Sounding the Alarm: Backdooring Acoustic Foundation Models for Physically Realizable Triggers

26 Sept 2024 (modified: 05 Feb 2025)Submitted to ICLR 2025EveryoneRevisionsBibTeXCC BY 4.0
Keywords: security, speech model, backdoor attack
Abstract: Although foundation models help increase performance on many downstream tasks while reducing the amount of labeled data needed, their proliferation has raised a natural question: To what extent can a model downloaded from the Internet be trusted? We tackle this question for acoustic foundation models (AFMs) and propose the $\textbf F$oundation $\textbf A$coustic model $\textbf B$ackdoor (FAB) attack against AFMs, showing that state-of-the-art models are susceptible to a new attack vector. Despite preserving model performance on benign data, AFM induces backdoors that survive fine-tuning, and, when activated, lead to a significant performance drop on various downstream tasks. Notably, backdoors created by FAB can be activated in a ${physically\ realizable}$ manner by ${inconspicuous}$, ${input}$-${agnostic}$ triggers that ${do\ not\ require\ syncing}$ with the acoustic input (e.g., by playing a siren sound in the background). Crucially, FAB also assumes a weaker threat model than past work, where the adversary has no knowledge of the pre-training data and certain architectural details. We tested FAB with two leading AFMs, on nine tasks, with four triggers, against two defenses, as well as in the digital and physical domains, and found the attack highly successful in all scenarios. Overall, our work highlights the risks facing AFMs and calls for advanced defences to mitigate them.
Primary Area: alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
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Submission Number: 6721
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