DIFFERENCE-SEEKING GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORK

ABSTRACT

We propose a novel algorithm, **D**ifference-**S**eeking **G**enerative **A**dversarial **N**etwork (DSGAN), developed from traditional GAN. DSGAN considers the scenario that the training samples of target distribution, p_t, are difficult to collect. Suppose there are two distributions $p_{\bar{d}}$ and p_d such that the density of the target distribution can be the differences between the densities of $p_{\bar{d}}$ and p_d. We show how to learn the target distribution p_t only via samples from p_d and $p_{\bar{d}}$ (relatively easy to obtain). DSGAN has the flexibility to produce samples from various target distributions (*e.g.* the out-of-distribution). Two key applications, semi-supervised learning and adversarial training, are taken as examples to validate the effectiveness of DSGAN. We also provide theoretical analyses about the convergence of DSGAN.

1 INTRODUCTION

In machine learning, how to learn a probability distribution is usually conducted in a unsupervised learning manner. Generative approaches are developed for learning data distribution from its samples and thereafter produce novel and high-dimensional samples from learned distributions, such as image and speech synthesis (Saito et al. (2018)). The state-of-the-art approaches include variational autoencoders (VAE)(Kingma & Welling (2014)), Pixel-CNN (Oord et al. (2016)), and Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN)(Goodfellow et al. (2014)). VAE is relatively easy to implement and robust to hyperparameter choices with useful latent representation. But, it might have the "blurring" effect on images. PixelCNN produces sharp images and obtains explicit likelihood of training data along with good evaluation metric, but is slow due to sequential generation and does not have a latent representation. GAN also produces sharp images based on a game-theoretic framework, but can be tricky and unstable to train due to multiple interacting losses. Correct hyperparameter selection is critical in GAN. In addition, hybrid methods (Larsen et al. (2016), Tolstikhin et al. (2018)) try to take various advantages of VAE, PixelCNN, and GAN, but with image quality being not better than that obtained from GAN. In this paper, our study focuses on GAN.

GAN consists of two functions: generator and discriminator. Both functions are represented as parameterized neural networks. The discriminator network is trained to classify whether or not inputs belong to real data or fake data created by the generator. The generator learns to map a sample from a latent space to some distribution to increase the classification errors of discriminator. GAN corresponds to a minimax two-player game, which ends if the generator actually learns the real data distribution. The generator is of main interest because the discriminator will be unable to differentiate between both distributions once the generator has been trained well.

One of requirements in GAN is to prepare training samples drawn from the the target distribution that the generator captures. However, it is sometimes difficult to collect training samples, including, for example, the out-of-distribution examples in MNIST. To overcome this difficulty, the out-of-distribution examples, from another point of view, are found to belong to the difference of the set of examples in MNIST and the universal set. Examples in both sets are relatively easy to obtain. Thus, if out-of-distribution examples can be produced by GAN, which is trained only by examples in both sets (*e.g.*, MNIST and its universal set), this problem can be solved. Nevertheless, the existing GAN methods are not found to utilize such an idea. It should be noted that the target distribution is equal to the training data distribution in traditional GANs; nevertheless, both distributions are considered different in DSGAN.

In this paper, we make the following contributions:

(1) We propose a novel algorithm, **D**ifference-**S**eeking **G**enerative **A**dversarial **N**etwork (DS-GAN), where the density of target distribution p_t is the difference between those of any two distributions, $p_{\bar{d}}$ and p_d. Nevertheless, the differences of two densities being negative are not well-defined. Thus, instead of learning the target distribution p_t directly, the generator distribution approximates p_t by minimizing the statistical distance between the mixture distribution of p_d and the generator distribution, and $p_{\bar{d}}$.

(2) Theoretical results based on traditional GAN are extended to the case of mixture distribution considered in this paper. With enough capacity of the generator and the discriminator, we show DSGAN converges when the optimum of the Jensen-Shannon divergence is attained such that the generator distribution is equal to the target distribution.

(3) We show that DSGAN possesses the flexibility to learn different target distributions in two key applications: semi-supervised learning and adversarial training. Samples from target distribution in semi-supervised learning must satisfy two conditions: i) are linear combination of any label data and unlabel data; ii) do not belong to neither label data nor unlabel data. For adversarial training, samples from the target distribution are assigned as out-of-distribution examples with bounded distortion. Experiments validate that DSGAN can learn these two kinds of distributions well in various datasets.

The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2, we introduce DSGAN, including the algorithm in the training procedure. Theoretical results are described in Sec. 3 along with a trick to stabilize the training procedure. In Sec. 4, two applications are taken as examples to show the effectiveness of DSGAN. Finally, we present the experimental results in Sec. 5 and conclude by pointing out some promising directions for future work in Sec. 6.

2 PROPOSED METHOD-DSGAN

We denote the generator distribution as p_g and training data distribution as p_d, both in a N-dimensional space. Let $p_{\bar{d}}$ be the distribution decided by user. For example, $p_{\bar{d}}$ can be the convolution of p_d and normal distribution. Let p_t be the target distribution such that

$$(1 - \alpha)p_t(x) + \alpha p_d(x) = p_{\bar{d}}(x), \qquad (1)$$

where $\alpha \in [0, 1]$. Our method, DSGAN, aims to learn p_g such that $p_g = p_t$. In other words, the generator is prone to output samples located in high-density areas of $p_{\bar{d}}$ and low-density areas of p_d. Fig. (1)(a) illustrates an example to generate boundary data given training data in one-dimensional space. We design $p_{\bar{d}}$ as the convolution of p_d and the normal distribution. When x belongs to boundary data, the density of $p_{\bar{d}}(x)$ is higher than that of $\alpha p_d(x)$, meaning that G generates boundary points with probability being larger than 0. Thus, DSGAN achieves the goal. More examples are illustrated in a two-dimensional space in Figs. (1)(b) and (c).

Intuitively, our method tries to learn p_g such that $p_g(x) \sim \dfrac{p_{\bar{d}}(x) - \alpha p_d(x)}{1 - \alpha}$. Moreover, we adopt the MNIST dataset to illustrate another example in Fig. (1)(d), where training data are images of digits "1" and "7". Let the examples from images of digit "1" be assigned as samples from p_d and let the samples from $p_{\bar{d}}$ be examples from images of digits "1" and "7". Since the density $p_d(x)$ is high when x is digit "1," the generator outputs digit "7" with high probability.

The inputs z of the generator are drawn from $p_z(z)$ in an M-dimensional space. The generator function $G(z; \theta_g) : \mathbb{R}^M \to \mathbb{R}^N$ represents a mapping to data space, where G is a differentiable function with parameters θ_g. The discriminator is defined as $D(x; \theta_d) : \mathbb{R}^N \to [0, 1]$ that outputs a single scalar. $D(x)$ can be considered as the probability that x belongs to a class of real data.

Similar to traditional GAN, we train D to distinguish the real data and the fake data sampled from G. Meanwhile, G is trained to produce realistic data as possible to mislead D. But, in DSGAN, the definitions of "real data" and "fake data" are different from those in traditional GAN. The samples from $p_{\bar{d}}$ are considered as real but those from the mixture distribution between p_d and p_g are considered as fake.

(a)

(b)   (c)   (d)

Figure 1: Illustrations of DSGAN. (a) shows a simple illustration about generating boundary data around training data. First, the convolution of p_d and normal distribution makes the density on boundary data be no longer zero. Second, we seek p_g such that Eq. (1) holds, where the support set of p_g is approximated by the difference of those between $p_{\bar{d}}$ and of p_d. For (b) and (c), the orange points are samples drawn from p_d. By assigning $p_{\bar{d}}$ to the convolution of p_d and the normal distribution, p_g generates boundary points (green points) around p_d. For (d), p_d denotes the distribution of digit "1" in the MNIST dataset, the samples drawn from $p_{\bar{d}}$ are digits "1" and "7", and p_g generates digit "7" with high probability. From figures (b)(c)(d), we can observe two properties of p_g: i) the higher density of $p_d(x)$, the lower density of $p_g(x)$; ii) p_g prefers to output samples from high-density areas of $p_{\bar{d}}$. $\alpha = 0.8$ in Eq. (1) is used.

The objective function is defined as follows:

$$\min_G \max_D V(G, D) = \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{\bar{d}}(x)} [\log D(x)] + (1 - \alpha)\mathbb{E}_{z \sim p_z(z)} [\log(1 - D(G(z)))]$$
$$+ \alpha \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_d(x)} [\log(1 - D(x))]. \tag{2}$$

During the training procedure, an iterative approach like traditional GAN is to alternate between k steps of training D and one step of training G. In practice, minibatch stochastic gradient descent via back propagation is used to update θ_d and θ_g. In other words, for each of p_g, p_d and $p_{\bar{d}}$, m sample are required for computing gradients, where m is the number of samples in a minibatch. Algorithm 1 illustrates the training procedure in detail. DSGAN suffers from the same drawbacks with traditional GAN (*e.g.*, mode collapse, overfitting, and strong discriminator such that the generator gradient vanishes). There are literatures (Salimans et al. (2016), Arjovsky & Bottou (2017), and Miyato et al. (2018)) focusing on improving the above problems, and their ideas can be combined into DSGAN.

Li et al. (2017) and Reed et al. (2016) proposed the similar objective function like (2). Their goal is to learn the conditional distribution of training data. Nevertheless, we aim to learn the target distribution p_t in Eq. (1), not the training data distribution.

In the next section, we will show that the objective function is equivalent to minimizing the Jensen-Shannon divergence between the mixture distribution (p_d and p_g) and $p_{\bar{d}}$ as G and D are given enough capacity. Furthermore, we provide a trick by reformulating the objective function (2) such that it is more stable to train DSGAN.

Algorithm 1 The training procedure of DSGAN using minibatch stochastic gradient descent. k is the number of steps to apply to the discriminator. α is the ratio between p_g and p_d in the mixture distribution. We used $k = 1$ and $\alpha = 0.8$ in experiments.

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01. **for** number of training iterations **do**
02.   **for** k steps **do**
03.   Sample minibatch of m noise samples $z^{(1)}, ..., z^{(m)}$ from $p_g(z)$.
04.   Sample minibatch of m samples $x_d^{(1)}, ..., x_d^{(m)}$ from $p_d(x)$.
05.   Sample minibatch of m samples $x_{\bar{d}}^{(1)}, ..., x_{\bar{d}}^{(m)}$ from $p_{\bar{d}}(x)$.
06.   Update the discriminator by ascending its stochastic gradient:

$$\nabla_{\theta_d} \left[\frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \log D\left(x_d^{(i)}\right) + \log \left(1 - D\left(G\left(z^{(i)}\right)\right)\right) \right.$$

$$\left. + \log \left(1 - D\left(x_{\bar{d}}^{(i)}\right)\right) \right]$$

07.   **end for**
08.   Sample minibatch of m noise samples $z^{(1)}, ..., z^{(m)}$ from $p_g(z)$.
09.   Update the generator by descending its stochastic gradient:

$$\nabla_{\theta_g} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \left[\log \left(1 - D\left(G\left(z^{(i)}\right)\right)\right) \right]$$

10. **end for**

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3 THEORETICAL RESULTS

There are two assumptions for subsequent proofs. First, in a nonparametric setting, we assume both generator and discriminator have infinite capacity. Second, p_g is defined as the distribution of the samples drawn from $G(z)$ under $z \sim p_z$. We will first show the optimal discriminator given G and then show that minimizing $V(G, D)$ via G given the optimal discriminator is equivalent to minimizing the Jensen-Shannon divergence between $(1 - \alpha)p_g + \alpha p_d$ and $p_{\bar{d}}$.

Proposition 1. *For G being fixed, the optimal discriminator D is*

$$D_G^*(x) = \frac{p_d(x)}{p_d(x) + (1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)}.$$

Proof. See Appendix A.1 in details. $\qquad \square$

Moreover, D can be considered to discriminate between samples from $p_{\bar{d}}$ and those from $((1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x))$. By replacing the optimal discriminator into $V(G, D)$, we obtain

$$
\begin{aligned}
C(G) &= \max_D V(G, D) \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{\bar{d}}(x)} \left[\log D_G^*(x) \right] + (1 - \alpha)\mathbb{E}_{z \sim p_z(z)} \left[\log \left(1 - D_G^*(G(z))\right) \right] \\
&\qquad + \alpha \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_d(x)} \left[\log \left(1 - D_G^*(x)\right) \right] \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{\bar{d}}(x)} \left[\log D_G^*(x) \right] + \mathbb{E}_{x \sim (1-\alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha \sim p_d(x)} \left[\log \left(1 - D_G^*(x)\right) \right] \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{\bar{d}}(x)} \left[\log \frac{p_{\bar{d}}(x)}{p_{\bar{d}}(x) + (1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)} \right] \\
&\qquad + \mathbb{E}_{x \sim (1-\alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha \sim p_d(x)} \left[\log \frac{(1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)}{p_{\bar{d}}(x) + (1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)} \right],
\end{aligned}
\tag{3}
$$

where the third equality holds because of the linearity of expectation.

Actually, the previous results show the optimal solution of D given G being fixed in (3). Now, the next step is to find the optimal G with D_G^* being fixed.

Theorem 1. *Suppose $\alpha p_d(x) \leq p_{\bar{d}}(x)$ for all x's. The global minimum of the virtual training criterion $C(G)$ is achieved if and only if $(1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x) = p_{\bar{d}(x)}$ for all x's. At that point, $C(G)$ achieves the value $-\log 4$.*

Proof. See Appendix A.2 in details. □

The assumption in Theorem 1 may be impractical in real applications. We discuss that DSGAN still works well even though the assumption does not hold. There are two facts: i) given D, $V(G, D)$ is a convex function in p_g and ii) Due to $\int_x p_g(x)dx = 1$, the set collecting all feasible solutions of p_g is a convex set. In other words, there always exists a global minimum of $V(G, D)$ given D, but it may not be $-\log(4)$. In this following, without the assumption in Theorem 1, we show that the support set of p_g is contained within that of $p_{\bar{d}}$ while achieving the global minimum such that we can generate the desired p_g by designing appropriate $p_{\bar{d}}$.

Proposition 2. *Suppose $\alpha p_d(x) \geq p_{\bar{d}}$ for $x \in \text{Supp}(p_d)$. If the global minimum of the virtual training criterion $C(G)$ is achieved, then*

$$\text{Supp}(p_g) \subseteq \text{Supp}(p_{\bar{d}}) - \text{Supp}(p_d).$$

Proof. See Appendix A.3 in details. □

In sum, the generator is prone to output samples located in high-density areas of $p_{\bar{d}}$ and low-density areas of p_d.

Another concern is the convergence of Algorithm 1.

Proposition 3. *The discriminator reaches its optimal value given G in Algorithm 1, and p_g is updated by minimizing*

$$\mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{\bar{d}}(x)} \left[\log D_G^*(x) \right] + \mathbb{E}_{x \sim (1-\alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha \sim p_d(x)} \left[\log \left(1 - D_G^*(x) \right) \right].$$

If G and D have enough capacity, then p_g converges to $\underset{p_g}{\text{argmin}} \, \text{JSD}\left(p_{\bar{d}} \parallel (1 - \alpha)p_g + \alpha p_d\right)$.

Proof. See Appendix A.4 in details. □

3.1 Tricks for Stable Training

We provide a trick to stabilize the training procedure by reformulating the objective function. Specifically, $V(G, D)$ in (2) is reformulated as:

$$
\begin{aligned}
V(G, D) &= \int_x p_{\bar{d}}(x) \log\left(D(x)\right) + \left((1-\alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)\right) \log\left(1 - D(x)\right) dx \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{\bar{d}}(x)} \left[\log D(x) \right] + \mathbb{E}_{x \sim (1-\alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha \sim p_d(x)} \left[\log\left(1 - D(x)\right) \right].
\end{aligned}
\tag{4}
$$

Instead of sampling a mini-batch of m samples from p_z and p_d in Algorithm 1, $(1 - \alpha)m$ and αm samples from both distributions are required, respectively. The computation cost in training can be reduced due to fewer samples. Furthermore, although (4) is equivalent to (2) in theory, we find that the training using (4) achieves better performance than using (2) via empirical validation in Table 1. We conjecture that the equivalence between (4) and (2) is based on the linearity of expectation, but mini-batch stochastic gradient descent in practical training may lead to the different outcomes.

Table 1: Comparing the semi-supervised learning results on MNIST whether to use the sampling tricks.

Methods	MNIST (# errors)
Our method w/o tricks	$91.0(\pm 7.0)$
Our method w/ tricks	$82.7(\pm 4.6)$

4 APPLICATIONS

DSGAN is applied to two problems: semi-supervised learning and adversarial training. Specifically, DSGAN acts as a "bad generator," which creates complement samples versus label data and unlabel data in semi-supervised learning. As for adversarial training, DSGAN generates adversarial examples located in the low-density areas of training data.

4.1 SEMI-SUPERVISED LEARNING

Semi-supervised learning (SSL) is a kind of learning model with the use of a small number of labeled data and a large amount of unlabeled data. The existing SSL works based on generative model (*e.g.,* VAE (Kingma et al. (2014)) and GAN (Salimans et al. (2016))) obtain good empirical results. Dai et al. (2017) theoretically show that good semi-supervised learning requires a bad GAN with the objective function:

$$\max_D \mathbb{E}_{x,y \sim \mathcal{L}} \log P_D \left(y \mid x, y \leq K \right) + \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_d(x)} \log P_D \left(y \leq K \mid x \right)$$
$$+ \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_g(x)} \log P_g \left(K + 1 \mid x \right), \quad (5)$$

where (x, y) denotes a pair of data and its corresponding label, $\{1, 2, \ldots, K\}$ denotes the label space for classification, and $\mathcal{L} = \{(x, y)\}$ is the label set. Note that the discriminator D in GAN also plays the role of classifier. If the generator distribution exactly matches the real data distribution (*i.e.*, $p_g = p_d$), then the classifier trained by the objective function (5) with the unlabeled data cannot have better performance than that trained by supervised learning with the objective function:

$$\max_D \mathbb{E}_{x,y \sim \mathcal{L}} \log P_D \left(y \mid x, y \leq K \right). \quad (6)$$

On the contrary, the generator is preferred to generate complement examples, which lie on low-density area of p_d. Under some mild assumptions, those complement examples help D to learn correct decision boundaries in low-density area because the probabilities of the true classes are forced to be low on out-of-distribution areas.

The complement examples in Dai et al. (2017) are complicate to produce. We will demonstrate that DSGAN is easy to generate complement examples in Sec. 5.

4.2 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING

Deep neural networks have impacted on our daily life. Neural networks, however, are vulnerable to adversarial examples, as evidenced in recent studies (Papernot et al. (2016))(Carlini & Wagner (2017)). Thus, there has been significant interest in how to enhance the robustness of neural networks. Unfortunately, if the adversary has full access to the network, namely white-box attack, a complete defense strategy has not yet been found.

Athalye et al. (2018) surveyed the state-of-the-art defense strategies and showed that adversarial training (Madry et al. (2018)) is more robust than other strategies. Given a trained classifier C parameterized by θ and a loss function $\ell(x; y; C_\theta)$, adversarial training solves a min-max game, where the first step is to find adversarial examples within ϵ-ball for maximizing the loss, and the second step is to train the model for minimizing the loss, given adversarial examples. Specifically, the objective (Madry et al. (2018)) is

$$\operatorname*{argmin}_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{L}} \left[\max_{\delta \in [-\epsilon, \ \epsilon]^N} \ell(x; y; C_\theta) \right]. \quad (7)$$

The authors used projected gradient descent (PGD) to find adversarial examples by maximizing the inner optimization.

Instead of relying on PGD, our DSGAN generates adversarial examples directly, which are combined into real training data to fine-tune C_θ. ϵ-ball in terms of ℓ_2 or $\ell_{\inf}$ can be intuitively incorporated into the generation of adversarial examples.

5 EXPERIMENTS

We first demonstrate the empirical results about semi-supervised learning, where DSGAN generates complement samples, in Sec. 5.1. Then, DSGAN is used to generate adversarial examples for adversarial training in Sec. 5.2.

Note that, the training procedure of DSGAN can be improved by other extensions of GANs such as WGAN (Arjovsky et al. (2017)), WGAN-GP (Gulrajani et al. (2017)), EBGAN (Zhao et al. (2017)), LSGAN (Mao et al. (2017)) and etc. We use the idea of WGAN-GP in our method such that DSGAN is stable in training and suffers less mode collapse.

5.1 DSGAN IN SEMI-SUPERVISED LEARNING

Following the previous works, we apply the proposed DSGAN in semi-supervised learning on three benchmark datasets, including MNIST (LeCun et al. (1998)), SVHN (Netzer et al. (2011)), and CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky (2009)).

We first introduce how DSGAN generates complement examples in the semi-supervised learning. Specifically, Dai et al. (2017) proved that if complement examples generated by G can satisfy the following two assumptions in (8) and (9):

$$\forall x \sim p_g(x), 0 > \max_{1 \le i \le K} w_i^T f(x), \text{ and } \forall x \sim p_d(x), 0 < \max_{1 \le i \le K} w_i^T f(x) \tag{8}$$

where f is the feature extractor and w_i is the linear classifier for the ith class and

$$\forall x_1 \sim \mathcal{L}, x_2 \sim p_d(x), \exists x_g \sim p_g(x) \text{ s.t. } x_g = \beta x_1 + (1 - \beta)x_2 \text{ with } \beta \in [0, 1], \tag{9}$$

then all unlabeled data will be classified correctly via the objective function (5).

The assumption in (8) implies $\text{Supp}\,(p_g) \bigcap \text{Supp}\,(p_d) = \{\}$. Furthermore, in (9), let each sample from $p_{\bar{d}}$ in DSGAN be the linear combination of those from $\mathcal{L}$ and p_d. Since $p_g(x) \approx \dfrac{p_{\bar{d}}(x) - \alpha p_d(x)}{1 - \alpha}$, the term $-\alpha p_d$ ensures that samples from p_g do not belong to $\text{Supp}\,(p_d)$. In sum, $p_g(x)$ approximates $p_{\bar{d}}(x)$ for $x \notin \text{Supp}\,(p_d)$. Thus, p_g satisfies both assumptions in (8) and (9).

The details of the experiments, including the network models, can be found in Appendix B.

5.1.1 MNIST, SVHN, AND CIFAR-10

For evaluating the semi-supervised learning task, we used 60000/ 73257/ 50000 samples and 10000/ 26032/ 10000 samples from the MNIST/ SVHN/ CIFAR-10 dataset for training and testing, respectively. Due to the semi-supervised setting, we randomly chose 100/ 1000/ 4000 samples from the training samples as the MNIST/ SVHN/ CIFAR-10 labeled dataset, and the amount of labeled data for all classes are equal.

The hyperparameters were chosen to make our generated samples consistent with the assumptions in (8) and (9). However, in practice, if we make all the samples produced by the generator following the assumption in (9), then the generated distribution is not close to the true distribution, even a large margin between them exists in most of the time, which is not what we desire. So, in our experiments, we make a concession that the percentage of generated samples, which accords with the assumption, is around 90%. To meet this objective, we tune the hyperparameters.

Finally, we perform testing with 10/ 5/ 5 runs on MNIST/ SVHN/ CIFAR-10 based on the selected hyperparameters and randomly selected labeled dataset. Following Dai et al. (2017), the results are recorded as the mean and standard deviation of number of errors from each run.

5.1.2 MAIN RESULTS

First, the hyperparameters we chose is depicted in Table 2, where β is defined in (9). Second, the results obtained from our DSGAN and the state-of-the-art methods on three benchmark datasets are depicted in Table 3.

Table 2: Hyperparameters in semi-supervised learning.

Hyperparameters	MNIST	SVHN	CIFAR-10
α	0.8	0.8	0.5
β	0.3	0.3	0.1

It can be observed that our results can compete with state-of-the-art methods on the three datasets. Moreover, in comparison with Dai et al. (2017), our methods don't need to rely on an additional density estimation network PixelCNN++ (Salimans et al. (2017)). Although PixelCNN++ is one of the best density estimation network, it cannot estimate the density in the feature space, which is dynamic during training. This drawback make the models in Dai et al. (2017) cannot completely fulfill the assumptions in their paper.

Table 3: Comparison of semi-supervised learning between our DSGAN and other state-of-the-art results. For fair comparison, we only consider the GAN-based methods. $*$ indicates the use of the same architecture of classifier. $\dagger$ indicates a larger architecture of classifier. $\ddagger$ indicates the use of data augmentation.

Methods	MNIST (# errors)	SVHN (% of errors)	CIFAR-10 (% of errors)
CatGAN (Springenberg (2016))	$191(\pm10)$	-	$19.58(\pm0.46)$
TripleGAN[†] (Li et al. (2017))	$91(\pm58)$	$5.77(\pm0.17)$	$16.99(\pm0.36)$
FM[*] (Salimans et al. (2016))	$93(\pm6.5)$	$8.11(\pm1.3)$	$18.63(\pm1.32)$
badGAN[*] (Dai et al. (2017))	$79.5(\pm9.8)$	$4.25(\pm0.03)$	$14.41(\pm0.30)$
CT-GAN[‡] (Wei et al. (2018))	-	-	$9.98(\pm0.21)$
Our method[*]	$82.7(\pm4.6)$	$5.01(\pm0.14)$	$15.08(\pm0.24)$

5.1.3 REMARKS

Our result on MNIST in Table 3 is slightly inferior to the best record of badGAN (Dai et al. (2017)) but outperforms other approaches. This indicates that the samples generated from DSGAN can satisfy the assumptions in (8) and (9) and really help the semi-supervised learning through the proof of badGAN. In SVHN and CIFAR-10, we still attain the same conclusions as in MNIST. In comparison with badGAN, there is a probable reason to explain the slightly inferior performance in the following. Since the patterns of images are complicated, the generator without enough capacity is not able to learn our desired distribution. However, this problem will be attenuated with the improvements of GAN, and our models benefit from them.

5.2 DSGAN IN ADVERSARIAL TRAINING

Our proposed DSGAN is capable to be used to improve the robustness of the classifier against adversarial examples. In the experiments, we mainly validate DSGAN on CIFAR-10, which is widely used in adversarial training.

Recall that the objective function (7) requires finding adversarial examples to maximize the classification error $\ell(\cdot)$. Adversarial examples usually locate on the low-density area of p_d and are generated from labeled data via gradient descent. Instead of using gradient descent, we aim to generate adversarial examples via GAN. By assigning $p_{\bar{d}}$ as the convolution of p_d and uniform distribution, samples from p_g will locate on the low-density area of p_d. Furthermore, the distortion ϵ is directly related to the range of uniform distribution. It, however, may be impractical for training the

generator for each class. Thus, we propose a novel semi-supervised adversarial learning approach here.

Three stages are required to train our model: First, we train a baseline classifier on all the training data. All the training data are labeled and represent samples from $\mathcal{L}$ in (10). Second, we train a generator to generate adversarial samples and treat these adversarial samples as additional unlabeled training data ($x \sim p_g$ in (10)). Third, we fine-tune the classifier C_θ with all training data and the data produced by the generator via minimizing the following objective:

$$\underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmin}} \, \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{L}} \left[\ell\left(x; y; C_\theta\right) \right] + \mathbb{E}_{x_g\sim p_g(x)} \left[\mathcal{H}\left(C_\theta(x_g)\right) \right], \tag{10}$$

where the first term is a typical supervised loss such as cross-entropy loss and the second term is the entropy loss $\mathcal{H}$ of generated unlabeled samples corresponding to the classifier, meaning that we would like the classifier to confidently classify the generated samples. In other words, if an adversarial example x_g is the closest to one of labeled data x, it should be classified into the class of x. Thus, the additional entropy loss will prevent our model from the attack by adversarial examples.

In order to determine how many iterations are required to train the classifier in the first and third stages, we use the classification accuracy on the validation set as the criterion to choose the best number of training iterations. The size of validation data is 5000. After determining the best number of iterations, we train the model with the whole training set. As for the second stage, we train DSGAN for 50 iterations in Algorithm 1.

5.2.1 MAIN RESULTS

The size of labeled data for CIFAR-10 is 4000 and we balance the number of data for each class. The experimental detail can be found in Appendix C. We evaluate the trained models against a range of adversaries, where the distortion is evaluated by ℓ_2-norm or $\ell_{\inf}$-norm. The adversaries include:

- White-box attacks with Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al. (2015)) using $\ell_{\inf}$-norm.

- White-box attacks with PGD (Kurakin et al. (2017)) using $\ell_{\inf}$-norm.

- White-box attacks with Deepfool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016)) using ℓ_2-norm and $\ell_{\inf}$-norm.

According to different adversaries, we first generate 3000 adversarial examples with minimal distortions and then calculate the average of 10000 distortions. We also train our models with different variances of uniform distribution. Table 4 shows the results about the adversarial training. The accuracy, which is the probability that adversarial examples fail to attack, is illustrated in Table 5. ϵ was set to be 0.01 and 0.2 for ℓ_2-norm and $\ell_{\inf}$-norm, respectively. Both experiments demonstrate that our models exhibit stronger robustness in that adversarial examples require larger distortions to defeat our models.

Table 4: Comparison of adversarial training between the baseline model and our model. Our model is trained with different variances (0.1, 0.3, and 0.5) of uniform distribution. We evaluate the average distortion based on ℓ_2-norm or $\ell_{\inf}$-norm.

Methods	FGSM-$\ell_{\inf}$	Deepfool-$\ell_{\inf}$	PGD-$\ell_{\inf}$	Deepfool-ℓ_2
Baseline	0.0113	0.0062	0.0057	0.248
Our method-0.1	0.0137	0.0069	0.0063	0.259
Our method-0.3	0.0151	0.0078	0.0071	0.273
Our method-0.5	0.0143	0.0075	0.0066	0.263

Table 5: Comparison of accuracy between the baseline model and our model. ϵ was set to be 0.008 and 0.2 for ℓ_2-norm and ℓ_{inf}-norm, respectively.

Methods	FGSM-ℓ_{inf}	Deepfool-ℓ_{inf}	PGD-ℓ_{inf}	Deepfool-ℓ_2
Baseline	56%	48%	41%	47%
Our method-0.1	63%	54%	45%	51%
Our method-0.3	78%	69%	63%	66%
Our method-0.5	69%	61%	56%	57%

6 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we propose DSGAN that can produce samples from the target distribution based on the assumption that the density of target distribution can be the difference between the densities of any two distributions. DSGAN is useful in the environment when the samples from the target distribution are more difficult to collect than those from the two known distributions. We demonstrate that DSGAN is really applicable to, for example, semi-supervised learning and adversarial training. Empirical and theoretical results are provided to validate the effectiveness of DSGAN. Finally, because DSGAN is developed based on traditional GAN, it is easy to extend any improvements of traditional GAN to DSGAN.

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APPENDIX

A PROOFS

A.1 PROOF OF THE PROPSITION 1

Proof. Given any generator G, the training criterion for the discriminator D is to maximize the quantity $V(G, D)$:

$$V(G, D) = \int_x p_{\bar{d}}(x) \log\left(D\left(x\right)\right) dx + (1 - \alpha) \int_z p_z(z) \log\left(1 - D\left(G\left(z\right)\right)\right) dz$$

$$+ \alpha \int_x p_d(x) \log\left(1 - D\left(x\right)\right) dx$$

$$= \int_x p_{\bar{d}}(x) \log\left(D\left(x\right)\right) dx + (1 - \alpha) \int_x p_g(x) \log\left(1 - D\left(x\right)\right) dz$$

$$+ \alpha \int_x p_d(x) \log\left(1 - D\left(x\right)\right) dx$$

$$= \int_x p_{\bar{d}}(x) \log\left(D\left(x\right)\right) + \left((1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)\right) \log\left(1 - D\left(x\right)\right) dx.$$

For any $(a, b) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \backslash \{0, 0\}$, the function $a \log(y) + b \log(1 - y)$ achieves its maximum in $[0, 1]$ at $y = \frac{a}{a+b}$. The discriminator only needs to be defined within $\operatorname{Supp}(p_{\bar{d}}) \bigcup \operatorname{Supp}(p_d) \bigcup \operatorname{Supp}(p_g)$. We complete this proof. $\qquad \square$

A.2 PROOF OF THEOREM 1

Proof. We start from

$$(3) = -\log(4) + \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{\bar{d}}(x)}\left[\log \frac{2 p_{\bar{d}}(x)}{p_{\bar{d}}(x) + (1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)}\right]$$

$$+ \mathbb{E}_{x \sim (1-\alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha \sim p_d(x)}\left[\log \frac{2\left((1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)\right)}{p_{\bar{d}}(x) + (1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)}\right]$$

$$= -\log(4) + \operatorname{KL}\left(p_{\bar{d}} \,\middle\|\, \frac{p_{\bar{d}} + (1 - \alpha)p_g + \alpha p_d}{2}\right)$$

$$+ \operatorname{KL}\left((1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d \,\middle\|\, \frac{p_{\bar{d}} + (1 - \alpha)p_g + \alpha p_d}{2}\right)$$

$$= -\log(4) + 2 \operatorname{JSD}\left(p_{\bar{d}} \,\|\, (1 - \alpha)p_g + \alpha p_d\right),$$

where KL is the Kullback-Leibler divergence and JSD is the Jensen-Shannon divergence. The JSD returns the minimal value, which is 0, iff both distributions are the same, namely $p_{\bar{d}} = (1 - \alpha)p_g + \alpha p_d$. Because $p_g(x)$'s are always non-negative, it should be noted both distributions are the same only if $\alpha p_d(x) \leq p_{\bar{d}}(x)$ for all x's. We complete this proof. $\qquad \square$

A.3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2

Proof. Recall

$$C(G) = \int_x p_{\bar{d}}(x) \log\left(\frac{p_{\bar{d}}(x)}{p_{\bar{d}}(x) + (1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)}\right)$$

$$+ \left((1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)\right) \log\left(\frac{(1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)}{p_{\bar{d}}(x) + (1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)}\right) dx$$

$$= \int_x S(p_g; x) dx$$

$$= \int_{x \in \operatorname{Supp}(p_{\bar{d}}) - \operatorname{Supp}(p_d)} S(p_g; x) dx + \int_{x \in \operatorname{Supp}(p_d)} S(p_g; x) dx$$

$S(p_g; x)$ is to simplify the notations inside the integral. For any x, $S(p_g; x)$ in $p_g(x)$ is non-increasing. Specifically, $S(p_g; x)$ is decreasing when $p_g(x) \geq 0$ and $p_{\bar{d}}(x) > 0$; $S(p_g; x)$ is a constant for any $p_g(x)$ if $p_{\bar{d}}(x) = 0$. Since DSGAN aims to minimize $C(G)$ with the constraint $\int_x p_g(d)dx = 1$, the solution attaining the global minima satisfies $p_g(x) = 0$ if $p_{\bar{d}}(x) = 0$; otherwise, there exists another solution with smaller value of $C(G)$. By the contrapositive of the previous statement, it implies $\text{Supp}(p_g) \subseteq \text{Supp}(p_{\bar{d}})$. Furthermore, $T(p_g; x) = \frac{\partial S(p_g; x)}{\partial p_g(x)} = \log\left(\frac{(1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)}{p_{\bar{d}}(x) + (1 - \alpha)p_g(x) + \alpha p_d(x)}\right)$ is increasing on $p_g(x)$ and converges to 0. When $x \in \text{Supp}(p_d)$, $T(p_g; x) \geq \log \frac{1}{2}$ always holds due to the assumption $\alpha p_d(x) \geq p_{\bar{d}}(x)$. In other words, given $p_{\bar{d}}(x)$ being fixed, the strategy to minimize $C(G)$ is to assign the density of $p_g(x)$ being larger than zero with $T(p_g; x) < \log \frac{1}{2}$ for $x \in \text{Supp}(p_d) - \text{Supp}(p_d)$. We complete this proof. □

A.4 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3

Proof. Consider $V(G, D) = U(p_g, D)$ as a function of p_g. By the proof idea of Proposition 2 in Goodfellow et al. (2014), if $f(x) = \sup_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} f_\alpha(x)$ and $f_\alpha(x)$ is convex in x for every α, then $\partial f_\beta(x) \in \partial f$ if $\beta = \text{argsup}_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} f_\alpha(x)$. In other words, if $\sup_D V(G, D)$ is convex in p_g, the subderivatives of $\sup_D V(G, D)$ includes the derivative of the function at the point, where the maximum is attained, implying the convergence with sufficiently small updates of p_g. We complete this proof. □

B EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS FOR SEMI-SUPERVISED LEARNING

In order to fairly compare with other methods, our generators and classifiers for MNIST, SVHN, and CIFAR-10 are same as in Salimans et al. (2016) and Dai et al. (2017). However, different from previous works that have only a generator and a discriminator, we design an additional discriminator in the feature space, and it's architecture is similar across all datasets with only the difference in the input dimensions. Following Dai et al. (2017), we also define the feature space as the input space of the output layer of discriminators.

Compared to SVHN and CIFAR-10, MNIST is a simple dataset as it is only composed of fully connected layers. Batch normalization (BN) or weight normalization (WN) is used to every layer to stable training. Moreover, Gaussian noise is added before each layer in the classifier, as proposed in Rasmus et al. (2015). We find that the added Gaussian noise exhibits positive effect for semi-supervised learning and keep to use it. The architecture is shown in Table 6.

Table 7 and Table 8 are models for SVHN and CIFAR-10, respectively, and these models are almost the same except for some implicit differences, *e.g.*, the number of convolutional filters and types of dropout. In these tables, given a dropping rate, "Dropout" is a normal dropout in that the elements of input tensor are randomly set to zero while Dropout2d is a dropout only applied on the channels to randomly zero all the elements.

Table 6: Network architectures for semi-supervised learning on MNIST.

Generator G	Discriminator D	Classifier C
Input $z \in \mathbb{R}^{100}$ from unif(0, 1)	Input 28×28 gray image	Input 28×28 gray image
100×500 FC layer with BN
 Softplus
 500×500 FC layer with BN
 Softplus
 500×784 FC layer with WN
 Sigmoid | 250×400 FC layer
 ReLU
 400×200 FC layer
 ReLU
 200×100 FC layer
 ReLU
 100×1 FC layer | Gaussian noise, std = 0.3
 784×1000 FC layer with WN
 ReLU
 Gaussian noise, std = 0.5
 1000×500 FC layer with WN
 ReLU
 Gaussian noise, std = 0.5
 500×250 FC layer with WN
 ReLU
 Gaussian noise, std = 0.5
 250×250 FC layer with WN
 ReLU
 Gaussian noise, std = 0.5
 250×250 FC layer with WN
 ReLU

 250×10 FC layer with WN |

Table 7: Architectures of generator and discriminator for semi-supervised learning on SVHN and CIFAR-10. N was set to 128 and 192 for SVHN and CIFAR-10, respectively.

Generator G	Discriminator D
Input $z \in \mathbb{R}^{100}$ from unif(0, 1)	Input 32×32 RGB image
100×8192 FC layer with BN
ReLU
Reshape to $4 \times 4 \times 512$
5×5 conv. transpose 256 stride = 2 with BN
ReLU
5×5 conv. transpose 128 stride = 2 with BN
ReLU
5×5 conv. transpose 3 stride = 2 with WN
Tanh	$N \times 400$ FC layer
ReLU
400×200 FC layer
ReLU
200×100 FC layer
ReLU
100×1 FC layer

Table 8: The architecture of classifiers for semi-supervised learning on SVHN and CIFAR-10.

Classifier C for SVHN	Classifier C for CIFAR-10
Input 32×32 RGB image	Input 32×32 RGB image
Gaussian noise, std $= 0.05$	Gaussian noise, std $= 0.05$
Dropout2d, dropping rate $= 0.15$	Dropout2d, dropping rate $= 0.2$
3×3 conv. 64 stride $= 1$ with WN	3×3 conv. 96 stride $= 1$ with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$	LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$
3×3 conv. 64 stride $= 1$ with WN	3×3 conv. 96 stride $= 1$ with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$	LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$
3×3 conv. 64 stride $= 2$ with WN	3×3 conv. 96 stride $= 2$ with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$	LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$
Dropout2d, dropping rate $= 0.5$	Dropout, dropping rate $= 0.5$
3×3 conv. 128 stride $= 1$ with WN	3×3 conv. 192 stride $= 1$ with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$	LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$
3×3 conv. 128 stride $= 1$ with WN	3×3 conv. 192 stride $= 1$ with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$	LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$
3×3 conv. 128 stride $= 2$ with WN	3×3 conv. 192 stride $= 2$ with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$	LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$
Dropout2d, dropping rate $= 0.5$	Dropout, dropping rate $= 0.5$
3×3 conv. 128 stride $= 1$ with WN	3×3 conv. 192 stride $= 1$ with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$	LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$
1×1 conv. 128 stride $= 1$ with WN	1×1 conv. 192 stride $= 1$ with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$	LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$
1×1 conv. 128 stride $= 1$ with WN	1×1 conv. 192 stride $= 1$ with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$	LeakyReLU, leak rate $= 0.2$
Global average Pooling	Global average Pooling
128×10 FC layer with WN	192×10 FC layer with WN

Furthermore, the training procedure alternates between k steps of optimizing D and one step of optimizing G. We find that k in Algorithm 1 is a key role to the problem of mode collapse for different applications. For semi-supervised learning, we set $k = 1$ for all datasets.

C   EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS FOR ADVERSARIAL TRAINING

In the experiments for adversarial training on CIFAR-10, the generator and discriminator are the same as those in semi-supervised learning. The architecture is described in Table 7 and the classifier is modified from the one shown in Table 8. First, we get rid of all the dropouts and Gaussian noise so that we can compare among different models with less randomness. Moreover, we decrease the number of layers in the original model, simply intending to accelerate training. The number of layers following the feature space is increased to 3. Because we apply our method in the feature space, the sub-network after feature space should be non-linear so that it can correctly classify generated data. The architecture is described in Table 9. Furthermore, k is assigned to 5 in all experiments.

Table 9: The architecture of classifier for adversarial training on CIFAR-10.

Classifier C for CIFAR-10
Input 32×32 RGB image
3×3 conv. 96 stride = 1 with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate = 0.2
3×3 conv. 96 stride = 2 with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate = 0.2
Dropout, dropping rate = 0.5
3×3 conv. 192 stride = 1 with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate = 0.2
3×3 conv. 192 stride = 2 with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate = 0.2
Dropout, dropping rate = 0.5
3×3 conv. 192 stride = 1 with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate = 0.2
1×1 conv. 192 stride = 1 with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate = 0.2
Global average Pooling
192×192 FC layer with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate = 0.2
192×192 FC layer with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate = 0.2
192×192 FC layer with WN
LeakyReLU, leak rate = 0.2
192×10 FC layer with WN