Abstract: Despite the tremendous advances that have been made in
the last decade in developing useful machine-learning applications, their wider adoption has been hindered by the
lack of strong assurance guarantees that can be made about
their behavior. In this paper, we consider how formal verification techniques developed for traditional software systems
can be repurposed for verification of reinforcement learning-enabled ones, a particularly important class of machine learning systems. Rather than enforcing safety by examining and
altering the structure of a complex neural network implementation, our technique uses black box methods to synthesize deterministic programs, simpler, more interpretable,
approximations of the network that can nonetheless guarantee desired safety properties are preserved, even when the
network is deployed in unanticipated or previously unobserved environments. Our methodology frames the problem
of neural network verification in terms of a counterexample and syntax-guided inductive synthesis procedure over
these programs. The synthesis procedure searches for both
a deterministic program and an inductive invariant over an
infinite state transition system that represents a specification
of an application’s control logic. Additional specifications
defining environment-based constraints can also be provided
to further refine the search space. Synthesized programs deployed in conjunction with a neural network implementation
dynamically enforce safety conditions by monitoring and
preventing potentially unsafe actions proposed by neural
policies. Experimental results over a wide range of cyber-physical applications demonstrate that software-inspired
formal verification techniques can be used to realize trustworthy reinforcement learning systems with low overhead.
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