Human Validation Is Not Enough for Theory of Mind Benchmarks: A Position Paper

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Abstract

In the last couple years, there has been a flood of interest in studying the extent to which language models (LMs) have a theory of mind (ToM) – the ability to ascribe mental states to themselves and others. The results provide an unclear picture of the current state of the art, with some finding near-human performance and others near-zero. To make sense of this landscape, we perform a survey of 15 recent studies aimed at measuring ToM in LMs and find that, while almost all perform checks for human identifiable issues, less than half do so for patterns only a machine might exploit. Among those which do perform such validation, none identify LMs to exceed human performance. We conclude that these datasets are easier than their peers, likely due to the presence of spurious patterns in the data, and we caution against building ToM benchmarks relying solely on human validation of the data.

1 Introduction

In cognitive science, theory of mind (ToM) refers broadly to the capacity to reason about the mental states of others (e.g., beliefs, intentions, emotions) – especially when they may differ from one's own (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). In recent years there has been an explosion of interest in understanding and quantifying the extent to which language models (LMs) demonstrate this ability. Numerous benchmark datasets have been designed to measure this using narratives (Nematzadeh et al., 2018; Le et al., 2019; Gu et al., 2024), human conversation (Bara et al., 2021; Soubki et al., 2024), and adversarial data generation (Sclar et al., 2024).

Despite, or perhaps due to, the growth of ToM evaluation tools in both diversity and number, the extent to which one can say that LMs display ToM remains unclear. Some evaluation metrics find that ToM is almost non-existent in modern models (Kim et al., 2023), others determine that there is evidence but they lack some sort of robustness (Shapira et al., 2024; Jones et al., 2024), while still others find that they already meet or exceed human performance in some respects (Gu et al., 2024; Street et al., 2024). This contradictory set of results leaves the working scientist wondering – do LMs have ToM?

In this position paper we argue that the variety of results seen across these evaluations is, at least in part, due to a lack of what we refer to as "machine validation", an analysis aimed at identifying patterns in data that neural models (but not humans) might exploit. We begin with a brief history of approaches to measuring ToM prior to 2020, and a discussion of how the data may mislead LM-based studies (§2). We then perform a meta-analysis of 15 recent papers introducing ToM datasets (§3) and find that those which report strong zero-shot LM performance, tend to lack machine validation. We present fine-tuning baselines for a sample of four datasets from our meta-analysis (§4); we find that simple models achieve perfect or near-perfect performance on the datasets that omitted machine validationand conclude with some final recommendations for the study of LM ToM going forward (§5).

2 Theory of Mind in Language Models

The term *theory of mind* was first introduced by psychologists (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) studying the behavior of chimpanzees. They posit that an agent has a ToM "if [they] impute mental states to [them]self and others". The study of ToM was later extended to examine the behavior of children including the, now famous, Sally-Anne test (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) which presents subjects with a narrated or acted scene about two or more agents, and a question to see if the subjects understand the story agents' cognitive state. This style of observer-based probing is especially amenable to the study of ToM in LMs, where question answering is already a well stud-

ied capability (Al-Mamari et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2018; Joshi et al., 2017). As a result, a number of datasets inspired by psychological experiments have been adapted for LMs over the years. Nematzadeh et al. (2018) produce a template-based question answering corpus (ToM-bAbi) generated from stories inspired by the Sally-Anne test. Le et al. (2019) note that such formulaic data results in a flawed evaluation, especially when using supervised methods, and produce their own templatic corpus (ToMi) which introduces more noise such as distractor sentences and reorderings. Despite these improvements, Sclar et al. (2023) find ToMi to be vulnerable to similar issues.

While recent approaches (see §3) differ greatly from their predecessors, concerns regarding models exploiting spurious correlations (Gordon and Van Durme, 2013; Aru et al., 2023) to display so-called *illusory ToM* have remained. Early work on neural ToM did not necessarily focus on zero-shot performance (Nematzadeh et al., 2018; Chandrasekaran et al., 2017; Grant et al., 2017) or even the inclusion of language as input (Rabinowitz et al., 2018). As zero-shot performance has gained priority, fewer studies seem to provide fine-tuned baselines for comparison.

We argue that one manner of checking for the presence of surface cues is to provide these simple, fine-tuned baselines. As humans are not thought to be exploiting such patterns for ToM, very strong performance of simple models (often prone to relying on these patterns) can be an indicator of undesirable correlations in data or a task that is somehow easier than prior work. We keep these observations in mind in our meta-analysis.

3 Meta-Analysis

To obtain the 15 papers selected for analysis we searched the ACL Anthology for papers since 2020 matching the keyword "theory of mind" and manually inspecting their content. We discarded papers which primarily contributed methods for improving models of ToM, rather than evaluation resources. While a number of datasets in related topics may be relevant (e.g., emotion recognition), we restrict our analysis to those specifically designed for ToM. A similar process was repeated by searching Google Scholar using the term "language model theory of mind". We then read the identified papers, paying special attention to the manner in which their data was created, validated, and used in evaluation. We also reviewed several papers in this citation network which did not meet our recency threshold.

The final collection is a diverse sample. It includes a number of datasets compiled to test higher order ToM (Wu et al., 2023; Street et al., 2024; Soubki et al., 2024), incorporate more tasks (Chen et al., 2024; Jones et al., 2024; Xu et al., 2024; Strachan et al., 2024), involve social reasoning (Sap et al., 2022; Shapira et al., 2023), and expand on belief-oriented approaches (Street et al., 2024; Shapira et al., 2024; Gandhi et al., 2024; Kim et al., 2023). Gu et al. (2024) make a distinction between explicit ToM (i.e., inferring mental states) and explicit ToM (i.e., making judgments based on these states). In (Bara et al., 2021), agents are evaluated in their ability to cooperate with humans to complete objectives in MineCraft. Sclar et al. (2024) generate questions adversarially, making the evaluation adaptive.

3.1 Data

We compile summary statistics for the 15 studies reviewed. This includes the performance (where available) of humans and their best models in zero-shot, few-shot, and fine-tuning experiments. Eight of the datasets involve composite scores (i.e., the benchmark evaluated more than one aspect of ToM). In this case we compute the mean of reported performance across these categories. We also identify the type of ToM (Kalbe et al., 2010) the studies focus on, classifying the types as cognitive (e.g. beliefs, thoughts) and/or affective (e.g. emotions, desires), as well as if non-text modalities are available in the corpus.

Other analyses of ToM benchmarks have called for evaluations which situate models as interactants rather then just passive observers (Shapira et al., 2024; Ma et al., 2023). We make note of this feature. We also record the datasets' answer format (multiple choice or free response), source (e.g., manually created by experts, LM generated), and size. The last thing we collect is whether the evaluation finds models to exceed human performance by at least one of their reported metrics (i.e., "superhuman performance"). For datasets which do not provide a human baseline we make an educated guess based on human performance for similar tasks. For additional details regarding the methods of our survey, see Appendix A.

3.2 Findings

The results from our survey are shown in Table 1.

	LM Evals		Data Evals		Superhuman	Metadata			
Study	**Zero-Shot**	**Few-Shot**	**Fine-Tuning**	**Human**	**In 1+ Expt.**	**Perspective**	**Format**	**Source**	**Size**
Common-ToM (Soubki et al., 2024)	60.6	-	64	80	No	Observer	MC (2)	Natural	7,374
FANToM (Kim et al., 2023)	26.6	-	53.7	87.5	No	Observer	FR, MC (2)	LM	10,317
OpenToM (Xu et al., 2024)	52.8	-	72.7	92.2	No	Observer	MC (2/3)	LM	13,708
ToMBench (Chen et al., 2024)	74.7	-	-	86.1	No	Observer	MC (4)	Manual	2,470
Social IQa (Sap et al., 2022)	42	73	83*	87	No	Observer	MC (3)	MTurk	1,954
MindCraft (Bara et al., 2021)	-	-	41.7	56.7	No	Interactant	MC (3, 21)	Natural	1,200
FauxPas-EAI (Shapira et al., 2023)	40	-	-	82	No	Observer	MC (2)	Manual	40
Hi-ToM (Wu et al., 2023)	58.9	-	-	-	No (?)	Observer	MC (15)	Template	600
Adv-CSFB (Shapira et al., 2024)	70	-	-	-	No (?)	Observer	MC (3)	Manual	183
ExploreToM (Sclar et al., 2024)	74	-	-	-	No (?)	Observer	FR, MC (2)	LM	1,000*
EPITOME (Jones et al., 2024)	58.9	-	-	70.6	Yes	Observer	FR, MC (2)	Manual	446
BigToM (Gandhi et al., 2024)	84.5	89.7	-	86	Yes	Observer	MC (2)	LM	5,000
Strachan et al. (2024)	88.2	-	-	89.2	Yes	Observer	MC (2)	Manual	105
MoToMQA (Street et al., 2024) 🔒	88.6	-	-	90.4	Yes	Observer	MC (2)	Manual	70
SimpleToM (Gu et al., 2024)	89.5	97.1*	-	-	Yes (?)	Observer	MC (2)	LM	3,441

Table 1: An overview of the ToM datasets surveyed (🔒 indicates not publicly available). The format of the evaluation is noted as multiple choice (MC) with the number of choices appearing in parenthesis, or free response (FR). Size is based on the number of questions and shading indicates performance relative to human baselines (if available). We make note of if their results find models to exceed human performance by at least one reported metric. For datasets that do not provide a human baseline we guess (?) based on similar tasks. Additional details (∗) are in Appendix A.

The Good The use of LMs to generate ToM data has raised some concern due to the possibility of low lexical diversity and other output patterns (Xu et al., 2024; Soubki et al., 2024). However, in our analysis we do not see any indication that model performance is strongly correlated with whether the source was human or synthetic. Prior reviews have also called for ToM benchmarks to broaden their scope (Ma et al., 2023). We find several recent benchmarks answer this call by incorporating a variety of skills beyond false beliefs (Chen et al., 2024; Jones et al., 2024; Gu et al., 2024).

The Bad Only a single benchmark places models in the role of an active participant – perhaps one of the most common scenarios for humans. The remaining all evaluate models' abilities to make ToM inferences as a passive observer. Additionally, only two of the benchmarks include input data in a form other than text and only four include affective aspects of ToM in their evaluation.

The Ugly Many papers discuss the dangers of models exploiting surface-level patterns and spurious correlations to motivate their data creation methodology. Despite this awareness, only one paper (Xu et al., 2024) performs a validation step aimed at identifying and correcting this. A surprising number of papers provide no human baseline to compare against, making it difficult to situate the source of their dataset's difficulty.

Every benchmark which identifies models with superhuman ToM omits machine validation (e.g., computing lexical overlaps, providing fine-tuned model baselines) of their dataset.

Task	**Subset**	**Accuracy**
FANToM 🖿 Kim et al. (2023)	Y/N	66.4
	MC	49.5
Common-ToM 🌱 Soubki et al. (2024)	All	67.5
SimpleToM 🖿 Gu et al. (2024)	State	100
	Judgment	100
	Behavior	97.1
BigToM 🖿 Gandhi et al. (2024)	Without Belief	97.5
	With Belief	97.9

Table 2: Accuracy of Flan-T5-base (~248M params) when fine-tuned on various ToM benchmarks. Results are averaged over five folds (🖿) or three seeds (🌱).

4 Case Study

We hypothesize that datasets which report superhuman performance will likely see strong performance in fine-tuning experiments (i.e., fail machine validation). To investigate this we compare the fine-tuning performance of Flan-T5-base (Chung et al., 2022), a relatively small model by modern standards at ~248M params, across two datasets which did not find superhuman performance (FANToM and Common-ToM) and two datasets which did (SimpleToM, BigToM). These datasets were selected somewhat arbitrarily from our set of 15 studies to include datasets which we perceived to report poor, moderate, and strong performance, respec-

tively. For FANToM we discard the free response questions to maintain comparability. We average over three seeds for Common-ToM using the author's splits and, for all other datasets, over five folds using cross-validation. Further details, including hyperparameters, can be found in Appendix B.

4.1 Results

The results of our fine-tuning experiments, averaged over all runs, can be seen in Table 2. For Fantom and Common-ToM, accuracies roughly replicate those reported by the original authors which also fall broadly in line with fine-tuning performance for the other datasets surveyed. On SimpleToM, our model achieves near perfect performance across both their implicit and applied ToM questions. Similarly high performance is observed on BigToM, even in the more difficult case where initial beliefs are not provided. These results are very unusual and, we argue, likely indicate that either (1) the benchmarks are markedly easier than others or (2) zero-shot models are exploiting spurious correlations in these datasets.

5 Where do we go From Here?

We have found that less than half of the 15 LM ToM studies we examined evaluate their dataset for patterns only a machine might exploit (i.e., machine validation). Among those which do perform such validation, none identify LMs to exceed human performance on any aspect of their benchmark, while all studies that find superhuman performance omit such checks. We then performed machine validation by providing a fine-tuning baseline. We found that a small, fine-tuned system could achieve near perfect accuracy on the datasets which did not perform machine validation. This indicates these datasets are, in some sense, easier than their peers, likely due to the presence of spurious patterns in the data. In the following paragraphs we offer some closing thoughts and suggestions.

How do you interpret LM performance on tests designed for humans? It is notable that ToM was first studied in animals, and the manner of testing underwent significant changes when attention was turned towards humans. It is entirely possible, as others have also noted (Ullman, 2023; Shapira et al., 2024; Markowska et al., 2023), that our methods will need to change further to study this phenomena in LMs. In the case of animals to humans, experimenters had to mind the change in capabilities between these two subjects. When observing the performance of LMs on tests originally used for humans, we can't necessarily take away the same conclusions – the capabilities of the subject have changed again. Models may exploit patterns present in our evaluations, otherwise undetectable by humans, that do not broadly generalize to what we wish to measure.

Other evaluation options Changing our evaluation approach might avoid this situation altogether. Moving away from observer-based ToM evaluations towards ones where the agent is situated (Bara et al., 2021), adaptive evaluations (Sclar et al., 2024; Sap et al., 2022), and simulated environments (Jin et al., 2024) all reduce the chances of measuring primary spurious patterns. In other words, we should couple evaluations more closely to the conditions in which ToM is actually used.

Fine-tuning small models is necessary but not sufficient Fine-tuning small models situates the difficulty of a dataset. Unexpectedly strong performance is likely an indicator of undesirable patterns or relative ease. While this may not directly say what in the data models are exploiting, it will indicate that there is probably an issue. The growing number of interpretability techniques (Zhu et al., 2024) and even more classical approaches like measuring lexical overlap (Xu et al., 2024) can help to track down the culprit. We can borrow from the extensive work on more general QA datasets which has run into similar issues, like shortcutting (Sen and Saffari, 2020; Jiang and Bansal, 2019). This is a sufficient, not a necessary condition. It doesn't mean the dataset is free of spurious patterns but if it fails, then it likely means trouble.

But do LMs have ToM? This is a tricky question. If the question is simply "Can they infer mental states?", as described in (Premack and Woodruff, 1978), the answer is plainly, *yes*. However, this has never been the problem. The trouble has always been making sense of the inconsistencies in their performance across seemingly similar contexts. Evaluation tools should not be aimed at measuring the presence of ToM but the *robustness* of ToM (Shapira et al., 2024; Chen et al., 2024). With few common goalposts to situate the difficulty of so many ToM datasets, it's hard to say if models are improving, but it seems clear that performance is not yet robust.

Limitations

We acknowledge that the study of ToM in LMs is progressing rapidly and, while we did our best to include as much work as possible, that our survey may not be comprehensive. We understand that our case study presented in Section 4 could be improved by including additional baselines for more datasets and that this lends some uncertainty to our conclusions.

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A Survey Details

We provide more information on the source of the performance scores for each dataset, as summarized in Table 1. Table 3 is an extended version of Table 1 with additional columns.

- **Common-ToM** - See Table 3 in Soubki et al. (2024) which reports Mistal-7B-Instruct zero-shot results and Mistral-7B fine-tuning results.
- **FANToM** - See Table 9 from Kim et al. (2023). We take the best results from the "All Question Types" column which includes GPT-4-0613 (June) with CoT for zero-shot performance and Flan-T5-XL for fine-tuning performance.
- **OpenToM** - See Table 2 from Xu et al. (2024) which reports macro-averaged F1 scores. We average over all rows for GPT-4-turbo for zero-shot and Llama2-13B for fine-tuning.
- **ToMBench** - See Table 2 from Chen et al. (2024). We use GPT-4-1106 zero-shot results averaged over English and Chinese performance.
- **Social IQa** - For zero-shot, few-shot, and human performance see Figure 7 from Sap et al. (2022). We use their results for PALM-535B. For fine-tuning performance see Table 8 from Lourie et al. (2021). As the result comes from another paper we note this with an asterisk. The dataset is originally from Sap et al. (2019).
- **MindCraft** - See Figure 5 from Bara et al. (2021) which reports F1. We average V. Tran. performance over all three prediction tasks for fine-tuning performance.
- **FauxPas-EAI** - See Table 1 from Shapira et al. (2023). We take the final accuracy (requiring correct answers on all four questions) of Flan-T5-xxl for zero-shot performance. Human performance cites a study of children aged 9-11 (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999).
- **Hi-ToM** - See Table 5 from Wu et al. (2023). We use the overall performance of GPT-4-32k for the zero-shot results.
- **Adv-CSFB** - See Table 2 from Shapira et al. (2024). We average the zero-shot accuracy of text-davinci-003 over the question and story levels.
- **ExploreToM** - See Table 2 from Sclar et al. (2024). For zero-shot performance we use the accuracy report for GPT-4o when Mixtral 7x8B Inst. was used for question generation. This was computed over a sample of 1000 question pairs and this is what we report in the size column, however note that the "size" of this dataset is ambiguous since the tool can be used for generation. The authors release a set of 13,300 questions to demonstrate this.
- **EPITOME** - See Table 1 from Jones et al. (2024). We use the average zero-shot performance of text-davinci-002 over all tasks.
- **BigToM** - See Table 2 from Gandhi et al. (2024) for model results. We use GPT-4 accuracy without initial beliefs and average over

all conditions. We take their 0-shot-CoT results for zero-shot performance and 1-shot-CoT for few-shot. Human performance is taken from Figure 3 and averaged over the same conditions.

- **MoToMQA** - See Table 7 from Street et al. (2024). We average over task types and use results reported with GPT-4 for zero-shot performance.
- **SimpleToM** - See Table 5 from Gu et al. (2024). For zero-shot performance, we use accuracy averaged over belief, behavior and judgment prediction tasks reported for Claude-Sonnet-3.5 with their CoT* prompt. For few-shot performance we take the same information from their MS-remind prompt-chaining experiments. We denote this value with an asterisk to acknowledge that few-shot approaches and prompt-chaining are similar but not equivalent.

B Experimental Details

All experiments were performed on Tesla V100-SXM2 GPUs. We fine-tune `google/flan-t5-base` for classification for a fixed 10 epochs and record the accuracy at the last epoch. All experiments use cross-entropy loss, the AdamW optimizer with a learning rate of 2e-5 and linear schedule, and a batch size of 1. We pad input text to the maximum sequence length of 512 and manually inspect training loss curves to ensure that models were converging.

We report average accuracy over three seeds (42, 0, 1) for Common-ToM using the authors splits. For corpora without established splits (FANToM, SimpleToM, and BigToM), we perform five-fold cross-validation and report the average over all five folds. Training times typically ranged from 4 to 6 hours for all runs on a given dataset.

SimpleToM asks multiple questions regarding specific scenarios. When splitting we ensure that no scenario appears in both the train and test data. For FANToM we use only the "multiple-choice" and "binary" answer types, as the free response questions are not amenable to classification models. When generating input sequences for BigToM, we shuffle the order of answer choices. We plan to make the code used in these experiments available for the purposes of replication and auditing.

	LM Evals		Data Evals		Superhuman	Task Type		Modality		Metadata			
Study	**Zero-Shot**	**Few-Shot**	**Fine-Tuning**	**Human**	**In 1+ Expt.**	**Cogn.**	**Affect.**	**Text**	**Other**	**Perspective**	**Format**	**Source**	**Size**
Common-ToM (Soubki et al., 2024)	60.6	-	64	80	No	✓	✗	✓	✓	Observer	MC (2)	Natural	7,374
FANToM (Kim et al., 2023)	26.6	-	53.7	87.5	No	✓	✗	✓	✗	Observer	FR, MC (2)	LM	10,317
OpenToM (Xu et al., 2024)	52.8	-	72.7	92.2	No	✓	✗	✓	✗	Observer	MC (2/3)	LM	13,708
ToMBench (Chen et al., 2024)	74.7	-	-	86.1	No	✓	✓	✓	✗	Observer	MC (4)	Manual	2,470
Social IQa (Sap et al., 2022)	42	73	83*	87	No	✓	✓	✓	✗	Observer	MC (3)	MTurk	1,954
MindCraft (Bara et al., 2021)	-	-	41.7	56.7	No	✓	✗	✓	✓	Interactant	MC (3, 21)	Natural	1,200
FauxPas-EAI (Shapira et al., 2023)	40	-	-	82	No	✓	✗	✓	✗	Observer	MC (2)	Manual	40
Hi-ToM (Wu et al., 2023)	58.9	-	-	-	No (?)	✓	✗	✓	✗	Observer	MC (15)	Template	600
Adv-CSFB (Shapira et al., 2024)	70	-	-	-	No (?)	✓	✗	✓	✗	Observer	MC (3)	Manual	183
ExploreToM (Sclar et al., 2024)	74	-	-	-	No (?)	✓	✗	✓	✗	Observer	FR, MC (2)	LM	1,000*
EPITOME (Jones et al., 2024)	58.9	-	-	70.6	Yes	✓	✓	✓	✗	Observer	FR, MC (2)	Manual	446
BigToM (Gandhi et al., 2024)	84.5	89.7	-	86	Yes	✓	✗	✓	✗	Observer	MC (2)	LM	5,000
Strachan et al. (2024)	88.2	-	-	89.2	Yes	✓	✓	✓	✗	Observer	MC (2)	Manual	105
MoToMQA (Street et al., 2024) 🔒	88.6	-	-	90.4	Yes	✓	✗	✓	✗	Observer	MC (2)	Manual	70
SimpleToM (Gu et al., 2024)	89.5	97.1*	-	-	Yes (?)	✓	✗	✓	✗	Observer	MC (2)	LM	3,441

Table 3: Expanded overview of ToM datasets surveyed.