Statistically Undetectable Backdoors in Deep Neural Networks

Andrej Bogdanov, Alon Rosen, Neekon Vafa

Keywords: cryptography, theory, backdoors, trust, adversarial examples, Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma, JL lemma, deep neural networks, computational complexity theory

Abstract: We show how an adversarial model trainer can plant backdoors in a large class of deep, feedforward neural networks. These backdoors are statistically undetectable in the white-box setting, meaning that the backdoored and honestly trained models are close in total variation distance, even given the full descriptions of the models (e.g., all of the weights). The backdoor provides access to invariance-based adversarial examples for every input, mapping distant inputs to unusually close outputs. However, without the backdoor, it is provably impossible (under standard cryptographic assumptions) to generate any such adversarial examples in polynomial time. Our theoretical and preliminary empirical findings demonstrate a fundamental power asymmetry between model trainers and model users.

Primary Area: alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations

Submission Number: 20344