How to Resolve Envy by Adding Goods

Matthias Bentert, Robert Bredereck, Eva Deltl, Pallavi Jain, Leon Kellerhals

Keywords: fair division, envy-freeness, resource allocation, social choice, parameterized complexity

TL;DR: We consider the problem of resolving the envy of a given initial allocation by adding elements from a pool of goods and analyze the complexity of finding such extensions under various constraints.

Abstract:

We consider the problem of resolving the envy of a given initial allocation by adding elements from a pool of goods.
We give a characterization of the instances where envy can be resolved by adding an arbitrary number of copies of the items in the pool.
From this characterization, we derive a polynomial-time algorithm returning a respective solution if it exists.
If the number of copies or the total number of added items are bounded, the problem becomes computationally intractable
even in various restricted cases.
We perform a parameterized complexity analysis, focusing on the number of agents and the pool size as parameters.
Notably, although not every instance admits an envy-free solution, our approach allows us to efficiently determine, in polynomial time, whether a solution exists—an aspect that is both theoretically interesting and far from trivial.

Submission Number: 5