Intention Communication and Hypothesis Likelihood in Game-Theoretic Motion Planning

Makram Chahine, Roya Firoozi, Wei Xiao, Mac Schwager, Daniela Rus

Abstract: Game-theoretic motion planners are a potent solution for controlling systems of multiple highly interactive robots. Most existing game-theoretic planners unrealistically assume <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">a priori</i> objective function knowledge is available to all agents. To address this, we propose a fault-tolerant receding horizon game-theoretic motion planner that leverages inter-agent communication with intention hypothesis likelihood. Specifically, robots communicate their objective function which incorporates their intentions. A discrete Bayesian filter is designed to infer the objectives in real-time based on the discrepancy between observed trajectories and predicted solutions to non-cooperative games under available hypotheses. In simulation, we consider three safety-critical autonomous driving scenarios of overtaking, lane-merging and intersection crossing, to demonstrate our planner's ability to capitalize on alternative intention hypotheses to generate safe trajectories in the presence of faulty transmissions in the communication network.