Does Representation Guarantee Welfare?

Jakob de Raaij, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas

Keywords: sortition, citizens’ assemblies, governance

Abstract: A panel satisfies *descriptive representation* when its composition reflects the population. We examine the role of descriptive representation in collective decision making through an optimization lens, asking whether representative panels make decisions that maximize social welfare for the underlying population. Our main results suggest that, in general, representation with respect to *intersections* of two or more features guarantees higher social welfare than that achieved by the status quo of proportionally representing individual features. Moreover, an analysis of real data suggests that representation with respect to pairs of features is feasible in practice. These results have significant implications for the design of *citizens' assemblies*, which are gaining prominence in AI governance.

Primary Area: Social and economic aspects of machine learning (e.g., fairness, interpretability, human-AI interaction, privacy, safety, strategic behavior)

Submission Number: 13232