A First Order Meta Stackelberg Method for Robust Federated Learning

Yunian Pan, Tao Li, Henger Li, Tianyi Xu, Quanyan Zhu, Zizhan Zheng

Keywords: Federated Learning, Game Theory, Reinforcement Learning, Robust Machine Learning

TL;DR: We propose a meta-Stackelberg game framework to adaptive defend federated learning systems against unknown/uncertain attacks.

Abstract: Previous research has shown that federated learning (FL) systems are exposed to an array of security risks. Despite the proposal of several defensive strategies, they tend to be non-adaptive and specific to certain types of attacks, rendering them ineffective against unpredictable or adaptive threats. This work models adversarial federated learning as a Bayesian Stackelberg Markov game (BSMG) to capture the defender's incomplete information of various attack types. We propose meta-Stackelberg learning (meta-SL), a provably efficient meta-learning algorithm, to solve the equilibrium strategy in BSMG, leading to an adaptable FL defense. We demonstrate that meta-SL converges to the first-order $\varepsilon$-equilibrium point in $O(\varepsilon^{-2})$ gradient iterations, with $O(\varepsilon^{-4})$ samples needed per iteration, matching the state of the art. Empirical evidence indicates that our meta-Stackelberg framework performs exceptionally well against potent model poisoning and backdoor attacks of an uncertain nature.

Submission Number: 65