Paths to Equilibrium in Games
Keywords: game theory, multi-agent reinforcement learning, strategic dynamics
TL;DR: We study a path connectivity structure of games that is relevant to strategic dynamics and iterative learning algorithms in multi-agent systems. We prove that paths to equilibrium exist in all normal-form games.
Abstract: In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and game theory, agents repeatedly interact and revise their strategies as new data arrives, producing a sequence of strategy profiles. This paper studies sequences of strategies satisfying a pairwise constraint inspired by policy updating in reinforcement learning, where an agent who is best responding in one period does not switch its strategy in the next period. This constraint merely requires that optimizing agents do not switch strategies, but does not constrain the non-optimizing agents in any way, and thus allows for exploration. Sequences with this property are called satisficing paths, and arise naturally in many MARL algorithms. A fundamental question about strategic dynamics is such: for a given game and initial strategy profile, is it always possible to construct a satisficing path that terminates at an equilibrium? The resolution of this question has implications about the capabilities or limitations of a class of MARL algorithms. We answer this question in the affirmative for normal-form games. Our analysis reveals a counterintuitive insight that suboptimal, and perhaps even reward deteriorating, strategic updates are key to driving play to equilibrium along a satisficing path.
Primary Area: Algorithmic game theory
Submission Number: 20958
Loading