FedSKU: Defending Backdoors in Federated Learning Through Selective Knowledge Unlearning

22 Sept 2023 (modified: 11 Feb 2024)Submitted to ICLR 2024EveryoneRevisionsBibTeX
Primary Area: societal considerations including fairness, safety, privacy
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Keywords: Federated Learning, Backdoor Defense, Machine Unlearning
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Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) has been found to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which involve an adversary uploading manipulated model parameters to deceive the aggregation process. Although several defenses have been proposed for backdoor attacks in FL, they are typically coarse-grained, as all of the methods process the uploaded model as a whole by either removing them or adding noises. In this paper, we propose a more fine-grained approach by further decomposing the uploaded model into malicious triggers and useful knowledge, which can be separately processed for improved performance. Specifically, our approach, called FedSKU, enables backdoor defense through \textbf{S}elective \textbf{K}nowledge \textbf{U}nlearning. We draw inspiration from machine unlearning to unlearn the malicious triggers while preserving the useful knowledge to be aggregated. Consequently, we accurately remove the backdoor trigger without sacrificing any other benign knowledge embedded in the model parameters. This knowledge can be further utilized to boost the performance of the subsequent aggregation. Extensive experiments demonstrate its superiority over existing defense methods.
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Submission Number: 4512
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