present in the data set. We can see that, for increasing values of α, the histograms of the scores conditioned on the value of the sensitive variable get closer, leading to a progressive reduction of biases, as seen in the decreasing values of the disparate impact, albeit at the expense of accuracy, as expected. The second important conclusion is that adding privacy does not significantly alter the results of the optimization. For different privacy budgets ε, both the histogram and the computed measures do not change much across the rows. Moreover, Figure 12 shows the training loss curve of the optimization for each

Figure 11: Histogram of the predicted probabilities $g_\theta(X)$ conditioned on the values of A in the private classification model with SP regularization, for the different values of α and ε, and fixed $\delta = 0.1/n$. Above each graph we indicate the noise added at each step of DP-SGD to obtain the desired privacy level, the value of the loss (8) in the training procedure, together with the individual value of the classification loss (CL) and the distributional Wasserstein loss (W). Last line includes accuracy (ACC) and disparate impact (DI) of the classification rule G_θ computed with independent test data.

Figure 12: Training loss curve for the experiment of Figure 11. Each graph represents the training loss (8) for a fixed value of α along the iterations of DP-SGD, for the different values of ε.

value of α considered when ε varies. Low values of ε result in noisier versions of the loss curve, but they remain very close to the non-private counterpart.

Equality of Odds: To measure the unfairness of our a classification rule G_θ, we consider the two following indexes:

$$EO_1(G_\theta) = \frac{\mathbb{P}(G_\theta(X) = 1 | A = 0, Y = 1)}{\mathbb{P}(G_\theta(X) = 1 | A = 1, Y = 1)} \ . \tag{13}$$

$$EO_0(G_\theta) = \frac{\mathbb{P}(G_\theta(X) = 1 | A = 0, Y = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(G_\theta(X) = 1 | A = 1, Y = 0)} \ . \tag{14}$$

Figure 13 shows the results of optimizing (9) for different values of α and ε. The histogram of the distribution of the predicted probabilities, $g_\theta(X)|A = 1, Y = j$ versus $g_\theta(X)|A = 0, Y = j$, illustrates the model's

Figure 13: Histogram of the predicted probabilities $g_\theta(X)$ conditioned on the values of A and Y in the private classification model with EOO regularization, for the different values of α and ε, and fixed $\delta = 0.1/n$. Above each graph we indicate the noise added at each step of DP-SGD to obtain the desired privacy level, the value of the loss (9) in the training procedure, together with the individual value of the classification loss (L) and the Wasserstein loss (W). Last line includes accuracy, EO_0 and EO_1 indexes computed with independent test data.

Figure 14: Training loss curve for the experiment of Figure 13. Each graph represents the training loss (9) for a fixed value of α along the iterations of DP-SGD, for the different values of ε.

capability to minimize discrepancies between the distributions as α increases, as shown by the values of EO_0, EO_1. From Figure 13, we can also observe that private training has minimal impact on the model's fit across all values of α. Similarly, it does not significantly affect the learning loss curve during optimization, as shown in Figure 14.

C.4 Regression

In our generating mechanism, the label $Y \in \{0, 1\}$ is defined as a set indicator function of a continuous response $Y^C \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$. From the data-generating process, it is easy to derive the distribution of Y^C conditioned on the sensitive attribute. If T_0 denotes the triangle with vertices $(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)$ and T_1 the triangles with vertices $(0, 1), (1, 1), (1, 0)$, then we know that $Y^C | A = j$ follows a mixture of the uniform distributions on T_0 and T_1, with weight p in T_0 and $(1 - p)$ in T_1 if $A = 0$, and vice versa if $A = 1$. The

Figure 15: Predicted values $g_\theta(X)$ conditioned on the values of A in the private regression model with SP regularization, for the different values of α and ε, and fixed $\delta = 0.1/n$. Above each graph we indicate the noise added at each step of DP-SGD to obtain the desired privacy level, the value of the loss (8) in the training procedure, together with the individual value of the regression loss (RL) and the sliced Wasserstein loss (SW). Last line includes the indexes OD_0 and OD_1.

aim of this experiment is to perform private and bi-dimensional fair regression over Y^C, which has never been considered before in the literature. To simplify our clipping bounds, we have centered our data to obtain a distribution in $[-1/2, 1/2] \times [-1/2, 1/2]$, and we have trained a two-layer neural network with hidden dimension 64, sigmoid activation function in the last layer, with the output centered by subtracting $(1/2, 1/2)$, and minimizing the loss (8), with mean square loss $\ell(g_\theta(x), y^C) = \|g_\theta(x) - y^C\|_2^2$ and applying the sliced Wasserstein penalization to the output layer $\varphi_\theta = g_\theta$.

Figure 15 shows the results of this experiment for different values of α and the privacy budget ε, with fixed $\delta = 0.1/n$, number of iterations $T = 1000$, clipping constants $C = 10$, $M = 1/\sqrt{2}$, $L = \sqrt{2}$, learning rate $= 0.05$ and number of projections in the Monte Carlo approximation $= 50$. From the visual inspection of the plots, we can appreciate that our statistical parity penalization helps to reduce the differences between the distributions of the predicted values. To aid visual inspection, we provide the values of the number of points over the diagonal for each class $A = 0$ and $A = 1$. If $g_\theta(x) = (g_\theta^1(x), g_\theta^2(x))$

$$OD_0 = \frac{\#\{X : g_\theta^2(X) > -g_\theta^1(X), A = 0\}}{n_0}$$

$$OD_1 = \frac{\#\{X : g_\theta^2(X) > -g_\theta^1(X), A = 1\}}{n_1}$$

Finally, Figure 16 shows the convergence of the loss curve for the different values of α and ε. As in the previous examples, the private loss curves are simply noisy versions of the non-private ones.

Remark C.3 (**Fair and private 1-D regression: comparison with the baseline**). As discussed in the related work section, the only existing method that allows for fair and private regression is the post-processing approach of Xian et al. (2024), which is only valid in the one-dimensional case. This method applies a post-processing step to an arbitrary private regressor g, consisting of three main stages: 1) approximate the conditional distributions $g_a = (g \mid A = a)$ using private histograms h_a; 2) transform each h_a into $\tilde{h}_a$ within a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) ball of radius β around a "generalized barycenter" (see Xian et al. (2024)

Figure 16: Training loss curve for the experiment of Figure 15. Each graph represents the training loss for a fixed value of α in (8) along the iterations of DP-SGD, for the different values of ε.

for precise definitions); and 3) use the optimal transport plan between h_a and $\tilde{h}_a$ to define the random post-processing maps. As noted in Section 7, the strength of our method lies in its versatility, enabling its application to a variety of problems, including novel ones. Our goal is not to outperform every existing method in each domain. For instance, in this case, we do not provide the fairness and utility guarantees of Xian et al. (2024). Nevertheless, the comparison helps contextualize our approach, and we show that our method remains empirically competitive with the procedure of Xian et al. (2024).

For the comparison, we use the same experimental setup as in Section 7. With the data described in Appendix C.2, let $Y^C = (Y_1^C, Y_2^C)$ and consider the one-dimensional regression problem of predicting $\tilde{Y} = Y_1^C + Y_2^C - 1$. From the discussion of the bidimensional fairness problem, it follows easily that the conditional densities of $\tilde{Y}$ given A are

$$f_{\tilde{Y}|A=0} = \begin{cases} 2p(1+x) & \text{if } x \in [-1,0] \\ 2(1-p)(1-x) & \text{if } x \in [0,1] \end{cases}, \quad f_{\tilde{Y}|A=1} = \begin{cases} 2(1-p)(1+x) & \text{if } x \in [-1,0] \\ 2p(1-x) & \text{if } x \in [0,1] \end{cases}.$$

Note that if $p = 1/2$, both distributions coincide with the symmetric triangular distribution on $[-1, 1]$. In our example, with $p = 0.7$, the distribution conditioned on $A = 0$ is biased toward negative values, whereas the distribution conditioned on $A = 1$ is biased toward positive values. To address this regression problem, we use a two-layer fully connected neural network with hidden dimension 128 and compare the following approaches, where DP-SGD is trained in all cases with $T = 1000$ iterations, clipping constants $C = 10$, $M = 1/\sqrt{2}$, $L = 1$, and learning rate 0.02.

- **Baseline:** Train the NN with DP-SGD without fairness under $(2, 1/n)$-DP.

- **Xian et al. (2024):** Train the NN with DP-SGD under $(1, 1/n)$-DP, then apply the fair and private post-processing under $(1, 0)$-DP for various values of the fairness regularization parameter β (radius of the KS ball around the barycenter, see Xian et al. (2024)). By composition, the mechanism satisfies $(2, 1/n)$-DP.

- **Our approach:** Train the model with DP-SGD under $(2, 1/n)$-DP, penalizing the squared Wasserstein distance between conditional distributions for different values of the regularization parameter α.

Figure 5 shows the tradeoff between fairness and accuracy for all methods, averaged over 5 random seeds. Since our method enforces fairness via minimizing the Wasserstein distance, whereas Xian et al. (2024) uses the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance, we report fairness both in terms of W_2^2 and KS distance, and accuracy using mean squared error (MSE). As shown, our method achieves a competitive tradeoff between utility and fairness under both metrics.

C.5 Representation Learning

Finally, we present another completely novel application of our procedure: fair representation learning. Using the same data as before, the objective is to privately learn an encoder φ_{θ_a} and a decoder ψ_{θ_b} minimizing the

Figure 17: Plot of the latent space representations $\varphi_\theta(X)$ conditioned on the values sensitive attribute A in the private representation learning model with SP regularization, for the different values of α and ε, and fixed $\delta = 0.1/n$. Above each plot we indicate the noise added at each step of DP-SGD to obtain the desired privacy level, the value of the loss (8) in the training procedure, together with the individual value of the reconstruction loss (RL) and the sliced Wasserstein loss (SW). Last line includes the reconstruction loss on the core variables (RL_1), accuracy and disparate impact on test data.

mean squared error of the reconstructed values, penalized with the sliced Wasserstein distance to alleviate statistical parity unfairness present in the data. As in Section 6, we denote $\theta = (\theta_a, \theta_b)$, $\varphi_\theta = \varphi_{\theta_a}$ and $\psi_\theta = \psi_{\theta_b}$. Now, the encoder and decoder are defined as fully connected neural networks with two layers, hidden dimension 62 and bi-dimensional latent space. Defining $g_\theta = \psi_\theta \circ \varphi_\theta$, we consider the reconstruction error $\ell(g_\theta(x), x) = \|g_\theta(x) - x\|_2^2$ and the fairness penalty is now imposed over the encoded representations given by φ_θ.

As usual, Figure 17 presents the result of training this model for different values of α and ε, with fixed $\delta = 0.1/n$, number of iterations $T = 500$ iterations, clipping values $C = 10, M = 2, L = \sqrt{2}$, learning rate $= 0.01$ and number of projections in the Monte Carlo approximation $= 50$. To assess the quality of the models, we have computed different comparative measures on an independent test sample. First, RL_c denotes the reconstruction loss in the core part X_{core}, i.e. the first eight variables of X. The rest of the variables X_{sp} are just a noisy version of A. Thus, RL_c provides a measure of the error in the reconstruction loss for the relevant part of the data, and Figure 17 shows that for increasing values of α, even though the reconstruction loss increases significantly, the reconstruction associated with the core part is not affected much. The other measures computed on the test data are the accuracy and disparate impact of a simple logistic regression model trained on the encoded representation of a portion (60%) of the test data and evaluated on the remaining (40%). We observe that increasing values of α lead to values of the disparate impact index closer to 1, at the expense of a decrease in accuracy. Finally, we can infer from Figures 17 and 18 that privacy doesn't affect much to the results of the optimization.

C.6 Randomness Strategy

To provide a deeper understanding of the previous results, it is important to detail the role of randomness across the experiments. For each of the four bias mitigation experiments, the training process was repeated for different values of the weight α and privacy budgets $\varepsilon \in \{\infty, 3, 1\}$. To ensure a fair comparison across

Figure 18: Training loss curve for the experiment of Figure 17. Each graph represents the training loss (8) for a fixed value of α along the iterations of DP-SGD, for the different values of ε.

(α, ε) pairs, we used the same random seed for all configurations. As a result, neural networks share the same weight initialization, the sampled batches are identical at each iteration, and the standard Gaussian noise used in private updates is also the same. With this setup, our experiments isolate the influence of α and ε on the training process. The only differences across configurations stem from:

- **Clipping:** Applied only when $\varepsilon < \infty$.

- **Gradient composition:** The gradient is a linear combination of the classification gradient and the sliced Wasserstein gradient, weighted by α.

- **Noise multiplier:** The standard Gaussian noise is scaled by a factor that depends on both α (via sensitivity) and the required privacy budget ε.

To illustrate the effectiveness of this isolation strategy, we repeated the Statistical Parity classification experiment—chosen for its simplicity and clarity—for 10 different random seeds. For each seed, the model was trained across the 12 combinations of (α, ε) used in Figure 11.

The first row of Figure 19 shows the average training loss for each (α, ε) pair, with $\pm 2\sigma$ confidence bands. The variability shows that if the randomness setup in Figures 11 and 12 had not been fixed, significant fluctuations in the training loss across different values of ε would have appeared, contrary to what is shown in Figure 12. The isolation effect of our randomness setup is even more evident in the second row of Figure 19, which shows the differences between the private ($\varepsilon = 3, 1$) and non-private ($\varepsilon = \infty$) losses computed using the same random seed, with the same $\pm 2\sigma$ confidence bands computed over the 10 seeds. These differences stay within a narrow range around zero, indicating that, in this classification task, adding privacy mainly introduces a small amount of noise around the non-private trajectory, supporting the conclusion obtained from Figure 12.

D Detailed comparison with Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021)

In this section, we compare our method to the approach of Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021) in two ways: first, through a simple conceptual example highlighting the broader applicability of our method, and second, via a numerical comparison on an example where both methods can be applied.

D.1 Conceptual Comparison

To simplify notations, we restrict ourselves to the simple case $h_\theta = I_d$. That is, we assume we have samples $\mathbf{X} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)^T \in \mathcal{X}^n$ and $\mathbf{Z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_m)^T \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times d}$, and we want to learn a map $g_\theta : \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R}^d$, parametrized by $\theta \in \Theta$, minimizing $W_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}), \mathbf{Z})$ using a first-order algorithm, where with a slight abuse of notation we denote $g_\theta(\mathbf{X}) = (g_\theta(x_1), \ldots, g_\theta(x_n))^T \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times d}$.

Figure 19: **Top**: The solid line represents the average training loss (8) over 10 random seeds for different values of ε and α. Dotted lines indicate the average ± 2 standard deviations. For a given α, the curves corresponding to different ε values nearly overlap. **Bottom**: Differences between private ($\varepsilon = 3, 1$) and non-private ($\varepsilon = \infty$) losses, computed using the same random seed for each pair, and averaged over 10 different seeds. Shaded bands represent ± 2 standard deviations.

The work of Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021) relies on the following simple idea. $SW_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}), \mathbf{Z})$ can be approximated via Monte Carlo sampling over k i.i.d. directions $\vartheta = (\vartheta_1, \ldots, \vartheta_k) \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times k}$ drawn uniformly from $\mathbb{S}^{d-1}$ by

$$\frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} W_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}) \cdot \vartheta_i, \mathbf{Z} \cdot \vartheta_i).$$

For each i, the only information used about the data is $g_\theta(\mathbf{X}) \cdot \vartheta_i$ and $\mathbf{Z} \cdot \vartheta_i$. Their proposal releases $g_\theta(\mathbf{X}) \cdot \vartheta + \epsilon$ and $\mathbf{Z} \cdot \vartheta + \xi$, where $\epsilon = (\epsilon_1, \ldots, \epsilon_n) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times d}$ and $\xi = (\xi_1, \ldots, \xi_m) \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times d}$ have i.i.d. $N(0, \sigma^2)$ entries. As usual, the noise required to achieve a given privacy budget (w.r.t. both $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Z}$) is proportional to the sensitivity of the projection, which does not decrease with the sample size and only vanishes as $k/d \to 0$. By post-processing,

$$DP_\sigma SW_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}), \mathbf{Z}) := \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} W_2^2\big(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}) \cdot \vartheta_i + \epsilon_i, \mathbf{Z} \cdot \vartheta_i + \xi_i\big)$$

inherits the privacy guarantees (w.r.t. both $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Z}$). In our optimization problem, however, we are interested in privacy guarantees for its gradient, namely

$$\mathcal{M}_R(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Z}; \theta) := \nabla_\theta DP_\sigma SW_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}), \mathbf{Z}).$$

Applying the chain rule to (1), $\mathcal{M}_R(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Z}; \theta)$ can be obtained by post-processing $g_\theta(\mathbf{X}) \cdot \vartheta + \epsilon$, $\mathbf{Z} \cdot \vartheta + \xi$, ϑ, together with $\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(\mathbf{X})$. If privacy is required only w.r.t. $\mathbf{Z}$, such as in a simple data generation problem where g_θ maps noise X into samples $\mathbf{Z}$, then $\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(\mathbf{X})$ is public, and, using the fix of Remark 1 of Greenewald et al. (2024), $\mathcal{M}_R(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Z}; \theta)$ inherits the privacy guarantees. However, no privacy guarantees can be derived w.r.t. $\mathbf{X}$ due to the presence of $\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(\mathbf{X})$.

This can be illustrated with the following example. Assume $d = 1$ (then $k = 1$), $\mathbf{X} \in [-L/2, L/2]^n$ for some $L > 2$, $\mathbf{Z} \in [0, 1]^m$, $\theta = (\theta_1, \theta_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2$, and consider the hard sigmoid function $g_\theta(x) = \max(0, \min(1, \theta_1 x + \theta_2)) \in [0, 1]$, whose gradient is

$$\nabla_\theta g_\theta(x) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} (x, 1) & \text{if } -\frac{\theta_2}{\theta_1} < x < \frac{1-\theta_2}{\theta_1} \\ (0, 0) & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right.$$

We can interpret this as fitting a (hard) logistic regression model. We focus on the simple case $m = 1$, where denoting $a_i = z_1 + \xi_1 - \epsilon_i$,

$$\mathcal{M}_R(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Z}; \theta) = \nabla_\theta \Big(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (g_\theta(x_i) - a_i)^2 \Big) = \frac{2}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (g_\theta(x_i) - a_i) \nabla_\theta g_\theta(x_i).$$

For instance, if $\theta = (1, 0)$ and $\mathbf{X} \in ([-L/2, L/2] \setminus [0, 1])^n$, then $\mathcal{M}_R(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Z}; \theta) = \delta_0$. However, if $\tilde{\mathbf{X}} \sim \mathbf{X}$ is obtained by replacing x_1 with $x_1' \in (0, 1)$, then $\mathcal{M}_R(\tilde{\mathbf{X}}, \mathbf{Z}; \theta) \neq \delta_0$, and in fact $P(\mathcal{M}_R(\tilde{\mathbf{X}}, \mathbf{Z}; \theta) = 0) = 0$, making it impossible to provide any non-trivial privacy guarantees with respect to $\mathbf{X}$. Our method solves this problem as it provides guarantees for both $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Z}$. Indeed, Theorem 4.1 directly applies with $M = 1$, $L_1 = L$, and $L_2 = 0$, providing private guarantees for

$$\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Z}; \theta) := \nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}), \mathbf{Z}) + N(0, \sigma^2)$$

w.r.t. both $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Z}$, and the required amount of noise to achieve a fixed privacy budget scales as the inverse of the sample size.

D.2 Numerical Comparison

In this second part, we consider the sliced version of the same problem, in the setting where privacy guarantees are required only with respect to $\mathbf{Z}$. That is, given a private dataset $\mathbf{Z} \in \mathcal{Z}^n$ with target distribution Q, the goal is to learn, in a privacy-preserving manner, a map g_θ that minimizes

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta) = SW_2^2\big(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, P_{\mathbf{Z}}\big) ,$$

where $\mathbf{X} \in \mathcal{X}^n$ is a dataset of noise drawn from a source distribution P from which sampling is straightforward. As discussed above, this provides a simple setting in which both our method and the baseline of Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021) can be applied.

Baseline of Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021) with the fix of Greenewald et al. (2024). As mentioned before, the original privacy analysis of Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021) is contested. In our experiments, we therefore use the fix to the privacy analysis provided in Greenewald et al. (2024) (Theorem 1). For this baseline, we also incorporate standard privacy amplification by sub-sampling for fixed batch size without replacement for the replacement neighboring relation, as stated in Steinke (2022). A dataset is sub-sampled at first, and we then use this sub-sampled dataset until the end of the training procedure. As described in Algorithm 1 in Greenewald et al. (2024), the same amount of dummy privacy noise is added to the points in $g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}$ in order to learn the de-convolution map and not the map to the convoluted distribution.

Data and results. We define the dataset $\mathbf{Z}$ as $n = 100000$ samples drawn uniformly from the circumference of the circle with radius $3/4$, and the dataset $\mathbf{X}$ as an equal number of samples drawn from the standard Gaussian distribution in $\mathbb{R}^2$. The function g_θ is defined as a fully connected neural network with an input dimension 2, three hidden layers with dimensions $(128, 64, 64)$, and an output dimension 2. Figure 20 shows the evolution of the matching problem at different training steps. Thanks to Theorem A.1, our methodology provides privacy guarantees for both the fixed variable $\mathbf{Z}$ and the *trained* variable $\mathbf{X}$, in the sense that g_θ is applied to $\mathbf{X}$. Above each plot, we can see the iteration number, the value of the loss, and the privacy budget ε for both $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Z}$, at each training step. The optimization parameters are $\delta = 0.1/n$, batch size $= 10000$, learning rate $= 0.0075$, number of projections in the Monte Carlo approximation $= 50$, clipping values $M = 1$ and $L = 2\sqrt{2}$ (imposed using the suboptimal approach described in Remark A.2). To ensure more stable results, once we have privatized the gradient by adding noise, we clip the gradient again to improve the method's stability with the same clipping constants. Note that this step preserves privacy due to the post-processing property.

The results for the method proposed by Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola (2021) are shown in Figure 21. For a fair comparison, we retained the same models and hyperparameters as in our approach, with the exception of reducing the number of projection directions to 15, as this adjustment improved the baseline's performance (trading increased bias for reduced privacy-related variance). Despite this tuning, the baseline performs

Figure 20: Data generation experiment. Samples from X are represented in blue, samples from Z in orange. Above each graph, we can see the iteration, the value of the loss, and privacy budgets w.r.t. the variables X and Z.

Figure 21: Baseline for the data generation experiment. Samples from X are represented in blue, samples from Z in orange. Above each graph, we can see the iteration, the value of the loss, and privacy budgets w.r.t. the variables X and Z.

poorly on this task, as shown by the substantially higher privacy budgets required to achieve acceptable results. Since the original paper (Rakotomamonjy & Ralaivola, 2021) did not include visual experiments of this kind, it remains unclear whether the poor performance is intrinsic to the method, a consequence of the correction proposed by Greenewald et al. (2024), or a limitation of our implementation.

E Computational Details

All experiments were conducted on a local server equipped with an NVIDIA RTX A6000 GPU with 48 GB of memory. The core of our implementation was developed in Python using the JAX library (Bradbury et al., 2018). The code represents a preliminary version aimed at illustrating the theoretical capabilities of our approach. We believe that a more refined implementation could lead to significantly faster execution. Notably, the current code does not leverage `jit`, the main just-in-time compilation tool in JAX, which could substantially reduce training time.

Nevertheless, the methodology presents inherent computational bottlenecks that limit the efficiency of our methodology. These bottlenecks are closely related to standard computational challenges in private learning. For illustration, assume the setting described in Remark 4.5 with output dimension $d = 1$, and let r denote the number of parameters in θ. Consider batches $\mathbf{X}_b$ and $\mathbf{Z}_b$ of size m. Using the same notation as in Remark 4.5, we aim to compute a private version of:

$$\underbrace{\nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b), \mathbf{Z}_b)}_{1 \times r} = \underbrace{\nabla_{g_\theta} W_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b), \mathbf{Z}_b)}_{1 \times m} \times \underbrace{\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b)}_{m \times r} \tag{15}$$

If privacy were not a concern, standard automatic differentiation would allow for efficient computation of the left-hand side, leveraging common operations and shared computational graphs. However, to enforce

Figure 22: Naive approach used for computing the clipped gradient $\nabla_\theta^{M,L} W_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b), \mathbf{Z}_b)$. To avoid computing the full Jacobian matrix in the batch $\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b)$, we: (i) split the batch $\mathbf{X}_b = (\mathbf{X}_b^1, \ldots, \mathbf{X}_b^T)$, (ii) Compute G_S, the gradient of the Wasserstein distance with clipping applied over the full batches $\mathbf{X}_b$ and $\mathbf{Z}_b$, as specified in Eq. (5). (iii) split $G_S = (G_S^1, \ldots, G_S^T)$, and (iv) iteratively compute $\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b^i)$, premultiply by G_S^i, and aggregate.

differential privacy, we need to adopt the inner clipping approximation described in Eq. (5). The expression (5) can be viewed as a product between a clipped version of $\nabla_{g_\theta} W_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b), \mathbf{Z}_b)$ and a clipped version of $\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b)$. The main computational bottleneck arises from the need to compute the matrix $\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b) \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times r}$. A similar challenge is usually encountered in differentially private optimization, where, if $g_\theta(x)$ represents the individual loss, we need to compute $\frac{1}{m} \sum_{x \in \mathbf{X}_b} \text{clipp}_C(\nabla_\theta g_\theta(x))$. Two key issues arise:

(i) Memory cost: If m and r are large, storing the full Jacobian $\mathcal{J}_\theta g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b)$ can become infeasible. In standard differential privacy settings, this is typically addressed by reducing the batch size or by computing gradients across individual data points (or across smaller subbatches) sequentially and then aggregating them.

(ii) Loss of GPU efficiency: These naive strategies undermine the advantages of batch computation on GPUs, leading to a significant increase in training time, as discussed in Goodfellow (2015) or Lee & Kifer (2021). In particular, within the JAX framework, computing the full Jacobian via `jax.jacobian` is substantially more efficient than computing all the per-sample gradients with `jax.grad`.

In our setting, using small batch sizes m is not suitable, as this would introduce substantial bias in the estimation of the Wasserstein distance. However, splitting the batch into smaller subbatches remains a viable strategy—if done carefully—as explained in Figure 22. The same discussion extends naturally to the general case of the sliced Wasserstein distance. If we flatten g_θ—i.e., we see $g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b) \in (\mathbb{R}^d)^m$ as an element of $\mathbb{R}^{dm}$—then the chain rule yields the same decomposition as in Equation (15), replacing W_2 with SW_2 (or its Monte Carlo approximation). In this setting, the dimension of the hidden dimension in the vector–matrix product becomes dm instead of m, further increasing the computational burden.

To quantify the runtime impact in a simple example, we fix $k = 30, n = 2^{12}, d = 2$, and vary the width h of a one-hidden-layer network g_θ (with $4h$ parameters). Table 5 compares the average time (over 100 runs) to compute the sliced Wasserstein gradient using standard autodiff (jax.grad) versus our clipping strategy, which splits the computation into $T = \max(h/32, 1)$ smaller Jacobians using the formula in Figure 22. With clipping, each block computes a Jacobian of size at most 2^{20}, which fits in our GPU memory. We find that clipping introduces no overhead when memory allows full Jacobians, and can even be slightly faster, thanks to our use of an explicit gradient formula rather than relying on generic autodiff through complex graphs.

Table 5: Comparison of the required time to compute $\nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta(\mathbf{X}_b))$.

h	T	AutoGrad	Loop	Loop/Autograd
8	1	0.0311s	0.0303s	0.97
16	1	0.0372s	0.0294s	0.79
32	1	0.0608s	0.0379s	0.62
128	4	0.0256s	0.0682 s	2.66
512	16	0.0239s	0.1961 s	8.20
2048	64	0.0213s	0.7890s	36.96
8192	256	0.0320s	3.9563s	123.81

F   Counterexample for General Cost Functions

In this section, we demonstrate that we cannot bound in general the sensitivity of the gradient if we use the Wasserstein loss function W_p, for general $p \geq 1$. Following the notation of Theorem 4.1, we denote by $\mathbf{X} = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \subset \mathcal{X}^n$ the private dataset, $\mathbf{Z} = \{z_1, \ldots, z_n\} \subset \mathbb{R}$ the non-private dataset, and $P_\mathbf{X}, P_\mathbf{Z}$ the associated empirical distributions. Given $g_\theta : \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R}$ depending on the parameter θ, and considering $h_\theta = I_d$, we study the sensitivity of $\Phi(\mathbf{X}) = \nabla_\theta W_p(g_\theta \# P_\mathbf{X}, P_\mathbf{Z})$, for the particular values of

- $\mathbf{X} = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$ with $x_i = \frac{i}{n}$, $i \in [n]$

- $\tilde{\mathbf{X}} = \{\tilde{x}_1, \ldots, \tilde{x}_n\}$ with $\tilde{x}_i = \frac{i-1}{n}$, $i \in [n]$

- $\mathbf{Z} = \{z_1, \ldots, z_n\}$, with $z_i = \frac{2i-1}{2n}$, $i \in [n]$.

- $g_\theta(x) = x + \theta$

For this particular choice, $\mathbf{X} \sim_1 \tilde{\mathbf{X}}$, and the assumptions of Theorem 4.1 are verified for certain constants (once we restrict the domain of θ). From the quantile representation, it is easy to compute

$$W_p(g_\theta \# P_\mathbf{X}, P_\mathbf{Z}) = \left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n |x_i + \theta - z_i|^p \right)^{1/p} = \left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{1}{2n} + \theta \right|^p \right)^{1/p}$$

$$= \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2n} + \theta & \text{if } \theta > -\frac{1}{2n} \\ -\theta - \frac{1}{2n} & \text{if } \theta \leq -\frac{1}{2n} \end{cases}$$

$$W_p(g_\theta \# P_{\tilde{\mathbf{X}}}, P_\mathbf{Z}) = \left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n |\tilde{x}_i + \theta - z_i|^p \right)^{1/p} = \left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| -\frac{1}{2n} + \theta \right|^p \right)^{1/p}$$

$$= \begin{cases} -\frac{1}{2n} + \theta & \text{if } \theta > \frac{1}{2n} \\ \theta - \frac{1}{2n} & \text{if } \theta \leq \frac{1}{2n} \end{cases}$$

Therefore, by setting $\theta = 0$, we observe that the derivatives are $\Phi(\mathbf{X}) = 1$ and $\Phi(\tilde{\mathbf{X}}) = -1$. Consequently, $\Delta_2 \Phi \geq 2$, indicating that the sensitivity does not decrease with the sample size n.

G   Proofs

G.1   Proofs of Section 3

Proof of Proposition 3.1. If we denote by F and G the distribution functions of $P_\mathbf{U}$ and $P_\mathbf{V}$, we know that

$$W_2^2(P_\mathbf{U}, P_\mathbf{V}) = \int_0^1 (F^{-1}(t) - G^{-1}(t))^2 dt$$

$$= \int_0^1 \Big(\sum_{i=1}^n U_{(i)} I\Big(\frac{i-1}{n} < t \le \frac{i}{n} \Big) - \sum_{j=1}^m V_{(j)} I\Big(\frac{j-1}{m} < t \le \frac{j}{n} \Big) \Big)^2 dt$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m (U_{(i)} - V_{(j)})^2 \int_0^1 I\Big(\frac{i-1}{n} < t \le \frac{i}{n}, \frac{j-1}{m} < t \le \frac{j}{n} \Big) dt$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m (U_{(i)} - V_{(j)})^2 R_{i,j}$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m (U_{(\sigma(i))} - V_{(\tau(j))})^2 R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)}$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m (U_i - V_j)^2 R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)} \ ,$$

where the third equality follows from the fact that exactly one element in each sum is different from 0, and the fifth equality follows from reindexing the sum. $\square$

G.2 Proofs of Section 4

Proof of Theorem 4.1. The second part of the theorem follows directly from the first and from the definition of the neighboring relation $\sim_2$ in $\mathcal{X}^n \times \mathcal{Z}^m$. To prove the first, consider two neighboring datasets under the substitution relation $\mathbf{X} \sim_1 \tilde{\mathbf{X}}$ in $\mathcal{X}^n$. We can assume without loss of generality that the datasets differ on the first observation $\tilde{x}_1 \neq x_1$. For ease of notation, denote $\tilde{\mathbf{X}} = (\tilde{x}_1, \ldots, \tilde{x}_n)$, even though $\tilde{x}_i = x_i$ for $i \neq 1$. Along this proof, we will define $U_i := g_\theta(x_i)$ and $\tilde{U}_i := g_\theta(\tilde{x}_i)$ for each $i \in [n]$, and $V_j := h_\theta(z_j)$ for $j \in [m]$. Again, $U_i = \tilde{U}_i$ for every $i \neq 1$. Define now the rank permutations $\sigma, \tilde{\sigma}$ and τ such that

$$\begin{aligned} U_i &= U_{(\sigma(i))} \ , & i \in [n] \ , \\ \tilde{U}_i &= \tilde{U}_{(\tilde{\sigma}(i))} \ , & i \in [n] \ , \\ V_j &= V_{(\tau(j))} \ , & j \in [m] \ . \end{aligned}$$

Denote $\mathbf{U} = (U_1, \ldots, U_n)$ and $\mathbf{V} = (V_1, \ldots, V_m)$. Proposition 3.2 ensures if we define $P_{\mathbf{U}} = g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \delta_{U_i}$ and $P_{\mathbf{V}} = h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}} = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m \delta_{V_j}$, then

$$\nabla_{U,V} W_2^2(P_{\mathbf{U}}, P_{\mathbf{V}}) = \Bigg(\Big(2 \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)}(U_i - V_j) \Big)_{i \in [n]}, \Big(2 \sum_{i=1}^n R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)}(V_j - U_i) \Big)_{j \in [m]} \Bigg) \ .$$

Applying the chain rule, we obtain that

$$\nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}}) = 2 \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)}(U_i - V_j) \nabla_\theta g_\theta(x_i) + 2 \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)}(V_j - U_i) \nabla_\theta h_\theta(z_j) \ .$$

Similarly, for the dataset $\tilde{\mathbf{X}}$ we get

$$\nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta \# P_{\tilde{\mathbf{X}}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}}) = 2 \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),\tau(j)}(\tilde{U}_i - V_j) \nabla_\theta g_\theta(\tilde{x}_i) + 2 \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),\tau(j)}(V_j - \tilde{U}_i) \nabla_\theta h_\theta(z_j) \ .$$

Therefore,

$$\|\nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}}) - \nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta \# P_{\tilde{\mathbf{X}}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}})\|_2 \le$$

$$\le 2 \Big\| \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)}(U_i - V_j) \nabla_\theta g_\theta(x_i) - \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),\tau(j)}(\tilde{U}_i - V_j) \nabla_\theta g_\theta(\tilde{x}_i) \Big\|_2 \qquad (16)$$

$$+ 2 \left\| \sum_{j=1}^{m} \sum_{i=1}^{n} R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)}(V_j - U_i)\nabla_\theta h_\theta(z_j) - \sum_{j=1}^{m} \sum_{i=1}^{n} R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),\tau(j)}(V_j - \tilde{U}_i)\nabla_\theta h_\theta(z_j) \right\|_2 . \qquad (17)$$

The term (17) is easier to bound, since the values inside $\nabla_\theta h_\theta(\cdot)$ coincide. First, note that

$$\sum_{j=1}^{m} R_{i,j} = \frac{1}{n} , \ \forall\, i \in [n] \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{i=1}^{n} R_{i,j} = \frac{1}{m} , \ \forall\, j \in [m] . \qquad (18)$$

The triangular inequality, the assumption $\|\nabla_\theta h_\theta(z)\| \le L_2$ for every z, θ and the previous property allow us to derive the following inequalities

$$(17) = 2 \left\| \sum_{j=1}^{m} V_j \nabla_\theta h_\theta(z_j) \Big(\sum_{i=1}^{n} R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),\tau(j)} \Big) - \sum_{j=1}^{m} \nabla_\theta h_\theta(z_j) \Big(\sum_{i=1}^{n} U_i R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tilde{U}_i R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),\tau(j)} \Big) \right\|_2$$

$$\le 2 \sum_{j=1}^{m} \left\| \nabla_\theta h_\theta(z_j) \Big(\sum_{i=1}^{n} U_i R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tilde{U}_i R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),\tau(j)} \Big) \right\|_2$$

$$\le 2L_2 \sum_{j=1}^{m} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{n} U_i R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tilde{U}_i R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),\tau(j)} \right|$$

$$= 2L_2 \sum_{j=1}^{m} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{n} U_{(i)} R_{i,\tau(j)} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tilde{U}_{(i)} R_{i,\tau(j)} \right|$$

$$= 2L_2 \sum_{j=1}^{m} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{n} R_{i,\tau(j)}(U_{(i)} - \tilde{U}_{(i)}) \right| \qquad (19)$$

where the last lines follows from $U_i = U_{(\sigma(i))}$, $\tilde{U}_i = \tilde{U}_{(\tilde{\sigma}(i))}$ and reindexing the sum. Since $U_i = \tilde{U}_i$ for every $i \ne 1$, we know that

- If $U_1 \ge \tilde{U}_1$, then $U_{(i)} \ge \tilde{U}_{(i)}$ for every $i \in [n]$.
- If $U_1 < \tilde{U}_1$, then $U_{(i)} \le \tilde{U}_{(i)}$ for every $i \in [n]$.

This monotonicity property and the fact that $R_{i,j} \ge 0$ for every i, j ensures that

$$(19) = 2L_2 \left| \sum_{j=1}^{m} \sum_{i=1}^{n} R_{i,\tau(j)}(U_{(i)} - \tilde{U}_{(i)}) \right|$$

$$= 2L_2 \left| \sum_{i=1}^{n} (U_{(i)} - \tilde{U}_{(i)}) \sum_{j=1}^{m} R_{i,\tau(j)} \right|$$

$$= \frac{2L_2}{n} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{n} (U_{(i)} - \tilde{U}_{(i)}) \right|$$

$$= \frac{2L_2}{n} \left| \sum_{i=1}^{n} (U_i - \tilde{U}_i) \right|$$

$$= \frac{2L_2}{n} \left| U_1 - \tilde{U}_1 \right| \le \frac{4L_2 M}{n}$$

By the triangular inequality, the term (16) can be bounded as follows

$$(16) \le 2 \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{n} \nabla_\theta g_\theta(x_i) U_i \sum_{j=1}^{m} R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \nabla_\theta g_\theta(\tilde{x}_i) \tilde{U}_i \sum_{j=1}^{m} R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),\tau(j)} \right\|_2 \qquad (20)$$

$$+ 2\left\|\nabla_\theta g_\theta(x_1)\sum_{j=1}^m R_{\sigma(1),\tau(j)}V_j - \nabla_\theta g_\theta(\tilde{x}_1)\sum_{j=1}^m R_{\tilde{\sigma}(1),\tau(j)}V_j\right\|_2 \tag{21}$$

$$+ 2\left\|\sum_{i=2}^n \nabla_\theta g_\theta(x_i)\sum_{j=1}^m V_j(R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),\tau(j)})\right\|_2 \tag{22}$$

We can bound independently each term in the decomposition,

$$(20) = \frac{2}{n}\left\|\sum_{i=1}^n \nabla_\theta g_\theta(x_i)U_i - \nabla_\theta g_\theta(\tilde{x}_i)\tilde{U}_i\right\|_2$$

$$= \frac{2}{n}\left\|\nabla_\theta g_\theta(x_1)U_1 - \nabla_\theta g_\theta(\tilde{x}_1)\tilde{U}_1\right\|_2$$

$$\leq \frac{2}{n}\left(|U_1|\|\nabla_\theta g_\theta(x_1)\|_2 + |\tilde{U}_1|\|\nabla_\theta g_\theta(\tilde{x}_1)\|_2\right)$$

$$\leq \frac{4L_1 M}{n}$$

$$(21) \leq 2L_1 M\left(\sum_{j=1}^m R_{\sigma(1),\tau(j)} + \sum_{j=1}^m R_{\tilde{\sigma}(1),\tau(j)}\right)$$

$$= \frac{4L_1 M}{n}$$

$$(22) \leq 2L_1 \sum_{i=2}^n\left|\sum_{j=1}^m V_j(R_{\sigma(i),\tau(j)} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),\tau(j)})\right|$$

$$= 2L_1 \sum_{i=2}^n\left|\sum_{j=1}^m V_{(j)}(R_{\sigma(i),j} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),j})\right| \tag{23}$$

The last equality is a simple consequence of $V_j = V_{(\tau(j))}$ and reindexing the sum. To bound the last expression, it is useful to see that all the terms $\sum_{j=1}^m V_{(j)}(R_{\sigma(i),j} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),j})$ have the same sign, for $i = 2, \ldots, n$. This will follow from the relationship between the permutations σ and $\tilde{\sigma}$. For instance, if $\tilde{\sigma}(1) < \sigma(1)$, it follows that

a) $\tilde{\sigma}(i) \geq \sigma(i)$ *for every $i \geq 2$.* Remember that $\sigma(i)$ denotes the position of U_i in the ordered statistic $(U_{(1)}, \ldots, U_{(n)})$, and $\tilde{\sigma}(i)$ denotes the position of $\tilde{U}_i$ in the ordered statistic $(\tilde{U}_{(1)}, \ldots, \tilde{U}_{(n)})$. Recall also that $\tilde{U}_i = U_i$ for every $i \geq 2$. Therefore, $\tilde{\sigma}(1) < \sigma(1)$ implies that $\tilde{U}_1 < U_1$, and for every $i \geq 2$,

- If $\sigma(i) < \tilde{\sigma}(1)$, then $\tilde{\sigma}(i) = \sigma(i)$.
- If $\tilde{\sigma}(1) \leq \sigma(i) < \sigma(1)$, then $\tilde{\sigma}(i) = \sigma(i) + 1$.
- If $\sigma(i) > \sigma(1)$, then $\tilde{\sigma}(i) = \sigma(i)$.

b) $\sum_{j=1}^m V_{(j)}(R_{\sigma(i),j} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),j}) \leq 0$ *for every $i = 2, \ldots, n$.* If we denote by G the empirical distribution function of $V_1, \ldots, V_m$, then by definition of $R_{i,j}$,

$$\sum_{j=1}^m V_{(j)}(R_{\sigma(i),j} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),j}) = \sum_{j=1}^m V_{(j)}\left(\int_{\frac{\sigma(i)-1}{n}}^{\frac{\sigma(i)}{n}} I\left(\frac{j-1}{m} < t \leq \frac{j}{m}\right)dt - \int_{\frac{\tilde{\sigma}(i)-1}{n}}^{\frac{\tilde{\sigma}(i)}{n}} I\left(\frac{j-1}{m} < t \leq \frac{j}{m}\right)dt\right)$$

$$= \int_{\frac{\sigma(i)-1}{n}}^{\frac{\sigma(i)}{n}}\sum_{j=1}^m V_{(j)}I\left(\frac{j-1}{m} < t \leq \frac{j}{m}\right)dt - \int_{\frac{\tilde{\sigma}(i)-1}{n}}^{\frac{\tilde{\sigma}(i)}{n}}\sum_{j=1}^m V_{(j)}I\left(\frac{j-1}{m} < t \leq \frac{j}{m}\right)dt$$

$$= \int_{\frac{\sigma(i)-1}{n}}^{\frac{\sigma(i)}{n}} G^{-1}(t)dt - \int_{\frac{\tilde{\sigma}(i)-1}{n}}^{\frac{\tilde{\sigma}(i)}{n}} G^{-1}(t)dt$$

$$= \int_{\frac{\sigma(i)-1}{n}}^{\frac{\sigma(i)}{n}} G^{-1}(t) - G^{-1}\left(t + \frac{\tilde{\sigma}(i) - \sigma(i)}{n}\right)dt \leq 0$$

for every $i = 2, \ldots, n$, where the last bound is consequence of (a) and the monotonicity of G^{-1}.

Similarly, if $\tilde{\sigma}(1) > \sigma(1)$, then $\tilde{\sigma}(i) \leq \sigma(i)$ for every $i \geq 2$, which implies $\sum_{j=1}^{m} V_{(j)}(R_{\sigma(i),j} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),j}) \geq 0$. Finally, the case $\tilde{\sigma}(1) = \sigma(1)$ is trivial, since this implies $\tilde{\sigma} = \sigma$. In any case, the sign property implies that

$$
\begin{aligned}
(23) &= 2L_1 \Big| \sum_{i=2}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{m} V_{(j)}(R_{\sigma(i),j} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),j}) \Big| \\
&= 2L_1 \Big| \sum_{j=1}^{m} V_{(j)} \sum_{i=2}^{n} (R_{\sigma(i),j} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),j}) \Big| \\
&= 2L_1 \Big| \sum_{j=1}^{m} V_{(j)} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (R_{\sigma(i),j} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(i),j}) - \sum_{j=1}^{m} V_{(j)}(R_{\sigma(1),j} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(1),j}) \Big| \\
&= 2L_1 \Big| \sum_{j=1}^{m} V_{(j)}(R_{\sigma(1),j} - R_{\tilde{\sigma}(1),j}) \Big| \\
&\leq 2L_1 M \Big(\sum_{j=1}^{m} R_{\sigma(1),\tau(j)} + \sum_{j=1}^{m} R_{\tilde{\sigma}(1),\tau(j)} \Big) = \frac{4L_1 M}{n}
\end{aligned}
$$

Putting everything together, we can conclude that,

$$
\|\nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}}) - \nabla_\theta W_2^2(g_\theta \# P_{\tilde{\mathbf{X}}}, h_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{Z}})\|_2 \leq \frac{12 L_1 M}{n} + \frac{4 L_2 M}{n} \; .
$$

$\square$

G.3 Other Proofs

Proof of Lemma 5.2. See the proof of Theorem 29 in Steinke (2022) which gives the result up to a minor adaptation. The term $\max\left(\frac{n'_1}{n_1}, \ldots, \frac{n'_k}{n_k}\right)$ indeed comes from considering the worst case analysis depending on which category the differing point is in. $\square$

Proof of Corollary C.1. Formally, with the notation of Definition 2.1, define for the first part $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{D}_0^{n_0} \times \mathcal{D}_1^{n_1}$, where $\mathcal{D}_j = \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \times \{j\}$ in the supervised case, and $\mathcal{D}_j = \mathcal{X} \times \{j\}$ in the unsupervised case, for $j = 0, 1$. Applying Theorem A.1 with $g_\theta = h_\theta$, we can bound the sensitivity of $\nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_\alpha^{SP}(g_\theta)$ by (10).

For the second part, consider $\mathcal{D} = \prod_{j,k} \mathcal{D}_{j,k}^{n_{j,k}}$, where $\mathcal{D}_{j,k} = \mathcal{X} \times \{j\} \times \{k\}$, for $j \in \{0,1\}, k \in \{0, \ldots, R-1\}$. Under the relation $\sim_{2R}$, given two neighboring datasets, all the terms except one are the same in the sum in (8), and similarly for the gradient expression. More precisely, under the assumptions of the theorem, with the notation adopted in Section 7,

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\sup_{\mathbf{D} \sim_{2R} \tilde{\mathbf{D}}} \Big\| \frac{1}{R} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \nabla_\theta SW_2^2\Big(\varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_{0,k}}, \varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_{1,k}}\Big) - \frac{1}{R} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \nabla_\theta SW_2^2\Big(\varphi_\theta \# P_{\tilde{\mathbf{X}}_{0,k}}, \varphi_\theta \# P_{\tilde{\mathbf{X}}_{1,k}}\Big) \Big\|_2 \\
&\leq \frac{1}{R} \sup_{\mathbf{D} \sim_{2R} \tilde{\mathbf{D}}} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \Big\| \nabla_\theta SW_2^2\Big(\varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_{0,k}}, \varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_{1,k}}\Big) - \nabla_\theta SW_2^2\Big(\varphi_\theta \# P_{\tilde{\mathbf{X}}_{0,k}}, \varphi_\theta \# P_{\tilde{\mathbf{X}}_{1,k}}\Big) \Big\|_2 \\
&\leq \frac{1}{R} \sup_{\substack{k=0,\ldots,R-1 \\ (\mathbf{X}_{0,k},\mathbf{X}_{1,k}) \sim_2 (\tilde{\mathbf{X}}_{0,k}, \tilde{\mathbf{X}}_{1,k})}} \Big\| \nabla_\theta SW_2^2\Big(\varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_{0,k}}, \varphi_\theta \# P_{\mathbf{X}_{1,k}}\Big) - \nabla_\theta SW_2^2\Big(\varphi_\theta \# P_{\tilde{\mathbf{X}}_{0,k}}, \varphi_\theta \# P_{\tilde{\mathbf{X}}_{1,k}}\Big) \Big\|_2 \\
&\leq \frac{1}{R} \max_{k=0\ldots,R-1} \frac{16 M L}{\min\{n_{0,k}, n_{1,k}\}} = \frac{1}{R} \frac{16 M L}{\min_{j,k}\{n_{j,k}\}}
\end{aligned}
$$

which implies (11). $\square$