Distribution of Chores with Information Asymmetry

Hadi Hosseini, Joshua Kavner, Tomasz Wąs, Lirong Xia

Abstract: A well-regarded fairness notion when dividing indivisible chores is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), which requires that pairwise envy can be eliminated by the removal of a single item. While an EF1 and Pareto optimal (PO) allocation of goods can always be found via well-known algorithms, even the existence of such solutions for chores remains open, to date. We take an epistemic approach utilizing information asymmetry by introducing dubious chores–items that inflict no cost on receiving agents but are perceived costly by others. On a technical level, dubious chores provide a more fine-grained approximation of envy-freeness than EF1. We show that finding allocations with minimal number of dubious chores is computationally hard. Nonetheless, we prove the existence of envy-free and fractional PO allocations for n agents with only 2n − 2 dubious chores and strengthen it to n − 1 dubious chores in four special classes of valuations. Our experimental analysis demonstrates that often only a few dubious chores are needed to achieve envy-freeness.