How Robust Are Router-LLMs? Analysis of the Fragility of LLM Routing Capabilities

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

Large language model (LLM) routing has emerged as a crucial strategy for balancing computational costs with performance by dynamically assigning queries to the most appropriate model based on query complexity. Despite recent advances showing that preference-data-based routers can outperform traditional methods, current evaluation benchmarks remain limited—they largely focus on general model capabilities while overlooking task-specific behaviors and critical concerns such as privacy, safety, and potential backdoor vulnerabilities introduced through preference data. In response, we propose the DSC benchmark ***D***iverse, ***S***imple, and ***C***ategorized, an evaluation framework that categorizes router performance across a broad spectrum of query types—including coding, translation, mathematics, human instructions, general knowledge, and LLM jailbreaking—and integrates privacy and safety assessments to reveal hidden risks. Our experiments on three preference-based routers and two commercial counterparts demonstrate that while these systems improve efficiency, they often make suboptimal, category-driven decisions; for instance, a BERT-based router directs all coding and mathematics queries to the most powerful LLM—even when simpler models would suffice—while routing jailbreaking attempts to weaker models, thereby elevating safety risks.

1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized natural language processing, showcasing exceptional performance across a wide array of tasks such as translation, coding, and complex reasoning (Dubey et al., 2024; Achiam et al., 2023; Meta, 2024b). However, their impressive capabilities come with substantial computational costs and latency during inference, making their deployment resource-intensive, particularly in real-time applications. To mitigate these challenges, routing techniques have emerged as a promising solution (Ong et al., 2024; Ding et al., 2024; Hu et al., 2024; Chen et al., 2023). These methods dynamically select the most suitable LLM based on the characteristics of a given query, aiming to optimize the trade-off between cost and performance without compromising the quality of results.



Figure 1: An illustration of the proposed benchmark, featuring diverse, straightforward, and categorized subsets of tasks, evaluated using three open-source and two closed-source routers.

Although routing techniques hold great promise, their evaluation has largely relied on modified versions of standard benchmarks originally intended to assess general LLM capabilities (e.g., GSMK8, MT-Bench, MMLU) (Cobbe et al., 2021; Zheng et al., 2023; Hendrycks et al., 2020). These evaluations often fall short of offering a holistic understanding of performance across diverse scenarios, particularly in critical domains like privacy and safety. Furthermore, these benchmarks, designed to test complex reasoning and mathematical abilities, lack straightforward examples to examine how routing techniques perform in simpler cases.

In this paper, we argue for a more fine-grained evaluation framework that scrutinizes routing performance across distinct categories and tasks illustrated in Figure 1. By doing so, we can uncover existing weaknesses and identify opportunities for improvement. Furthermore, we emphasize the importance of incorporating privacy and safety benchmarks to ensure the practical applicability of rout-

ing techniques in real-world scenarios.

To address these gaps, we present the DSC benchmark, a comprehensive evaluation suite covering categories like coding, translation, mathematics, human instructions, factual questions, and adversarial tasks such as LLM jailbreaking. Its subsets are intentionally simplified in areas like math, translation, and coding to evaluate whether routing behavior stems from the techniques themselves or other factors. By "simple," we mean queries where the weak LLM performs as well as the strong LLM.

It includes nine subsets, such as SVAMP (Patel et al., 2021) and simple math for evaluating mathematical problems; Leetcode-easy-problems and simple code for coding assessment; Translate-WildChat (Zhao et al., 2024) for translation tasks involving human instructions; a categorized version of WildChat for evaluating human instructions across 17 tasks (Mireshghallah et al., 2024); PUPA for privacy evaluation (Siyan et al., 2024), and AdvBench Subset for testing jailbreaking scenarios (Qi et al., 2023). Our findings indicate that:

1. Existing preference-based routers frequently depend on category-based heuristics instead of considering the intrinsic complexity of queries or the efficiency of the chosen LLM. For example, a BERT-based router directs all math and coding queries to the strongest LLM, even when the question is simple.

2. Current benchmarks for evaluating routing methods are ill-suited for this purpose, as they emphasize complexity while overlooking performance on simpler queries.

3. Employing a more fine-grained benchmark would better assess the efficiency of routing techniques.

4. Neglecting privacy and safety evaluations for these methods poses significant risks in real-world deployments.

Through this work, we aim to provide a robust foundation for understanding and improving routing techniques, ultimately advancing their ability to balance efficiency, performance, and safety in diverse and dynamic applications.

2 Background & Related Work

In this section, we will introduce the definition of the routing problem and then discuss the preference-data-based routers existing in the literature.

2.1 Routing Problem Formulation

Consider a set of N distinct LLM models $M = \{M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_N\}$. Each model $M_i : Q \to A$ can be abstracted as a function that maps a query to an answer. A routing function $R : Q \times M_N \to \{1, \ldots, N\}$ acts as an N-way classifier that takes a query $q \in Q$ and determines which model should handle q. The selected model then produces the answer $a = M_{R(q)}(q)$. Here, the term "classifier" refers broadly to any method that decides which LLM to utilize for the given input query.

The routing process seeks to optimize the trade-off between response quality and cost. This objective can be expressed as:

$$R^* = \arg\max_R \left(\lambda Q(R) - C(R)\right) \quad (1)$$

Where:

- $Q(R)$: The quality of the response, which depends on the routing function R,
- $C(R)$: The cost associated with the response, determined by R,
- λ: A weighting factor that balances quality against cost.

2.2 Routing With Preference Data

We describe the most prominent preference-data-based method, RouteLLM, along with the various implemented routers used in our analysis. For further details, see (Ong et al., 2024).

RouteLLM introduces a routing approach based on preference data collected via 80k battles from the online Chatbot Arena platform (Chiang et al., 2024), supplemented by 120k synthetically generated samples. The method employs four routing strategies to learn the win prediction model $P_\theta(win_{M_{strong}} \mid q)$ from preference data D_{pref}. A sample $(q, M_i, M_j, l_{i,j}) \sim D_{pref}$ is denoted as $e = (q, M_w, M_l)$, where M_w and M_l refer to the winning and losing model, respectively. The preference data is formally defined as:

$$D_{pref} = \{(q, l_{i,j}) \mid q \in Q, i, j \in N, l_{i,j} \in L\}, \quad (2)$$

where q represents a query, and $l_{i,j}$ is a label indicating the comparison outcome of M_i's and M_j's quality on q. The label $l_{i,j}$ can take values in



Figure 2: Benchmark Categorization among various sources.

$L = \{win_{M_i}, tie, win_{M_j}\}$.
The routing strategies include a similarity-weighted ranking model using query embeddings and the Bradley-Terry framework (Bradley and Terry, 1952), a matrix factorization approach capturing low-rank structures in preference data (Koren et al., 2009; Töscher et al., 2009), a fine-tuned BERT classifier (Devlin, 2018) for win probability prediction, and a causal LLM classifier leveraging Llama-3 8B (Meta, 2024a) using an instruction-following paradigm (Wei et al., 2021). These methods collectively enhance model selection, optimizing response quality and user alignment. For more details, please refer to (Ong et al., 2024)

3 Inside the Routing Benchmark

In this section, we will begin by outlining the motives and rationale behind constructing this benchmark. Next, we will present the data sources, statistics, and categories that define the benchmark. Lastly, we will evaluate the similarity between the benchmark and the training data of the assessed techniques to ensure it does not include out-of-distribution samples. Benchmark samples are shown in Figure 3.

3.1 Why Do We Need DSC-Benchmark?

The problem we address is not new, as existing routing studies use various benchmarks to assess method robustness. However, we argue that these benchmarks have flaws in both their selection and evaluation methods. To resolve these, we propose principles for building our own benchmark.

Diverse Tasks. We integrated multiple datasets to encompass a wide range of tasks, including code generation, debugging, translation, math, factual queries, human instructions, privacy, and safety.

Simplicity. While standard benchmarks effectively demonstrate the capabilities of LLMs, they often fall short of routing techniques due to their inherent complexity. This complexity, designed to push LLMs to their limits, hinders the evaluation of routing techniques with simple, straightforward questions. By "simple" in this context, we mean that when the same query is posed to the weak LLM, it produces a response of equal quality to that of the strong LLM.

Categorization. Most existing work relies on popular benchmarks like MT-Bench, a conversational benchmark covering human instructions on diverse topics. However, to the best of our knowledge, none provide performance breakdowns across distinct categories, which limits understanding of model behavior in specific contexts.

3.2 How DSC-Benchmark is Curated?

3.2.1 Data Sources & Statistics

To construct the proposed benchmark, we draw from eight distinct sources tailored to the topics under evaluation. Key datasets include WildChat, a compilation of user-LLM interactions via ChatGPT and GPT-4 APIs; MT-Bench, a conversation dataset featuring 160 open-ended questions judged by LLMs; and LeetCode, which provides coding problems across varying difficulty levels. We also incorporate AdvBench for safety evaluations and employ synthetic data generation to produce straightforward, naive samples for coding and mathematics, comprising 3,087 samples. A summary of the sources and categorization is shown in Figure 2.

3.2.2 Data Categories

As we mentioned earlier, we spanned various tasks and provided more fine granularity to better assess the routing capabilities.

Coding. We drew from four sources to create this subset, prioritizing our core principles of diversity and simplicity. We selected the easy-level problems of Leet-Code, which resulted in 540 problems, to maintain simplicity. Additionally, we synthetically generated simple code problems with minimal text and difficulty based on the “C How to Program” book early chapters (Ch 1-6) to keep the content straightforward (Deitel and Deitel, 1992). We included different programming languages in the prompts to ensure diversity, which resulted in 50 problems. Such problems include “Finding sum,” “sorting,” or “Palindrome.” To uphold our third principle, categorization, we incorporated the MT-Bench coding subset to deepen our understand-



Figure 3: Illustrative examples of the benchmark samples from code, math, and safety subsets. All the examples are routed to the Strong LLM (GPT-4o).



Figure 4: Similarity between training data (arena, judge) and the benchmark subsets.

ing of coding capabilities. Lastly, we included code generation, debugging, and editing tasks from the WildChat subset to diversify the coding subset further.

Math. Similar to the coding category, we aimed to diversify the sources by selecting three distinct datasets. First, we chose *Simple Variations on Arithmetic Math Word Problems* (SVAMP), which includes 1,000 samples. Additionally, we synthetically generated math problems with minimal text and difficulty, using only one arithmetic operation per sample to maintain simplicity, which concludes with 50 samples. Finally, we incorporated the MT-Bench math subset.

Translation. We selected 100 simple, clear translation samples from WildChat, with instructions like "Please translate" or "Translate," all verified by a human annotator. Additionally, we included 49 samples from the translation subset of WildChat (Mireshghallah et al., 2024) to assess against a range of human translation instructions.

Factual Questions. We also used 200 samples from the SimpleQuestions (Bordes et al., 2015) test set to evaluate how asking simple factoid questions would affect routing.

Human Instructions. Clustering human questions into specific classes is challenging. This category includes all questions from GPT-4 API-based datasets like MT-Bench and WildChat, covering tasks such as writing, reasoning, roleplay, extraction, summarization, and multiple-choice answering. For more details, refer to Appendix A and (Mireshghallah et al., 2024).

Privacy & Safety. Protecting the privacy and safety of input queries is crucial. We incorporated these aspects into our benchmark using 200 samples from PUPA (Siyan et al., 2024), containing PII from the WildChat subset. For safety, we included 50 harmful examples from AdvBench (Chao et al., 2023) designed to exploit LLM vulnerabilities. We used three attack settings: a baseline with no attack, the moderate Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), and the advanced Persuasive Techniques Attack (PAP).

3.3 Benchmark-Training Data Similarity

To ensure our benchmark is not an out-of-distribution sample, we employed two approaches. First, we retained categories from the original evaluation, excluding safety and privacy. For instance, instead of using GSMK8 for math, we used SVAMP and synthetically generated data. Second, we assessed the similarity between training data and evaluation benchmarks. Previous works showed that higher similarity correlates with better performance, but we did not observe the same trend.

Training Data. The routing models were trained on preference data from 80k battles on the Chatbot Arena platform, with 120k additional samples



Figure 5: Routing results on MT-Bench across eight different categories, which shows that most, if not all, of the math and coding queries, are routed to the GPT-4o (strong LLM).

from a synthetic GPT-4 judge method (Zheng et al., 2023).

Quantifying Similarity. We used the methodology from (Ong et al., 2024) to compute similarity scores for each benchmark B. The score is calculated as:

$$S(B, D_{pref}) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \max_{1 \leq j \leq m} \frac{\mathbf{b}_i \cdot \mathbf{d}_j}{\|\mathbf{b}_i\| \|\mathbf{d}_j\|}$$

Figure 4 shows the similarity between each benchmark and the training data subsets. The average similarity score is 62.15, with simpler subsets showing higher similarity than MT-Bench, which performed best in previous routing evaluations. However, a lack of proper categorization may mislead perceptions of superiority.

4 Routers Are Not Routing!

Ostensibly, preference-based routing techniques aim to optimize costs by directing queries that can be answered well to weaker LLMs. Training on preference data helps prioritize the most suitable LLM for high-quality responses. We examine case studies on routing performance across tasks like math, code, safety, and simple queries to validate assumptions about routing decisions based on query complexity and LLM quality.

Experiments Design. Our goal is to determine if routers base their decisions on query complexity or categories. We evaluate the proportion of simple queries routed to the strong LLM, expressed as:

$$P_{strong} = \frac{N_{strong}}{N_{total}} \times 100 \quad (3)$$

where N_{strong} is the number of queries directed to the strong LLM and N_{total} is the total number of queries. We ensure that if queries routed to the strong LLM were sent to the weak LLM, their quality would remain high. We used a "Matrix Factorization" router for these experiments, but we also discussed other routers, which show similar limitations. For each case study, we list the evaluation data, the strong LLM, and the weak LLM.



Figure 6: Routing results on Code, Math, and Translation on simple benchmarks. All of the queries are routed to GPT-4o except for Simple Questions.

4.1 CASE STUDY: Revisiting MT-Bench

Previous studies showed that routing techniques achieve a 50% reduction in calls to the strong LLM (GPT-4) on the MT-Benchmark. We re-evaluate these findings by considering different categories.

Evaluation Data & Models. We used GPT-4o as the strong LLM and Llama-3 8B as the weak LLM, with a router trained on the Arena dataset and supplemented with the Judge data, as detailed in subsection 2.2. Instead of reporting the MT-Bench as a whole, we included the category labels originally defined by the creators.

Results & Analysis. Figure 5 shows the routing results between GPT-4o and Llama-3 8B across various MT-Bench categories. Most categories route interchangeably between the two models, except



Figure 7: Routing results on WildChat subset that includes various human instructions.

for code, where P_{strong} is 100%, and math, though to a lesser extent. In contrast, humanities and writing categories show the reverse pattern. The first scenario, where simple problems are routed to the stronger LLM, increases cost and inference time and remains unexplored. We hypothesize that math and code problems in MT-Bench might explain this, so we explore simple and naive questions from these categories in the next sections.

4.2 CASE STUDY: Evaluating Simple Questions

We evaluated simple questions under the assumption that code and math problems are routed to the stronger LLM due to their difficulty. By "simple," we mean queries where the weak LLM produces a response equal in quality to the strong LLM. We tested this hypothesis with simple questions from various categories.

Evaluation Data & Models. We used GPT-4o as the strong LLM and Llama-3 8B and Mistral-7B v0.1 as weak LLMs, with the router consistent with previous experiments. The evaluation subsets included SVAMP and Simple Math (math), Leet-Code Easy and Simple Code (code), Wild-Translation (translation), and SimpleQuestions (factual queries).

Results & Analysis. As shown in Figure 6 and Figure 8, all queries, regardless of their simplicity, were routed to GPT-4o. This supports our hypothesis that the routing mechanism relies on category-based heuristics rather than query complexity, leading to resource waste for simple code, math, or translation queries.

4.3 CASE STUDY: Safety & Privacy of Router-LLMs - BackDoor Attacks

As LLMs are increasingly used, ensuring user privacy and safety is crucial. Most prior works overlook evaluating routing techniques in relation to



Figure 8: Routing results on Code and Math for SVAMP and LeetCode Subsets.

LLM vulnerabilities. We assess routing performance in unsafe scenarios.

Evaluation Data & Models. As in previous experiments, we used GPT-4o as the strong LLM and Mistral-7B v0.1-Instruct as the weaker LLM. For evaluation, we used the PUPA subset (containing PII) and AdvBench for safety, which includes harmful prompts. We applied three attack settings: a baseline with no attack, the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack (Zou et al., 2023) for moderate adversarial influence, and the Persuasive Techniques Attacks (PAP) (Zeng et al., 2024), the most complex and effective attack.

Results & Analysis. Figure 9 shows routing decisions on AdvBench, with most data points routed to the weak LLM. Mistral-7B, easily jailbroken, routes most harmful queries to it, while only a few reach GPT-4o, known for strong safety filters. Routing weaker LLMs reduces costs but increases Attack Success Rates (ASR). Mistral achieves 100% ASR on all attacks, while GPT-4o blocks plain-text and GCG queries (0% ASR) but allows 60% ASR for PAP. ASR was assessed using LLM-as-a-judge (Zeng et al., 2024; Mehrotra et al., 2023). For the PUPA subset, no concerning behavior was found,

Preference-Based (Open Source)								
Router/Dataset	**MT-Bench$_{\text{Math}}$** (%)	**MT-Bench$_{\text{Code}}$** (%)	**MT-Bench$_{\text{Writing}}$** (%)	**SimpleCode** (%)	**LeetCode** (%)	**SimpleMath** (%)	**WildTrans** (%)	**AdvBench** (%)
MF	100	75.0	20.0	100	99.8	100	100	4.00
BERT	90.0	75.0	45.0	100	100	98.0	93.8	8.00
Causal-LLM	100	80.0	55.0	92.0	100	100	97.9	48.0
Random	40.0	55.0	55.0	57.0	51.0	50.0	48.9	50.0
Amazon Bedrock (Commercial/Proprietary)								
Meta Router	80.0	50.0	75.0	32.0	24.0	70.0	65.3	69.3
Anthropic Router	80.0	50.0	70.0	30.0	7.00	64.0	79.5	10.0

Table 1: Comparison of router methods across math, code, translation, and AdvBench tasks. The top table evaluates preference-based open-source routers, while the bottom table focuses on commercial Amazon Bedrock routers. Red intensity highlights P_{Strong}, while green indicates a higher proportion of smaller calls directed to the strong router.

with queries balanced between LLMs, slightly favoring the strong LLM. More details in Appendix B

4.4 CASE STUDY: Evaluating Routers in The Wild

To evaluate the routers in real-world scenarios, we used the WildChat subset from (Mireshghallah et al., 2024), covering 17 diverse query types.

Evaluation Data & Models. As in prior experiments, we used GPT-4o as the strong LLM and Llama-3 8B as the weaker LLM. The WildChat subset includes instructional queries, factual retrieval, text generation tasks (code, stories, text editing), document creation, code debugging, translation, summarization, AI prompt generation, problem-solving, role-playing, brainstorming, jailbreaking, and multiple-choice answering, ensuring a comprehensive evaluation of the routers.

Results & Analysis. As shown in Figure 7, a significant gap emerges between GPT-4o and Llama-3 8B for tasks like code debugging, math problems, and translation, with the strong LLM predominantly handling these queries. However, for writing and summarization, the weak LLM receives more queries, showing a shift in routing decisions.



Figure 9: Routing results on the safety benchmark AdvBench, compared against plain harmful text, PAP, and GCG attacks, using both a strong LLM (GPT-4) and a weak LLM (Mistral-7B).

4.5 CASE STUDY: Are Commercial Routers Any better?

In previous experiments, we evaluated open-source routers using preference-based techniques. To explore further, we examined whether a commercial/closed-source router, potentially more powerful, shares similar limitations.

Evaluation Data & Models. We used the "Meta Prompt Router," routing between Llama-3 8B and 70B, with Llama-3 70B as the strong LLM given it is superior performance (Dubey et al., 2024), and the "Anthropic Prompt Router," using Claude 3 Haiku and Sonnet, with Claude 3.5 Sonnet as the strong LLM. The evaluation subsets included SimpleCode, LeetCode, MT-Bench$_{Math}$, SimpleMath, WildTrans, MT-Bench$_{Writing}$, and Plain attacks from AdvBench. We focused on subsets routed to the strong LLM in open-source routers and those directed to the weak LLM (writing).

Results & Analysis. As shown in Table 1, the closed-source routers face similar limitations to the open-source routers on MT-Bench$_{Math}$. However, shifts were noted in subsets like SimpleCode, LeetCode, and AdvBench with Anthropic Router. Although closed-source routers route fewer queries to the strong LLM in some subsets, they still exhibit the same limitations as open-source counterparts.

5 Ablations & Analysis

In this section, we conduct ablations and analyses to identify the key components of our evaluation.

5.1 Evaluation of Different Router Types

In previous sections, we used the Matrix-Factorization-based router due to its superior performance but also evaluated two other routers—BERT and Causal-LLM—as discussed in subsection 2.2. We compared them to the random

baseline, where predictions are assigned a probability of 0.5 for each router, expecting a P_{strong} of 50%.

Results. As shown in Table 1, most routers rely on the strong LLM, particularly for datasets like MT-Bench$_{Math}$, SimpleCode, and LeetCode. However, in simpler tasks like Math and Code, the "Random" baseline performs competitively, highlighting the failure of most routers to significantly outperform it. In AdvBench, Causal-LLM routes queries better to the strong LLM but still directs most queries to the weak LLM, with a very low percentage of calls to the strong LLM.



Figure 10: P_{Strong} of various threshold values across MT-Bench Subsets.

5.2 Effect of Training Data on Routing

To explore how training data influences routing decisions, we investigated whether trends in the training data align with routing behavior. For example, harmful queries tend to be routed to the weakest model, so we analyzed whether the most harmful queries in the training data are similarly routed. We indexed the training data embeddings and retrieved the top 5 most similar samples to each query for each subset. We then counted how many of these samples were routed to the strong or weak LLMs. For harmful queries, we found that 45 out of 48 samples routed to the weak LLM were highly similar to training data samples, suggesting a potential backdoor attack. For other evaluation subsets like MT-Bench, we observed a weak correlation, with 37 out of 87 samples routed to the strong LLM and 123 out of 73 samples directed to the weak LLM, indicating false positives. This pattern was consistent across SimpleCode and SimpleMath.

5.3 Ablating the Calibration Values

In the main experiments, we used the default threshold across all benchmark subsets, as they closely matched the original evaluation benchmarks in subsection 3.3. We aimed to verify that assigning queries to the strongest LLM within specific categories remains consistent. Varying thresholds is impractical due to the unknown categories of incoming queries.

Given MT-Bench's diverse categories, such as math and coding, we tested various thresholds to assess their impact on P_{Strong}.

Results. As shown in Figure 10, adjusting threshold values affects query distribution to the strong LLM for coding and math, as well as other categories, showing that it is not a zero-sum game. For example, thresholds between 0.6 and 0.8 reduce P_{Strong} for math from 100% to 0%. This shift reduces performance in other categories like roleplay, ultimately redirecting queries to the weak LLM.

5.4 How Keywords Affect Routing Decision

To assess the sensitivity and robustness of the routing techniques, we observed that categories like math and code tend to favor the stronger LLM. We tested this by adding relevant keywords to queries from other categories and measured the "Flipping Rate" (FR), the proportion of samples whose routing decisions changed:

$$FR = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_{total}} 1(Route_{original,i} \neq Route_{modified,i})}{N_{total}} \quad (4)$$

We found that queries from categories like 'Writing,' 'STEM,' and 'Roleplay' remained routed to the weaker LLM. However, adding math-related or coding keywords redirected them to the stronger LLM, with an average flipping rate of 98%, indicating high sensitivity to prompt modifications.

6 Conclusion

The DSC benchmark evaluates large language model (LLM) routing systems across a range of categories, including simple queries and safety/privacy tasks. It finds that current routers often use category-based heuristics, which, while reducing costs, lead to inefficiencies and safety issues. Existing benchmarks overlook these concerns by focusing only on complex tasks. The DSC framework emphasizes that better efficiency doesn't necessarily mean better robustness, as routers often fail to address query complexity and security vulnerabilities. The benchmark aims to improve routing strategies for better efficiency, safety, and real-world use.

Limitations

We would like to acknowledge that while we highlighted the limitations in both open and closed-source routing techniques and presented an evaluation benchmark to better understand these issues, we did not provide a clear and concise method for mitigation. However, we offered recommendations for potential solutions and left this task for future work.

Ethical Considerations

Enhancing the routing capabilities in the LLMs domain is crucial, as it helps reduce the carbon footprint by selecting the most cost-effective model for a given query. Additionally, analyzing the implications for safety and privacy is vital, as it deepens our understanding of these techniques and how to address their limitations. By introducing this benchmark, we aim to advance the understanding of routing techniques and encourage future work to develop improved methods for mitigating the constraints and risks associated with them.

References

Josh Achiam, Steven Adler, Sandhini Agarwal, Lama Ahmad, Ilge Akkaya, Florencia Leoni Aleman, Diogo Almeida, Janko Altenschmidt, Sam Altman, Shyamal Anadkat, et al. 2023. Gpt-4 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.08774*.

Antoine Bordes, Nicolas Usunier, Sumit Chopra, and Jason Weston. 2015. Large-scale simple question answering with memory networks. *ArXiv*, abs/1506.02075.

Ralph Allan Bradley and Milton E Terry. 1952. Rank analysis of incomplete block designs: I. the method of paired comparisons. *Biometrika*, 39(3/4):324–345.

Patrick Chao, Alexander Robey, Edgar Dobriban, Hamed Hassani, George J Pappas, and Eric Wong. 2023. Jailbreaking black box large language models in twenty queries. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.08419*.

Lingjiao Chen, Matei Zaharia, and James Zou. 2023. Frugalgpt: How to use large language models while reducing cost and improving performance. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.05176*.

Wei-Lin Chiang, Lianmin Zheng, Ying Sheng, Anastasios Nikolas Angelopoulos, Tianle Li, Dacheng Li, Hao Zhang, Banghua Zhu, Michael Jordan, Joseph E Gonzalez, et al. 2024. Chatbot arena: An open platform for evaluating llms by human preference. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.04132*.

Karl Cobbe, Vineet Kosaraju, Mohammad Bavarian, Mark Chen, Heewoo Jun, Lukasz Kaiser, Matthias Plappert, Jerry Tworek, Jacob Hilton, Reiichiro Nakano, et al. 2021. Training verifiers to solve math word problems. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2110.14168*.

Harvey M Deitel and Paul J Deitel. 1992. *C: how to program*. Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Jacob Devlin. 2018. Bert: Pre-training of deep bidirectional transformers for language understanding. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.04805*.

Dujian Ding, Ankur Mallick, Chi Wang, Robert Sim, Subhabrata Mukherjee, Victor Ruhle, Laks VS Lakshmanan, and Ahmed Hassan Awadallah. 2024. Hybrid llm: Cost-efficient and quality-aware query routing. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.14618*.

Abhimanyu Dubey, Abhinav Jauhri, Abhinav Pandey, Abhishek Kadian, Ahmad Al-Dahle, Aiesha Letman, Akhil Mathur, Alan Schelten, Amy Yang, Angela Fan, et al. 2024. The llama 3 herd of models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.21783*.

Dan Hendrycks, Collin Burns, Steven Basart, Andy Zou, Mantas Mazeika, Dawn Song, and Jacob Steinhardt. 2020. Measuring massive multitask language understanding. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2009.03300*.

Qitian Jason Hu, Jacob Bieker, Xiuyu Li, Nan Jiang, Benjamin Keigwin, Gaurav Ranganath, Kurt Keutzer, and Shriyash Kaustubh Upadhyay. 2024. Routerbench: A benchmark for multi-llm routing system. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.12031*.

Yehuda Koren, Robert Bell, and Chris Volinsky. 2009. Matrix factorization techniques for recommender systems. *Computer*, 42(8):30–37.

Anay Mehrotra, Manolis Zampetakis, Paul Kassianik, Blaine Nelson, Hyrum Anderson, Yaron Singer, and Amin Karbasi. 2023. Tree of attacks: Jailbreaking black-box llms automatically. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.02119*.

AI Meta. 2024a. Introducing meta llama 3: The most capable openly available llm to date. *Meta AI*.

AI Meta. 2024b. Llama 3.2: Revolutionizing edge ai and vision with open, customizable models. *Meta AI*.

Niloofar Mireshghallah, Maria Antoniak, Yash More, Yejin Choi, and Golnoosh Farnadi. 2024. Trust no bot: Discovering personal disclosures in human-llm conversations in the wild. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.11438*.

Isaac Ong, Amjad Almahairi, Vincent Wu, Wei-Lin Chiang, Tianhao Wu, Joseph E Gonzalez, M Waleed Kadous, and Ion Stoica. 2024. Routellm: Learning to route llms with preference data. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.18665*.

Arkil Patel, Satwik Bhattamishra, and Navin Goyal. 2021. Are nlp models really able to solve simple math word problems? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2103.07191*.

Xiangyu Qi, Yi Zeng, Tinghao Xie, Pin-Yu Chen, Ruoxi Jia, Prateek Mittal, and Peter Henderson. 2023. Fine-tuning aligned language models compromises safety, even when users do not intend to! *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.03693*.

Li Siyan, Vethavikashini Chithrra Raghuram, Omar Khattab, Julia Hirschberg, and Zhou Yu. 2024. Papillon: Privacy preservation from internet-based and local language model ensembles. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.17127*.

Andreas Töscher, Michael Jahrer, and Robert M Bell. 2009. The bigchaos solution to the netflix grand prize. *Netflix prize documentation*, pages 1–52.

Jason Wei, Maarten Bosma, Vincent Y Zhao, Kelvin Guu, Adams Wei Yu, Brian Lester, Nan Du, Andrew M Dai, and Quoc V Le. 2021. Finetuned language models are zero-shot learners. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2109.01652*.

Yi Zeng, Hongpeng Lin, Jingwen Zhang, Diyi Yang, Ruoxi Jia, and Weiyan Shi. 2024. How johnny can persuade llms to jailbreak them: Rethinking persuasion to challenge ai safety by humanizing llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.06373*.

Wenting Zhao, Xiang Ren, Jack Hessel, Claire Cardie, Yejin Choi, and Yuntian Deng. 2024. Wildchat: 1m chatgpt interaction logs in the wild. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.01470*.

Lianmin Zheng, Wei-Lin Chiang, Ying Sheng, Siyuan Zhuang, Zhanghao Wu, Yonghao Zhuang, Zi Lin, Zhuohan Li, Dacheng Li, Eric Xing, et al. 2023. Judging llm-as-a-judge with mt-bench and chatbot arena. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 36:46595–46623.

Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, J Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. 2023. Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043*.

A Human Instruction Subset Details

WildChat (Zhao et al., 2024; Mireshghallah et al., 2024) is a dataset of one million English and non-English user interactions with GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, collected through free chatbot access from users who consented to share their data. It includes full conversation threads, metadata such as hashed IP addresses, and user countries, though ethical and data limitations are noted. To understand sensitive information sharing in conversations, tasks representing user goals were identified through an iterative hand-annotation process of 300 conversations using a topic model trained on 10,000 random conversations. To scale annotations, GPT-4 was used to categorize 5,000 filtered conversations, achieving a mean accuracy of 89.2% upon manual verification, though three low-accuracy categories were excluded. Analysis revealed tasks like explanation, information retrieval, and code generation as prevalent in WildChat, with power users influencing task distributions, while ShareGPT showed a greater skew toward explanation and code-related tasks.



Figure 11: Comparsion between the strong & weak LLM in four subsets of PUPA dataset.

B PUPA Subset Results

PUPA subset (Siyan et al., 2024) comprises 200 samples with PII from WildChat, categorized into four classes: financial and corporate information, healthcare details, job and visa applications, and quoted emails or messages. No privacy concerns were identified, as the assignment of queries to weak or strong LLMs is balanced, as depicted in Figure 11.