Prior-independent Dynamic Auctions for a Value-maximizing BuyerDownload PDF

21 May 2021, 20:44 (edited 26 Oct 2021)NeurIPS 2021 PosterReaders: Everyone
  • Keywords: dynamic auctions, value-maximizing buyer, return on investment (ROI) constraint
  • TL;DR: We present a prior-independent dynamic mechanism for autobidding buyers with sublinear regret.
  • Abstract: We study prior-independent dynamic auction design with production costs for a value-maximizing buyer, a paradigm that is becoming prevalent recently following the development of automatic bidding algorithms in advertising platforms. In contrast to a utility-maximizing buyer, who maximizes the difference between her total value and total payment, a value-maximizing buyer aims to maximize her total value subject to a return on investment (ROI) constraint. Our main result is a dynamic mechanism with regret $\tilde{O}(T^{2/3})$, where $T$ is the time horizon, against the first-best benchmark, i.e., the maximum amount of revenue the seller can extract assuming all values of the buyer are publicly known.
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