Matching Markets Meet LLMs: Algorithmic Reasoning with Ranked Preferences

Hadi Hosseini, Samarth Khanna, Ronak Singh

Keywords: Preference reasoning, matching markets, stability, comprehension

Abstract:

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has driven progress in reasoning tasks, from program synthesis to scientific hypothesis generation, yet their ability to handle ranked preferences and structured algorithms in combinatorial domains remains underexplored.
We study matching markets, a core framework behind applications like resource allocation and ride-sharing, which require reconciling individual ranked preferences to ensure stable outcomes. We evaluate seven state‐of‐the‐art models on a hierarchy of preference‐based reasoning tasks---ranging from stable‐matching generation to instability detection, instability resolution, and fine-grained preference queries---to systematically expose their logical and algorithmic limitations in handling ranked inputs. Surprisingly, even top-performing models with advanced reasoning struggle to resolve instability in large markets, often failing to identify blocking pairs or execute algorithms iteratively. We further show that parameter-efficient fine-tuning (LoRA) significantly improves performance in small markets, but fails to bring about a similar improvement on large instances, suggesting the need for more sophisticated strategies to improve LLMs' reasoning with larger-context inputs.

Primary Area: Deep learning (e.g., architectures, generative models, optimization for deep networks, foundation models, LLMs)

Submission Number: 21892