Go to ICLR 2025 Conference homepageCompromised Turing Machines: Adversarial Interference and Endogenous Verification
We introduce the concept of a Compromised Turing Machine (CTM), an extension of the classical Turing machine model where an adversary, Eve, can tamper with the tape or internal state between timesteps. The CTM exposes fundamental vulnerabilities in the machine's ability to self-verify its computations, particularly in adversarial environments where endogenous verification mechanisms cannot reliably ensure computational integrity. Through a novel parallel with Descartes' deus deceptor thought experiment, we explore the epistemological limits of computational certainty, illustrating how the CTM reveals the failure of self-verification in adversarial contexts.
To address these vulnerabilities, we propose several secure computational models, including hybrid systems with external verification, randomized and probabilistic verification protocols, distributed computing models with cross-verification, self-correcting and self-healing mechanisms, and advanced cryptographic techniques such as zero-knowledge proofs and homomorphic encryption. While each solution presents trade-offs in terms of computational overhead and complexity, they provide a foundation for building resilient systems capable of withstanding adversarial interference. Our work highlights the need for external sources of trust and verification in secure computation and opens new directions for research into adversarial computational models.