Learning-Augmented Facility Location Mechanisms for the Envy Ratio Objective

Haris Aziz, Yuhang Guo, Alexander Lam, Houyu Zhou

Keywords: Learning Augmentation, Facility Location Game, Fairness, Envy Ratio, Mechanism Design

Abstract: The augmentation of algorithms with predictions of the optimal solution, such as from a machine-learning algorithm, has garnered significant attention in recent years, particularly in facility location problems. Moving beyond the traditional focus on utilitarian and egalitarian objectives, we design learning-augmented facility location mechanisms for the envy ratio objective, a fairness metric defined as the maximum ratio between the utilities of any two agents. For the deterministic setting, we propose a mechanism which utilizes predictions to achieve $\alpha$-consistency and $\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}$-robustness for a selected parameter $\alpha \in [1,2]$, and prove its optimality. We also resolve open questions raised by Ding et al. [2020], devising a randomized mechanism without predictions to improve upon the best-known approximation ratio from $2$ to $1.8944$. Building upon these advancements, we construct a novel randomized mechanism which incorporates predictions to achieve improved performance guarantees.

Primary Area: Theory (e.g., control theory, learning theory, algorithmic game theory)

Submission Number: 24806