Keywords: Green Security Game, Game Theory, Diffusion Models
TL;DR: We propose a robust optimization method combing diffusion model and game thoery for green security.
Abstract: In green security, defenders must forecast adversarial behavior—such as poaching, illegal logging, and illegal fishing—to plan effective patrols. These behavior are often highly uncertain and complex. Prior work has leveraged game theory to design robust patrol strategies to handle uncertainty, but existing adversarial behavior models primarily rely on Gaussian processes or linear models, which lack the expressiveness needed to capture intricate behavioral patterns. To address this limitation, we propose a conditional diffusion model for adversary behavior modeling, leveraging its strong distribution-fitting capabilities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of diffusion models in the green security domain. Integrating diffusion models into game-theoretic optimization, however, presents new challenges, including a constrained mixed strategy space and the need to sample from an unnormalized distribution to estimate utilities. To tackle these challenges, we introduce a mixed strategy of mixed strategies and employ a twisted Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) sampler for accurate sampling. Theoretically, our algorithm is guaranteed to converge to an \(\epsilon\)-equilibrium with high probability using a finite number of iterations and samples. Empirically, we evaluate our approach on both synthetic and real-world poaching datasets, demonstrating its effectiveness.
Latex Source Code: zip
Signed PMLR Licence Agreement: pdf
Readers: auai.org/UAI/2025/Conference, auai.org/UAI/2025/Conference/Area_Chairs, auai.org/UAI/2025/Conference/Reviewers, auai.org/UAI/2025/Conference/Submission657/Authors, auai.org/UAI/2025/Conference/Submission657/Reproducibility_Reviewers
Submission Number: 657
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