Generative Model Inversion Through the Lens of the Manifold Hypothesis

Xiong Peng, Bo Han, Fengfei Yu, Tongliang Liu, Feng Liu, Mingyuan Zhou

Keywords: Generative Model Inversion Attacks

Abstract: Model inversion attacks (MIAs) aim to reconstruct class-representative samples from trained models. Recent generative MIAs utilize generative adversarial networks to learn image priors that guide the inversion process, yielding reconstructions with high visual quality and strong fidelity to the private data. To explore the reason behind their effectiveness, we begin by examining the gradients of inversion loss w.r.t. synthetic inputs, and find that these gradients are surprisingly noisy. Further analysis shows that generative model inversion approaches implicitly denoise the gradients by projecting them onto the tangent space of the generator manifold—filtering out directions that deviate from the manifold structure while preserving informative components aligned with it. Our empirical measurements show that, in models trained with standard supervision, loss gradients exhibit large angular deviations from the data manifold, indicating poor alignment with class-relevant directions. This observation motivates our central hypothesis: models become more vulnerable to MIAs when their loss gradients align more closely with the generator manifold. We validate this hypothesis by designing a novel training objective that explicitly promotes such alignment. Building on this insight, we further introduce a training-free approach to enhance gradient–manifold alignment during inversion, leading to consistent improvements over state-of-the-art generative MIAs.

Primary Area: Social and economic aspects of machine learning (e.g., fairness, interpretability, human-AI interaction, privacy, safety, strategic behavior)

Submission Number: 11260