Learning to Strategically Acquire Resources in Competition

Abstract: We consider multiple agents competing to acquire some costly divisible resource (\emph{e.g.} shares of a financial asset, compute resources, etc.) over time. Leveraging a standard model for price dynamics, we propose a novel game-theoretic model for this problem, generalizing settings studied in diverse literatures. Our analysis considers different assumptions on the information available to agents. Under partial-information with a common prior (which subsumes complete information as a special case), we establish the existence, uniqueness, and efficient computability of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), and bound the price of anarchy. Next and more generally, we consider agents with no common prior learning to act optimally given realistic market feedback from repeated interactions. We provide sufficient conditions on agents doing simultaneous learning dynamics for last-iterate convergence to the BNE. For all settings, we provide detailed simulations based on real financial data to illustrate our theory and offer new insights on strategic behavior in the context of trading and resource acquisition.

Submission Type: Regular submission (no more than 12 pages of main content)

Assigned Action Editor: ~Olivier_Cappé2

Submission Number: 7762