Dyslexify: A Mechanistic Defense Against Typographic Attacks in CLIP

Lorenz Hufe, Constantin Venhoff, Maximilian Dreyer, Erblina Purelku, Sebastian Lapuschkin, Wojciech Samek

Open Source Links: https://github.com/lowlorenz/dyslexify

Keywords: Circuit analysis, Probing, Causal interventions, AI Safety, Vision transformers

TL;DR: We defend CLIP against typographic attacks by ablating a causal attention circuit, yielding dyslexic CLIP models that achieve +22.06% on ImageNet-100-Typo with <1% loss on ImageNet-100 accuracy, without fine-tuning.

Abstract:

Typographic attacks exploit multi-modal systems by injecting text into images, leading to targeted misclassifications, malicious content generation and even Vision-Language Model jailbreaks.
In this work, we analyze how CLIP vision encoders behave under typographic attacks, locating specialized attention heads in the latter half of the model's layers that causally extract and transmit typographic information to the cls token.
Building on these insights, we introduce Dyslexify - a method to defend CLIP models against typographic attacks by selectively ablating a typographic circuit, consisting of attention heads. Without requiring finetuning, Dyslexify improves performance by up to 22.06\% on a typographic variant of ImageNet-100, while reducing standard ImageNet-100 accuracy by less than 1\%, and demonstrate its utility in a medical foundation model for skin lesion diagnosis. Notably, our training-free approach remains competitive with current state-of-the-art typographic defenses that rely on finetuning. To this end, we release a family of dyslexic CLIP models which are significantly more robust against typographic attacks. These models serve as suitable drop-in replacements for a broad range of safety-critical applications, where the risks of text-based manipulation outweigh the utility of text recognition.

Submission Number: 59