Random Graph Asymptotics for Treatment Effect Estimation in Two-Sided Markets

27 Sept 2024 (modified: 05 Feb 2025)Submitted to ICLR 2025EveryoneRevisionsBibTeXCC BY 4.0
Keywords: Two-sided markets, Random graph models, Network interference
Abstract: In two-sided markets, the accurate estimation of treatment effects is crucial yet challenging due to the inherent interference between market participants, which violates the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). This paper introduces a novel framework that leverages random graph asymptotics to model and estimate treatment effects under network interference in two-sided markets. By incorporating a random graph model, we handle two-sided randomization by modeling customer interference within the potential outcome function as a function of graph topology and equilibrium dynamics, while capturing listing interference through the random graph structure. Our new estimation process provides asymptotically normal estimators with robust theoretical properties, suitable for large-scale market scenarios. Our theoretical findings are supported by extensive numerical simulations, demonstrating the effectiveness and practical applicability of our approach in estimating direct and indirect causal effects within these complex market structures.
Supplementary Material: zip
Primary Area: causal reasoning
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Submission Number: 11085
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