CONCRETIZER: MODEL INVERSION ATTACK VIA OCCUPANCY CLASSIFICATION AND DISPERSION CONTROL FOR 3D POINT CLOUD RESTORATION

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ABSTRACT

The growing use of 3D point cloud data in autonomous vehicles (AVs) has raised serious privacy concerns, particularly due to the sensitive information that can be extracted from 3D data. While model inversion attacks have been widely studied in the context of 2D data, their application to 3D point clouds remains largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we present the first in-depth study of model inversion attacks aimed at restoring 3D point cloud scenes. Our analysis reveals the unique challenges, the inherent sparsity of 3D point clouds and the ambiguity between empty and non-empty voxels after voxelization, which are further exacerbated by the dispersion of non-empty voxels across feature extractor layers. To address these challenges, we introduce *ConcreTizer*, a simple yet effective model inversion attack designed specifically for 3D point cloud data. *ConcreTizer* incorporates Voxel Occupancy Classification to distinguish between empty and non-empty voxels and Dispersion-Controlled Supervision to mitigate non-empty voxel dispersion. Extensive experiments on widely used 3D feature extractors and benchmark datasets, such as KITTI and Waymo, demonstrate that *ConcreTizer* concretely restores the original 3D point cloud scene from disrupted 3D feature data. Our findings highlight both the vulnerability of 3D data to inversion attacks and the urgent need for robust defense strategies.

1 INTRODUCTION

Recent advancements in Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) have underscored the importance of continuous vision data collection and sharing. At the same time, AI and big data have amplified privacy concerns, prompting increased research on this issue (Guo et al., 2017; Stahl & Wright, 2018). Consequently, AV's data collection faces strict regulations that requires data de-identification (Mulder & Vellinga, 2021). For example, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU, 2016) mandates businesses to adopt stringent data protection protocols.

Beyond these regulations, the need for privacy preservation is rapidly increasing, particularly in 3D point cloud data. This is because various types of privacy-related information can be revealed through rich 3D shape information. For instance, personal information can be identified through facial recognition (Zhang et al., 2019) and person re-identification (Cheng & Liu, 2021). Furthermore, behavioral patterns can be exposed through human pose estimation (Zhou et al., 2020) and activity recognition (Singh et al., 2019b). Additionally, by using methods like Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) (Kim et al., 2018), location information can also be inferred. Moreover, the fact that 2D images can be reconstructed from sparse 3D data (Pittaluga et al., 2019; Song et al., 2020) emphasizes the importance of securing raw 3D point data from the outset.

However, research on privacy in 3D point cloud data remains limited and has not been explored as extensively as in the 2D image domain One prominent research area in 2D image privacy is inversion attacks. It was previously believed that 2D images could be anonymized by extracting features (Gupta & Raskar, 2018; Vepakomma et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2019a). However, inversion attacks on these features have demonstrated that the original 2D images can be restored. In contrast, 3D data has not been extensively explored for inversion attacks. This research gap has allowed the only recent approach (Hwang et al., 2023) to operate under the assumption that disseminating 3D features inherently prevents the restoration of the original dataset. This is illustrated in Figure 1 (see the conventional inversion attack).



Figure 1: **Restoration result of a 3D Point Clouds**. Feature data is extracted from original point cloud through a 3D feature extractor (Yan et al., 2018). *ConcreTizer* (right) enables restoration with simple modifications to conventional approach (left), and even achieves more concrete restoration than generative model approach (middle) (Xiong et al., 2023).

As depicted in Figure 1, conventional inversion attacks fail to restore 3D point cloud data from intermediate features. To address this issue, we delve into the phenomena that arise when the voxel-based feature extractors handle 3D point cloud scenes. Due to the sparse nature of 3D point clouds, most voxels are empty after voxelization. The main challenge, however, lies in distinguishing between a zero-padded empty voxel and a non-empty voxel containing a valid point at the origin (0, 0, 0), as their representations are identical. Thus, the key to a successful inversion attack is not restoring the representation of the voxel but accurately identifying whether the voxel was originally empty or non-empty. Once this classification is achieved, localizing points within non-empty voxels becomes more straightforward, as the error is constrained by the voxel size, which is typically small. With this insight, we transform the point regression problem of conventional inversion attacks into a more explicit *Voxel Occupancy Classification (VOC)* problem.

A further challenge is that non-empty voxels become increasingly disperserd as the feature extractor progresses, leading to increased confusion between non-empty and empty voxels. To address this, our *ConcreTizer* incorporates *Dispersion-Controlled Supervision (DCS)*. This method divides the feature extractor based on downsampling layers and then trains each segment, helping to retain the sparse data characteristics. By proactively controlling dispersion, it ensures the accuracy and integrity of 3D point cloud reconstruction. Particularly, thanks to its tailored design, our model outperforms conditioned generation methods that use generative models (see Figure 1, the generative model approach (Xiong et al., 2023)).

To demonstrate the general applicability of *ConcreTizer*, we deployed it on two representative 3D feature extractors (Yan et al., 2018; Lu et al., 2022), which are essential components in various applications including 3D object detection (Yan et al., 2018; Shi et al., 2020), 3D semantic segmentation (Wu et al., 2019; Thomas et al., 2019), and tracking (Yin et al., 2021). Our experiments conducted on prominent datasets, KITTI (Geiger et al., 2012) and Waymo (Sun et al., 2020), confirm that *ConcreTizer* consistently outperforms across various datasets and 3D feature extractors. We showcase the superior performance of *ConcreTizer* through a range of quantitative and qualitative evaluations, employing point cloud similarity metrics, visual aids, specific-task (3D object detection) performance using restored scenes, and the performance of potential defense mechanisms.

The contributions of this paper are as follows:

- This work is the first to conduct an in-depth study of model inversion attacks aimed at restoring 3D point cloud scenes. Our analysis identifies unique challenges for inversion attacks, which arise from interaction between sparse point cloud data and voxel-based feature extractors.
- To address these unique challenges, we propose *ConcreTizer*, tailored for inverting 3D backbone networks, incorporating Voxel Occupancy Classification and Dispersion-Controlled Supervision.
- Through extensive experiments with representative 3D feature extractors and well-established open-source datasets, we demonstrate the quantitative and qualitative effectiveness of *ConcreTizer*.



Figure 2: **(Left) The results of the conventional inversion attack:** As the layer depth increases, the number of restored points increases rapidly, and the concentration of points near the origin becomes more noticeable. **(Right) The VoI (Voxel of Interest) dispersion effect:** The non-empty voxels spread as they pass through the feature extractor and inversion attack model.

2 Related Work

3D Point Clouds Feature Extraction. Feature extractors for 3D point cloud data encompass set, graph, and grid-based approaches, each distinguished by its representation format. The computational complexity of set and graph-based methods (Qi et al., 2017; Kipf & Welling, 2016) scales significantly with the number of points, limiting their use in real-time applications like autonomous driving. Conversely, grid-based methods (Zhou & Tuzel, 2018; Yan et al., 2018; Shi et al., 2020; Lang et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2022) organize the 3D space into a grid and apply sparse convolution (Liu et al., 2015; Graham & Van der Maaten, 2017) for efficient feature extraction from sparse voxel data. These methods are particularly advantageous for autonomous driving applications due to their efficiency with sparse data. Considering these characteristics, we explore inversion attacks tailored to scenarios using grid-based feature extractors.

Model Inversion. Model inversion was initially studied from the perspective of interpretability in deep learning models. Traditional approaches generate saliency maps to understand how models produce outputs (Du et al., 2018). Other methods (Mahendran & Vedaldi, 2015; Dosovitskiy & Brox, 2016b;a) reconstruct the input from intermediate features to analyze the information flow through model layers. Recently, with growing concerns about data privacy, model inversion has gained attention as a privacy attack. Early studies attempted to restore input face images from confidence scores (Yang et al., 2019b). Subsequent studies (Zhang et al., 2020; Zhao et al., 2021) leverage additional information for more sophisticated restoration. Based on these studies, corresponding defense techniques (Liu et al., 2019; Xue et al., 2023; Dusmanu et al., 2021; Ng et al., 2022; Zhang et al., 2022) have also been investigated, enriching the exploration of data privacy. However, previous work has primarily focused on 2D image data. There is a clear need for an inversion attack technique that accounts for the unique characteristics of 3D point cloud data in autonomous driving. To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first to study inversion attacks for 3D data.

Point Cloud Generation. Generative models, with their ability to produce plausible raw data, are widely used for various tasks. In the 3D point cloud domain, diverse generative models are being researched. Unconditional generation tasks create plausible shapes from random inputs like noise (Achlioptas et al., 2018; Valsesia et al., 2018; Shu et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2019a; Luo & Hu, 2021). Conditional generation tasks involve generating the remaining part from a partial point cloud (Yu et al., 2021; Huang et al., 2020; Wen et al., 2020) or generating a 3D point cloud from a 2D image (Mandikal et al., 2018; Mandikal & Radhakrishnan, 2019; Melas-Kyriazi et al., 2023). However, most existing research focuses only on dense point cloud data for single objects (e.g., Chang et al. (2015)). In contrast, there is little research on handling scene-level sparse point clouds captured from autonomous vehicles. Only a few studies (Caccia et al., 2019; Zyrianov et al., 2022) deal with scene-level sparse point clouds. However, even these studies require specific representation formats and do not support using 3D grid-shaped features, given in our inversion attack scenario, as conditions. To our knowledge, the only scene-level sparse point cloud generation model based on 3D grid representations is Xiong et al. (2023). We also conducted performance comparisons with conditional generation approach using this generative model.



Figure 3: *ConcreTizer* **framework.** Original point cloud and feature data are represented by p and f_i, while their restored counterparts are denoted by p' and f'_i, respectively. The value i means that it is obtained from the i-th downsampling layer. *ConcreTizer* restores data by classifying the occupancy of f_0 and then placing points at the center of each restored voxel. For deeper layers, it employs partitioning at the downsampling layer and restores f_{i-1} from f_i for each block.

3 Preliminary: Limitations of Conventional Inversion Attack

The only known attempt at an inversion attack on 3D point cloud data is by Hwang et al. (2023). This research showcases an inversion attack using point regression to evaluate their privacy protection effectiveness at the feature level. Before designing our method, we explore why conventional approaches can not effectively restore 3d point cloud scenes. The left side of Figure 2 shows the results of the conventional inversion attack. We can observe two noticeable tendencies. First, the restored points are biased towards a specific location, namely, the origin at (0, 0, 0). Second, we can see that a much larger number of points are restored compared to the original data. These restoration tendencies become more pronounced as the depth of the feature extractor's layers increases.

Assuming that these tendencies are linked to the inherent sparsity of point cloud data, we conducted a statistical analysis across different feature extractor depths. We first categorized the entire voxels into empty voxels and non-empty voxels, naming the non-empty voxels as Voxels of Interest (VoI). Our analysis, as shown on the right side of Figure 2, demonstrates that the VoI density increases as the layers get deeper. In particular, we observed a sharp increase in VoI density during the downsampling process of the feature extractor. This rising VoI density significantly degrades restoration performance by *generating false points* in originally empty voxels. The challenge is further exacerbated by the fact that voxelization represents both empty voxels and non-empty voxels containing a point at the origin (0, 0, 0) with *identical zero-padding*. Consequently, we aimed to design a restoration algorithm specifically tailored for 3D point scenes, taking these factors into account.

4 Proposed Method

4.1 AV Scenario

We focus on autonomous vehicle (AV) scenarios because they carry a high risk of exposure to inversion attacks. In AV contexts, there is a need to share feature data for purposes such as computation offloading (Xiao et al., 2022; Hanyao et al., 2021), model enhancement (Hwang et al., 2023), and cooperative perception (Wang et al., 2020; Xu et al., 2022; Yu et al., 2022). Specifically, we selected voxel-based feature extractors as the target for inversion attacks. Voxel-based feature extractors are commonly used in autonomous vehicles due to their suitability for real-time applications like 3D object detection (Yan et al., 2018; Lang et al., 2019; Shi et al., 2019; 2020; Shi & Rajkumar, 2020), semantic segmentation (Wu et al., 2019; Thomas et al., 2019), and tracking (Yin et al., 2021). In this scenario, an attacker with access to the same feature extractor would need to prepare 3D point

cloud data for training the inversion attack model. Since the restoration task doesn't require separate labeling, training can be conducted using open-source datasets or self-collected data.

4.2 Problem Definition

The goal of an inversion attack is to discover the inverse process of a given feature extractor. For voxel-based feature extractors, the initial step involves a voxelization process that transforms point cloud data into a grid format.

Voxelization converts a 3D point cloud $p \in \mathbb{R}^{k\times 3}$, where k is the number of points, into a voxel grid $f_0 \in \mathbb{R}^{3\times H\times W\times D}$, where H, W, D represent the spatial dimensions of the grid. Here x, y, and z coordinate information is channelized and voxels without points are zero-padded, resulting in channel values of (0, 0, 0). In particular, during the downsampling process, the spatial dimensions shrink while the channel size increases, producing features $f_N \in \mathbb{R}^{C_N\times h_N\times w_N\times d_N}$, where N is the number of downsampling layers, $C_N > 3$, and h_N, w_N, d_N are smaller than H, W, D. Consequently, our inversion attack aims to restore the original voxel grid f_0 from the downsampled features f_N.

4.3 ConcreTizer Framework

Figure 3 depicts the overall *ConcreTizer* framework incorporating the scenario and attacker-side training operations. In designing the structure of the inversion attack model, we chose a symmetrical design with the feature extractor, following previous studies (Yang et al., 2019b; Zhang et al., 2020; Zhao et al., 2021). In other words, original shape can be restored by performing upsampling at the positions where downsampling occurs (detailed structure in the supplementary material). Building upon symmetric structure, *ConcreTizer* applies Voxel Occupancy Classification (VOC) and Dispersion-Controlled Supervision (DCS) to overcome the limitations of traditional inversion attack. VOC transforms the regression problem into a classification problem to address the issue of point clustering near the origin. DCS prevents the dispersion of VoI by splitting the feature extractor, mitigating the degradation of restoration performance as the network deepens.

4.3.1 Voxel Occupancy Classification

In traditional inversion attack methods, the original data is directly restored through regression on channel values. In our scenario, since the x, y, and z coordinates are channelized during the voxelization process, performing regression would restore coordinate values. However, since voxelization of sparse point clouds produces a large number of zero-padded voxels with (0, 0, 0) channel value, many unnecessary points cluster near the origin in the inversion attack results (Figure 2, left). To address this issue, we transform the regression problem into a classification problem to resolve the semantic ambiguity of zero-padded voxels—whether they represent empty voxels or valid points at coordinates (0, 0, 0). This can be achieved through simple binary encoding, where each voxel is labeled as 0 (*negative occupancy*) or 1 (*positive occupancy*), making the meaning of zero-padding clear. Using the VOC method, the inversion attack model outputs binary classification scores in the form of $\mathbb{R}^{1\times H\times W\times D}$, rather than continuous coordinate values in the form of $\mathbb{R}^{3\times H\times W\times D}$. If a voxel is determined to contain a point, the corresponding coordinate can be restored easily. This is because the range of coordinate values is bounded by the spatial location of the voxel, and the voxel size is typically small enough. As a result, by using the center coordinates of the voxel, we achieve effective restoration within an error range constrained by the voxel size.

Additionally, due to the sparsity of original point cloud data, the binary-encoded labels have a higher ratio of 0s compared to 1s. This phenomenon is particularly exacerbated as the depth of the layers increases. Let f_0 be the original voxelized point cloud and f_0' be the restored one by the inversion attack. The number of positive labels is fixed as $|\text{VoI of } f_0|$, while the number of negative labels, $|\text{VoI of } f_0'| - |\text{VoI of } f_0|$, increases exponentially as the depth of the layer increases. To account for this imbalance, we apply the Sigmoid Focal (SF) loss (Lin et al., 2017), a variant of the conventional cross-entropy loss. The mathematical representation of the SF loss is given by:

$$\text{FL}(p_t) = -\alpha_t(1-p_t)^{\gamma}\log(p_t), \tag{1}$$

where p_t denotes the model's predicted probability for the target class. The factor α_t is employed to adjust the importance given to the positive and negative classes.

4.3.2 Dispersion-Controlled Supervision

While applying SF loss in VOC can partially address the label imbalance issue, it cannot prevent the problem of VoI dispersion. The original data is sparse with many empty voxels. However, as we

observed earlier, the VoI density exponentially increases during the downsampling process (Figure 2, right). Therefore, after VoI spreads too much at the deep layer, it becomes difficult to restore the data back to the original sparse state.

Our proposed DCS is a more fundamental solution to address VoI dispersion. It divides the feature extractor into multiple blocks and performs restoration progressively. First, feature extractor can be partitioned based on the downsampling layer where the VoI spread occurs. Through this, the VoI dispersion in each block can be effectively controlled. Then, in the inversion attack model, an inversion block corresponding to each block can be created to train the restoration in block units. Note that at the original voxel level, the channel values represent point coordinates, eliminating the need for regression (if classification result is positive, channel value is estimated as the center coordinate of the voxel). However, at the intermediate feature level, normalization is applied, so both classification and regression on the channel values are required.

For example, if the input of the $(i+1)$-th block is $f_i \in \mathbb{R}^{C_i \times h_i \times w_i \times d_i}$ and the output is $f_{i+1} \in \mathbb{R}^{C_{i+1} \times h_{i+1} \times w_{i+1} \times d_{i+1}}$, then the $(i+1)$-th inversion block in the inversion attack model takes f_{i+1} as input and produces $f'_i \in \mathbb{R}^{C_i \times h_i \times w_i \times d_i}$, which is the result of restoring f_i. Specifically, $m'_i \in \mathbb{R}^{1 \times h_i \times w_i \times d_i}$ (spatial occupancy scores found by applying SF loss) and $c'_i \in \mathbb{R}^{C_i \times h_i \times w_i \times d_i}$ (channel values found by applying L2 loss) are derived from f_{i+1}. Then, c'_i is masked by using m'_i to generate f'_i. In the masking process, unnecessary VoI values are erased, so the dispersion of VoI can be suppressed. Note that in the first inversion block, which is the final stage of the inversion attack model, only classification is performed, with no additional regression. The loss function for each inversion block is:

$$Loss(\text{inversion block } i+1) = \begin{cases} L_{\text{cls}} & \text{if } i = 0, \\ L_{\text{cls}} + \beta \cdot L_{\text{reg}} & \text{if } i \geq 1. \end{cases}$$

$$L_{\text{cls}} = \sum \text{SF loss}(m_i, m'_i) \quad \text{and} \quad L_{\text{reg}} = \sum \text{L2 loss}(c_i, c'_i)$$

where the summation is taken over VoI of the output.

$$\begin{pmatrix} m_i : \text{Ground Truth spatial occupancy mask} \\ m'_i : \text{Predicted spatial occupancy scores} \\ c_i : \text{Ground Truth channel values} \\ c'_i : \text{Predicted channel values} \end{pmatrix}$$

The final result of passing through all inversion blocks is a binary classification scores in the form of $\mathbb{R}^{1 \times H \times W \times D}$, and the restoration is completed by generating a point at the center of the voxel corresponding to the positive occupancy.

5 Experiments

5.1 Experimental Setup

3D Feature Extractor. We employ a voxelization-based 3D feature extractor as the target of our inversion attack. Based on the OpenPCDet (Team, 2020) project, we utilize pre-trained Voxel-Backbone (Yan et al., 2018) and VoxelResBackbone (Lu et al., 2022), extensively used in a crucial application area for 3D point cloud data. The VoxelBackBone structure contains four downsampling layers (i.e., $N = 4$), each preceded by two convolutional layers, while the VoxelResBackbone incorporates additional convolutional layers and skip connections.

Inversion Model Training. We train the inversion attack model on the real-world KITTI (Geiger et al., 2012) and Waymo (Sun et al., 2020) datasets. When using the SF loss function in VOC, only the alpha value in the hyperparameters is adjusted, and in DCS, the weight on regression loss, β, is set to 1.

Metrics. In our analysis of 3D scene restoration performance, we utilize various metrics. First, for qualitative analysis, we visualize the 3D point cloud using KITTI viewer web tool. Next, for quantitative analysis, we use point cloud similarity metrics such as Chamfer Distance (CD) (Borgefors, 1984), Hausdorff Distance (HD) (Huttenlocher et al., 1993), and F1 Score (Goutte & Gaussier, 2005). Furthermore, to verify the utility of the restored data, we also check the 3D object detection accuracy with pre-trained model (Lang et al., 2019).

Table 1: Inversion attack result with KITTI and Waymo dataset. Average CD and HD values in centimeters, and F1 scores with 15 cm and 30 cm thresholds for KITTI and Waymo datasets. Metrics evaluate over two scene sets with 3769 and 3999 scenes, respectively.

	#Downsampling	1 (3rd)			2 (6th)			3 (9th)			4 (12th)		
	(LayerDepth)	CD (↓)	HD (↓)	F1score (↑)	CD (↓)	HD (↓)	F1score (↑)	CD (↓)	HD (↓)	F1score (↑)	CD (↓)	HD (↓)	F1score (↑)
KITTI	Point Regression	1.3868	23.5855	0.3543	1.2879	34.2395	0.3904	3.1229	54.0173	0.2110	4.1439	56.9811	0.1298
	UltraLiDAR	0.0744	8.2269	0.9122	0.0818	8.0974	0.8905	0.0836	7.9561	0.8869	0.1012	**7.9185**	0.8152
	ConcreTizer	**0.0321**	**7.5603**	**0.9918**	**0.0373**	**7.5249**	**0.9914**	**0.0507**	**7.8453**	**0.9793**	**0.0776**	8.1193	**0.9160**
Waymo	Point Regression	1.4979	55.6589	0.7644	2.7733	66.7899	0.6489	4.1053	70.6608	0.5524	4.9340	71.9608	0.4355
	UltraLiDAR	0.0810	10.9582	0.9742	0.0898	11.3360	0.9623	0.1017	11.4987	0.9503	0.1378	12.0259	0.8849
	ConcreTizer	**0.0374**	**10.2544**	**0.9984**	**0.0466**	**10.2326**	**0.9979**	**0.0712**	**10.5724**	**0.9781**	**0.1087**	**11.3399**	**0.9251**



Figure 4: **Qualitative results for KITTI (scene 73) and Waymo (scene 79).** Top shows the original point cloud, 2D image, and highlighted region. Below, restoration performance of three techniques is displayed, progressing left to right by layer depth.

5.2 Restoration Performance

Comparison Schemes. We conducted comparisons in various ways to confirm the superiority of *ConcreTizer*. We start with Point Regression (Mahendran & Vedaldi, 2015; Dosovitskiy & Brox, 2016a;b), a traditional inversion attack method. In Point Regression, post-processing is applied to eliminate points that fell outside the defined point cloud range or were excessively concentrated near the origin. Next we compare *ConcreTizer* with a generative model approach. To perform an inversion attack using a generative model, a conditional generation with feature data as a condition must be employed. Among the existing LiDAR point cloud generation models, UltraLiDAR (Xiong et al., 2023) is the only model based on voxel representation, similar to our feature extractor. We modified the encoder part of UltraLiDAR to accept voxel features as an input and then trained it with the KITTI and Waymo datasets.

Result Analysis. Table 1 presents the point scene restoration performance at different depths of VoxelBackBone (Yan et al., 2018), utilizing point cloud similarity metrics, while Figure 4 illustrates the corresponding restored point cloud scenes. It is evident that *ConcreTizer* consistently demonstrates exceptional performance across all cases within both the KITTI and Waymo datasets.

It can be observed that traditional Point Regression methods are not feasible for performing inversion attacks on 3D features. In particular, the results show that numerous points cluster near the origin, and this phenomenon intensifies as the depth of the layers increases. This can be understood as a failure to take into account the characteristics inherent to 3D sparse features.

By employing a conditional generation approach, UltraLiDAR can restore the overall scene in a coarse-grained manner with less significant performance degradation in terms of the HD metric relative to layer depth. This rough recovery can be attributed to the conversion of 3D sparse features into 2D dense features, aligning with the 2D VQ-VAE design. In the context of 2D dense features, problems like VoI dispersion are no longer present, which contributes to better robustness. However, this transition results in the loss of 3D sparse characteristics, leading to less accurate restoration of finer details.

In contrast, our *ConcreTizer* effectively suppresses VoI dispersion through DCS while preserving the sparse characteristics of 3D features. As a result, despite its simple design, *ConcreTizer* achieves a more concrete restoration than the generative model approach. At the deepest layer, *ConcreTizer*





#Downsampling (LayerDepth)	4 (12th)			
	CD (↓)	HD (↓)	F1score (↑)	AP_{3D} (↑)
Point Regression	3.7381	55.6439	0.1483	0
UltraLiDAR	0.0967	9.8154	0.8388	57.73
ConcreTizer	**0.0714**	**9.5625**	**0.9350**	**63.67**

Figure 5: **Restoration result on VoxelResBackbone with KITTI dataset.** At the left, the last layer's restoration performance for three techniques is shown. At the right, average performance across the KITTI dataset is presented. A bar graph depicts relative performance, and a table details raw values.

Table 2: 3D object detection results with KITTI and Waymo datasets. The reported metric for the KITTI dataset is Average Precision (AP) at hard difficulty, while for the Waymo dataset, Average Precision weighted by Heading (APH) is reported at LEVEL2 difficulty.

	#Downsampling (LayerDepth)	1(**3rd**)	2(**6th**)	3(**9th**)	4(**12th**)
KITTI	Original Data	76.11			
	Point Regression	0	0	0	0
	UltraLiDAR	58.48	56.81	61.57	58.32
	ConcreTizer	**75.93**	**73.86**	**67.54**	**62.02**

	#Downsampling (LayerDepth)	1(**3rd**)	2(**6th**)	3(**9th**)	4(**12th**)
Waymo	Original Data	0.5604			
	Point Regression	0	0	0	0
	UltraLiDAR	0.3131	0.3763	0.3536	0.2328
	ConcreTizer	**0.5484**	**0.5410**	**0.4923**	**0.4245**

outperforms the generative approach by 23.4% and 12.4% on KITTI, while on Waymo, it shows improvements of 21.1% and 4.5% in CD and F1 score, respectively.

In Figure 5, we also tested *ConcreTizer* to the VoxelResBackbone (Lu et al., 2022). In this case, when analyzing the representative results from the deepest layer, *ConcreTizer* exhibits the highest of performance. A persistent issue with UltraLiDAR is the lack of detailed shape in the restored scenes. Detailed experimental results, including those conducted with the VoxelResBackbone and the Waymo dataset, are provided in the supplementary materials.

5.3 Attack Performance in the Context of 3D Object Detection

To assess the effectiveness of the restored scenes in compromising privacy, we measured the 3D object detection accuracy using the restored point cloud scenes, employing a separately trained PointPillar (Lang et al., 2019) model. Table 2 displays the benchmark results for the KITTI and Waymo datasets. Point Regression failed to restore meaningful data, producing entirely unusable results. In addition, UltraLiDAR's inability to restore detailed features led to inconsistent performance. Only *ConcreTizer* demonstrates a consistent performance across both datasets, even with increasing layer depth, achieving 75.7 to 81.5% of the detection performance based on original scenes. This indicates that the restored scenes contain enough private information to detect 3D objects.

5.4 Ablation Study: Component-wise Analysis

To understand the performance of *ConcreTizer*, we examine the impact of each component. Figure 6 illustrates the comparative performance of VOC (BCE loss), VOC, and *ConcreTizer* (VOC+DCS). Firstly, VOC (BCE loss) reveals that shifting from regression to classification, thus clarifying the meaning of zero-padded voxels, made restoration possible (6th layer result). However, the BCE loss struggles to handle the significant label imbalance as the layer depth increases. By comparing VOC (BCE loss) with VOC, it becomes evident that using SF loss helps mitigate the label imbalance issue to some extent. Nonetheless, in the results of VOC, the restored points tend to cluster in specific areas, resulting in biased restoration (12th layer result). Only *ConcreTizer* successfully restores points with a distribution closely matching the original point cloud. This effectiveness stems from DCS's ability to efficiently mitigate the dispersion of VoI that arises with deeper layer.

5.5 Partitioning Policy in Dispersion-Controlled Supervision

We conduct experiments to determine the effective strategy for applying DCS in *ConcreTizer*, given a specific 3D feature extractor. Restoration performance is evaluated on the KITTI dataset by varying



Figure 6: **Ablation study on VoxelBackbone with KITTI dataset.** At the left, the restoration performance for three cases is shown. At the right, average performance across the KITTI dataset is presented wih boxplot.



Figure 7: **Effect of the number of DCS instances.** DCS 1 is the end-to-end approach without partitioning. DCS 2 and 4 use downsampling-based partitioning with 2 and 1 downsampling layers per block, respectively. DCS 10 partitions at every layer.



Figure 8: **Effect of noise on restoration (privacy) and 3D object detection (utility).** Measured: AP_{3D} of the SECOND model and CD of *ConcreTizer*.

the number of DCS instances (i.e., the number of inversion blocks). In each case, partitioning is applied at positions that evenly divide the total number of layers. As shown in Figure 7, applying 10 DCS instances leads to even worse performance than not using DCS at all (i.e., DCS 1). This is because the restoration error of each block accumulates as it goes through multiple blocks. The best performance is achieved with 2 or 4 DCS instances, where partitioning coincides with the downsampling layer. This is attributed to the additional supervision effectively suppressing VoI dispersion that occurs during the downsampling process. Therefore, to maximize the benefits of supervision, partitioning should align with the downsampling layers, where VoI dispersion manifests. Qualitative results for different DCS instances and further discussion on the optimal DCS split position are provided in the supplementary materials.

5.6 Tradeoff Between Privacy and Utility

We explored the use of Gaussian noise addition as a potential defense mechanism against our *ConcreTizer* inversion attack. In this experiments, we use three types of noise for different regions: **distributed noise**, which is uniformly applied across all feature data regions; **feature-centric noise**, applied only to VoI containing information; and **empty-centric noise**, exclusively targeting empty region. The results in Figure 8 demonstrate that while adding noise can reduce restoration capability (defense), it also negatively impacts object detection performance (target task). The fact that defenders must severely compromise target-task performance to counter our inversion attack highlights the challenge of defending against *ConcreTizer*. To ensure safety and reliability in accuracy-critical applications (e.g., autonomous driving applications), it is essential to develop an advanced and tailored defense mechanism against our *ConcreTizer*. More discussion on potential defense mechanisms is provided in the supplementary materials.

6 Conclusion

This paper presents the first comprehensive study on model inversion for 3D point cloud restoration. We analyzed the challenges posed by the interaction between 3D point cloud characteristics and voxel-based feature extractors. Based on this, we introduced *ConcreTizer*, a simple yet effective inversion technique tailored for restoring 3D point data from features, which incorporates Voxel

Occupancy Classification and Dispersion-Controlled Supervision. Through rigorous evaluations using prominent open-source datasets such as KITTI and Waymo, along with representative 3D feature extractors, we not only demonstrated the superiority of *ConcreTizer* but also analyzed each of its components in detail for valuable insights. Our research reveals the vulnerability of 3D point cloud data to inversion attacks, emphasizing the urgent need to devise extensive defense strategies.

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