Semantic Definition of Anonymity in Identity-Based Encryption and Its Relation to Indistinguishability-Based Definition

Goichiro Hanaoka, Misaki Komatsu, Kazuma Ohara, Yusuke Sakai, Shota Yamada

Abstract: In this paper we point out an overlooked subtlety in providing proper security definitions of anonymous identity-based encryption (anonymous IBE) and its applications such as searchable encryption. Namely, we find that until now there is no discussion whether the widely used indistinguishability-based notion of anonymity for IBE implies simulation-based definition of anonymity, which directly captures the intuition that recipients’ IDs are not leaked from ciphertexts. We compensate this undesirable situation by providing a simulation-based notion, which requires that a ciphertext can be simulated without knowing the associated ID, by specializing the anonymity notion defined for more generalized notion of attribute-based encryption in previous work to the setting of IBE and then proving that this definition is equivalent to the conventional indistinguishability-based definition. We note that while the final result is something one would expect, our proof is not completely trivial. In particular, previous proofs that show the equivalence between semantic security and indistinguishability-based one in the setting where the security of payload is the main concern do not work immediately in our setting due to the difference between the semantics of identities and messages and the existence of the key extraction oracles.