AERM: An Attribute-Aware Economic Robust Spectrum Auction Mechanism

Zhuoming Zhu, Shengling Wang, Rongfang Bie, Xiuzhen Cheng

Abstract: The lack of radio spectrum resources and low resource utilization have always been existing problems. Current researchers usually use spectrum auctions to improve the utilization of radio spectrum. The existing auction mechanisms rarely consider the attributes of the radio frequency spectrums, which is likely to cause problems that it cannot meet user needs. Based on the double auction mechanism, we propose an auction mechanism perceiving spectrum attributes to solve this problem. This mechanism can improve the satisfaction of secondary users, provide a certain incentive for high-quality service providers, and at the same time reuse spectrums. The economic robustness of the auction mechanism is of great importance. The auction mechanism proposed in this paper satisfies the three economic properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, and ex-post budget balance, so it is economically robust.