Realizable Deployment of Limited-Knowledge Robotic Inspectors for Nuclear Verification

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***Abstract*— This extended abstract underscores the prospect and fundamental challenges of deploying robotic radiation detectors in nuclear safeguards and arms control applications, where safety and security concerns are of utmost importance. We propose a performant, minimal-knowledge approach which addresses information security constraints, with specific emphasis on the challenge of confirming the absence of undeclared radioactive sources. We demonstrate a random walk process which requires no *a priori* knowledge of the environment and certifies the absence or presence of sources without revealing any *a posteriori* information. We improve the convergence of this method by incorporating directional radiation measurements. The finite time and physical safety limitations may be addressed by limited, rather than minimal, knowledge approaches. The methods discussed illuminate a spectrum of limited-information contexts which have not yet been thoroughly explored in this application space.**

I. INTRODUCTION

Nuclear safeguards and arms control are cornerstones of the broader global security mission. Safeguards, which are measures to verify that nuclear facilities are not misused and nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses, require verification throughout the nuclear fuel cycle [1], [2]. Arms control, which is concerned with limiting arms competition and regulating arsenals, is made possible through declarations, data exchange, and inspections to verify compliance with agreed upon limits [3]–[5]. Future agreements will likely require new verification approaches that minimize the need for access to sites, such as storage or dismantlement facilities, and treaty accountable items, or avoid measurements of those altogether [7].

The introduction of robotics to the field of nuclear safeguards and treaty verification has the potential to be a paradigm shift in efficiency, effectiveness, and capability [8]–[11]. A "robotic inspector" enables remote inspections, wherein a human need not be present at the inspected site, thereby reducing safety and security concerns. Inspection tasks may include a variety of typically human-based measures, including verification of labels and seals, counting of objects, and, of principle interest here, radiation measurements. The eventual transition from human-in-the-loop to autonomous inspections will require a high level of confidence in the systems and processes [12]. Although robotic systems have been proposed, and in some cases deployed, for applications in nuclear disaster response and facility monitoring [13]–[15], there remain significant hurdles for deployment in nuclear safeguards and treaty verification. Here we highlight relevant considerations for implementing a robotic detector.

Certification and Authentication. Regulation and certification is a fundamental concept in this application space. Radiation equipment must be certified and authenticated [16]–[18]. Certification verifies that the system does what it's designed to do (and nothing more). Authentication requires verifying that the system provides genuine data.

Physical Safety. Safety verification is also crucial when considering the operation of a remote or autonomous system in environments potentially containing sensitive objects. Potential high-risk environments encountered in safeguards and arms control include navigating rows of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment and searching storage facilities with sensitive weapon components or delivery vehicles. In both scenarios, collisions could be catastrophic for environmental health and safety, potential damage to expensive and critical infrastructure, and diminished trust from the host party.

Privacy. A suitable solution for deploying robotic inspectors would require that no sensitive information – which may include images, dimensions, radiation measurements, etc. – is unnecessarily or inadvertently revealed. Reported methods in robotic radiation detection primarily perform source localization or mapping; as such, many of these techniques assume either full *a priori* knowledge of the search environment or, by consequence of the algorithmic design, reveal full knowledge of the environment configuration or its radiation field *a posteriori* [19]–[23]. We also note that current approaches do not consider the inverse problem of confirming the *absence* of sources. Toward addressing the aforementioned safety and security considerations, we focus on absence confirmation, in addition to source localization, to resolve security concerns [24].

II. PROBLEM DEFINITION

Assume that a physical, bounded environment is declared to contain no radioactive sources. The associated verification task is to actively explore the two-dimensional obstacle-filled space such that the robot certifies source absence (or presence, in the case of non-compliance). Ideal certification methods should allow for provable correctness (the robot will return the correct decision) and/or provable privacy (the robot's capacity to "leak" information is minimal).

The algorithm we propose takes inspiration from randomized, sampling-based motion planners [25], [26] and out-of-distribution detection [27], with an emphasis on scalar task-relevant detection as in [28]. When measurements are

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consistent with source absence, the robot moves according to a ("reference") random walk that explores the space; if the reading is consistent with source presence, it moves according to a different ("out-of-distribution") random walk. Detection of a shift is accomplished by Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) testing [29] of the composite (realized) action distribution. Further, because the actions depend only on the detected counts, the resulting distribution over actions for any source-free map is theoretically identical; such a property can help provide evidence that the algorithm *never* constructs a usable representation of the space during operation.

III. MINIMAL KNOWLEDGE BASELINE

Practically, we assume that a robot is equipped with the capacity to rotate and translate in a controllable manner (e.g., via encoders on a wheeled system), to detect imminent collisions in a non-destructive fashion, and to accurately acquire radiation measurements. Such a system can run Alg. 1 (see App. V-A), and derives the performance properties of the following lemma:

Lemma 1 (Minimal Knowledge Properties): Assume that Alg. 1 is run on a traversable map E of outer dimensions (L_x, L_y). In the discrete case, if E can be observably discretized to tolerance $\epsilon > 0$, then the expected coverage time, for any initial configuration, is bounded by $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{1}{\epsilon^4})$. Further, the false positive rate is no greater than p^*.

Proof: The claim follows by initially observing that Alg. 1 is a linear combination of uncorrelated random walks on a graph $\mathcal{G}_E(V, \mathcal{E})$ in two dimensions. Results from [30], [31] give an upper bound on expected coverage time of $2|V||\mathcal{E}|$. Because the connecting edges of a random walk are local, we can bound the number of edges by $|\mathcal{E}| \leq k|V|$, thereby giving a coverage bound of $2k|V|^2$. Noting that the discretization has $L_x L_y/\epsilon^2$ nodes completes the result. The calibration of the algorithm to p^* relies on controlling for the pre-selected number of tests n via the testing threshold of p^*/n. The resulting union bound is robust to correlation in the input data to the sequential KS tests. ■

The general extension of covering time results for two-dimensional random walks from discrete to continuous space is given by [32], meaning that the above result can generalize to models in the continuous setting. Verifying this property and the privacy characteristics of the minimal-information baseline is ongoing work.

IV. INCREASING INFORMATION

The addition of an omnidirectional radiation detector, such as [33], [34], enables a similar pseudo-random walk policy. In the absence of a prevailing source, the direction is random due to the Poisson-distributed counting statistics; if a source is present, the robot would more expeditiously switch to the "slowed down" policy. Fig 1 demonstrates the convergence of the proposed approach with and without the addition of directional information. Sample random walk trajectories are visualized in Fig. 2, as are the cumulative density functions (Fig. 3) corresponding to the same observed environments (see App. V-B).



Fig. 1. Evolution of floored KS test p-values for baseline (top) and directed (bottom) algorithms, averaged over 20 seeds, for source presence (red) and absence (black). In all settings, a log-significance below -6 served as the cutoff for detection. For both cases, source-absence is correctly identified. While both variants show steady convergence for the source-presence case, the directed algorithm demonstrates faster convergence due to its utilization of some additional information in the radiation sensing model.

As another possible extension, distribution testing may also be used to confirm that an environment remains unchanged by redefining the reference action distribution. This introduces the concept of template matching, wherein "absence" is reframed in terms of the absence of deviations, rather than the absence of absolute sources.

Further advancements may also be made by relaxing the constraints of no *a priori* or *a posteriori* knowledge of the search environment. While theoretically sound, a random walk process may still be impractical for time-efficient inspections. There is a benefit to including limited contextual knowledge to expedite the inspection process. Particle filtering, commonly used for radioactive source localization [35]–[38], can be adapted to absence confirmation by extending the range of admissible source intensities to zero. Sufficient coverage of the accessible environment is necessary to eliminate weak-source hypotheses with high confidence; unfortunately, efficient coverage algorithms typically require knowledge of the environment [39]–[41]. To improve the efficiency of absence confirmation with the particle filter while also minimizing requisite environment knowledge, LiDAR can be employed to rapidly eliminate nonzero-intensity particles in free space, since a radioactive source must be bound to a physical feature. This should enable more efficient exploration than a random walk by moving toward where potential sources may be located. LiDAR also enables simple collision avoidance, even without full map generation, providing a degree of safety which would otherwise be impossible without alternative proximity sensors or odometry.

V. APPENDIX

A. Minimal Knowledge Exposition

The minimal-knowledge random walk algorithm (without directional sensing) is presented below in the paradigm of continuous space. It can be directly modified to the discrete case by discretizing acceptable orientations (e.g., 4- or 8-connecting graphs) and step sizes.

Algorithm 1 Random walk absence confirmation.

Input: Background count rate B, outer dimensions x, y, confidence parameter p^*, run time T, test count n, threshold level z, constants $0 \leq c_L < c_U$, reference V_r
Initialize $\underline{p} = 1.0$, $x_0, y_0, \theta_0 \sim \mathcal{U}(x, y, 2\pi)$, $t = 1$, $V_e = \{\emptyset\}$
while $t \leq T$ **do**
  $N_t \sim h(x_t, y_t; E)$ {Measurement}
  $c \leftarrow c_L + (c_U - c_L)\mathbb{1}[N_t \leq B + z\sqrt{B}]$
  $ds, d\theta \sim \mathcal{U}(c, 2\pi)$ {Step Length, Rotation}
  Rotate by $d\theta$ rad. and move forward ds distance
  Append ds to memory V_e
  if $t \equiv 0 \pmod{T/n}$ **then**
    $\underline{p} = \min\{\underline{p}, \mathbf{KS}(V_e, V_r)\}$
  end if
  if $\underline{p} \leq p^*/n$ **then**
    return 1
  end if
end while
return 0

B. Preliminary Random Walk Demonstration



Fig. 2. Representative trajectories of the minimal-knowledge robotic radiation detector in obstacle-filled environments with and without a source. For each case, two variants of the proposed random walk algorithm are applied: the robot moves in a uniformly random direction for each step (above); the robot moves in the apparent direction provided by radiation sensor measurements (below). Both algorithms demonstrate qualitatively broad covering behavior in their respective absence cases (left).



Fig. 3. Cumulative density function over step lengths, averaged over 20 seeds, for source presence (red) and absence (black), corresponding to the environments tested in Fig. 1. The solid lines indicate the result for uniformly random sampled directions, whereas the robot used the apparent direction measured by the simulated radiation detector to yield the dotted lines. Note that the black dotted line is nearly identical to the solid black line, which is indicative of the equivalency of the random walk methods in a source-absence environment. The directed algorithm demonstrates faster convergence due to its utilization of some additional information in the sensing model.

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