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since 04 Oct 2024">EveryoneRevisionsBibTeXCC BY 4.0
Evaluating the potential privacy leakage of synthetic data is an important but unresolved problem. Most existing adversarial auditing frameworks for synthetic data rely on heuristics and unreasonable assumptions to attack the failure modes of generative models, exhibiting limited capability to describe and detect the privacy exposure of training data. In this paper, we study designing Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) that specifically exploit the observation that generative models tend to memorize certain data points in their training sets, leading to significant local overfitting. Here, we propose Generative Likelihood Ratio Attack (Gen-LRA), a novel, computationally efficient shadow-box MIA that, with no assumption of model knowledge or access, attacks the generated synthetic dataset by conducting a hypothesis test that it is locally overfit to potential training data. Assessed over a comprehensive benchmark spanning diverse datasets, model architectures, and attack parameters, we find that Gen-LRA consistently dominates other MIAs for generative models across multiple performance metrics. These results underscore Gen-LRA's effectiveness as an interpretable and robust privacy auditing tool, highlighting the significant privacy risks posed by generative model overfitting in real-world applications