Core-Competitiveness in Partially Observable Networked Market

Bin Li, Dong Hao

Keywords: Partially observable networked market, Auction design, Core competitiveness, Incentive compatibility

Abstract:

In auction theory, a core is a stable outcome where no subgroup of participants can achieve better results for themselves.
Core-competitive auctions aim to generate revenue that is achievable in a core. They are particularly important because they not only generate optimized revenue for the seller, but also provide an efficient and stable environment for participants.

We generalize the design of core-competitive auctions to encompass partially observable networked markets (PONM). Unlike traditional auctions, which often deal with scenarios of limited trading activity, our approach to core-competitive auctions for PONM captures the nature of real-world transaction markets, which is a large linking world for the economic entities and commodities circulate among the entities in the market. Our generalizing the auction market to PONM can much improve the liquidity of the auction, and is especially meaningful for the web economics.
Specifically, we quantify the upper and lower bounds of the minimum core revenue in PONM, and further prove that there does not exist any truthful auction for PONM which is efficient and core-competitive. Governed by this impossible result, we identify the criteria that the allocation rule for PONM should meet. Based on these criteria, we propose a new class of auction mechanisms for PONM that is individually rational, incentive-compatible, and core-competitive.

Track: Economics, Online Markets, and Human Computation

Submission Guidelines Scope: Yes

Submission Guidelines Blind: Yes

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Student Author: No

Submission Number: 1425